

71-8035

BATH, C. Richard, 1937-  
THE BOLIVIAN MNR AND THE MEXICAN PRI:  
A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE  
POLITICAL SYSTEMS.

Tulane University, Ph.D., 1970  
Political Science, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© 1971

C. RICHARD BATH

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED






Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

THE BOLIVIAN MNR AND THE MEXICAN PRI:  
A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

A DISSERTATION  
SUBMITTED ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH DAY OF APRIL, 1970  
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
TULANE UNIVERSITY  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

  
C. RICHARD BATH

APPROVED:   
ROLAND H. EBEL, CHAIRMAN  
  
WARREN ROBERTS, JR.  
  
JAMES D. COCHRANE  
  
JOHN GILLESPIE  
  
FRANK L. KELLER

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend my sincere appreciation and gratitude to Professor Roland H. Ebel, Tulane University, for the care and devotion he has shown over the long duration of this dissertation. His concern and help have gone further than that normally demanded of an advisor. Professors Warren Roberts, James Cochrane, and John Gillespie were also most helpful in their suggestions and criticisms.

The number of Bolivians who contributed to the paper is too long to list here; my special thanks to all of them. Father Chuck Dahm of IBEAS was more than helpful, and it is hoped that his project will be of great service to all future scholars interested in Bolivia. Perhaps another special thanks should go to the Bolivian postal service which, in an unprecedented act, allowed the various chapters to safely reach the United States.

Finally, to Donia and Donita, mil gracias for enduring the bear.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	ii
Chapter	
I. A FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE BOLIVIAN MNR.....	1
Origins and Development of Functional Theory	
The Functional Theory of Gabriel Almond	
A Critique of Functional Theory	
A Functional Framework for Studying the Bolivian MNR	
II. THE MEXICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE PRI.....	53
Political Culture	
Political Socialization	
Political Recruitment	
The Interest Articulation Function	
The Interest Aggregation Function	
The Rule Making and Rule Application Functions	
The Rule Adjudication Function	
The Political Communication Function	
III. THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOLIVIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM.....	136
The Political Culture	
Political Socialization and Recruitment	
Interest Articulation	
Interest Aggregation	
Government Functions and Political Communication	
IV. THE POLITICAL CULTURE, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION, AND RECRUITMENT.....	200
The Political Culture	
The Political Socialization Function	
The Political Recruitment Function	
V. THE FUNCTION OF INTEREST ARTICULATION.....	282
The Structures of Interest Articulation	
Methods and Channels of Articulating Demands	
The Style of Interest Articulation	

VI.	THE FUNCTION OF INTEREST AGGREGATION.....	356
	The Function of Aggregation in the Bolivian Political System Under the MNR	
	The MNR as an Aggregating Structure	
	The Specific "Tasks" Performed by the MNR	
	Conclusion	
VII.	THE GOVERNMENTAL AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION FUNCTIONS...	414
	The Rule Making Function	
	The Rule Application and Enforcement Function	
	The Rule Adjudication Function	
	The Political Communication Function	
	Conclusion	
VIII.	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.....	463
	Comparison of the Mexican and Bolivian Political Cultures	
	Functional Comparison of the Mexican and Bolivian Systems	
	A Critique of Almond's Functional Theory	
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	485

## CHAPTER I

### A FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE BOLIVIAN MNR

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a general framework for the analysis of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) of Bolivia during the period from 1954 to 1964. The approach adopted is known as the functional approach to comparative politics.<sup>1</sup> In this chapter a brief review of functional theory in anthropology and sociology will introduce the general theory as well as the problems and difficulties involved in its usage. The next section will be an analysis of the specific functional approach developed by the political scientist Gabriel Almond. A general critique of functional theory and a specific criticism of Almond's approach will follow. The final section will develop and define the exact functional framework to be utilized in the paper.

#### A. Origins and Development of Functional Theory

Functionalism or functional theory as used in political science was borrowed from other disciplines.<sup>2</sup> A brief review of the works of the anthropologist, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, and the sociologists, Talcott

---

<sup>1</sup>The leading exponent of the functional approach to comparative politics is Gabriel Almond. His two best known works are: "Introduction," in Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Almond and J. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1960).

<sup>2</sup>The terms "functionalism," "functional theory," "functional analysis," and "functional approach," are often used indiscriminately. The writer has dropped the use of the term "functionalism" because it appears less precise than the others; also because the other terms

Parsons and Robert K. Merton, will provide the necessary background to assess the development of Almond's theory, as well as to introduce the reader to the basic assumptions and pitfalls of functional analysis.<sup>3</sup> However, before tracing these intellectual antecedents, it may prove rewarding to take a look at the various problems encountered in the use of the very word "function." As Robert K. Merton has pointed out, the word has several meanings which do little to give it the intellectual clarity appropriate for a theoretical framework.<sup>4</sup> Merton found five commonly used meanings for function. The first may refer to a popular gathering or festive occasion in common usage, e.g., the Mayor attended the party (function) at the country club. Function is also used by the economists to refer to occupation, as in the phrase "functional analysis of group." Merton suggests that this second meaning of the word function is used popularly as well as by political scientists when referring to activities assigned to incumbents of a social status or political position. From this usage we derive the word "functionary"

---

suggest only a theoretical framework rather than a comprehensive answer to all social and political problems.

For the interrelationship of "functionalism" in the social sciences, see Don Martindale, "Forward," in Martindale (ed.) Functionalism in the Social Sciences, The Annals of the American Political and Social Science Academy, Monograph No. 5 (February, 1965); also Robert K. Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions," in Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 46-8.

<sup>3</sup>A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, "On the Concept of Function in Social Science," in Structure and Function in Primitive Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 178-87; Talcott Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System," in Parsons, et. al., Theories of Society, Vol. I (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 30-79; also Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951); and Merton, op. cit.

<sup>4</sup>Merton, op. cit., pp. 20-1. The difficulty of employing the word "function" was brought home to the writer in the discussion of what the specific "tasks" performed by the MNR and the PRI were to be called. Normally they would be called "functions" but in the restricted context of this paper that was impossible.

or public official. He suggests that it would be best to exclude this meaning because it is largely limited to institutional roles. A fourth and more precise meaning of the word is in mathematics when referring to a variable in relation to one or more other variables in terms of which the original variable may be explained. The only difficulty with this meaning according to Merton is that social scientists have transferred and confused the term by intermingling it with "interdependence," "reciprocal relation," or "mutually dependent variations." The fifth concept of function is that which is central to functional analysis as practiced in sociology and social anthropology. Borrowing from the biological sciences, this concept of function sees it as "the vital or organic processes considered in the respects in which they contribute to the maintenance of the organism."<sup>5</sup> It is this latter usage of the word function which is the primary focus of this chapter and the paper.

One of the leading exponents of the functional approach in anthropology was A. R. Radcliffe-Brown who was most explicit in using models found in the biological sciences.<sup>6</sup> Since Radcliffe-Brown systematically and succinctly lays down the major tenets of functional theory as it has developed in the social sciences, a detailed examination of his theory appears appropriate. He openly states that the concept of function "applied to human societies is based on an analogy between social life and organic life." He notes that the comparison was prevalent throughout the nineteenth century in the field of sociology and first encountered systematic treatment in the work of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim.

---

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>6</sup>All references will be found in the article cited in footnote No. 3.



Durkheim defined the function of a social institution as the correspondence between it and the needs of the social organism. In order to avoid the teleological connotations of "needs," Radcliffe-Brown substitutes the term "necessary conditions for existence." He also stresses that any attempt to apply the concept of function in the social sciences involves the basic assumption that there are necessary conditions of existence for human societies and institutions.

In returning to the analogy between social and animal life, he notes that "an animal organism is an agglomeration of cells and interstitial fluids arranged in relation to one another not as an aggregate but as an integrated whole." It is a complex, integrated system and the system of relations by which the various units are brought together is the structure of the organism. The organism itself is not the structure; rather it is arranged in a structure, i.e., the organism has structure. Structure is then defined as a set of relations between entities. While the cells of an organism may be lost or changed, as long as the organism lives it preserves a certain continuity of structure. This process of structural continuity of the organism is called life. "The life-process consists of the activities and interactions of the constituent units of the organism, the cells, and the organs into which the cells are united." The word function is used in this case to refer to the life of the organism as the functioning of its structure. In considering any one aspect of the life process, e.g., respiration, digestion, etc., its function is the part it plays in, and the contribution it makes to, the life of the organism as a whole.

In carrying on with his analogy of social life with animal life, three sets of problems are presented: the first is that of morphology, that is the types of structures, their variations, and how they may be classified; the types of structures, their variations, and how they may be classified;

the second is that of physiology meaning how structures function and what is the nature of the life-process; and the third is the problem of evolution or development--how do new types of organisms come into existence? Each society has social structure; the essential units are human beings who are connected by a definite set of social relations into an integrated whole. The continuity of the social structure is not destroyed by changes in units since this continuity is maintained by the process of social life consisting of the activities and interactions of individual human beings. The social life of the community is defined as the functioning of the social structure. Thus according to Radcliffe-Brown, the concept of function involves "the notion of a structure consisting of a set of relations amongst unit entities, the continuity of the structure being maintained by a life-process made up of the activities of the constituent units." His definition of function is the correspondence between a structure and the necessary conditions for the existence of a social organism.

Radcliffe-Brown notes that there are two important points at which the comparison between animal and social organisms begins to break down. In the animal organism it is possible to distinguish the structure independent of the physiology. But there is no way to study the "anatomy" of a social structure; the entire social structure must be observed. While it may be possible to isolate certain demographic characteristics, these have little meaning unless the relations between various units are observed in their social activities. Social morphology cannot be separated from social physiology; the researcher must combine the two, thereby greatly complicating his task. The second major distinction between a social and animal organism is that whereas the latter can seldom change its structural type (without death), the former can and

does change its structure--as in the case of revolution. In order to avoid this problem, Radcliffe-Brown simply states that the function of a particular social usage is the contribution it makes to the total social life. This means that any social system retains a certain type of continuity or unity which he terms "functional unity." Functional unity is then defined as a "condition in which all parts of the social system work together with a sufficient degree of harmony or internal consistency, i.e., without producing persistent conflicts which can neither be resolved nor regulated." While the thesis of functional unity has been highly criticized, it should be noted that Radcliffe-Brown only called it an hypothesis.<sup>7</sup>

Equally important, he introduced another concept of functional theory which has received relatively little attention, namely the concept of dysfunction. The Greeks had a word for good order, social health, and harmony in the city-state and that word was eunomia. They called disorder, social ill-health, and lack of harmony dysnomia. Radcliffe-Brown believed that the concept of eunomia could be equated with that of functional unity or the harmonious working together of societal parts. He even suggested that objective criteria for evaluating the health of a society could be developed and therefore, the researcher would be able to determine functional and dysfunctional structures. The social scientist would also be able to study social change since any society with a measure of dysnomia would struggle to achieve eunomia especially in the case of the "native peoples subjected to the domination of the civilized nations"--remarkable foresight in

---

<sup>7</sup>See the various criticisms of Radcliffe-Brown mentioned in Martindale, op. cit., passim.

light of the application of functional theory to the study of the developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Despite the obvious teleological connotations of his remarks, the concept of dysfunction in Radcliffe-Brown's thesis has been ignored by subsequent advocates and critics of functional theory.<sup>8</sup>

In this short but concise statement of Radcliffe-Brown's theory are to be found most of the major tenets of functional theory as it has developed in the social sciences, including political science:

- 1) Every political system or social system must perform certain "functions" in order to exist. These functions, i.e., the necessary conditions for existence, may be discovered and analyzed by the observer.
- 2) There is, however, a need to look at the social (or political) system as a whole. The system is an organic functioning whole and isolation of the functional requisites will either be impossible or present a distorted picture of the system.
- 3) These functions are interrelated in a functional unity. A change in one or more of the functions will therefore produce changes in the other functions as well as for the entire system. There is thus an interdependence of the functions of the system.
- 4) Functions are performed by structures. These structures or sets of relations may vary from system to system but the essential factor to note is that the functions must be performed by structures. This means that comparison of the various structures which perform the functions is possible between and among different systems.
- 5) Although the goal of every system is an harmonious working together of all parts, functional unity, this does not prevent a certain degree of disharmony from being introduced. However, it is possible for the scientific observer to measure these dysfunctions against some yardstick of functional unity.

Following Radcliffe-Brown, two sociologists have elaborated on functional theory. Talcott Parsons has had the greatest influence on

---

<sup>8</sup>Merton, op. cit., fails to mention that Radcliffe-Brown discusses the concept of dysfunction.

Gabriel Almond and is perhaps the most important.<sup>9</sup> In the Parsonian scheme a system is a set of parts or subsystems which interact in such a slow fashion that they may be treated as constant. These interactions and transactions tend to persist and when they are conducive to the maintenance or reproduction of the system they are called functions. A social system must perform four basic functions; (1) pattern maintenance, (2) goal attainment, (3) adaptation, and (4) integration.<sup>10</sup> Pattern maintenance is essentially the study of the attitudes, values, and beliefs which support the system. Goal attainment refers to the need for every system to have necessary motivations to maintain the system. Although these goals may or may not be realizable, the question of adaptation refers to the ability of the system to adapt itself to resources in light of the sought-after goals. The final function, integration, refers to the capacity of the subsystems to contribute to the effective working of the whole system. Although these functions are not explicitly used by Almond, they are influential and Parsons has had some impact on the development of functional theory in political science.

Another sociologist who has had effect on the formulation of functional theory is Robert K. Merton.<sup>11</sup> Merton formulated his

---

<sup>9</sup>Parsons, op. cit.

<sup>10</sup>For an explanation--often needed due to verbal obscurity--of Parson's work, see Karl Deutsch, "Integration and the Social System: Implications of Functional Analysis," in Deutsch, et. al., The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1964), pp. 179-208; also Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 47-50; for a criticism of Parsons based on the lack of empirical evidence found in his work, see Ian Whitaker, "The Nature and Value of Functionalism in Sociology," in Martindale (ed.), op. cit., p. 134.

<sup>11</sup>Merton, op. cit.

functional approach through criticisms of functionalism as employed in anthropology.<sup>12</sup> He posits three major, interconnected postulates which have been prevalent in functional analysis: that of the functional unity of society, that of universal functionalism, and last, that of the "indisposability" of the structures. In attacking the Radcliffe-Brown assumption that the social system displays a tendency towards harmony, Merton states that the measure of functional unity is not beyond the reach of empirical test (it should be added that Radcliffe-Brown also stated this although it is seldom noted by his critics). Societies will not have all the same degree of integration in which every culturally standardized activity or belief is functional for that particular society. In fact social usages may be either functional or dysfunctional. Universal functionalism holds that every structure must fulfill a function. Merton notes that an item may have functions, but one cannot assume that such an item (or structure) must be functional. Structures have a net balance of functional consequences and therefore can perform positively or negatively in terms of their functions. Finally, Merton states that the common assumption that specific structures must perform certain functions is manifestly false. Other structures may perform a function and he states his thesis in the following rule: just as the same item (structure) may have multiple functions, so may function be diversely fulfilled by alternative items. The remainder of Merton's presentation is devoted to a discussion of manifest (observed) and latent (unobserved) functions; these functional categories have been utilized by political scientists less

---

<sup>12</sup> His attack was directed chiefly against Malinowski.

concerned with the development of functional theory per se.<sup>13</sup>

B. Functional Theory in Political Science: The Theory of Gabriel Almond

Functional analysis in political science has borrowed heavily from the preceding anthropologists and sociologists but it is often difficult to trace the direct influence of their work. It should be pointed out that several different levels of functional analysis have been employed in political science. In a perceptive article, William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman distinguish three different types of functionalism operating in political science: eclectic functionalism, empirical functionalism, and structural functionalism.<sup>14</sup> In eclectic functionalism function is treated as but one aspect of analysis and is not the focus of research; an example would be the study of American political parties at the level of what they actually do. This type is the lowest level of functional analysis and little systematic theory is applied. Empirical functionalism is based on the distinction between latent and manifest functions made by Merton. Here the major concern is with straightforward empirical statements of relationships and not with the functional requisites of the system, nor is the political system treated as a special system. Empirical functionalism is therefore not concerned with the entire political system but with isolated units treated without "any presumptions about the significance of these units for the system as a whole."<sup>15</sup> An outstanding example of this type of functional

---

<sup>13</sup>For instance, see L. Vincent Padgett, "Mexico's One-Party System: a Reevaluation," American Political Science Review, Vol. LI (December, 1957), pp. 995-1008.

<sup>14</sup>William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Functionalism in Political Science," in Martindale (ed.), op. cit., pp. 111-26.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

analysis was that employed by L. Vincent Padgett in his study of the Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).<sup>16</sup> Padgett investigated not only the overt structures and ideological aspects of the PRI but also the various socio-political "functions" performed by the party. The concern was not only with the manifest political activities of the PRI but also with the significant social and economic effects produced by the party. However, there was no attempt to construct functional requisites for the system nor to treat the system as a whole. The third and final type of functional analysis, structural functionalism, is derived primarily from Talcott Parsons and is actually an effort to provide a "consistent and integrated theory from which can be derived explanatory hypotheses relevant to all aspects of the political system."<sup>17</sup> The distinguishing characteristics of this type of approach are an emphasis on the whole political system as the unit of analysis, the positing of certain functional requisites for the system, and the demonstration of the functional interdependence of the structures within the system. Although there are many political scientists who can be classified in this third approach, the most consistent and probably the most developed is Gabriel Almond.<sup>18</sup>

In assessing the functional theory of Almond, it should be noted that his theory continues to expand and grow since he formulated it over ten years ago.<sup>19</sup> The most explicit and well-known statement of his

---

<sup>16</sup>Padgett, op. cit.

<sup>17</sup>Flanigan and Fogelman, op. cit., p. 115.

<sup>18</sup>Among this type Flanigan and Fogelman list Almond, David Apter, William Mitchell, and Leonard Binder.

<sup>19</sup>Among the more important articles and books in chronological order are: "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, Vol. XVIII, ]



theory was in the "Introduction" of The Politics of Developing Areas published in 1960. He has continued to expand this original statement in a series of articles that culminated in his book, co-authored with G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, published in 1966. In describing and criticizing his theory, it may prove advantageous to differentiate between the two major statements: that formulated in 1960 will be called Functional Theory I (FTI) and the later theory will be referred to as Functional Theory II (FTII). In the critique to follow it should be noted that FTII has not yet received, at this writing, the attention of the critics to the extent of FTI.

Although most political scientists are by now well aware of Almond's original statement, FTI, it might prove beneficial to give a brief review in order to have a better perspective for the remainder of this chapter.<sup>20</sup> Almond first announces that he is following the "behavioral approach" of political science which is trying to get away from traditional usage because of its lack of explicitness in using such words as office, powers, institutions, etc.<sup>21</sup> He suggests that a new vocabulary consisting of words used in other disciplines, such words as functions, roles, political culture, structures, etc., will

---

(August, 1956), pp. 391-409; "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," American Political Science Review, Vol. LII (March, 1958), pp. 270-82; "Introduction," in The Politics of Developing Areas, op. cit., pp. 1-64; "Political Systems and Political Change," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. VI (June, 1963), pp. 3-10; Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics, Vol. XVII (January, 1965) pp. 183-214; and Comparative Politics, op. cit.

<sup>20</sup>Unless otherwise noted all references are from the "Introduction" of The Politics of Developing Areas, hereafter cited as "Intro..."

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

13

allow a more rigorous application of scientific methods.<sup>22</sup> Although Almond appears to equate function with power and structure with institution, an explicit definition of either function or structure is not made. However, he later mentions "properties" of political systems and suggests that the functions he mentions must be performed in all political systems. From this it would be inferred that the political functions enumerated are "necessary conditions for existence" for a political system, and therefore he falls back on Radcliffe-Brown's assumption that a function is a prerequisite for the system to exist. He later discusses the function of political socialization as the "process of induction into the political system!"<sup>23</sup> Such a definition seems to refer to the Parsonian definition of function as a process. Functions thus appear to mean power, they are necessary for the system to exist; but they are also processes which can be discovered by scientific inquiry. The definition of function is not precise, and furthermore, no effort is made to define the concept of structure.

In order to analytically separate out the structures which perform functions in the political system, a definition of the political system is required. His definition of the political system is

...a political system is that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which perform the functions of integration and adaptation (both internally and vis-a-vis other societies) by means of the employment, or threat of employment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion.<sup>24</sup>

(It should be noted that although Almond employs the Parsonian functions of integration and adaptation in his definition of the political system, there is no further reference to these functions in his own theory.) The particular

---

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p.27.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

set of interactions which affect the use of physical compulsion are the subject matter of politics, and the proper concern of the political scientist should be the study of all the structures in the system which relate to the use of physical compulsion. The former are in some way related to the claims for the use of physical compulsion; the latter are in some way related to the actual legitimate physical compulsion.<sup>25</sup>

With this definition of the "political," Almond then moves on to define the concept of "system." A system refers to a particular set of interactions which differentiates the political from other systems. The properties which define the system are comprehensiveness, interdependence, and the existence of boundaries. Comprehensiveness includes all the interactions, both inputs and outputs, which effect the use of, or the threat of use of, physical coercion. The political scientist must study all the structures in a society in their political sense such as lineage, caste, riots, status, and so on. By interdependence he refers to the concept that a change in one subset of interactions produces change in all the other subsets. If, for example, a new party arises in the political system, the legislative, executive, electoral, and other subsystems will be effected by the change in the party subsystem. The concept of interdependence, in the words of Almond, "suggests the usefulness of thinking at the level of the system and its interdependence rather than in terms of discrete phenomena, or limited bilateral relationships occurring only within the formal-legal structure." The final property, the existence of boundaries, means that at some point the political system is differentiated from other systems---over the crucial question of the use of physical compulsion. The researcher will then be able to determine at what specific point a set of interactions is no longer

---

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

political and therefore unimportant to him. The boundary between the society and the polity will differ from system to system and "good boundary maintenance" means maintenance of the boundaries which are appropriate to the particular system, whether or not differentiated structures exist at the boundary.

Almond then establishes four universal properties of all political systems

- 1) All political systems have political structure. Structures may be compared according to the degree and form of structural specialization.
- 2) The same functions are performed in all political systems. These can be compared by the frequency of performance, the kinds of structures performing them, and the style of their performance.
- 3) All political structure is multifunctional. Systems can be compared according to the degree of specificity of function in structure.
- 4) All political systems are "mixed" in the cultural sense. This means that modern and primitive elements exist side by side but they differ in the dominance of one or another in the pattern of mixture.<sup>26</sup>

Of particular importance to this analysis is the "universality of functions." Structure is a concept of limited utility; it is like "comparative anatomy without physiology."<sup>27</sup> Functional questions must be asked; that is, the political scientist must ask himself how certain functions are performed and then find the structures which perform them. Furthermore, the functional categories employed will have to be adapted to the particular aspect of the political system with which one is concerned. He adds that the functional categories were developed for the purpose of comparing systems as wholes, and particularly for comparing modern Western systems with transitional and

---

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

traditional systems. In order to obtain his functional categories, Almond asked a series of questions about the most developed systems in the West. In looking at the functions of interest groups in Western systems, he was led to ask the question, "How are interests articulated in different political systems?" or the interest articulation function. As he states, "In other words we have derived our functional categories from the political systems in which structural specialization and functional differentiation have taken place to the greatest extent."<sup>28</sup> Based on this methodology, Almond derives the following functional categories:

A. Input Functions

- 1) Political socialization and recruitment
- 2) Interest articulation
- 3) Interest aggregation
- 4) Political communication

B. Output Functions

- 1) Rule-making
- 2) Rule-application and enforcement
- 3) Rule adjudication<sup>29</sup>

In remarking on the three output functions, Almond admits that they bear remarkable resemblance to the three traditional branches of government, but that the new "functions" rids them of any structural overtones. He also admits that it might reflect a bias of the current study in that political functions (inputs?) may be more important in the classification of non-Western political systems than the governmental functions.

One further refinement of Almond's approach is the adoption of Parson's pattern variables. As noted all political systems are "mixed" in the cultural sense, meaning that side by side within the same system may exist "modern" and "traditional" elements. The pattern variable adopted include manifest-

---

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p.22

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p.27

latent, specific-diffuse, universalistic-particularistic, instrumental-affective, and achievement-ascriptive, and in each case the first is regarded as a modern characteristic, the second as a traditional or primitive pattern.<sup>30</sup> Each may exist in all the subsystems of the political system but what is crucial and important is the mixture of the two. In the modern system the secondary structures are far more differentiated and significant; also the primary structures will tend to be modernized by the secondary structures. Thus not only the structures and functions of a political system can be compared; but using the pattern variables, the styles (or mixtures of modern and traditional elements) can be compared as well.

In further elaboration of the functional requisites of the political system, Almond defines socialization as "the process of induction into the political system," "Its end product is a set of attitudes--cognitions, value standards, and feelings--towards the political system." Further, political socialization means "that all political systems tend to perpetuate their cultures and structures through time, and they do this mainly by means of the socializing influences of the primary and secondary structures through which the young of the society pass in the process of maturation."<sup>31</sup> The structures which perform the political socialization function must be analyzed for the particular socialization patterns they maintain. These structures include the family, peer group, community, school-work group, media of communication, interest groups, and political parties. The existence of subcultures need investigation. One must also seek continuity and discontinuity in the socialization process.<sup>32</sup> Finally, the

---

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 22

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 27

<sup>32</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 69-72

pattern variables must also be applied to political socialization to determine the extent to which either modern or traditional elements dominate and how they combine. He calls the socialization process "basic to the whole field of political analysis" since it determines the pattern of cultures and subcultures within the system and sets the attitudes which determine the pattern of performances of the other functions. Another aspect of this function is political recruitment which simply means that every system must have means of recruiting members of the society into the specialized roles of political leadership.<sup>33</sup> Not only are the structures of recruitment of interest, but also the degree of structural differentiation and the autonomy of the roles are important. In developing areas one should have special interest in the multiplicity and interchangeability of roles in the political system.<sup>34</sup>

The function of interest articulation refers to the fact that "every political system has some way of articulating interests, claims, demands, for political action."<sup>35</sup> This function is crucial since the particular structures which perform the articulation of interests and their style of performance will determine the character of the boundary between the society and the polity. Four (in FTII Almond adds individuals to make five) types of structures are normally found performing the articulation: (1) institutional interest groups such as the army, bureaucracy, church, the legislature, etc., (2) non-associational interest groups including kinship and lineage, ethnic groups, religion, and status; (3) anomic interest groups referring to more or less spontaneous outbreaks such as riots and demonstrations; and (4) associational interest groups such as trade unions,

---

<sup>33</sup>"Intro...", op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>34</sup>"Almond and Powell," op. cit., pp. 48-9.

<sup>35</sup>"Intro...", op. cit., p. 35.

business organizations, civic groups, and what we in Western countries normally associate with interest groups, lobbies, or pressure groups.<sup>36</sup> Almond states that this latter type of interest articulation structure, when dominant, may indicate a "good" boundary maintenance between society and the polity, and therefore contribute to a maintenance of the subsystems. This good boundary maintenance is the result of the regulatory role associational groups play in processing articulated demands and directing them in an orderly manner through the rest of the system. In addition to these structures performing the interest articulation function, attention should also be given to the channels used to present demands.<sup>37</sup> What are the means used to present demands? Physical demonstrations and violence, personal connections, elite representation, or formal, institutional channels? Finally the student must study the style of interest articulation; that is, the degree to which demands are manifest or latent, specific or diffuse, general or particular, instrumental or affective, and so forth.

"Every political system has some way of aggregating the interests, claims, and demands which have been articulated by the interests of the polity."<sup>38</sup> This function of interest aggregation refers to the "more inclusive level of the combinatory process," i.e., there is a narrow distinction between articulation and aggregation; the former refers to specialized interests, the latter to the more inclusive.<sup>39</sup> Interest aggregation is also

---

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 80-6.

<sup>38</sup> "Intro...", op. cit., pp. 38-9.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pp. 39-40.



the function of converting demands into general policy alternatives.<sup>40</sup>  
As such it often occurs at many points in the political system and the functions of articulation, aggregation, and rule-making may overlap or occur simultaneously within the same structure. Although almost any structure may perform the aggregation function, Almond feels that in the modern system two structures, the bureaucracy and the political party, are most likely to perform the function. In the case of the former it is important that there be an outside center of power and that the bureaucracy not be "colonized" by interest groups in order for it to serve as an aggregative mechanism.<sup>41</sup> The political party is the more "modern" structure performing the aggregation function and Almond divided party systems into several types: (1) authoritarian, which may be either totalitarian or authoritarian--the latter has a lower rate of coercive social mobilization; (2) dominant non-authoritarian where one party tends to dominate the entire system; (3) competitive two-party systems; and (4) competitive multiparty systems which are in turn divided into two types: the working or Scandinavian, and the "immobilist."<sup>42</sup> On the basis of styles three general types of parties are to be found: the secular, bargaining, rational parties; absolute, value-oriented, Weltanschauung or ideological parties; and particularistic and traditional parties.<sup>43</sup> The first type is found in the Western, developed countries and may be either narrow- or broad-based. The second is characteristic of fascist or communist systems. Particularistic parties are those which are identified with a special ethnic, religious, or regional interest. Almond then notes that an analysis of the interest aggregation function must take into consideration the degree

---

<sup>40</sup> Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 98-99

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> "Intro...", op. cit., p. 40.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. p. 43.

of fragmentation of the function since it is at this point that the system is most likely to experience difficulties.<sup>44</sup>

The final input function discussed is the political communication function, and it means that all the other functions of the political system-- articulation, aggregation, socialization, etc.,---are performed by means of communication. He explains that at first glance it would appear that communication should not be considered as a separate function but as an aspect of the other functions. However, in the modern political system a differentiated media of communication has developed a vocational ethic of "neutral" or objective communication which makes it possible to observe communication as a separate function. In general the free, neutral media of communication are essential to democratic government because they "regulate the regulators" by making it possible for all structures to calculate and to act rationally and effectively. Once again the pattern variables may be applied to the communication function and comparison between a modern system and a traditional system made in four respects: (1) the homogeneity of political information; (2) the mobility of information; (3) the volume of information; and (4) the direction of flow of information.<sup>45</sup> The role played by different structures in the communication function requires analysis as does the degree of autonomy enjoyed by these structures.<sup>46</sup> Finally, the amount of information distortion in the system will need to be investigated.

Almond then continues in FTI to utilize the categories developed by

---

<sup>44</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 110-12.

<sup>45</sup>"Intro...", op. cit., p. 45.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>47</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 170.

Edward Shils to classify entire political systems, but they have little relationship to the previous functional analysis. In the final section he optimistically states that the present theory might lead to a comparison of all political systems in terms of their functions, structures, and styles. He does offer, however, a tentative rejoinder to his critics when he adds that "the set of political functions which we have proposed is most preliminary;" he was right in the sense that he has gone on to elaborate and extend the functional approach to comparative politics.<sup>48</sup>

In expanding his theory, Almond has been answering his many critics of FTI while at the same time attempting to fit the theory into a schema for political development or political modernization. What follows is the barest outline of the new Almond theory and the reader is urged to consult Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, for various points of clarification and illumination---full justice cannot be done to such a thought-provoking book in a few pages.<sup>49</sup> His definition of the political system remains essentially the same but three major changes are made in Almond's new theory: first, a more elaborate definition of political structure and political culture is given with the establishment of a separate system maintenance and adaption function; second, a division of the inputs and outputs of the system into either supports or demands is made; and third, the operation of the political system itself is divided into three different levels of functions.

Almond attempts to define the term "structure" in FTII by calling it the "observable activities which make up the political system." There is

---

<sup>48</sup>"Intro.," op. cit., p. 62.

<sup>49</sup>References for this section come from Almond and Powell, primarily from Chapter II, op. cit., pp. 16-41.

23  
a regularity of behavior and when applied to individuals this becomes a "role." A subsystem consists of related and interacting roles, and the political system is a set of interacting subsystems. The concept of political culture also plays a more important role in FTII.<sup>50</sup> In order to study a political system it is necessary to know its "underlying propensities" or "psychological dimensions." This consists "of attitudes, beliefs, values, and skills which are current in the entire population as well as those special propensities and patterns which may be found within separate parts of the population."<sup>51</sup> The observer not only has to study the actual behavior of the participants but also their subjective propensities--a project which will doubtless frighten both political scientists and psychologists. Two concepts are important in understanding political culture, political socialization and political secularization. The first refers to the process by which individuals receive their "propensities" and is familiar from FTI. The second term, "secularization," is introduced to help understand the developmental process of political systems and refers to the process whereby men become "increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action."<sup>52</sup> He is careful to note that neither structural differentiation nor cultural secularization should be regarded as inevitable trends in the developmental process; nor should any direction of development be inferred from the terms. In fact, "whatever the direction may

---

<sup>50</sup> Almond elaborated his theory of political culture in The Civic Culture, op. cit.

<sup>51</sup> Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p.24.

be in a given period of time and in a given political system, we may still speak of development in terms of the degree of differentiation and secularization."<sup>53</sup>

The political system includes the inputs from the environment or from the system itself, the conversion of these inputs, and the production of outputs into the environment. These outputs may in turn produce changes within the political system which result in new inputs. Almond is here adopting the system analysis, complete with feedback process, of David Easton.<sup>54</sup> He also adopts Easton's classification of inputs and outputs into two types, demands and supports; and this represents a basic change from FTI. The breakdown of these demands and supports into inputs and outputs is as follows:

#### A. Inputs

1. Demands
  - a) Demands for allocation of goods and services
  - b) Demands for the regulation of behavior
  - c) Demands for participation in the political system
  - d) Demands for communication and information such as affirmation of norms, policy intent of elite.
2. Supports
  - a) Material supports such as taxes or military service
  - b) Obedience to laws and regulations
  - c) Participation, such as voting
  - d) Attention to government communication, deference and respect for authority.

#### B. Outputs

1. Extraction
2. Regulation of behavior
3. Allocation of goods and services, opportunities, etc.
4. Symbolic outputs such as affirmation of values.

---

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>54</sup>David Easton, The Political System (New York: John Wiley and Son, 1953); also A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Son, 1965).

In defining demands, these generally effect the policies or goals of the system; supports provide the resources which allow a political system to regulate, extract, distribute or, in other words, to carry out its goals. The flow of inputs may come from three different sources: the domestic society, the political elites, or the international environment. The latter is apparently in answer to the criticism of FTI that it did not allow for demands emanating from outside the system. Frankly, this writer is somewhat in the dark as to where to place the input and output "sides" of the political system. Although it would appear that they should be considered as functions, especially when a statement is made that "in the political system, properly speaking, the inputs of demands and supports are converted into **extractive**, regulative, distributive, and symbolic outputs," Almond clearly starts out the section following the explanation of demands and supports with the following statement: "This discussion of the flows of inputs and outputs leads logically to a consideration of the functions of political systems."<sup>55</sup> It appears from this statement that inputs and outputs are something separate from the functions of the political system. If this is true, where exactly do they fit in the general schema of the "functional" approach to politics? The explanation would appear to be that Almond later incorporates the terminology and phrases of the inputs and outputs into his discussion of the capabilities functions. However, it would also appear that a more forthright explanation should have been made with regard to where exactly the inputs and outputs fit into the theory.

From this outline of the political system the next step is to describe the functions of the political system. In fact structures

---

<sup>55</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 27.

perform functions within systems and Almond goes so far as to say that this theory should be considered a "functional-system theory." The operation of the political system may be viewed at three different levels, and three different general categories of functions emerge: the system maintenance and adaptation functions, the conversion functions, and the capabilities functions. The conversion functions or processes are those which transform the inputs into outputs. There are six basic functions: interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication, rule-making, rule application and enforcement, and rule adjudication. The first three were adequately discussed in FTI and need not detain us. Considerably more attention is given to the three "governmental" functions. Every system has structures which make the rules for the system. The degree of centralization and the performance of these structures can be measured. Almond also suggests the use of Robert Dahl's patterns of policy agreement as a useful device for classifying the performance of the rule-making function.<sup>56</sup> Under the rule application and enforcement function the chief focus should be on the performance of the bureaucracy, and again, Almond uses another classification, this time by Merle Fainsid, as a guide to classification of patterns of rule application.<sup>57</sup> In the rule adjudication function the focus is again on the types of structures performing the function as well as on the degree of impartiality and autonomy these structures enjoy. It should be noted that the system maintenance and adaptation functions are separated from the conversion functions in FTII, although

---

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 141; also Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

<sup>57</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 146.

it can effect the internal efficiency of the system and condition the performance of the other functions. It would seem that this is an effort to associate the system maintenance and adaptation functions with the political culture, rather than with the dynamics of the political system in its day-to-day conversion processes.

It is the capabilities functions of the political system which adds a whole new dimension to Almond's functional approach. Apparently what he wishes to do is introduce the "ought" into the functional analysis of the political system. Actually it is an effort to measure the over-all performance of the political system in its environment using empirical indicators. Political scientists have traditionally been concerned with the "how?" and "who?" of politics and the new capabilities functions will enable them to ask and measure at least two other questions: "What impact does the political system have on the domestic and international environment?" and "What impact does society and the international environment have on the political system?"<sup>58</sup> Rather than simply borrowing the capabilities of the system from the sociologists--he specifically mentions Talcott Parsons--he suggests five categories which were derived from the earlier classification of inputs and outputs. These are: (1) extractive, (2) regulative, (3) distributive, (4) symbolic, and (5) responsive.<sup>59</sup> The extractive capability refers to the ability of the system to draw human and material resources from its environment; it can be measured by such factors as gross national product, amount of taxes paid, etc. The regulative capability refers to the control over individual and

---

<sup>58</sup>Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," op. cit., p. 196.

<sup>59</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 195-205.



group behavior by or through the political system. It can be measured by such factors as the number of laws existing, types and numbers of social deviancy, methods of enforcing the law, and so forth. The distributive capability is the allocation of goods, services, honors, and opportunities to groups and individuals within the system. Measurement of this function is relatively easy by such matters as budget allocation. The symbolic capability is the rate of effective symbol flow from the political system into the society and the international environment. It consists of various symbolic gestures by the elites, and is therefore difficult to measure. The responsive capability is the measurement of the government response to inputs. It tries to measure the degree to which outputs respond to demands emanating from the system. One must seek those groups and individuals who receive outputs in response to demands to measure the capability. These five capabilities are functional requisites for any political system, i.e., every political system must in some measure extract resources, regulate behavior, distribute values or materials, respond to demands, and communicate with other systems, both within and without its national or territorial boundaries.<sup>60</sup>

Before going on to consider the more dynamic "growth" aspects of Almond's theory, it might be appropriate to stop and establish his functional system. This system is static and the discussion to follow will amplify the development aspects of the theory. His functional categories are:

A. The Political System (The Political Culture)

1. The Function of System Maintenance and Adaptation
  - a) Political socialization
  - b) Political recruitment

---

<sup>60</sup> Almond, "A Developmental...", op. cit., p. 196.

2. The Conversion Functions of the System
  - a) Interest aggregation
  - b) Interest articulation
  - c) Rule-Making
  - d) Rule-application and enforcement
  - e) Rule adjudication
  - f) Political communication
  
3. The Capabilities Functions of the System
  - a) Extraction
  - b) Regulation
  - c) Distribution
  - d) Symbolic
  - e) Responsive

From this outline of the functions of the political system, Almond goes on to apply these categories to the "development" of political systems. First, there must be some significant change in the magnitude and content of the flow of inputs into the system from any of the three major sources: the domestic society, the international society, or within the political elite. "Development results when existing structure and culture of the political system is unable to cope with the problems or challenges which confronts it without further structural differentiation and cultural secularization."<sup>61</sup> The types of problems or challenges which confront the political system are: state building, nation building, participation, and distribution.<sup>62</sup> State building is the problem of penetration and integration, and problems arise in several areas; it normally refers to the creation of new structures and organizations by the political elite which are designed to "penetrate" the society in order to regulate behavior and obtain further resources from the society. In essence, the problem of state building is structural, meaning the construction of viable institutions and organizations for the system. On the other hand, nation building emphasizes the cultural aspects of

---

<sup>61</sup> Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 34.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. p. 35.

political development. The specific reference is the extent to which various subcultures within the political system are capable of shifting their allegiances and loyalties to the central political system. The problem of participation is related to the increase in the volume and intensity of the demands of various groups for a share of the decision-making process. The role of the political party will be particularly tested for its ability to aggregate demands for participation into institutional channels. Finally, the problem of distribution occurs when there are demands for a more rapid and widespread distribution of the resources of the system for different groups. Almond notes that these challenges or problems represent the sequence in which they have emerged in the political systems of Western Europe and the United States, but that "if we can relate the structural and cultural characteristics of political systems to the ways in which they have confronted and coped with these common system-development problems, we have taken the first steps in the direction of a theory of political growth..."<sup>63</sup>

In any analysis of political development five major factors must be considered: (1) the stability of the system will be heavily dependent on the types of problems it faces; this is especially true if the problems are cumulative and breakout simultaneously; (2) the resources the system can draw on to resolve the basic problems, (3) developments in other political systems or the international environment must also be taken into consideration; (4) the pattern of functioning of the system must be taken into regard; some are geared for change and adaptation, others are not; finally (5) the response of the political elites will to a great extent determine the success or failure of the system to respond and

---

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 37.

adapt to the problems and challenges.

One final consideration is necessary with respect to the measurement of political growth or development. Essentially the introduction of the capabilities functions in FTII is an attempt to meet the criticisms of FTI in which it was argued that the theory did not allow for dysfunctional analysis. Almond is attempting to allow for innovative flows-- or disruptive ones for that matter---into the system. (It should be noted that he calls these dysfunctions in one article and then drops the term in FTII.)<sup>64</sup> It is important that he tries to show that these innovative flows (or problems and challenges to the system) can be measured by five different means: (1) in quantitative terms using such measures as incremental or high magnitude increases in voting participation, or other phenomena; (2) in substance or content such as agrarian reform or nationalization of industries; (3) in intensity meaning whether they involve orderly procedures or violence and revolution; (4) in their source whether they come from the domestic or international society or the political elite; (5) in the number of kinds of dysfunctional inputs, i.e., does the system have to pursue domestic goals while fighting a war. Thus combining the four basic problems facing the political system, the five factors which must be considered in the analysis of political development, and the five methods which can be used to measure these challenges or problems, the aim of political research must be

- 1) to discover and compare capabilities profiles summarizing the flows of inputs and outputs between the political system and its domestic and international environments; 2) to discover and compare the structures and processes which convert these inputs and outputs; and 3) to discover and compare the recruitment and

---

<sup>64</sup>Almond, "A Developmental...", pp. 205-11. Almond apparently feels that the inclusion of the capabilities functions answers the criticism of the lack of dysfunctional analysis.

socialization processes which maintain these systems in equilibrium or enable them to adapt to environmental or self-initiated changes.<sup>65</sup>

The remainder of Almond's theory is devoted to a typology of entire political systems and also "towards a theory of political development." His typology of political systems is based on: the twin criteria of the degree of structural differentiation and cultural secularization and is superior to that developed in FTI---at least one is able to see the relationship between his typology and the preceding theory. As appears to be his custom, Almond ends his theory on an optimistic note, issuing an appeal to political scientists:

We are confronted here with the ultimate question of the Enlightenment. Can man employ reason to understand, shape, and develop his own institutions, particularly those concerned with power and coercion, to plan political development with the least human cost and with bearable risks? Can he find solutions to the state-building and nation-building problems of the developing areas which will not indefinitely prejudice or postpone the effective confrontation of their problems of participation and welfare? The modern political scientist can no longer afford to be the disillusioned child of the Enlightenment, but must become its sober trustee.<sup>66</sup>

### C. A Critique of Functional Theory

The purpose of this section is to criticize functionalism in general, and the specific functional theory of Almond in particular. This does not purport to be a comprehensive nor exhaustive examination of functional theory; the primary focus is to discover the best method of utilizing the functional approach in the study of the Bolivian MNR.<sup>67</sup>

---

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 203.

<sup>66</sup>Almond and Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 331-32.

<sup>67</sup>Among the critiques, by no means exhaustive, of functional theory consulted were the following: Harry C. Bredemeir, "The Methodology of Functionalism," *American Sociological Review*, Vol 20 (April, 1955), pp. 173-80; Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 24 (December, 1959), pp. 757-72; Robert A. Dowse, "A Functionalist's Logic," *World Politics*, Vol. XVIII (July, 1966).

What is proposed is to employ the general criticisms of functional analysis to the theory of Almond to derive a framework or research design for studying the Bolivian political system.

Criticisms of functional theory as an approach in the social sciences can be roughly divided into three different categories, although these overlap and it may be artificial to make such a division. These three types of criticism are ideological, logical, and methodological. The ideological criticism accuses functional theory of being teleological, of being inherently conservative, and of being culturally oriented towards the more developed systems. The logical criticism attacks functional theory for its lack of good logic, especially in establishing the functional requisites for the system without being able to prove that an activity is essential to the existence of the system. The methodology of functional analysis is also attacked for a general lack of rigorous definitions, for verbal obscurity, and for an emphasis on the abstract rather than empirically verifiable statements. Each of these criticisms will be examined with specific reference to the theory of Gabriel Almond.

One ideological criticism of functionalism can be dispensed with immediately. Some have argued that functional theory make a claim for being a "neutral" approach to the study of social systems and that it

---

pp. 607-22; Flanigan and Fogelman, op. cit., as well as the other articles dealing with functionalism in the special edition of the Annals, op. cit.; Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in Llewellyn Gross (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory (Evanston: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1959); Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration in Comparative Political Analysis (New York: D. Van Nostrand and Co., 1966); Irving Louis Horowitz, "Sociology and Politics: The Myth of Functionalism Revisited," Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (May, 1963), pp. 248-64; Arthur L. Kalleberg, "The Logic of Comparison: Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems," World Politics, Vol. XIX (October, 1966), pp. 69-82; Merton, op. cit.; and Almond reviews some criticisms in "A Developmental...", pp. 184-89, and Almond and Powell, pp. 12-15.

actually masks the political predilections of the researcher.<sup>68</sup> In other words functionalism, although theoretically value-free, is actually a method which either the conservative or the radical may use to support his own ideological positions. This writer would tend to agree with Merton when he says that "functional analysis may have no intrinsic ideological commitment itself, but can be infused with a wide range of values."<sup>69</sup> This means that the ideological values of the researcher may be injected into the study; and therefore, it becomes paramount to determine exactly what those values are. Almond does not specify his ideological commitments but it is not difficult to ascertain them. He is committed to political democracy, to the rational solution of political problems through negotiation and compromise, and believes that political development is possible. This writer makes no claim to a "neutral" or value-free approach; he has obvious commitments which should be stated. First and foremost, there is a feeling that the MNR had the opportunity to achieve success in the sense of bringing some stability to the Bolivian political system. There is a measure of disillusionment with the failure of the party to achieve this stability. Second, the writer was in Bolivia during the coup of 4 November, 1964, and suffered a great deal of frustration and disillusionment concerning some of the practices of the Movimientista regime. Prior to going to Bolivia, the writer believed that the MNR was a democratic party, launched on a crusade to improve the lot of the Bolivian masses, yet the actual practices of the government, the cynicism, the corruption, and the brutality, left him aghast at his previous ignorance and naïvete concerning the

---

<sup>68</sup>See Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 250-53, for a discussion of this problem.

<sup>69</sup>Merton, op. cit., p. 39.

reality of Bolivian politics. The writer also feels that the individual plays a much more important role in Bolivian politics than functional theory generally assigns the individual.<sup>70</sup> Although it is possible to view individuals as structures operating within the political system, this dehumanization of the personal element may lend a distorted picture of politics in Bolivia. Therefore, throughout the paper attention will often be focused on individuals, their actions and motivations, and this will be a departure from the normal functional approach. Finally, it should be noted that the writer has an admiration for the Mexican system which may not be justified. The use of the Mexican model to develop hypotheses is based on secondary sources and not personal observance; any distortion of the Mexican system will probably be favorable to that system.

Other ideological criticisms of functional analysis stem from several different bases. First, the application of biological parallels to the social system is held to be inappropriate. It is argued that functional theory attempts to use models adopted from biology, especially the organic theory of evolution, and apply them to society. These critics accuse the functionalists in social science of trying to derive an organic theory of the evolution of society and this immediately introduces a teleological interpretation since the society must be going somewhere, i.e., it must be developing. Often this criticism is not entirely correct since the critic lends his own interpretation of the supposed direction the system is to take. However, the criticism is somewhat justified because functionalists do tend to equate their theory with desired goals. This is implicit in Almond's FTI when he states that

---

<sup>70</sup>See Whitaker, op. cit., p. 143.



the functional requisites obtained, e.g., articulation, aggregation, etc., were derived from the most developed systems and hence the "developing systems" will be studied in terms of how they approximate the ideal--- implying that they should model themselves on the Western, more developed systems. Or as stated by Almond, "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny." This application of functionalism reverses the normal procedure of anthropology which starts with the primitive system, that is, the least developed system, and applies the theories and hypotheses derived to the more developed systems. While the functional theory of Almond appears to reverse the "normal" functional approach, there is nothing inherently wrong methodologically with using the most developed system as a research guide as long as no ethical or ideological comparisons are made. (It may, however, make it more difficult for the field researcher to determine structures, functions, and their performance due to the diffuseness and lack of differentiation of the less developed systems.) Almond is well aware of the problem in FTII and is careful to say that his theory of development does not necessarily mean in any one direction. Nonetheless, inherent in the theory is the implied suggestion that it would be "better" for the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to follow the models of the industrialized Western countries. But after all, they are given several models to choose from and none is erected as a necessarily desired goal.

In order to avoid this teleological criticism of functional theory, the present study will make no effort to adopt or utilize the various suggestions of Almond for measuring political development. Since the dynamic aspect of his theory starts with the capabilities functions assessed in the light of the problems and challenges faced by the political system, the capabilities functions will be dropped from the analysis.

Essentially a static picture of two political systems, the Mexican and Bolivian, will be drawn with no effort made to say they are developing, or that one system is more "mature" than the other. Although the exclusion of the capabilities functions will detract from an accurate analysis of both systems, the teleological criticism against functional analysis make the exclusion necessary.

The comparison of two static systems, however, introduces another basic ideological criticism of the functional approach; namely that it is inherently conservative, that it favors the status quo. It is argued that because of the emphasis placed on the system being in equilibrium, no allowance is made for change, for dysfunctions, for system destruction, etc. This particular criticism was leveled against FTI since nowhere in the theory is allowance made for dysfunctional analysis. Some argued that his theory was no more than a defense of the Anglo-American system and a desire to perpetuate it indefinitely. Almond acknowledged this criticism in FTII and developed his theory specifically to handle the problem of development and change. His treatment of the capabilities functions allows for dysfunctional analysis since the investigation of the demands and supports of the system revolves around the four criteria, nation-building, state-building, etc., and implies that a system will be dysfunctional if it does not perform these functions adequately. (Unfortunately there is no effort to relate these functions to the system maintenance and adaptation and conversion functions in terms of possible dysfunctional performance.) The exclusion of the capabilities functions from this paper offers an opportunity to criticize the ideological foundations for being a defense of the status quo. This is not, however, the case. One may analyze the status quo without necessarily defending it. One may quite correctly analyze a political system in time without saying that the

system is "good" or that it cannot change. Analytically we will investigate two political systems but no effort will be made to say that those systems are not in a process of change or that they are "correct" for their particular culture or system.

Another criticism arises from the organic approach common to functional analysis; it is both ideological and methodological. Basically this criticism is that entire political (or social) systems must be the unit of analysis because of the organic whole of the system, and, therefore, functional analysis is not very useful for specific, empirical investigations. This criticism is crucial to the present study because the object under investigation is not the entire Bolivian political system but the MNR. Perhaps it might be helpful to introduce a division within functional theory adopted by Ian Whitaker to distinguish and establish the limits of the present study.<sup>71</sup> Whitaker establishes two basic divisions within functionalism: the first is with respect to the scope of the study or perhaps the unit of study. Those who investigate whole societies are macrofunctionalists; those who limit themselves to specific groups are microfunctionalists. A second division is with regard to the aim of the study and here the divisions are between idiographic, referring to scholars interested in descriptive inquiry and nomothetic, meaning those interested in broader theoretical generalizations. The four may be combined to produce idiographic macro- or microfunctionalists and the same applies to the nomothetic. He includes Parsons, Levy, and Merton under the nomothetic macrofunctionalist heading and Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski under idiographic macrofunctionalist. It would appear that Almond could be placed with the former

---

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

group, nomothetic macrofunctionalists, since he is interested primarily in broad theoretical generalizations concerning the political system. But as will become apparent in the logical and methodological criticisms to follow, this type of approach presents a good many difficulties to the empirical researcher studying one problem. Since the object under investigation in the present paper is the MNR, this paper might be regarded as an idiographic microfunctionalist analysis meaning that a specific group is under investigation in terms of empirical evidence. Although the use of the Mexican model will offer a basis for comparison between the two systems, no effort will be made to broaden the conclusions to generalizations about all political systems.

However, the problem of limiting the study is extremely complicated because both the PRI and MNR dominated (the PRI still does) their respective systems. Both were, to use Almond's classification, "dominant non-authoritarian party systems," meaning that both penetrated virtually every aspect of the political system. Two approaches could have been used by the researcher. The first was an analysis of the party based on such mundane factors as organization, leadership, membership, and so forth, as utilized by Maurice Duverger or by John Martz in his study of Acción Democrática of Venezuela.<sup>72</sup> In fact this approach was used in an earlier abortive attempt to analyze the MNR.<sup>73</sup> The difficulty with this approach is that it totally failed to take into account the impact of the political culture, of such processes as political socialization, and the

---

<sup>72</sup>Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1954); John Martz, Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

<sup>73</sup>This is supposed to appear in the future under the title Mito y realidad del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Cochabamba: Los Amigos del Libro, n.d.).

over-all performance of the MNR within the theoretical framework. The second approach was suggested by Robert Merton: a middle-range approach based in an analysis of the latent and manifest functions performed by the MNR. Such a study was made by Padgett of the PRI and would have proved an excellent basis for comparison.<sup>74</sup> (In fact an effort will be made to compare these "functions" under the interest aggregation function.) The basic difficulty with this type of analysis is that, through no fault of this writer, the data was not available. Research for the present paper was undertaken from August, 1964 to February, 1965 and during this time the MNR was overthrown. What records may have been available rapidly disappeared, those who could have offered information either had escaped the country or refused to discuss aspects of the MNR regime---in fact, following the November golpe, it was difficult to encounter anyone who had any dealings with the party whatsoever. The ethereal nature of Latin American political parties makes it extremely difficult to investigate their everyday activities once they have disappeared from the scene. While a study similar to Padgett's may have been useful, it was impossible under the circumstances.

What was needed was an approach which could explain or at least provide an accurate assessment of the MNR within the political system. The functional theory of Almond seems to provide the necessary framework for such a study. He notes that using FTII it is possible to focus on one or more types of problems or configurations for comparison. Thus the focus of the present paper is the operation of the MNR and the PRI within their political systems.

The second general type of criticism, the logical, seems to revolve

---

<sup>74</sup>Padgett, op. cit.

around the basic question of determining the functional requisites of the system.<sup>75</sup> Almost every critic of functionalism argues that there is no precise method for establishing the functional requisites of any social system. Yet, they argue, the functionalist goes ahead on the assumption that the particular functional requisites he assigns to a system must be performed in order for the system to operate; then he even goes further and adds that every system must perform these functions. Thus the functionalist erects his own theory as a comprehensive explanation of all political or social systems. The problem is that this type of functionalist analysis rests its entire case on faulty logic. This can be shown by the following syllogism illustrating the circular argument:<sup>76</sup>

- I. 1) If system s is to be maintained adequately under conditions c, then requisite functions f1, f2, . . . must be performed.  
 2) System s is being adequately maintained  
 ∴ Requisite function f1, f2 . . . are being performed.
- II. 1) If requisite function f1, f2 . . . are being performed, this will be accomplished by existing structures.  
 2) Requisite functions f1, f2, . . . are being performed.
- 
- . Requisite functions are being performed by existing  
 . . structures.

It is clear that these are tautological arguments; in both syllogisms no effort is made to determine exactly what the functions are nor is there any reason to suppose that only one set of functions is requisite. In fact the theorist may set up any group of functional requisites he desires and then shop around for the structures which perform these functions. Almond commits this error in his functional theories although he

---

<sup>75</sup>The major logical criticisms of functionalism are Hempel, op. cit., and Kalleberg, op. cit.

<sup>76</sup>These syllogisms are taken from Flanigan and Fogelman, op. cit., p. 120.

is careful in both FTI and FTII to mention that his functional categories are by no means to be considered as exhaustive. Nevertheless, he does actually state that the capabilities functions are functional requisites and implies that the other functions are also required in any political system. Further, he comes dangerously close to specifying the structures which perform the functions, e.g., the identification of the interest aggregation function with Western political parties.

This criticism of functional analysis is crucial to this paper since the adoption of Almond's functional categories would require a justification in terms of operationalizing the concepts as well as an elaborate clarification of the functional requisites themselves. However, there is an easy way out of the difficulty. One need not state that these particular functions are "necessary conditions for existence" for the political system; one need not adopt functional theory as the explanatory theory of politics. All that is necessary is to state that the functions selected are used solely as analytical guides for research and that no effort is being made to make these particular functions requisites for the Bolivian, or any other, political system. "If the assumptions about the nature and development of societies are dropped, and functionalists turn their theory into a research guide, all such objections (ideological)--- and the logical ones as well---fall away."<sup>77</sup> We are simply utilizing the functional categories of Almond as analytical guides and will not attempt to use them as explanatory factors of how the Bolivian or any other political system should operate. Universal verities are not being stated; functional theory is only being used as a

---

<sup>77</sup>I. C. Jarvis, "Limits to Functionalism in Anthropology," in Martindale (ed.), Functionalism in the Social Sciences, op. cit., p. 27.

research guide.

The distinction is important and perhaps it would benefit to refer to the article by Flanigan and Fogelman mentioned earlier. The major distinction between empirical and theoretical functionalism is that the latter "is doing nothing less than (an effort) to provide a consistent and integrated theory from which can be derived explanatory hypotheses relevant to all aspects of a political system."<sup>78</sup> On the other hand, empirical functionalists are not concerned with the functional requisites of the system as a whole; instead they treat specific units of the system without "any presumptions about the significance of these units for the system as whole."<sup>79</sup> Perhaps even more important to this study is that functionalism is used only as a framework for analysis, and the empirical functionalist is more concerned with the validity of his data than the possibility of functional theory being able to explain the entirety of the political system. Empirical functionalism is the approach to be adopted in the present study; the concern is with relating empirical data from the Mexican and Bolivian political systems and not with an effort to "explain" the total system.

The third major criticism, methodological, leveled at functionalism stems from the ideological and logical errors, but functionalists are also accused of what might be termed minor (and some not so minor) mistakes in empirical statements and in establishing their methodology. Perhaps the major criticism of this type is that functional theory is such a "grand theory" that actual research is almost impossible. The same charge is often made against systems analysis and actually stems from the necessity to investigate the entire political system as a unit.

---

<sup>78</sup>Flanigan and Fogelman, op. cit., p. 115.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 114.



It is argued that empirical studies based on functional analysis are few and far between simply because the theory itself is so broad, so general, and so comprehensive that the researcher is awed by the amount of time and effort required and abandons functionalism as his research guide. This criticism is often made of Almond in relation to the study of the entire political system. However, studies have been made using one or another of Almond's functional categories, e.g., aggregation, articulation, etc. But there have been few such cross-national or cross-cultural studies.<sup>80</sup> In defense of both functional and systems analysis it may well be that the criticism should be directed at the current state of comparative politics rather than at either of the two theories. The comprehensiveness of the functional approach should by no means be underestimated, but on the other hand, both functional and systems analysis have to build on the empirical case studies of various functions within the system. Until very recently these case studies have been lacking for the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.<sup>81</sup> What functional theory has been able to accomplish is to stimulate further empirical research---the present effort is one---and even though it may be some time before we can analyze total systems individually or comparatively with any reliability, such studies will eventually mitigate against the charge of being "too grand" for actual research.

A much more serious methodological criticism of functional analysis is the failure to provide operational definitions of key concepts for

---

<sup>80</sup>One such study is that of Almond and Verba, op. cit.

<sup>81</sup>This is especially the case with Latin America. For the current abysmal state of research in Latin America, see Merle Kling, "The State of Research on Latin America: Political Science," in Peter G. Snow (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America: A Reader (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), pp. 1-36.

field research. Critics continually point out that the basic terms employed, especially the words "function," "structure," or "system," are not defined well enough to permit the researcher to use them---especially in a case study. This charge is particularly true with respect to Almond and deserves further comment because of the adoption of his functional categories for this paper. The basic question is: has Almond given definitions of his terms that are precise enough to operationalize in the field?

Perhaps the major difficulty is encountered with the definition of "political system." In both FTI and FTII the definition given suggests that the political system is differentiated from other systems by the use of "legitimate physical coercion." This includes not only the traditional structures associated with the study of politics such as the legislature, the executive, political parties, etc., but also any and all structures in their political aspects. Thus the family, kinship, caste, riots, subcultures, and so forth are part of the legitimate study of politics. Certainly no one would argue that this expansion will hurt political science since it opens up areas previously regarded as parts of other disciplines and allows for a more comprehensive and integrated study of the political system. The problem arises with the definition of legitimate physical coercion combined with the necessity of having boundaries for the political system. How does one determine these boundaries? Almond answers by reference to legitimate physical coercion. But frankly, this writer is not at all certain how to determine when an action or process becomes related to the use of the legitimate physical coercion. Almond's definition is not very precise for an empirical study. His use of the three properties of a political system of interdependence, comprehensiveness, and the existence of boundaries appears

to beg the question since an explicit definition of "political" is not given. The problem is acute for this paper since in the undifferentiated political system of post-revolutionary Bolivia it was extremely difficult to determine when an action was political and when it was not---in fact one could argue that in a revolutionary setting every action could be considered political, but this would, again, depend on the definition of political. Although the implication of this problem will be discussed in the next section, it would appear that the inadequate definition of "political system" is a justified complaint against the functional theory of Almond.

Another difficulty is encountered with the words "function" and "structure." Nowhere in his theory does Almond give a rigorous definition of these key concepts. His definition of function sometimes seems to mean "necessary conditions for survival" following Radcliffe-Brown (aggregation is an example); at other times it seems to refer to processes of the political system in the manner of Parsons (the socialization "process"). He does not separate the terms "function" and "structure" and the reader is often somewhat in the dark as to what is the difference. In FTII he defines structures as all "the observable activities which make up the political system." Structure implies there is some regularity to these activities. Functions on the other hand appear to refer to the actual operations of the political system. What is the difference between observable activities and operations? For instance, when an interest group articulates interests, is it a structure performing the function of articulation? Or is it simply functioning with regularity and therefore becomes a structure. The line between the two is very fine, but it does make it difficult to operationalize either term. In the definition of his other terms such as the functions

themselves, Almond seems to achieve more success, but the bedrock on which these functions lie that is, the definition of political system, structure and function is extremely weak; and one who purports to establish a general theory of politics should make a more systematic effort to provide more exact definitions of his key concepts.

There are other criticisms of Almond's theory; some of them are derived from his efforts to use functional analysis as a tool for measuring political "development" or "growth." Others state that his sub-classifications under each of the functional categories are in no way related to his over-all theory. One wonders exactly what the connection is between the types of interest groups, associational, anomic, etc., and the function of interest articulation. Similarly with his styles of aggregation and communication, the problem is not that these categories are not valid for research for they often provide useful insights into the political system; rather the difficulty is that the relationship of these sub-classifications to the entire functional theory is never made explicitly clear. Yet another criticism is that Almond confuses the reader and the researcher with the proliferation of his classifications--- as in the case of five capabilities functions analyzed in terms of four challenges by five methods. Certainly there is a vast expansion of types of classifications from FTI to FTII and one might well wonder if FTIII will continue this pattern ad infinitum. However, it should also be noted that in his effort to classify entire political systems Almond has made considerable improvement in FTII through the utilization of his classifications.

Despite these various criticisms of functional theory, the general functional approach appears to be a useful device for studying the political system. Although one must be careful to specify exactly the scope

of research; that is, the type of functionalism used, functional analysis does generate the necessary hypotheses and offer insights into the operations of the political system. Functional analysis cannot yet fulfill the role of a general explanation of politics at this moment when, after all, political science is still struggling to establish basic theories and methods. If after several years functionalism proves to be a blind alley with regard to a general theory of the polity, it will still have served as a useful guide for empirical investigations. It will therefore play a major role in the creation of a general theory should such a theory ever develop.

#### D. A Functional Framework for Studying the Bolivian MNR.

The approach to be used in this paper consists of three basic divisions: (1) the use of the system maintenance and adaptation and the conversion functions of Gabriel Almond as a theoretical framework. In addition, the political culture of both Mexico and Bolivia will be investigated. (2) The construction of a model using Mexico and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) to obtain various hypotheses related to the political system and the operation of the political party in it. (3) The application of the hypotheses derived from Mexico to the Bolivian situation to determine to what extent the systems were similar or dissimilar. Some clarifications of the approach are necessary.

First, it seems that most of the problems arising from the use of functional analysis stem from the use of theory as an explanatory element of the entire political system. In other words, functional theory is just that, theory. Yet the criticisms of functionalism are basically correct in attacking the logical and methodological inconsistencies of the functional approach. These inconsistencies present themselves in any whole-hearted effort to use the theory, but if a careful and

legitimate distinction is made between theory and framework it is quite permissible to use functional categories. There is a danger in this type of approach because it can lead to "sterile verbalism" or an endless listing of hypotheses without any central focus.<sup>82</sup> However, the comparison of the two systems should guard against this danger. The study will not only be an empirical one of the relationship between the Mexican and Bolivian political systems, but will also attempt a methodological critique of functional analysis in a field situation. The basic method will be the development of hypotheses from the Mexican system, the application of these hypotheses to the Bolivian system, and possible subsequent refinement of the hypotheses in light of assessment by functional analysis.

A further point of clarification is that this study is not one of the entire Bolivian and Mexican political systems. The primary focus is on the role of the two parties in their systems through the application of the functional categories. The major exception will be the analysis of the political culture which is not related solely to party activities. No effort will be made to compare whole political systems nor their state of "development." The basic difficulty is to keep the focus on the political parties, and here is immediately encountered the inadequate definition of political system given by Almond. How does one differentiate between political and other types of socialization? Perhaps one could use Almond's theory implicitly and then arbitrarily analyze those aspects of the political system which the observer regards as important. The above approach will be used in the present paper; the writer will simply determine what he regards as the most important factors under each of the functional categories applied, bearing in mind some of the more obvious

---

<sup>82</sup>Kalleberg, op. cit., p. 72.

classifications and assumptions of Almond. While this is somewhat less than scientific, there does not appear a scientific method to avoid arbitrary selection of these factors---at least until a more rigorous definition of the political system is forthcoming.

Another conceptual problem encountered in the present study is best summarized by the statement that "two objects being compared must already have been shown to be in the same class." Since the two "objects" in this case are the MNR and the PRI, it is imperative that it be shown that the two parties are similar. There are many similarities between the two: both dominated (it should be remembered that the PRI still dominates) their respective systems; both received more than 80% of the electoral vote; and both had complete control of the legislature, judiciary, and the bureaucracy. Within the context of Latin American politics other factors are equally if not more important: the President of both Republics was acknowledged as the leader of the party; party membership was regarded as a necessary criterion for obtaining government employment; and the press and communication systems were dominated by the government. Furthermore, both parties were responsible for carrying out economic and social revolutions. The interesting consideration is that the PRI has also apparently successfully carried out a political revolution whereas the MNR failed to construct such a new political system. In both countries the political parties were identified with and synonymous with their respective revolutions and governments in the minds of their citizens.

While the two political systems do have much in common, there is one problem that must be faced in comparing the PRI and MNR: this is the problem of the time relationship. The MNR ruled Bolivia from 1952 to 1964 and was in control, directly or indirectly, of the Bolivian

Revolution from the start. On the other hand, the PRI was first founded in 1928 as the Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario (PNR), some eighteen years after the Mexican Revolution began. In the interim period the existing structure was destroyed, the goals of the Revolution were established, and many regard the PRI less as an instrument for revolution than as a conscious effort to avoid further excesses of the Revolution. If this is the case it might appear logical to compare the two parties at some different time; for example, the MNR with the PRI during the 1930's. (One difficulty would be the lack of studies available for this period.) However, it is believed that a legitimate argument can be made for comparing the present PRI with the MNR. First, the history of the PRI, especially in the efforts to socialize the Mexican citizen into the ideology of the Revolution and in constructing an effective instrument for the aggregation of group interests, was essentially the same as that of the MNR. As structures both parties faced similar problems in the performance of their functions. Both were also instruments of a reformist elite interested in major structural changes for the system. While the parties may differ in their historical reasons for being, and also in their purpose of establishment, both were instruments for revolutionary changes, and both faced the same types of challenges and problems.

Another argument in favor of the comparison, in spite of the time relationship, is that the MNR had the model of the PRI to benefit from and use. The Mexican Revolution was the first of a series of social and economic revolutions of this century and the MNR could have profited from the model presented by Mexico. It could be argued that the telescoping of change through the instrument of the modern mass party as in Bolivia was based on the experiences of the earlier Mexican



example. Certainly the Movimientista leaders were aware of the Mexican example and they often compared themselves with it.<sup>83</sup>

To summarize, this paper will adopt the classifications of Gabriel Almond, political culture, political socialization, political recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, rule-making, rule application, rule adjudication, and political communication, as a basis for examining the Mexican political system. From that system will be derived hypotheses which will then be tested in the Bolivian political system. Chapter II will formulate the hypotheses relating to the Mexican political system. In Chapter III a review of the pre-1952 Bolivian political system will be given as a basis for comparison with the post-revolutionary system. The political culture, political socialization, and political recruitment of the Movimientista\* system will be discussed in Chapter IV. Chapter V will analyze the interest articulation function and the structures which performed that function. Chapter VI will discuss the function of interest aggregation. The three governmental functions, rule-making, rule application and enforcement, and rule adjudication, will be treated in Chapter VII. The political communication function will also be discussed in that chapter. The final chapter will summarize the empirical findings and then review the use of functional analysis in a field situation.

---

<sup>83</sup>In many of their speeches and writings the leaders of the MNR made references to the similarities between the Mexican and Bolivian revolutions. See Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Mensaje a la VIII Convención del MNR (La Paz: n.p., 1960), p. 12; also in a personal interview, Lima, Peru, July 5, 1969.

\*Throughout the paper the writer follows the practice of underlining Spanish terms when first used. Thereafter they are not underlined.

## CHAPTER II

### THE MEXICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE PRI

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the political system of Mexico and the role of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in that system. No effort will be made for a complete functional analysis of the Mexican system, rather the point will be to develop statements and relationships which can then be tested against the situation in Bolivia. In other words, the Mexican system will be used to construct a limited model which will then be tested in the Bolivian system.<sup>1</sup> Once again, the major focus of this chapter, as well as subsequent ones, will be upon the operation of the political party within the system rather than on the entire system. The following material will be divided into these parts: the political culture of Mexico, both pre- and post-revolutionary; the functions of political socialization and recruitment; the structures, styles, and patterns of interest articulation; the structures and patterns of interest aggregation, with special emphasis on the role of the PRI; the role of the President will be analyzed under rule making and rule application; and, finally, rule adjudication and

---

<sup>1</sup>The following analysis depended heavily on secondary sources. Used most often were these books: Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964); L. Vincent Padgett, The Mexican Political System (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1966); and Robert L. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

In a perceptive article which appeared after this chapter was written, Carolyn and Martin Needleman criticize the various approaches to the Mexican political system and point out some of the discrepancies with respect to the roles of the President, the PRI, and the bureaucracy. See Carolyn and Martin Needleman, "Who Rules Mexico?: A Critique of Some Current Views on the Mexican Political Process," Journal of Politics, Vol. 31 (November, 1969), pp. 1011-34.

political communication will be investigated.

#### A. Political Culture

The political culture, as the pattern of attitudes and orientations towards politics, conditions to a great extent the nature of the political system, and certainly effects the operation of political parties within the system. The primary focus here is the pattern of political attitudes and orientations which condition and effect the operation of the PRI within Mexico. It would seem wise to divide the study of Mexican political culture into two parts, pre- and post-revolutionary cultures. Although Mexico has had some sixty years to alter the political culture, no one would argue that traditional attitudes have been eliminated. The situation in Bolivia is even more important because the Bolivians have had less time to change the effects of the traditional culture. In addition, the study of the pre-revolutionary cultures in both countries should give a yardstick for measuring the cultural changes.

Using the Almond framework, the major focus of the study should incorporate the following points. First, there are several components of the individual orientation towards politics, referring to the methods by which these attitudes and orientations are obtained.<sup>2</sup> Specifically these are cognitive orientations, affective orientations, and evaluative orientations. The pattern of these three components will constitute the "propensities for political behavior" and are therefore important to the prediction of actual political behavior.<sup>3</sup> Second, the orientations

---

<sup>2</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1966), pp. 50-64; also Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1965).

<sup>3</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 51.

towards politics can then be classified in general patterns, the parochial, subject, and participant.<sup>4</sup> Almond and Verba classify the parochial as one who has little concept of the political system as a concept in itself and may not have any knowledge of the existence of the nation. The parochials also lack any knowledge of the structures of input and have a comparative absence of expectations concerning output from the government. Finally, they do not see themselves as participants in the system. The subjects are aware of the system as a general object and also relate to the output objects of the system but generally fail to relate to the input objects or to see themselves as participants. The participants relate to all four classifications, recognizing the system, relating to both input and output objects, and seeing themselves as actual participants. An analysis of political culture should attempt to determine the number and combination of these subcultural patterns within the system. In addition to these basic factors in the political culture, several attitudinal patterns are of particular interest. Among these patterns are the level of personal political competence found in different groups and levels, the general level of political trust in the society, whether the concept of politics is viewed as basically an harmonious or discordant process, the level of civility (courtesy) in political interaction, and the relation of the political culture to the capabilities, i.e., what is regarded as the proper role of the political system in the society.<sup>5</sup> Almond then classifies the degree of secularization in the political culture by utilizing the dichotomy between the ideological rigid

---

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 13-26.

<sup>5</sup>See Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 512-60.

culture and the pragmatic, bargaining culture.<sup>6</sup> Finally, the identification of various subcultures within the system should be investigated. Using the proceeding format as a guide, we can now review the Mexican pre- and post-revolutionary political cultures.

The historical development of Mexico prior to the Revolution of 1910 left many legacies effecting the political culture.<sup>7</sup> Among these were an authoritarian legacy derived from the pre-Conquest political structures of the Indians subsequently reinforced by the centralized governmental systems of the Colonial era as well as the caudillismo of the Republican period. The general orientation towards the political system of the Aztecs and the other Indian tribes in pre-Spanish Mexico was one of absolute subservience and obedience to the ruling class. There was little or no concept of democracy or popular participation in the system. The Colonial system did not substantially alter the basic pattern as the Spanish simply grafted their authoritarian structures onto those already existing. The one difference was that whereas the Indians had been exploited before in the interests of their own rulers and gods, now it was for foreign gods and a distant ruler. During the Republican period

---

<sup>6</sup>Due to some confusion on the part of this writer as to how to employ these categories in the study of the Mexican and Bolivian systems, they will not be used in the present work. The division seems to be one based on differences between developed systems, e.g., the United States and the Soviet Union, rather than one applicable to the less developed states.

<sup>7</sup>The following material was consulted for this section: Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, op. cit.; Howard Cline, The United States and Mexico (rev. ed.; New York: Atheneum, 1968); Daniel James, Mexico and the Americas (New York: Praeger, 1963); Padgett, The Mexican Political Systems, op. cit.; Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, op. cit.; and Robert L. Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," in Pye and Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, op. cit., pp. 330-405; Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960); and James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

there was no consensus over the fundamentals of the society and the political system vacillated between periodic liberal periods and demagogic generals. Throughout the period the ruling elite struggled for the rewards of office while the majority of the population felt an increasing alienation from a system which, with few exceptions, offered them little or nothing. One must bear in mind that during the entire history of Mexico prior to 1910, there was no such thing as a Mexico, rather there were "many Mexicos," which was a reflection of the lack of national integration and the subsequent existence of numerous subcultures with little physical or psychological identification with the nation.<sup>8</sup>

The political system was reinforced by a social system which, while not an absolutely rigid caste system (as witnessed by the Presidencies of Benito Juarez, an Indian, and Porfirio Díaz, a mestizo), was sufficiently closed so that there was little hope by the masses of moving up the social ladder or of participating and receiving benefits from either the economic or political systems. The vast majority of citizens lived as peones on the larger haciendas, and their lives revolved almost totally around the farm or the local community. These Indians were despised and feared by both the small elite and a larger mestizo group dominating the towns and much of the local trade. These local elites were for the most part mestizo and rested rather uncomfortably between the national elite and the mass of the population, but generally supported the existing system and were secure in their limited role in it. The national elite, ruling from Mexico City, was the only group which had any concept of Mexico as a nation; the rest focused their attention and allegiance on their local

---

<sup>8</sup>See Leslie Byrd Simpson, Many Mexicos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964).

community or immediate vicinity. The national elite generally rejected anything Mexican and looked either to the United States or to Europe for its model. This elite was not primarily interested in a restructuring of the Mexican system which would destroy their predominance. The very rejection of anything Mexican in itself symbolized the basic problem of the country; even the elite wanted to escape the reality of their own country.

Using the categories of Almond, Robert Scott estimates that pre-revolutionary Mexico included approximately 90% parochials, those who had no sense of relatedness to the political system; about 9% who could be regarded as subjects relating to the system as a whole and the output objects, and the remaining 1% who were the active participants in the system.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, the closing-off of the elite had resulted in a general feeling that it was impossible to change the existing order of things without a dramatic restructuring of the entire polity.<sup>10</sup> If one adds the strong sense of localismo which virtually prevented the emergence of any concept of Mexican nationalism, together with the physical isolation of much of the country due to lack of transportation and communication facilities, the picture is one of a society rigidly controlled and generally apathetic to the national elite. Since pre-revolutionary Mexico was overwhelmingly rural, the system of rural caciques, together with the operations of the rural police of the Díaz regime, the rurales, further alienated the masses and reinforced their allegiance to locality. In terms of the capabilities of the system,

---

<sup>9</sup>Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," op. cit., p. 335.

<sup>10</sup>Padgett, op. cit., p. 21; and Howard F. Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

it seems safe to assume that the vast majority, when relating to the national system at all, regarded it as a punitive instrument of the few and therefore had little faith in it and gave it less support.

In terms of individual orientations to the political system, the general alienation of the masses formed a syndrome of behavioral patterns still persisting in degrees in contemporary Mexico.<sup>11</sup> First, there was a "stoic fatalism" on the part of the rural masses. In general they simply accepted their plight and expected little change. This was, in turn, reinforced by the authoritarian religious, social, and political structures. The resignation to one's fate had been accepted because more often than not, when changes were made, the peon found himself the victim of change. This was especially the case when improvements in the land were made by the peasant and then he found himself deprived of the land because it offered a more lucrative prize to the hacendado. To a certain extent these feelings have persisted, and one of the major handicaps to improved agricultural methods has been the fear on the part of the peasant that his lands might be seized for the improvements he has made.<sup>12</sup>

Largely as a result of the centuries of oppression, humiliation, and ignorance, there was a lack of personal security, a lack of self-esteem, in short an identity crisis.<sup>13</sup> The masses were subject to the arbitrary

---

<sup>11</sup>Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," op. cit., pp. 337-9.

<sup>12</sup>See, for instance, Robert Redfield, A Village that Chose Progress: Chan Kom Revisited(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950); and Oscar Lewis, Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlán Restudied(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), for attitudes of resistance to the introduction of new farming methods.

<sup>13</sup>Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," op. cit., p. 338; Also Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). Scott borrows heavily from Pye for many of his concepts.



whims of their local bosses or to sudden depredations from the rurales; and as a result, they tended to lack a sense of personal security or a sense of relatedness to anything outside their immediate family. The sense of anomie growing from the feelings of personal insecurity reinforced the adherence to local structures and values, and effectively hampered what few efforts were made to build a national political system. When the government did touch the lives of the rural masses, as Scott points out, they often regarded it as simply the act of the local hacendado or cacique. The lack of personal security manifested itself in an ambivalent behavior pattern in which the peon alternatively acted in a virulent form of self-assertion called machismo, or an over emphasized focus on the male sexual prowess, dominance of others, and physical violence, and then resorted back into periods of apathy and resignation to life.<sup>14</sup>

The pre-revolutionary political culture of Mexico, then, can be classified as one in which the vast majority of the citizens were parochials and had little or no opportunity to participate in or receive benefits from the government. An elite at the top governed through an authoritarian structure which placed great emphasis on controlling the localities, thus increasing the alienation of the masses from the national system. With the possible exception of the few científicos within the elite, the majority of the population was related to the government through affective orientations; there was little cognitive or evaluative orientation involved. Generally it was a matter of simple emotional response to the political system and its representatives. Among the citizens there was a lack of personal political competence, either in terms of

---

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

understanding what the government was doing or in terms of actively participating in and supporting the system. The level of political trust in the society was very low, especially in view of the rurales and the traditional violent methods of Mexican politics. In terms of the concept of politics as a discordant or harmonious process, it seems safe to assume that the majority regarded it as a discordant process; that is, if they regarded it as a "process" at all. The highly personal relationships between the rural masses and their local bosses would seem to indicate that to them the government was a person rather than any sort of "process." Given this general picture, it appears equally obvious that the level of civility in political interaction was extremely low; if courtesy existed it was at the top, and even there the whims of Díaz made courtesy a necessity rather than a reaction learned in basic human relations. As stated previously, there existed no consensus on the role of the political system, although one would probably be correct in stating that the government was generally regarded, by the masses as well as the elite, as an instrument for the betterment of those who controlled it. The political culture was neither ideologically rigid, nor bargaining. The general lack of ideology is pointed out by the fact that Madero's call of "no reelection" was the only ideological cry heard in the early days of the Revolution.<sup>15</sup> The sole exception was the Magón brothers immediately prior to the Revolution; but at least until the emergence of Zapata, ideology was not a major factor in the political system or in the call for reform.

With regard to the immediate causes of the Mexican Revolution, it

---

<sup>15</sup>For an appreciative interpretation of Madero's policies, see Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952); also Wilkie, op. cit., p. 47.

should be noted that there was no single cause or factor generating the revolutionary movement. It developed, instead, out of a general malaise throughout the entire country. (This contrast with the case of Bolivia where the shock suffered in the Chaco War led to the galvanization of the revolutionary forces.) The Porfirato was a time of considerable economic growth, but that growth was controlled by a smaller number of Mexicans and foreigners. Not only did the poverty of the rural masses increase, but the economic changes also created an urban proletariat living at the bare subsistence level. There was an increasing stagnation of the entire system. The decision of Díaz in 1910 to seek the Presidency precipitated the Revolution, at first no more than a simple effort to enforce the principle of no-reelection. Soon, however, it broke into a full social and economic revolution which many regard as still in progress.

The changes in the post-revolutionary political culture have not eliminated the effects of the past, and many of the cultural traits previously mentioned are still to be found in Mexico, although perhaps in lesser degrees. As Scott comments

An obvious surge towards ordered, rational, and systematic politics is counterbalanced by what appears to be a continuation of nearly endemic resort to violence, mistrust of other people, lack of self-assurance, and seeking after warmth in interpersonal relations, all reinforced by strong feelings of rejection of authority in any form.<sup>16</sup>

And as Almond and Verba point out, this is due to the historical pattern established before and during the Revolution.<sup>17</sup> What is important to

---

<sup>16</sup>Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," Op. cit., p 344. The following section is heavily indebted to Scott for his analysis of the Mexican political culture.

<sup>17</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 310.

this analysis is the changes which have occurred and how they affect the current operation of the political system.

First, and perhaps most important, the Mexican pattern has changed from an overwhelming parochial culture to a dominant subject one. Scott gives the current percentages of parochials, subjects, and participants as 25%, 65% and 10% respectively.<sup>18</sup> This is a remarkable change from the pre-1910 culture in which approximately 90% were parochials and 1% active participants. The dominance of a subject political culture means that the majority of the citizens are well aware of the output objects, that is government policies, while they still do not relate well to the input aspects of the political system and are not active participants. Most Mexicans manifest a strong support for the system as a whole, especially for the ideals of the Revolution and for the office of the Presidency while at the same time they also manifest a high degree of cynicism towards the actual operations of the system and continue to lack the political skill and experience to participate in that system.<sup>19</sup> One of the striking examples found throughout the Civic Culture is the high degree of support for the system that all Mexicans apparently feel, while at the same time they have no sense of relation to the structures which lead into the decision-making apparatus. What this dichotomy appears to indicate is a political cultural disjunction arising from the discrepancy between professed political norms and actual political practice in the Mexican system. It also indicates that in gaining the support of the populace, the Mexican system discloses a higher rate of

---

<sup>18</sup>Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," op. cit., p. 345.

<sup>19</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit., passim.

adjustment in affective orientations than in cognitive or evaluative orientations. Two factors seem important in explaining this seemingly paradoxical political behavior: first, a discrepancy between the primary and secondary socializing agents; and, second, a general personal identity crisis which pervades much of the society.

In Mexico the primary socializing agents, the family, the school, community, peer groups, etc., do not relate well to the secondary structures such as interest groups and political parties. The principle problem is the disharmony introduced between professed norms of the secondary agents and the actual behavioral practices introduced in the primary agents. Without the emergence of a consensus on norms and behavior between the two sets of structures, it is extremely difficult for a sense of stable personal identity to emerge. Perhaps the major factor in this divergence is that between the professed ideals of democracy and equalitarianism in the secondary structures and the strongly authoritarian family structure. The Mexican family places a high degree of emphasis on authoritarianism with the father occupying the position of patriarch and master of the household. Yet the exercise of authority in the family is arbitrary and outside the norms expressed in a democratic society. This arbitrary exercise of authority seems to lead to an authoritarian syndrome developed in the family and reinforced throughout the entire socialization process. Authority is both feared and desired, i.e., Mexicans resent authority when in a subordinate role but at the same time exercise it strongly when in a

---

<sup>20</sup>See Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sanchez (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961); also Redfield, Op. cit.

21  
superordinate role. These behavioral traits developed in the family, and maintained throughout the primary socialization process, probably lead to certain behavioral patterns and cultural orientations toward the political system, most notably rebelliousness and resentment towards political leaders and a desire to avoid any authoritarian situation. Thus, for instance, the average Mexican might express the ideal of working through interest groups or through local government structures for political ends but in practice he might avoid doing so in order to escape any authoritarian position. In another sense, the avoidance of authority leads the average Mexican to overestimate his political competence since he accepts the norms of democratic behavior yet refuses to actually participate in a situation which might lead to the exercise of authority.<sup>22</sup>

At the same time the personal identity crisis of the individual may be augmented because he cannot discover any behavioral patterns of political involvement. He knows that Mexico has democratic and equalitarian ideals but he can find no way to exercise these ideals in his own personal life. This in turn may lead to further behavioral patterns of interest in determining political cultural traits in the Mexican system. Perhaps most important is that the individual cannot learn to subordinate his personal search for identity and security to the collective good. He is preoccupied with his own problems and cannot understand why he should try to solve them through cooperative action

---

<sup>21</sup>Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," op. cit., p. 367.

<sup>22</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 311.

with others. In part due to this identity crisis, the Mexican finds it difficult to understand the notion that phenomena are related or that causal relationships can occur.<sup>23</sup> Thus when an individual does achieve success it is regarded as luck or some other factor outside his personal ability, rather than hard work and perseverance and this applies equally to the community, whether nation or village. (One bit of evidence found throughout Latin America indicating this attitude is the almost fanatical devotion to the lottery. Most Latin Americans would rather strike it rich in the lotería than save their money over a long period of time.) This personal-centered approach has been virtually institutionalized in Mexico, as well as much of Latin America, in the concept of dignidad, a concept of personal dignity and sanctity which minimizes individual responsibility toward the community and maximizes individual self-realization.<sup>24</sup> Thus, "nearly everything in the early socialization process hinders development of a sense of collective responsibility toward the polity at the expense of individual self-fulfillment."<sup>25</sup> One must add that this type of attitude would make it somewhat difficult to relate to the input structures when attempting to present demands to the political system. As a result of this identity crisis, the average Mexican is likely to have a weak ego-image that acts as a deterrent to collective action and the individual finds it easier to identify with the President

---

<sup>23</sup> Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," op. cit., p. 367.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

of the Republic as a strong ego-figure.

However, while the development of political norms of behavior and the socializing structures for the average Mexican may lead to a general alienation from the system, the political elite, in general, suffers no such alienation or identity crisis. Primarily this is because the rather homogenous elite has agreed on the basic social economic, and political norms of the system and they operate within these norms. Therefore the Mexican political style at the national level is highly pragmatic, not ideological, and the elite operate within the system by bargaining and compromising. They also are related to the political system primarily in cognitive and evaluative orientations rather than the more emotional pattern of the masses. At the personal level, however, the majority of Mexicans remain suspicious, uncooperative, and generally alienated from the system and the elite. These attitudes were also present in 1928 when it became obvious to the elite that an instrument was necessary to control the various factions whose fighting was threatening the system as well as to provide some means by which the masses could relate to the Revolution and the political system. As a result the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR), the forerunner of the PRI, was founded. Since that time there has been a gradual shift of power away from the revolutionary party to the office of the Presidency and this has helped to supply the necessary strong-ego figure to the masses. The result is that the Mexican system now has a measure of political stability because the structures of the

---

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 357.



political system have been able to adjust and change to the cultural patterns of Mexicans. As Scott aptly states

Mexico's political system provides a high degree of stability because it neatly balances a need for authority with a minimum of direct control over the individual, taking into account the as yet unresolved inconsistencies in the political culture mix of the majority of nationally aware citizens. Unassimilated parochial tendencies are mitigated by the government's minimal demands made upon the citizens and by providing a mechanism (the revolutionary party) and a symbol (the President of the Republic) to relate the diffuse traditional approach to politics with the differentiated agencies of modern government. At the same time, the nature of individual and group relations with the operating political structures minimizes the necessity of adjusting an essentially insecure and suspicious personality to the demands of collective cooperation.<sup>27</sup>

To summarize the Mexican political culture: from a basically parochial culture with a high degree of alienation and suspicion of the political system, Mexico has moved to a predominately subject political culture, where at least the citizens are aware of the nation and the government even if they seldom participate actively in it. Yet basic patterns of distrust and alienation have continued to manifest themselves. The system now seems to rest on the ability of the political elite to engender system support through the revolutionary party as a mechanism for political demands while the President operates as a symbol of the system and offers a strong figure with whom the masses can identify. It seems irrelevant to this particular discussion whether the President or the party actually serves as the mechanism for aggregating demands since from the viewpoint of political culture the important aspect is the general change from alienation to

---

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 389.

in system support has been an important factor in the reduction of sub-cultural affiliations within the system. The following statements or questions would seem the most important in the subsequent discussion of political culture in Bolivia:

- 1) Starting with a parochial system marked by a high degree of alienation and with the existence of numerous subcultures, Mexico has moved to a basically subject political culture with a reduction of both alienation and subcultural affiliation. Along with this has developed a degree of pride, identification, and knowledge of their own system by many Mexicans. The questions is: what type of political culture existed in pre-1952 Bolivia? Has the political culture undergone similar changes found in Mexico? If so, in what way? Has there been a reduction in alienation and cultural fragmentation?
- 2) In Mexico, because of the inability of the political system to develop political behavior patterns in line with the professed norms of the system, there has not developed an harmonious socialization process between the primary and secondary socialization agents. Although this is but one of the cleavages found in the society, it is important, for it has led to a sense of personal insecurity, and identity crisis, which manifests itself in distinctive behavioral patterns, most notably the authoritarian syndrome. Has there been a similar development in Bolivia? Why or why not? Do the primary socializing agents relate to the secondary? Are the identity crisis and the authoritarian personality found in Bolivia?

3)The Mexicans have successfully evolved a system which satisfied the present cultural pattern in Mexico. This pattern is composed of a political party permitting the entrance of demands into the system while providing a symbol of national unity through the office of the Presidency. This helps to alleviate the identity crisis by giving the Mexican an authority figure to identify with and support. Did a similar development take place in Bolivia? If an identity crisis existed, did the MNR provide the structures and symbols to overcome the basic insecurities of the citizens?

## B. Political Socialization

Political socialization is defined as the process by which political cultures are maintained and changed; through this process the individual receives his orientation to the political system as well as the knowledge and skills to operate within the system.<sup>28</sup>

In the study of political socialization, the most important factors appear to be the events and experiences which effect the political culture or the individual (either and/or regular experiences such as family life, or specific events such as wars and depressions); the manner in which attitudes and values are transmitted; the various agents of socialization such as the family, school, community, and other structures; and, finally, the continuity and discontinuity in the socialization process. Each of these factors will be considered with regard to Mexico.

The experience which clearly stands out in Mexico is, of course, the Mexican Revolution. There are two important considerations with respect to this event: the first is the effect it had on the elite in terms of subsequent behavior, and the second is the development of the ideology of the Revolution. It is difficult to investigate the exact impact of the Revolution upon the elite, but some suggestions and conclusions are in order. A great many of the present ruling elite in Mexico went through the early days of the Revolution and saw something of the violence and chaos it created. (This is not true of newer leaders appearing now in Mexico but it is yet too early to forecast what

---

<sup>28</sup> Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 64.

effect the newer leaders will have on the system.) These older leaders fought against Díaz, against Victoriano Huerta, saw the appeals of Villa and Zapata to the rural masses, faced the continuing crisis of the 1920's with its independent caudillos and church opposition and, finally, worked together to create the present Mexican system. Although one can only speculate, it would seem that this common background would give them not only a sense of participation in a movement to create a greater Mexico, but it would also give them greater appreciation of the dangers of a lack of stability and unanimity within the elite. From this one would assume that they have an interest in maintaining the system and that they would also have a fear of returning to the violence associated with the Revolutionary days. What seems important, especially in comparison with Bolivia is that the Mexican elite is a group "forged under fire" and dedicated to the maintenance of the present system. The comparison with the Bolivian elite will be made in a later chapter.

The second major factor emerging from the Revolution was the development of the revolutionary ideology. One of the difficulties facing pre-revolutionary Mexico, and a difficulty facing many of the countries of the world today, was the fact that there was no consensus on political fundamentals, no agreement on the norms of the society and the polity. Yet now, Mexico does have a group of values shared at least by a majority of the elite which can be called collectively the ideology of the Revolution, or the Revolutionary Creed.<sup>29</sup> However,

---

<sup>29</sup> Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 7-18, employs the term "Revolutionary Creed;" Padgett, op. cit., pp. 8-46, speaks of "legitimized"

it should be stressed at the outset that the ideology is not a closed philosophical system, but rather a set of pragmatic goals which have developed since 1910. Some of these goals demand further inspection.

First the foremost among these values is "Mexicanism." Mexicanism can refer to many things but perhaps most important is the concept of a Mexican nation, a concept not widely prevalent prior to 1910. This means a basic pride in the nation, and a desire to be regarded as a Mexican rather than a member of this community or that village. In this sense Mexicanism is primarily internal. directed towards the forging of a modern nation-state which will help to eliminate the various subcultures which have dominated Mexican history and aided in the fragmentation of the nation. It also means that the nation is considered capable of offering something to its citizens such as social justice, economic progress, and participation in the political system. Equally important Mexicanism invokes pride in the Indian and mestizo elements in Mexican history and society. It strongly rejects malinchismo which refers to those who adopt "white" ways of life and reject the cultural inheritance of the indian. The "new" Mexican is expected to be proud of his mixed background. The heroes of the Mexican Revolution are not Diaz and Santa Anna or Cortez, but rather the Indian Cuauhtemoc, the mestizo Juarez, and the revolutionary leaders who started poor and

---

interpretation of Mexican history; Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-112, talks of an ideology of the Revolution. Also see William P. Glade and Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Mexico (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963).

<sup>30</sup> Malinche was the Indian woman who became the wife of Cortez. For an explanatory essay of malinchismo and other phenomena of the Mexican mind, see Octavio Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude: Life and Thought in Mexico (New York: Grove Press, 1961).

rose to the top such as Lazaro Cardenas. In fact the mestizo is the ideal Mexican of today because he symbolizes the emergence of the best of the two races, the Indian and the White, which have dominated Mexican history. This is one side of Mexicanism: pride in the nation, a desire to see the Mexican nation strong, its citizens incorporated into meaningful roles in the society and polity.

The second half of Mexicanism is directed outward towards the foreigners who have dominated and exploited the country through much of its history. These foreigners include the original Spanish conquistadores, the white cosmopolitan elite who looked to Europe for guidance, and foreign business interests who have invaded Mexico periodically. By and large this chauvinistic nationalism, which borders on the xenophobic is directed towards the United States, not only for the imperialistic designs of the nineteenth century, but also for the activities of business interests before and after the Revolution, as well as the subsequent attitudes of the U. S. government toward the revolutionary regime. The time of the oil expropriation in 1938, it has been often remarked, was the moment at which almost every Mexican had pride in his nation and his government for being able to stand up to the

31

"colossus to the North." Recently the fear and hatred of the United States has diminished despite problems during the early Castro years and over the independent role of Mexico in the Organization of American States. However, anti-Americanism remains a significant factor in Mexican nationalism and should be remembered as an important ingredient

---

<sup>31</sup>See Tannenbaum, op. cit., p. 73.

in building the Mexican nation--that is, anti-gringoism offers a convenient rallying point for mobilizing the masses, as well as the elite, behind the goals and pursuits of the Mexican government.

A second ingredient of the revolutionary ideology, or creed is constitutionalism and a general support for political liberalism. This, of course, can be traced back to the 19th century and previous Constitutions in Mexican history, but in the current context it refers primarily to the "aura of sanctity" of the Constitution of 1917.<sup>32</sup> The Constitution of Queretaro is regarded not only as the basic statement of Mexican political goals and ideals, but also as the embodiment of the social and economic ideals of the Revolution. In terms of political ideals the most important are the traditional liberties; freedom of the press, of thought, of religion and assembly, as well as effective universal suffrage, an independent judiciary, federalism, civilian supremacy over the military, and other facets of traditional liberalism. Although there may be a wide divergence between the ideal and actual practice (as, for instance, concerning federalism or an independent judiciary), the point is that they are esteemed as goals, that the Mexican people regard them as their political ideals, and, if inapplicable now, they will be fully institutionalized later when the people are ready for them. Perhaps most important is that political liberalism has come to be regarded as tolerant rule applied moderately, which offers a genuine respite and change from the traditional pattern of violence and violation of these rights in Mexican

---

<sup>32</sup> Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 10.



politics. The Constitution also sanctifies the one concrete and enduring rule of Mexican politics, no reelection. The defeat of continuismo and the resulting peaceful change of Presidential administrations has been generally recognized as the most important factor in the subsequent economic and social development of the country. Certainly it represents a major step in assuring some degree of stability, and definitely establishes the possibility that Presidents can be changed in Latin American countries without producing a major crisis, a thesis yet unaccepted throughout most of the hemisphere.

The Constitution of 1917 also gives legal justification and sanctity to the social and economic goals of the Revolution. Perhaps most important is Article 27 which grants the Mexican government control over the land resources of the nation. This was a major bone of contention between the United States and Mexico for forty years since we felt it was a violation of the basic right to private property.<sup>33</sup> However, Art. 27 goes further than merely representing a threat to major American land interests in Mexico; it actually embodies a comprehensive approach to the development of Mexican resources. In reality it offers an eclectic approach utilizing the "communism" of the Indian communal village, the ejido, combined with private plots for small farmers and large commercial enterprises. In other words it tries to utilize the land of Mexico in whatever form best aids the development of the country. This eclectic approach has been subsequently adopted throughout the economic system, and despite Yankee objections, it continues to be the

---

<sup>33</sup>For an explanation of the importance of Art. 27, see Tannenbaum, op. cit., pp. 102-12.

guiding light of Mexican economic policy.

Another article demonstrating the social and economic goals of the Revolution is Article 123, the Magna Carta of labor. As will be seen, the labor unions in Mexico are captives of the government, but, nonetheless, Art. 123 established the minimum standards for the workers of the country. In establishing labor rights, Art. 123 helped to institute ideals and no matter how much these may deviate in practice, they are recognized and accepted throughout the country. Article 130 attacked another buttress of the old regime and strengthened the role of the state vis-a-vis the Church. Although the Church has had a recent resurgence in Mexican life, the basic separation of church and state and the reduction of clerical privileges has remained part of the revolutionary ideology.<sup>34</sup> Yet another bulwark in the ideology is Article 3 which guarantees free education to all the citizens. Although there has been considerable controversy over this article, especially over the revision calling for "socialist education," there is basic agreement that all citizens are entitled to education, that illiteracy must be eliminated, and that the state must aid in the development and training of the personnel necessary to Mexico's future needs. Perhaps the point to be noted is that each of these social, economic, and political goals

---

<sup>34</sup>Since the Church did not play as important a role in the Bolivian system as was the case in Mexico, it has been omitted in the discussion of the Mexican system. The Church, of course, remains an important interest group in Mexican politics. The role of the Church in Bolivia under the MNR was highly restricted, although recently under the aegis of foreign priests, most notably North Americans, the Church has played an increasingly important role in the social, economic, and political life of Bolivia. See, for instance, The New York Times, March 31, 1968, p. 13.

is given legal sanctity and recognition in the Queretaro Constitution, and the Constitution is not only regarded as the fundamental law of the land but is also esteemed by Mexicans. The contrast with Bolivia will be noted later.

In terms of actual social and economic goals or norms, mention should be made of such factors as improved health standards for the population, religious tolerance (after initial squabbles with the Roman Catholic Church had been resolved), and general economic goals such as a minimum standard of living for all. What should be kept continually in mind is that the Mexican revolutionary ideology is not rigidly fixed towards economic methods or towards economic methods or towards which type of system may be "better." Although there have been recent trends toward state ownership of the larger industries (and certainly state control of all industries), the basic truth is that Mexican policy makers are ready and willing to consider any type of economic method or system, whether socialist or capitalist, but the basic criteria is how such a policy will benefit Mexico. Thus there is no rigid pattern, no fixed method for determining economic policy; what is important is that Mexico become self-sufficient, economically integrated, economically independent of the United States, and financially stable.

Finally, mention should be made of the foreign policy goals of the revolutionary ideology, apart from economic independence. Although Mexico certainly has great interest in the markets of Central and South America, it also has the political goal of leading the Latin American nations, as their most prosperous and successful representative.

Frequently it clashes in this regard with Argentina and Brazil, and more often with the United States, especially with the recent troubles in the Caribbean. More often than not these clashes are the result of Mexico's determination to support certain principles of international relations, such as non-intervention, equality of all states, peaceful settlement of disputes, and so forth, rather than a desire to directly confront the United States. While Mexico's general position of support for international principles has at times angered the American government, the point is that it has given prestige to Mexico in the international world while at the same time allowing the average Mexican to take pride in that role. All this has been done with an amazing degree of independence from US policies and commitments, helping to catapult Mexico into the front ranks of the secondary powers of the world while at the same time she has managed to reach a basic accommodation with her northern neighbor.<sup>35</sup>

Despite the emergence of the revolutionary ideology helping to give all Mexicans a common bond, a word of caution is necessary. In referring to the dilemma of the Revolution, Scott notes that there were actually two revolutions in Mexico, one a social and economic revolution,<sup>36</sup> the other political. Precedence was given to the economic and social revolution through the revolutionary years for the simple reason that the political revolution, leading to a more democratic polity, required the necessary social and economic changes to lay the foundations for

---

<sup>35</sup>Scott, 'Mexico: The Established Revolution,' op. cit., p. 334.

<sup>36</sup>Padgett, op. cit., p. 46.

democratic government. This was the elite concept; and it has led to emphasis on the material benefits of progress while political reform has lagged behind especially with regard to constructing an effective, responsive, and honest administrative structure in Mexico, as well as the full incorporation of the masses into the system. Therefore, when one speaks of the revolutionary ideology and the goals of the Revolution, one must be careful to note that political reforms have not often kept pace with the professed ideals. Nevertheless, the foundations of legitimacy have been laid and

there has tended to develop a common language concerning the political antecedents of the present regime which make possible a more meaningful dialogue between various strata of urban society as well as between urban and rural people. <sup>37</sup>

Whether or not the promise of that meaningful dialogue will be fulfilled remains to be seen.

The revolutionary ideology is the major orientation of the Mexican polity. The next problem is: how is this ideology transmitted and by what structures in the society? As should be obvious from the preceding discussion of the political culture, there still exists a great deal of latent transmission of political socialization in the Mexican system. Most obvious is the continuing suspicion and alienation from the government on the part of much of the population. On the other hand, many of the structures in the society, including the schools, the mass media, political parties, etc., have consciously tried to transmit the revolutionary ideology. The citizen receives further manifest transmission

---

<sup>37</sup>Padgett, op. cit., p. 46.

of the revolutionary ideology through an expanding role of government structures, structures which increasingly effect his everyday life. (By the same token, this expansion of government structures could engender certain negative affective orientations because of the prevalence of corruption, bribery, poor administrative practices, etc.) What needs to be examined is the relationship between latent and manifest transmission and the structures performing this transmission. Although basic studies of the socialization process in Mexico are lacking, a few generalizations seem in order.

What needs to be established at the outset is that there can exist a wide discrepancy between the ideals to be transmitted and the structures which perform this function. As an example, if the goals and ideals of the society stress democratic and equalitarian practices, yet the family (or other structure) stresses basically authoritarian practices and therefore works against the ideal, it is obvious that one would expect to find a measure of disharmony in the socialization process. This appears to be the case in Mexico. Despite the emphasis on democratic means and norms, the family remains basically an authoritarian structure. This is especially the case in the middle class family where the father is present and occupies a strong position of authority. It may be less true in the urban poorer classes because of the breakdown in family structure and the fact that many women are left abandoned.<sup>38</sup> It would appear that the rural poor still tend to

---

<sup>38</sup>On first glance the hero of Lewis' The Children of Sanchez, op. cit., Jesus Sanchez, may represent a contradiction to this assertion.

be patrifocal.<sup>39</sup> In any case the accepted model and more than likely the general practice is a family with a strong, authoritarian, dominant father. Thus early in life the child encounters a dichotomy between professed norms of a democratic society and his own family life. However, given the general subject orientation of the masses, this process is probably not as greatly disharmonious as it would appear to be in the middle sectors, those who are the greatest supporters of the ideals of the Mexican Revolution. What this may mean is that among the very elements of the society to be later recruited into elite positions, the disparity in the socialization process may be most evident and, therefore, have the widest effect on the operation of the political system.

It is in the schools that the majority of Mexicans first receive their socialization into the revolutionary ideology and the political system. This is a conscious part of the educational process and an effort is made to idolize the heroes of the Revolution as well as the general goals of the revolutionary ideology. The effectiveness of this effort is difficult to judge, but it does seem evident that at least the school children are made aware of the Mexican nation and the Revolution. Once again, however, there may exist a discrepancy

---

He appears to represent something difficult to encounter in the culture of poverty: the husband and father who takes full responsibility for his family. The actions of his sons indicates that he was unable to transmit this sense of responsibility to them.

<sup>39</sup>See either Oscar Lewis, Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty (New York: Mentor, 1959), especially the story of the Martinez family; or Redfield, op. cit., passim.

between the content of the revolutionary ideology and the method of teaching. Although this writer is only faintly familiar with primary and secondary education in Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua, his observations would tend to indicate that Mexican teaching follows the Latin and European tradition of teacher authoritarianism. This means that the teacher dictates the content of the course and the students are expected to take copious notes, little room is left for discussion, for questions, for inquiring research, or for the active participation of the students in the class. In addition, students do participate directly in the political system through protests which reaches its apex at the university where students take a very active role in the political process.<sup>40</sup> One problem in relating the effect of the educational process to political socialization is that little is known about how the former effects the latter. Until further research is done in this field, the most that can be suggested is that the schools in Mexico probably help to reinforce the discrepancy between ideals and practice that is introduced in the family.<sup>41</sup>

The remaining socialization agents tend to also reinforce this disparity between theory and practice. For instance, the religion of

---

<sup>40</sup>Although Mexican students have been more quiescent than other Latin American students, in recent years they have staged the bus burnings in Mexico City, sparked the revolt in Hermosillo against the governor of Sonora, and instigated the Olympic Game riots.

<sup>41</sup>As James Coleman states, "We are unable to establish more firmly the relationship between education and democracy chiefly because there are so many sources of political attitudes." In James S. Coleman (ed.) Education and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 20.



the majority of middle sector males (as well as in the urban poor) remains pure form and they seldom actively practice their religious beliefs. The most obvious discrepancy is found in work groups, especially in the labor organizations. Despite the legal and ideological goals of the Revolution, offering the worker a democratically-run union, by and large the unions remain dominated by a small elite which does little or nothing to aid the union member. Corruption and authoritarianism are rife in the unions and the general result has been the alienation and apathy of the worker.<sup>42</sup> Perhaps the major factor in this regard is that the unions are "captive associations" created by the government, nurtured under its auspices, and totally at the will of political leaders. Although this point will be further developed under interest articulation, it should be remembered that these unions are supporters and beneficiaries of the Revolution, but there exists a disharmonious element in terms of their actual practices with regard to members. Finally, it should be added that the government, as a socializing agent, might contribute somewhat to disharmony. The government through conscious policies (such as parades, supporting public murals, printing pamphlets, making speeches, etc.) tries to indoctrinate the citizen into the revolutionary ideology, but as mentioned before, the actual practices of the government, including fraud, corruption, and manipulation, may reinforce the suspicion and distrust which the Mexican has traditionally felt towards his government.

In terms of the socialization process then, it should be obvious

---

<sup>42</sup>See the attitude of Guillermo Gutiérrez in Five Families, op. cit., p. 181.

that despite the emergence of the revolutionary ideology, which has been an effective device for uniting the people around a common set of goals, there is a discontinuity between the goals themselves and their transmission. This discontinuity is chiefly the result of a disparity between the professed ideals and goals of the Revolution, specifically those dealing with democratic and equalitarian ideals, and the actual socialization of the individual into the polity. Throughout the socialization process this dichotomy is to be seen in the family where a strong authoritarianism exists, in the schools, in religion, and in work groups. On the other hand the mass media and the government stress the participatory ideals of the Revolution. In actual contact with the government the citizen may be confronted with practices in direct contrast with the ideals, and this in turn might reinforce the traditional suspicion and alienation of the Mexican.

The following relationships appear most important for a subsequent discussion of the socialization process in Bolivia:

1. Mexico has developed a set of goals and ideals around the Revolution which have created a basis for consensus within the nation. The revolutionary ideology is highly pragmatic and allows the elite to adapt and alter its policies according to the needs of the moment. Perhaps the most important ingredient in this ideology is Mexicanism, which contains two elements: a pride in and respect for the nation and a hatred of foreign influence. This ideology was formalized in the Constitution of 1917 and has been implemented by a number of important policy decisions since that date.

The question is: did the MNR develop a similar ideology of the National Revolution which was accepted by the majority of the people and gave a basic consensus on the social, economic, and political values of the society? Did a trait similar to Mexicanism develop in Bolivia? If so, in what way, and did it succeed in building a basic pride in the nation for Bolivians?

2. The structures in the socialization process, the family, school, work groups, etc., have created a discontinuous socialization process. Despite the existence of the revolutionary ideology uniting the people, with its emphasis on democratic and equalitarian ideals, the general socialization pattern is an authoritarian one which conflicts with the ideal. This may help to explain the "authoritarian syndrome" in the political culture since the divergence between the primary socialization agents and the expressed ideals could lead to an ambivalence towards authority. It also aids in explaining the subject orientation of the majority of Mexicans; they cannot change their opinions and attitudes of suspicion towards the political system. Was there a similar discontinuity in the socialization process in Bolivia? Did the primary and secondary agents relate to each other in terms of the revolutionary ideology---or the values of the society---and actual practices?

#### C. Political Recruitment.

The study of political recruitment is concerned with the means by which the roles of the political system are filled. Of interest are such

factors as the criterion for recruitment, whether it is by universalistic and general or ascriptive and particular criteria; the autonomy and differentiation of roles is also important. Finally, the recruitment function cannot be separated from the socialization function because the background and training of those in the roles will greatly determine their performance.

Concerning one point there is little dissension among critics and observers of Mexican politics: Mexico is ruled by an elite. Whether it is called the "ruling class," the "Revolutionary Family," or the "Revolutionary Coalition," there seems to be few doubts that Mexican politics is controlled and directed by a limited number of individuals.<sup>43</sup> Scott divides this elite into three groups: the ruling class, the governing class, and the mediatory class.<sup>44</sup> Brandenburg makes essentially the same division. The top division consists of about twenty men who make the basic decisions with regard to Mexican policy. This "Inner Council" consists of the President, ex-Presidents, the President-designate, and various leaders from commerce, the military, and the government.<sup>45</sup> The next level is composed of about 200 people, the major financial and commercial leaders, various leaders of the functional interest groups, governors of states, some party leaders, major intellectuals, and directors of important mass media. Finally, the third level consists of the formal government apparatus, the line officers of the polity, including teachers, administrators, the military, and the bureaucracy. This homogeneous elite, which is slowly becoming not only the political, but also the

---

<sup>43</sup>Scott, in "Mexico: The Established Revolution," op. cit., calls the elite the "ruling class;" Brandenburg, op. cit., refers to the "Revolutionary Family;" and Padgett, op. cit., calls the elite the "revolutionary coalition."

<sup>44</sup>Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," op. cit., pp. 380-3.

<sup>45</sup>The phrase "Inner Council" is used by Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 4.

social and economic elite of the country, is bound together by certain principles and tenets: first and foremost is their dedication to the Revolution, and the building of a better nation; second, is friendship which has come from close, personal contact during the years of the Revolution, as well as from social, business, and government association; third is self-interest in the accumulation of wealth, power, and prestige; fourth is fear, fear of defeat, of loss of power and prestige, and even of death; and finally is inertia in that they endorse things as they are, they support the existing system, and they do not want to rock the boat.<sup>46</sup> These characteristics give the elite a unity and purpose which helps to assure its dominant position in Mexican political life. Where do the elite come from and how do they get to the top? It appears that the majority of the present elite come from the middle sectors, although studies of leadership are lacking.<sup>47</sup> By and large the middle sectors would be defined or would have characteristics including a mestizo background, well-educated, urban, with economic security but not necessarily affluence.<sup>48</sup> In spite of the predominant middle sector character of the governing elite, there are indications that for the few it is possible to become part of that elite even if you are poor, rural, and uneducated. However, for the most part, recruitment from other than urban middle sectors is limited. This is especially true because education is highly restricted---over 90% of the population seldom gets beyond primary grades, and the universities, the source of the technically trained people,

---

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-4.

<sup>47</sup>See Scott, 'Mexico: The Established Revolution', op. cit., p. 361.

<sup>48</sup>Padgett, op. cit., p. 225.

admitted to the elite, are largely limited to members of the middle sectors.<sup>49</sup> In fact the major path of admittance to the elite or to the bureaucracy is by means of the specially acquired skills obtained through a university education. For the less educated, one path to follow is admittance through election to lower offices, but these are, needless to say, somewhat limited in number.

This method of recruitment points out another characteristic of the recruitment function in Mexico, namely that admission to the elite is totally dominated from the top. The Revolutionary Family, specifically the Inner Council and the upper echelons of the Family, start the process by determining exactly who will be admitted into higher posts, and they in turn control the chain all the way down to the lowest municipal post. Despite this control and domination from the top, the system is not closed and many find their way into the elite, primarily through the accumulation of the necessary skills needed by the Family. Approximately every six years there is a dramatic change in personnel as thousands of new people are recruited into administrative and elective positions after selection by the elite. It has been estimated that as many as 18,000 elective offices and 25,000 administrative posts are opened or changed every six years.<sup>50</sup> The importance of this periodic replenishment should not be underestimated for it means that a person who is rejected for a post knows that he will have another opportunity in six, or possibly twelve, years. Adding to the reward is the possibility of making oneself rich, or at least "comfortable", during a short term of

---

<sup>49</sup>See, for example, the process of recruiting Cabinet members in James D. Cochrane, 'Mexico's 'New Científicos': The Díaz Ordaz Cabinet', Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol 21 (Summer, 1967), pp. 61-72.

<sup>50</sup>Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 157.

office. Although Brandenburg estimates that 90% of the administrative officials are "honest", for those who receive the right type of appointment, the financial rewards may be worth the delay.<sup>51</sup> However, it should be added that one apparent danger of the current Mexican policy of recruitment, the continual expansion of government jobs in order to create more opportunities for the ever-expanding middle sectors, is that Mexico might become top-heavy with useless administrative structures and posts. Nonetheless, the important factor is that there exist possibilities to break into the elite, some of the positions are very lucrative, and this helps to insure the loyalty of many to the existing system.

There are two important exceptions to mobility within the system and both present potential danger points to the Revolutionary Family.<sup>52</sup> The first is the labor unions where there has been little or no recruitment of new elements into union leadership in some years. The present leaders are old, corrupt, and supporters of the status quo. They seldom act in the interests of their members but usually faithfully follow the government line. The result has been an increasing alienation and lack of faith by the worker in his union and its leaders. The situation is not helped by the economic policies of the government in forcing the workers to pay the cost of economic development by holding wages down while inflation reduces the actual purchasing power of the average worker.<sup>53</sup> Many of the commentators on present Mexico are agreed that the government must allow the purchasing

---

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 161.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., pp. 159-60.

<sup>53</sup>For the labor policies of the government, see Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 241-42; also Padgett, op. cit., pp. 163-84.

power of the worker to increase in order to broaden the base of the internal market, as well as to cut down current unrest in labor ranks. Whether this will happen is uncertain, but the prospects for difficulties with labor will certainly increase unless they are given the opportunity to openly bargain for higher wages through less corrupt union leaders. A problem with even graver consequences is that of the military. The hierarchy of the armed forces is dominated by a few older generals, many of them in their seventies, who fought in the Revolution. Although the armed forces has been a consistent supporter of the regime and has not actively interfered in politics for many years, the problem is that the generals have closed off access to ~~the~~ most lucrative and prestigious positions.<sup>54</sup> There exists the danger that the younger officers may become frustrated and revolt against the system and this would be dangerous because they represent one of the best qualified elites in Mexico, and they have the military force to attempt such an overthrow. Should the younger officers decide that the existing system does not offer ~~the~~ opportunity for advancement they desire, they might be tempted to attack the system. However, this problem may resolve itself in the near future as the older generals die off.

Another characteristic of the recruitment function is that despite an increasing specialization of political roles in Mexico, there still exists a measure of multifunctionality and interchangeability in them. This is to say that members of the elite may and do fill more than one role and that they move around with surprising facility. Multifunctionality is

---

<sup>54</sup>Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 160.



especially true in the lower echelons where one can find functional interest group leaders occupying posts as party and administrative leaders. In some measure it is also present at the top where leaders may occupy several positions at the same time.<sup>55</sup> Also of interest is the mobility of the elite since they move from post to post---party, administrative, and elective---with relative ease. If nothing else this mobility indicates the control from the top exercised over the entire recruitment function.

One final word is necessary on the recruitment of the President. It is highly important because it has been the peaceful succession of Presidents that has helped to stabilize the Mexican political system. This recruitment process has been institutionalized and is generally supported by the Mexican masses. The process begins with the determination of the presidenciable candidates by the Revolutionary Family, that is to say, with the narrowing down of those who might assume the office. Certain criteria are applied in this selection process: the candidates will normally occupy a high position in the government, usually in the Cabinet; he will be of humble origin (or at least of the lower middle sectors) and have come up through the ranks, either administrative or party, preferably both; his personal attitudes will include an ambivalence on the religious question, or at least he should not have taken a strong position on the Church. In addition he is expected to be married and have some measure of charisma.<sup>56</sup> The most important factor in his selection is his acceptability

---

<sup>55</sup>Padgett, op. cit., p. 87.

<sup>56</sup>These characteristics of the President-designate are discussed in Padgett, op. cit., pp. 137-39; Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 145-57; and Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, op. cit., pp. 211-16.

to the Presidential incumbent, for without his support no candidate can win. By and large he must also have a reputation for moderation and not be too closely identified with either the Cardenista or Alemanista wing of the PRI. Mexican Presidents have displayed a remarkable ability to choose successors who have emphasized policies the incumbents had not been able to pursue; and therefore, new Presidents often appear in the guise of totally new policies. This not only appeals to interest groups who might have been ignored under the previous President but can also serve as a device for whipping up public enthusiasm for the new changes. For instance, after the corruption of the Alemán period, the Family selected Ávila Camacho to follow him, perhaps because he realized that after the vast changes of his administration someone was needed to consolidate the reforms. Equally, Lopez Mateos brought new zeal and enthusiasm to the system at a time when many thought a new direction for the Revolution was necessary. The president-designate is also someone who is moderate enough not to offend any of the major interest groups within the Family. The President naturally consults many of these interest groups for their opinion and after making his decision, most of them jump on the bandwagon and endorse the official candidate. The President-designate then names his own supporters to key positions and starts the new administration. This process of the recruitment of the President has stabilized the system and helped to eliminate the single most important cause of turmoil and government instability throughout Latin America - the selection of the President.

With respect to the recruitment function in Mexico then the following conclusions appear to be most important:

1. Mexico is dominated by an elite which controls the country.

This elite is unified around the revolutionary ideology and the maintenance of the present political system. The elite is primarily recruited from the middle sectors. Despite control of the recruitment function from the top, there does exist a degree of "openness" in the system due to the creation of new jobs every six years. This helps to attract younger people and offers others the change to participate in the benefits of the system, thereby insuring their support for the Family. First, did Bolivia develop a unified elite supporting the Revolution and the system? Was there recruitment of new elements into the elite? Who controlled the recruitment function in Bolivia?

2. There still persists in the Mexican system a high degree of multiplicity and interchangeability of roles. Was this true of Bolivia?

3. Finally, the Mexicans have been able to institutionalize the selection of the President to the degree that it no longer represents a threat to the very existence of the political system. Did Bolivia manage to reach some sort of agreement

on the selection of the President?

#### D. The Interest Articulation Function

Every political system has some way of articulating the demands of the system. In analyzing the interest articulation function, the major focus should be on: (1) the structures which perform the function, that is the various groups and individuals formulating demands; (2) the methods used to articulate them; (3) the variety of channels utilized; and (4) the style of participation (latent or manifest, specific or diffuse, general or particular, instrumental or affective.)

First, it should be obvious that the elite-domination of Mexico will condition a great deal of the interest articulation function, both in terms of structures, as well as methods and styles. This elite dominates the entire articulation function; not only does the elite dominate the organizations making demands, but it also, through the President and the

Revolutionary Family, determines the recipient of the demands. This factor must be borne in mind throughout the discussion of the articulation function.

What then are the major groups, outside the Family, articulating demands in the Mexican system? The following are some of the groups, their characteristics and problems.

1. Labor. Labor organizations in Mexico are creatures of the state. They were born, nurtured, and remain under control of the government. This government control has in practice meant that they are neither independent in their labor policies nor in their relations with the political system. As previously mentioned, in reality the workers have been sacrificed to the over-all demands of the Mexican economy and the labor leaders have worked closely with both management and government to circumscribe the more basic needs of the workers. This has, of course, led to some alienation and disgruntlement on the part of many workers. The organization of the labor movement is dominated by the Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM) founded by Cárdenas, although several other organizations had preceded the CTM, among them the CROM of Luis Morones. Although the CTM is the major organization, and theoretically includes most of the unions in Mexico, there are numerous other groups, some economic, others political in nature, either within the CTM or independent of it. Among these groups are the Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC), the Bloque de Unidad Obrera (BUO), and more recently the Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT).

---

<sup>57</sup>Padgett, op. cit., pp. 103-09, traces recent conflicts between these two groups.

In addition, several specific unions are powerful, such as the petroleum workers. Not only does this pluralistic structure indicate a fractionalized labor movement, but it also allows the elite to play one organization off against another and thus prevent the emergence of a unified labor movement. At the same time, it should be added, it does give the workers an opportunity to try and gain support from one or the other organizations for their demands.<sup>58</sup> One factor to be noted is that the labor hierarchial structure, especially the CTM, closely parallels that of the PRI and, therefore, enables the party to dominate and control the CTM organization. Despite the favorable position of the labor movement in the revolutionary ideology, labor in general has suffered from direct control of organizations by the government and has therefore been sacrificed for the goal of economic development; it also has suffered from a corrupt and inefficient leadership which has been frozen; and finally it suffers from a division within its own ranks.

2. Agricultural Interest Groups. By and large the same problems plague the farmers groups. The Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC), the major agricultural organization within the PRI, was also created by Cárdenas, primarily as a counter-measure against the growing power of the labor movement. It has remained largely under government control and has seldom acted in an independent capacity. Recently a new organization, the Confederación Campesina Independiente (CCI) has emerged to challenge the supremacy of the CNC.<sup>59</sup> The basic problem of

---

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 103.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., pp. 120-23.

interest representation in the agricultural sector is the diversity of farms in Mexico. For instance, the CNC is basically the instrument of the ejidos and its interests often clash with those of the smaller and larger private owners. The smaller farmers now work through the CNOP in the public sector of the PRI while some of the larger landowners have started working through the business and commercial interest groups. Left out all together is the agricultural worker. Naturally this factionalism has made it somewhat difficult for the farmers to present a unified front to the government and has therefore made it easier for the politicians to manipulate the agricultural sector. Organizationally the campesino regional machinery coincides with the municipio administration; and, according to Padgett, one result is the continuance of both caciquismo and continuismo in rural areas.<sup>60</sup> Once the peasant leader gains control of the municipio machinery, he is hard to dislodge, and it is very difficult for demands to get any further because he is blocking both party and government channels. What this would suggest is that Mexico has not yet been able to break the traditional rural pattern of cacique domination. Therefore it would seem that, like labor, the agricultural groups in Mexico (more specifically the smaller farmers and ejiditarios) have been a relatively ineffective force in Mexican politics and that the sector as a whole is divided, making it easier for the government to control.

3. The Popular Sector. The most widely diversified sector

---

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

called the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (CNOP). CNOP is actually a combination of almost all the other groups in Mexican society outside labor and agriculture, and this includes the national cooperatives, teachers, government employees, small agricultural property owners, merchants, youth groups, women, intellectuals, the military, and individual members of the party. CNOP was formed in 1943, and despite the wide variety of interests represented and the fact that it has lacked a formal code of operation similar to the labor and agrarian sectors, it is by far the most powerful sector for the PRI. At the same time it gives the greatest support to the Revolutionary Family. This support is primarily because CNOP represents the middle sector professionals, merchants, and bureaucrats; and it has been this group which has most closely identified with the revolutionary ideology and the existing system. Needless to say, one of the reasons for this support is that the popular sector has been the recipient of many of the benefits of the Revolution. The primary reason for this superiority over the labor and agricultural sectors is the quality of leadership in the popular sector.<sup>61</sup> Generally speaking the leaders are the most qualified in Mexico in terms of training and experience. Also, since they come from the middle sectors, they have usually the same education and background as the elite. These close personal ties with the elite make access to the decision-making apparatus easier. In fact, the close personal ties of the popular sector's leaders give them direct access to the Inner Council and the President. The result is that they often can make their demands heard more easily than the other two sectors.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 125; also Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, op.cit., p.169.

<sup>62</sup>Padgett, op. cit., pp. 127-28.



One of the amazing considerations with regard to the popular sector is that despite the diversity of groups represented in its ranks, the CNOP has managed to present a unified front in the PRI and also to the government. A few groups within the popular sector demand special attention, not necessarily for the role they play in the Mexican system, but for comparison with similiar groups in Bolivia.

(a). The bureaucrats or government employees are organized into the Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores en el Servicio del Estado (FSTSE) within the popular sector. It would not be far wrong to say that the FSTSE is the single most important political group in Mexican politics (outside the Revolutionary Family) for they wield considerable leverage on the President and throughout the system.<sup>63</sup> They also are the most politicized group in Mexico and probably represent the majority of participants in the system. Since they are the most developed politically, they have also received the most benefits, and thus are the most consistent and loyal supporters of the system.

(b). Although the military was given a separate sector in 1938, it rapidly decided to abandon direct participation in politics and disbanded the sector in 1943. Since then the military has continued to work through the popular sector and through personal contact with the elite. By and large the military has tended to support the system and favored a behind-the scenes role. In recent years the power of the military has declined considerably as can be seen by budget allocations.<sup>64</sup> Although they remain

---

<sup>63</sup>Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, op. cit., p. 169.

<sup>64</sup>Wilkie, op. cit., pp. 100-06.

a potent and powerful interest group, the military can no longer be regarded as the ultimate arbiter of the system and could probably be defeated by the combined strength of the other sectors.<sup>65</sup>

(c). As far as can be determined, the Revolutionary Family has not been notably successful in gaining the support of the students in Mexico.<sup>66</sup> However, this would apply primarily to the urban secondary and university students. Despite the general lack of support among the students, the system has been successful in recruiting the more advanced and technically qualified. The simple reason for this is that one must play the game, join the elite, in order to advance economically or politically. One of the more important factors in this successful recruitment has been the continual expansion of government jobs to attract more young people. There still exists the very real danger that the Family will be unable to provide enough opportunities in the future and as a result alienate the youth.

4. Business Organizations. The two major business organizations, the Confederation of Chambers of Commerce (CONCANACO) and the Confederation of Industrial Chambers (CONCAMIN) are not officially part of the PRI.<sup>67</sup> They are, however, more or less official since Cardenas brought them (as he did with labor and agriculture) under government jurisdiction by laws requiring them to organize as government recognized interest

---

<sup>65</sup>See Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 101-21.

<sup>66</sup>Padgett, op. cit., p. 57, notes that recently the PRI has taken an increasing interest in the students, apparently as a result of past failures.

<sup>67</sup>See Frank R. Brandenburg, "Organized Business in Mexico," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 12 (Winter, 1958), pp. 26-50.

groups. (Apparently his major goal was not a unified business group for internal politics, rather it was to teach them that the major opponent was not socialism or capitalism, but foreign domination.)<sup>68</sup> Although CONCANACO theoretically represents the smaller industries, and CONCAMIN the larger (in reality the difference seemed to be based on old versus new industries), in practice within the last few years there has emerged a similarity of view which has greatly aided business to articulate unified demands.<sup>69</sup> Generally opposed to government economic policy in the early 1940's, business has gradually become one of the major backers of the revolutionary ideology and the political system. Not only have they accepted the role of the government in the economy, but they also have begun to endorse the social and economic goals of the Revolution, including worker benefits and sharing the wealth. (One of the reasons might be the realization that this will be necessary to expand their internal market.) One of the major factors in this support is the increasing identification between the political elite and the economic elite and the ensuing personal contact between the Family and economic leaders. In fact, a good many of the leading industrialists, financiers, and bankers of Mexico are themselves members of the Revolutionary Family. Naturally this has led to a beneficial position in terms of achieving their goals and demands and thus helped to insure their loyalty and support for the system. Perhaps because of this direct access to the elite there has been little pressure from business to form a sector of their own within the official party; there has been no need. Despite the existence of personal contact and informal access to

---

<sup>68</sup>Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

<sup>69</sup>Brandenburg, "Organized Business in Mexico," op. cit.

the decision-making process, the extent of the institutionalization of the formal contacts between business and government should not be underplayed because these contacts have been regularized within the government agencies specifically dealing with business.<sup>70</sup>

5. Political Parties. At first glance it may appear peculiar to list parties under structures of interest articulation, but the truth is that opposition parties in Mexico can hardly be considered as 'aggregators of interest' in the model assigned to American or British parties. However, with the exception of the Sinarquista and the Communist (and some would even question the extent to which the Communists oppose the system) the majority of opposition parties in Mexico support the system and work within it.<sup>71</sup> Aside from the two mentioned, the opposition parties can be divided into two types, the permanent parties, especially the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), and the transitional parties which have sprung up at election time, primarily as vehicles for disappointed presidential aspirants. The latter type may be disappearing since there has not been one since the campaign of 1952. What can be said about both the PAN and the PPS is that both parties basically accept the political system and the revolutionary ideology and they attempt to present alternatives within the system; they do not represent efforts to overthrow it. This indicates that on both the left and the right there exist groups which support the political system and try to present alternatives to the PRI, rather than working in the traditional Latin American mold to overthrow the government. One

---

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>71</sup> For a discussion of the parties or "publics", see Padgett, op. cit., pp. 62-79; and Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, op. cit., pp. 119-40.

problem is that it is difficult to determine exactly how independent these parties are; many believe they are nothing more than officially supported opposition to lend an aura of democracy in Mexico.<sup>72</sup> Whether and how much these parties are actually independent and the extent to which they receive financial support and other benefits from the government is difficult to prove. What does seem important is that on both the left and the right there does exist a consensus on the Mexican Revolution and the evolving political system. The battle is not over the system itself but over the control of that system; this could represent the greatest victory for the Mexican Revolution.

What methods are employed for articulating demands in Mexico?

One of the most remarkable aspects of current Mexican politics is the reduction in the incidence of violence, and it should be remembered that violence has been a traditional factor in Mexican politics. This is not to say that violence has been eliminated (for numerous examples in recent years have involved violence, especially the series of strikes in 1958, the student strike of the same year, the more recent troubles in Sonora, the murder of campesino leaders in Acapulco, and more recently the pre-Olympic riots but in comparison with its own past, not to mention comparison with other Latin American countries, Mexico appears now as a calm sea. Another indicator that physical demonstration has declined as a method is the number of strikes in recent years, a number far below that of the United States.<sup>73</sup> The lack of violence would suggest two

---

<sup>72</sup>Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 144-65, is most vociferous in this view.

<sup>73</sup>See Wilkie, op. cit., Appendix G., p. 295.

points: first, that Mexicans are by and large contented with their system as it currently operates; and second, that other means have been found to articulate demands which helps to reduce the necessity of violence and direct confrontation in the political system.

Given the nature of the Revolutionary Family, one would expect that the major method of articulation would be through personal contact within the elite. Although this appears to be the case at the moment, what is striking about Mexico is the degree to which articulation of demands has become institutionalized. As would be expected with a high degree of polyfunctionalism and overlapping of leadership roles, it is easier for the Mexican elites to establish personal contact with their respective superiors in the hierarchy and make demands personally. Nonetheless, this process has been institutionalized to the extent that regular channels exist for contact.<sup>74</sup> This should not be too surprising since American government works on the same principles; officials work through regular channels but it always helps to "know someone", whether in Congress, the administration, or city hall. One should also note that the Mexican system has a plurality of channels open within the system, from the party, administrative offices, and semi-autonomous agencies, to the over-riding personal contacts throughout the system. The one structure that seems to be lacking in the Mexican system, in comparison with that of the United States, is the Congress where individuals can make their demands known.<sup>75</sup> While it is true that the

---

<sup>74</sup>Padgett, op. cit., pp. 156-58.

<sup>75</sup>Scott, Mexican Government in Tradition, op. cit., p. 262.

average Mexican probably has less access to the political system than the American, one might legitimately question the extent to which the individual in the U.S. can gain access---or wants to gain access--to the decision-making process. What appears true for both systems is that those with money and influence can find some way in which to gain access.

The present method of making demands in Mexico would thus seem to be a mixture of elite representation and personal contact with an increasing institutionalization of the channels through which one gains access to the President. In this system the President stands at the apex and despite the existence of a plurality of access structures, sooner or later the major decisions must be made by him. With the institutionalization of the office of the Presidency, much of the individual burden has been assumed by the administrative structures and this might indicate a specialization and dispersion of the decision-making power which could prove healthy to the system.<sup>76</sup> It would appear that with the increasing scope of governmental activity in the economic and social fields along with the increasing specialization of interest groups and their demands, Mexico will further evolve toward institutional channels of articulation of demands and personal contact will play less important a role.

One final word is deemed appropriate relating to the style of interest articulation. In discussing the style of interest articulation Almond states that it can be either manifest or latent, specific or

---

<sup>76</sup> Padgett, op. cit., pp. 143-45.

diffuse, etc., using the categories developed by Talcott Parsons.<sup>77</sup>

107

At this moment it appears extremely difficult to determine with exactitude the relationship between the variables of style in Mexico. For instance, the President no doubt receives demands in the form of messages through government channels from interest groups as well as the mass media.

These are specific manifest requests for governmental action. At the same time he also no doubt receives messages "through whispers and conferences in guarded tones at lunch, or in hallways, or offices."<sup>78</sup>

While there can be little doubt that the majority of these whispered messages are also manifest and specific, it does seem very difficult to detect the prevalence of one type of style or another. What can probably be said is that Mexico seems to be moving away from the variables indicating the "traditional" style and towards those representing the "modern" style. That is to say, demands are increasingly couched in specific, universalistic, manifest, and general patterns. Other than this general statement it is difficult to affirm the pattern of style until further research establishes such a pattern.

In comparing the interest articulation function, the following statements appear most relevant:

1. All the major interest groups in Mexican politics are controlled by the government, either through the party structure or by the Revolutionary Family. Therefore, they are not independent and must operate within the amount of freedom granted by the elite. To what extent were the major interest groups in Bolivia controlled by the elite? Was there a stagnation of

---

<sup>77</sup> Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 86-8.

<sup>78</sup> Padgett, op. cit., p. 157.



the leadership? Were the needs of the workers sacrificed to the Bolivian economy?

2. With respect to specific interest groups in the Mexican system:
  - (a) Labor is dominated by a stagnant and corrupt leadership which is controlled by the elite. As a result worker demands have often not been met because they are sacrificed to the over-all needs of the Mexican economy. Was labor in Bolivia controlled by the elite? Was there a stagnation of the leadership? Were the needs of the workers sacrificed to the Bolivian economy?
  - (b) Agriculture is also dominated by the government and the party. The agrarian sector is further handicapped by a division based on type of agricultural production. There has been a continuance of the pre-revolutionary caciquismo pattern of personal rule in the country. Was the agrarian sector dominated by the government in Bolivia? Was there friction based on types of production? Finally, what type of pattern of authority was maintained in the rural areas?
  - (c) The middle sectors, including the professionals, bureaucrats, industry and commerce, have been brought into the system and accord it the most support, in addition to receiving the greater share of benefits. For the most part they work through the Popular Sector of the PRI but the larger merchants, industrialists, etc., tend to have direct contact through the Revolutionary Family. To what extent did these middle sectors support, receive benefits from, and participate in the political system of the MNR?

- (d) Two groups, the students and the military, while not formally a part of the PRI generally support the system and the revolutionary ideology. As these two groups always represent threats to stability in Latin America, their relative quiescence is important. Although there are indications that the students may be less than happy with the present system, they must look to the government for employment, and generally they find it. Therefore, they do endorse the system when they become part of it. The military has been gradually reduced as the major power in Mexican politics and the military elite does not appear interested in becoming the arbiters of the system. Did the students support the system of the MNR? Why or why not? Was the military eliminated as a major factor in the political system?
- (e) In general the most powerful of the opposition parties have accepted the present political system and the Mexican Revolution. They work through the system not attempting to overthrow it. Did the opposition parties in Bolivia accept the Revolution and the political system? What was their attitude towards the methods to change the system or the elite?
- (3) In terms of methods of articulating demands, violence and physical demonstrations have decreased, with a corresponding increase in elite representation. At the same time there has also been an increase in articulation through formal and institutional channels because of the growing complexity of Mexican society and

administration structures. The number of channels which are open has increased as well, but at the top stands the President who must make all important policy decisions; and therefore demands must eventually reach him. Was there a reduction of violence as a means of articulating demands in Bolivia? Was elite representation used? Did institutional channels open up? How? Did the President have to make all important decisions in the Bolivian system?

- (4) At this time it appears difficult to determine the exact pattern of style in the articulation process. However, it does seem that the "modern" variables are increasingly replacing and dominating the "traditional." What style predominated in Bolivia? Was there a trend toward the more modern variables?

#### E. The Interest Aggregation Function.

Before taking up the major factors under the interest aggregation function, it would seem wise to briefly review a debate over this function which has developed between two students of Mexican politics, Robert Scott and Frank Brandenburg. Scott, in his Mexican Government in Transition, took the position that the major aggregator of interests in the Mexican system is the PRI.<sup>79</sup> In his acrimonious answer, Brandenburg argues that the President alone is the aggregator, and then added (in an obvious reference to Scott), "it merely indicates that misleading, partial explanations of Mexican politics and government...will emerge

---

<sup>79</sup>Scott, op. cit., passim.

from students that credit too much of what happens in the Mexican political system to its official party."<sup>80</sup> To many the debate appears a sterile argument, and this writer would tend to agree with both Padgett and Wilkie in taking a middle course which posits that certainly the President stands far above the party in aggregating interests, but one of the most useful structures he has is the official party.<sup>81</sup> The problem appears to arise from a misunderstanding of the functional approach. Almond clearly states that the aggregation function can be and is performed by many structures throughout the system. Just as structures may be multi-functional, so may functions be performed by many structures. In the Mexican system it seems obvious that he is added in this function by many other structures, among them the PRI, the bureaucracy, and the Revolutionary Family. To argue that one structure is the only aggregator of interests would be to distort reality. The same is true for the United States in that if one were to examine any major piece of legislation it would be virtually impossible to determine which structure, whether the party, interest group, Congress, the bureaucracy, or the President had the single greatest impact in terms of aggregation. In the Mexican system it appears valid to state that any major decision will require the consideration of the President and that he will no doubt listen to various positions and demands of the groups concerned. In this sense he is the "final aggregator." However,

---

<sup>80</sup>Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 144-45.

<sup>81</sup>Padgett, op. cit., p. 47; Wilkie, op. cit., p.4.

in this section, for the sake of convenience, the official party will be discussed and the role of the President will be elaborated in subsequent sections. This is done solely for the purpose of reserving a section for the party and not because it is being argued that the PRI is the aggregator in the Mexican system. With this reservation in mind, the primary focus here will be on the PRI---as announced in the first chapter the focus on both systems is the political party. The functions of the party within the system will be analyzed, that is the specific tasks which the party performs (or empirical functionalism) during elections, in recruitment, etc. The historical development and organization of the party will also be studied.

The forerunner of the modern PRI, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) was established at Querétaro in 1929 by Plutarcho Calles, at that time the most powerful politician in Mexico. Although there is some disagreement concerning his reasons in establishing the party, it does seem apparent that he was looking for some sort of instrument to bring the various warring factions into a cohesive group.<sup>82</sup> Mexico at that time was still divided into regions with many military and local caudillos fighting for control. The PNR was organized as a loose confederation of state and local parties, military groups, and various individuals. Membership was based on the individual but most groups were expected to channel their demands through the party organization. A notable exception was the exclusion of Luis Morones labor group from the PNR. What was actually established was a formal mechanism for the elite to consult each other and thereby help to cut-down on the wide variety

---

<sup>82</sup>James, op. cit., p. 246, states that it was a calculated move; Padgett, op. cit., pp. 48-9, suggests that it was simply a political maneuver.

of fractional disputes within the country. It may be supposed that some freedom was allowed to local caudillos, at least in terms of being able to reap their own harvests in their proper locales, but that they were forced to work through the PNR to reach the incipient Revolutionary Family. The PNR thus offered a strong force for conformity in regular procedures, especially with regard to the selection of candidates for office. As Padgett mentions, "The burden of proof morally--after March, 1929---rested upon any civilian or military leader who considered rebellion as a viable alternative against party decision."<sup>83</sup> However, Calles totally dominated the PNR; and although he used it as an instrument for the dispensation of patronage, there existed a wide gulf between the ideology of the party and actual practices, especially as he became more conservative in later years.

With the vast changes of the Cárdenas administration, it became evident that changes were also necessary in the structure and composition of the official party. Cárdenas had effected a revolution in the organization of interest groups in Mexico through the creation of the CIM, the CNC, CONANCO, and many other formally organized interest groups. It was increasingly evident that in order to insure stability and give access to the government, a new form of organization was also necessary to incorporate the labor and agrarian sectors into the party. Accordingly, in March, 1938, the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM) was created with an entirely new organizational base. The party was divided into four sections: labor, agrarian, popular, and military (which was later

---

<sup>83</sup>Padgett, op. cit., p. 49.

disbanded). Each of these four sectors had its own organization within their area and all other interest groups were forced to work through that sector. Collectively the sectors determined the allocation of offices and posts within the party and the government. A hitch soon developed in the selection process when the labor and agrarian sectors, due to their larger numbers, demanded a greater share of the power in the nomination procedures of important officials.<sup>84</sup> Actually it almost took the form of a direct confrontation between Vicente Lombardo Toledano and President Cárdenas and the latter was considerably angered by the threat to his preminence.<sup>85</sup> As a result he began to ignore the party structure and centralize all decision-making in the office of the Presidency. In the nomination of Manuel Ávila Camacho in 1940, Cardenas ignored the demands of both the labor and agrarian sectors in selecting his successor. As Brandenburg states, these struggles with the excessive demands of labor convinced Cárdenas that the party had to remain totally subordinate to the President and state governors, and not subject to the internecine squabbles between the sectors.<sup>86</sup> Throughout the 1940's the President continued to increase his power vis-a-vis that of the party, but at the same time dissident elements were forced into the official party until by the end of the decade they were virtually eliminated.

At the same time there developed a feeling that reorganization of

---

<sup>84</sup> Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 91.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., p. 93

the party was necessary, chiefly to subordinate the somewhat autonomous sectors to the party hierarchy. Consequently, in 1946 with the founding of the PRI, the power to select candidates was taken from the sectors and given to the party as a whole by means of primaries cutting across sector lines. This proved premature and in 1950 the nomination of candidates was given back to the sectors.<sup>87</sup> The change in name was accompanied by a shift in the official ideology of the party. The PRM was categorized as the party of the workers, but the PRI tried to appeal to all, especially the new middle sectors emerging in Mexico. Organizationally the PRI remained dominated from the top, that is to say by the Revolutionary Family, but recently it has begun to inaugurate changes in the party to instill some life into it. Chief among these is the relaxation of party controls in local and municipio elections, and also an effort to recruit more individuals into the party.<sup>88</sup> One of the major problems facing the PRI currently is an increasing cynicism towards it on the part of many Mexicans and a general atrophy of its organizational structure. Nonetheless, it would appear that the party is trying to revitalize itself and might, in the near future, inaugurate further structural changes to broaden the participation base, as well as to democratize internal politics. It is significant that the party has helped to stabilize Mexican politics since as an institution it has "durability beyond the personal popularity of individuals."<sup>89</sup> One should note that the party also has some degree of flexibility in adjusting to the needs and exigencies of the moment, although it has always remained subordinate to the Revolutionary Family and the President.

---

<sup>87</sup> Padgett, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50.



In terms of organization, the official party has moved from a loose association of independent caudillos and state parties to a highly disciplined, hierarchial structure with control vested in the Comité Ejecutivo Nacional (CEN). Although the CEN is but one of several national bodies of the party hierarchy, in practice it dominates the other structures. In commenting on the organization of the PRI, Scott says, "the structure of the revolutionary party is complex, one might almost say cumbersome."<sup>90</sup> (However, as will shortly be seen, the PRI appears relatively simple in comparison with the MNR.) In addition to the CEN, the PRI also has, at the national level, the National Assembly and the National Council. The former is theoretically the most powerful body of the party, but in reality it does little more than name, officially, the Presidential candidate for the forthcoming election. Delegates are chosen to the Assembly from sectors as well as from state assemblies. This organ has not fulfilled its assigned task for the simple reason that it is totally dominated by the party bureaucracy and the President. In reality it is little more than a propaganda device for announcing the Presidential candidate, major changes in party line, and notifying the party members of decisions already made elsewhere. The National Council is even weaker since it does literally nothing. Although theoretically charged with supervision of the Executive Committee, it in reality has seldom exercised such authority and may generally be regarded as a showcase rather than a significant structure.<sup>91</sup>

The most important organ of the party is the CEN, The National Executive Committee. This body is composed of a President, general

---

<sup>90</sup>Scott, op. cit., p. 154.

<sup>91</sup>Padgett, op. cit., pp. 51-2.

secretary, a secretary for each of the three sectors, a representative from both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, and three other secretaries, one for organization, one for press and propaganda, and finally, one for finance. The powers of the CEN are extensive and include internal discipline for the party, convening state conventions (thereby controlling them), removal of members of state and local committees for infractions, appointment of committees and delegates for all party activities, and responsibility for party membership. In short, the CEN is the executive of the party and dominates all activities of the PRI throughout Mexico.<sup>92</sup> The President of the CEN is named by the President of the Republic and usually is a close political associate. He is the most powerful figure in the party since he controls the budget and can also convene the Executive Committee. An important factor to be noted is that the PRI has as its chief a man personally loyal to the President, but at the same time one who can assume the daily decision-making of the party and therefore ease the burden on the chief executive. The general secretary of the CEN carries out the administrative details of the party. The two delegates from the legislature are responsible for coordination between the PRI and the Senate and Chamber. The three sector leaders are specifically charged with coordinating party activities within their respective sectors, and to facilitate this the three are normally the acting heads of their sectors. Under the rules of 1960, their role involves responsibility for proposing concrete educational and action programs, for stimulating militance of party members, for promoting loyalty to principles of the Mexican Revolution, and for establishing

---

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., pp. 52-53.

close coordination among the sectors in the interest of party unity and strength."<sup>93</sup> In addition in 1960, the CEN was given the power to form councils within each sector representing diverse groups and opinions, and these councils were to meet regularly with the CEN to discuss sector problems. These organs were specifically created to provide communication between sectors and the party, and therefore the President. The new rules in 1960 also created the new secretaries of organization, press and propaganda, and finance. The task of the secretary of organization is to recruit new members, keep accurate lists of membership (something heretofore never done), and to oversee lower level committees in their performances. The secretary of finance is charged with responsibility for collecting regular dues (once again something not done previously) and overseeing general party finances. This latter is aimed at making the party independent of pure government financial support for its activities.<sup>94</sup> The creation of these new posts apparently represents an effort to broaden the membership base as well as to separate the government from the party. It might be added that in 1965 another national body, the Commission of Honor and Justice was created, chiefly as a device to clean up corruption among those officials of the PRI who were filling their own pockets. Although there is little known of the actual operations of this body, once again it does indicate a response to the numerous charges of corruption lodged against party officials and for that reason shows some concern by the PRI for its public image.

The party hierarchy in descending order includes regional, municipal,

---

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

and district committees. The regional committees are found in each state, territory, and the federal district. These committees follow the composition of the CEN and generally have the same duties within their respective areas. The same is true of municipal and district committees. What should be stressed is that the CEN totally dominates the party hierarchy through control of the nomination and election of all members of party committees in the Republic. In commenting on the rules of 1960, Padgett notes that the increasing control of the CEN over the lower organizations "seems a clear indication of intent to increase the party's potential for playing a part in the decision-making through strengthened, centralized instruments of discipline and control."<sup>95</sup> He also points out that the PRI is trying to expand its activities in such areas as sports, and other social and cultural areas, perhaps to better resemble the "party of social integration."<sup>96</sup>

Thus, in general, the official party is one dominated from the top. It is one that has moved from a loose confederation of independent chiefs towards one with more and more internal discipline. It has also showed an ability to change and adopt its structures to fit the times. Recently, it has inaugurated changes designed to broaden its membership as well as to heighten the sense of participation through financial and social contributions. Although it is yet too early to foresee the results of these changes, and one is tempted to be somewhat dubious of any basic alteration in the Family's outlook; nonetheless, Padgett may be correct when he says that, "the new formal

---

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>96</sup> This is the phrase used by Sigmund Neumann to denote the emergence of a party devoted to the indoctrination of its members into a particular life style. See Sigmund Neumann, Modern Political Parties (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956), pp. 403-05.

emphasis upon centralization and financial support may reflect agreement in the higher echelons of the Revolutionary Coalition that the party be given greater strength apart from government circles and outside centers of power, i.e, more voice in nominations for electoral posts and more capacity to aggregate demands effectively.<sup>97</sup>

The specific role of the PRI in the recruitment and socialization functions has been discussed, keeping in mind the central and predominate part played by the President and the Revolutionary Family. The functions to be discussed here are the specific "tasks" performed by the party in the Mexican political system and are not to be confused with the functional categories employed in this paper. These tasks have been elaborated by Padgett.<sup>98</sup> First, the party is an important structure in the communication process. After the President and the Family make decisions, the party provides a mechanism for transmitting the decisions to the masses, as well as to important officials throughout the country. More important, the party provides a measure of support or at least a reaction to the important decisions made. This means that the Family has a yardstick for measuring the support of the decisions taken through probing the reactions at the various party levels. At the same time the party also serves as a mechanism for informing the Inner Council of some of the demands and problems emanating from below. Second, the party serves an important role as mediator of disputes and promoter of consensus. The party provides a convenient structure through which diverse groups can meet and resolve their differences over the conference

---

<sup>97</sup>Padgett, op. cit., p. 60.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., pp. 60-2; also see his article, 'Mexico's One Party System: A Re-evaluation,' American Political Science Review, Vol. LI (December, 1957), pp.995-1008.

table rather than resorting to violence or to authoritarian methods. Granted that the chief task of the party is to facilitate the decisions made by the President and the Family, the PRI still can reconcile or help to resolve differences and make sure that the various groups understand the reasons for a decision, thereby helping to placate those who feel they were slighted by the decision. As will be clear in the case of Bolivia, this role should not be underestimated for it does give a feeling of participation in the decision-making process. This was not the case under the MNR in Bolivia. The party also serves an electoral role. The PRI helps to legitimize the candidates selected and gives a symbol of unity during the periods of elections; at the same time, of course, this also legitimizes the political recruitment process of the Family. The party also serves as a device for the nomination of various candidates and thus helps to eliminate vicious infighting for the higher offices. Of course, it also serves as an electoral device for mobilizing the population behind the goals of the elite and the revolutionary ideology. During the campaigns the party organization is used to facilitate the new policies of the incoming President. In addition to the above roles, one should add that the PRI occasionally has special and economic tasks, such as the supply of food and other materials to the needy; but these performances are somewhat limited. Finally, the party is one of the structures operating within the executive branch and therefore helps the President in some of the facets of administering the country.

In general, the most important aspects of the aggregation function in Mexico appear to be the following:

1. Although there are several structures performing the aggregation function in Mexico, by far the most important is the President.

The President is the "final aggregator" in the sense that he must make all the important decisions. The PRI is thus only one of the structures performing this function, but it does aid the President. Who and what performed the function of aggregation in Bolivia? Was the President the major aggregator? Did the MNR have any role in the function of aggregation?

- (2) The official party was established by Calles as a specific instrument for reconciling the various factions in Mexico. It was designed to unite the elite and avoid the violence of post-revolutionary Mexico. Later it broadened its base by the inclusion of more and more interest groups while at the same time it gradually became totally subordinated to the President. At present the party is under the President and tightly controlled throughout the country. What was the exact nature of the MNR after the Revolution? Was it a confederation of independent chiefs? Was it controlled from the top? Did it undergo changes during the years? What was its relationship to the President?
- (3) The PRI has shown an ability to adapt its structures to the necessities of time. The National Committee of the party is the strongest organ and other national bodies have little power. State and local structures are totally dominated by the CEN and it, in turn, by the Family and President. Did the MNR change its structures to fit the times? What were the structures and how strong were they in the organization of the MNR? What was the relationship between the national organizations and the local one under the MNR? Finally, as in the case of Mexico, did the MNR

make an effort to incorporate its members actively into the life of the party? If so, when?

- (4) The party also performs some specific tasks in the Mexican system. Chief among these is as a communicating mechanism between the Inner Council and the base, both in terms of disseminating the decisions of the elite and of testing grass roots opinion. It also acts as a mediator in the sense that it provides a meeting place for the interest groups to understand and reconcile government decisions and demands. In addition, the party serves as an effective instrument for both the selection of candidates and the mobilization of electoral support during the campaigns. What specific tasks did the MNR serve? Did it have a communication function similar to the PRI? Did it serve as a meeting place for reconciling differences? Finally, what did the MNR do during elections? Did the party have an electoral role?

#### F. The Rule-Making and Rule Application Functions.

The reason these two functions are linked together rather than under separate headings is that they are performed by the same structure, the office of the Presidency. As is well known, the chief structure which performs the function of rule making in the United States is the Congress; however, as is equally well known, the legislature in Latin America seldom exercises independent functions of rule making and is usually totally subordinate to the executive.<sup>99</sup> The legislature in Mexico is no exception to this general rule. The primary role of the Mexican legislature is to give public credence to the

---

<sup>99</sup>For a general description of the Latin American legislature, see Alexander T. Edelman, Latin American Government and Politics (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1965), pp.429-49.



decisions made by the executive. Debate usually takes the form of hortatory expressions of faith in the President and the Mexican Revolution. Recent changes in the composition of the legislature allowing more members from opposition parties may create a more meaningful dialogue in the chambers, but it seems difficult to imagine that the legislature will absorb a great share of the rule making function from the President.<sup>100</sup> Another role of the Mexican legislature is as a reward, both in terms of prestige and financial remuneration, to faithful followers of the Revolutionary Family. However, the vast powers of the President make it virtually impossible for the legislature to act outside his will and direction.<sup>101</sup>

Another source of rule making found throughout Latin America is the so-called semi-autonomous agency. These agencies are usually development corporations in specific areas of the economy with a marked degree of independence from the legislature, the executive, and the central bureaucracy. Although Mexico has such agencies, they have not been as independent as similiar organizations in other countries of the hemisphere. The chief reason is central control of the budget as well as the fact that the agency directors are appointed, and can be removed, by the President. Since these men are generally members of the Family or are personally loyal to the President they seldom exercise independent action unless specifically granted permission by the elite. In comparison with other Latin American countries then, Mexico has managed to control and direct the semi-autonomous agencies to a

---

<sup>100</sup> Padgett, op. cit., p. 80.

<sup>101</sup> See, for instance, the extensive powers of the President with regard to the budget and his ability to virtually circumvent the legislature in the budgetary process, in Wilkie, op. cit., passim; also Robert L. Scott, "Budget Making in Mexico," Inter-American Economic Affairs, V01. 9 (Autumn, 1955), pp. 3-20.

Other structures of rule making in many countries of Latin America are the state, local and regional governments, or councils, which may and often do act independent of the will of the central government. This too has been virtually eliminated in Mexico. Although Mexico is theoretically a federal system, in reality the central government has virtual total control over the state and municipio governments.<sup>103</sup> This is because the government in Mexico City has complete control over the budget and sends money down to the lower levels. Without independent means of finance, these structures are totally dependent on the whims of the central government. Furthermore, the chief executive of the state, the governor, is selected by the President and usually is a close political confidant. Although these governors are nominally elected, they are selected by the Family and assured of election through control of the electoral process by the elite. The appointment of local and municipal officials is also controlled from the top and for all practical purposes the state and local governments have been reduced to appendages of the central government.<sup>104</sup>

Thus, in Mexico the rule making function is performed by the President, and this analysis should be focused on the manner in which it

---

<sup>102</sup>Apparently there is some disagreement concerning the degree of independence of the semi-autonomous agencies. For a discussion of the problem, see Carolyn and Martin Needleman, "Who Rules Mexico," op. cit., p. 1022.

<sup>103</sup>For a discussion of some of the problems faced by local and state governments, see Leonard Cardenas, Jr., "Contemporary Problems of Local Government in Mexico," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XVIII (December, 1965), pp. 858-65.

<sup>104</sup>For Presidential control over the state and local governments, see Padgett, op. cit., pp. 150-51; Bradenburg, op. cit., pp. 150-52; and Scott, op. cit., pp. 46-7.

is performed. The interesting aspect of the President's role in rule making is that a body of procedures and rules have developed which has led to a greater institutionalization of the process. The phrase "government by consultation" has been used to describe this process of institutionalization, the major characteristic being the expansion of the office of the Presidency.<sup>105</sup> The expansion of this office has helped the regularization of procedures in both minor and major decisions. In minor decisions the concerned bureaucratic agency can usually make the decision and this will be passed on to a representative in the office of the Presidency. Should the decision involve any difficulty it can be sent to the President and after his decision, be sent back through channels to the appropriate structure. This standardization of minor procedures has helped to ease the burden of Presidential decision-making, especially in comparison with the Cárdenas administration when he was forced into making virtually all the decisions within the political system.<sup>106</sup> It also means that the President and the Inner Council can devote more time to important policy decisions without bogging down in a morass of hopeless details. In these major questions of policy, the President often establishes a committee in the ministry or agency concerned with representation of those interests groups with a stake in the matter, a representative from his own office and bureaucrats concerned

---

<sup>105</sup>Scott , op. cit., p. 279, first used this phrase.

<sup>106</sup>Cardenas made almost all the important decisions for the political system including the lands to be distributed under the agrarian reform. See James, op. cit., pp. 250-88.

with the decision. After the committee has reached a decision based on the compromise of positions, they submit their recommendations to the President who can either reject or accept the proposals---in most cases it is accepted since the representative of the President can communicate his desires throughout the consultative period. This process allows for compromise before the President makes a decision, while at the same time he is aware of the problems within the committee and therefore is able to determine within some degree what solution will be accepted.<sup>107</sup> Thus Mexico has developed a system of rule making centralized in the office of the Presidency, one that has been increasingly institutionalized; and one that allows for compromise and mediation between representatives of interest groups, the President, and the administrative structure. This process is no small feat in a country with little background in the institutionalization of decision-making allowing for the participation of those concerned.

In the rule application function, it should be obvious that the President applies all the rules. But he is helped in this function by a fine corps of bureaucrats that have recently aided in the administration of the country. Despite the existence of graft and the omnipresent mordida, by and large there has been a vast improvement in administrative practices in Mexico in the last thirty years. The primary reason for this improvement appears to be the recruitment of more and more technically-trained personnel to fill administrative posts. These people have grown up under the revolutionary ideology and manifest an intense

---

<sup>107</sup> This process is discussed in Padgett, op. cit., pp. 157-60.

desire to fulfill the goals of the Mexican Revolution. With the general goals of social and economic development, these people have been able to subordinate personal desires and political ambition to the over-all goal of Mexican development. While political considerations have not all-together disappeared as factors in the recruitment and appointment of officials, often technical considerations are more important than political ones. Needless to say, political "adaptability" is the second major consideration.<sup>108</sup> Scott notes that an effort is also made to include within the Cabinet representatives of the major interest groups in the country, and in addition to providing them with access to the President, it probably also provided a measure of rapport with the administrators.<sup>109</sup> As stated earlier, the FSTSE is the major interest group supporting the goals of the Revolutionary Family. These are the Mexicans who endorse the revolutionary ideology to the greatest extent, and in return they have benefitted probably more than any other single group. This means that in the administration of the country the President can rely on a group committed to the goals and policies of the Family while he also has the power to make sure the policies are enforced.

In the rule making and rule application functions the following features appear most significant for comparison with Bolivia:

1. The President is the major structure performing the rule making function in Mexico. As such, it is important to note the extent to which the function has not been performed by other structures in the polity. In Mexico the legislature has very

---

<sup>108</sup>Scott, op. cit., p. 282.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid.

little power and is used chiefly as a propaganda device as well as to reward faithful politicians. The semi-autonomous agencies are controlled by the President. Finally, through control of the budget and the selection of local officials, the budget and the selection of local officials, the President has subjugated the state and local units to the central government's domination and control. Thus, in Bolivia the first question is: what structures performed the rule making function? Was it the President? Were the semi-autonomous agencies subordinated to the President? And, to what extent did the central government control state and local government's?

- (2) There has developed in the office of the Presidency a regularized procedure for making decisions. In minor matters decisions are made within the bureaucracy; in major decisions a consultative process has been institutionalized which includes representatives from interest groups, the bureaucracy, and the President. To what extent did Bolivia develop regular procedures for making rules? Where did these procedures take place? Did the bureaucracy make decisions in any manner? What was the role of the President?
- (3) Although graft and poor administrative practices have not been eliminated in Mexico, the rewards and prestige of offices have given a certain elite status to bureaucrats. The emphasis in recruitment is on technical qualifications, and the elite seems to have adopted an elan and esprit de corp of devotion to the ideals of the Mexican Revolution. One of the reasons for this

has been the fact that the bureaucrats are major recipients of rewards from the system. Finally, the President and the Family directly control the rule application function with the aid of the administrative structure. Who performed the rule application function in Bolivia? Was it controlled directly by the President and the elite? Did they have a unified bureaucracy to help in the application of the rules? Did the administrators support the MNR? What were the standards of recruitment of bureaucrats under the MNR?

#### G. The Rule Adjudication Function.

The primary concern under the adjudication function is the performance of the structures which interpret the rules and decisions of the system. This is normally equated with the judiciary, but in Mexico the judiciary is not independent for the simple reason that the President appoints the judges for specific terms of office and can remove them virtually at will.<sup>110</sup> In effect the President, as in the case of rule making and rule application, dominates the rule adjudication function. Under the current system it would seem highly unlikely that any judge would be totally independent of the Family (even if permitted) since he would have been recruited and chosen on the basis of support for the Family and the revolutionary ideology. It should also be remembered that the Supreme Court of Mexico has no power of judicial review over decisions made by the legislature of the President. Nevertheless,

---

<sup>110</sup>For the role of the judiciary, see Scott, op. cit., pp. 260-71; also Padgett, op. cit., pp. 148-9. Both point out that there is an increasing professionalization of the judiciary.

an interesting practice has developed around the writ of amparo which requires mention. 131

The writ of amparo is issued against an administrative official for acts committed against constitutional rights. Although the writ is not used for political questions, it has been and is involved often in Mexico against particular abuses of government officials. While the decision of the courts does not have binding power over similar problems, in practice the decision often serves as a warning to the government about specific abuses or government procedures. The increase in the number of writs of amparo in recent years would seem to indicate that many citizens have found it to be an effective means for protecting themselves against arbitrary government acts. The President or any other official has little to fear from the writ, but minor officials know that they can be held responsible for their acts and this has no doubt helped to regularize administrative practices and at the same time given the average citizen some feeling that he can be protected against irresponsible acts of the government.<sup>111</sup>

One other factor should be considered under rule adjudication, and this is the role of the police and other security organs of the system. (In the strict sense of the term the actions of the police are both rule application and rule adjudication since they apply the rules and interpret them at the same time.) The Mexican police are notorious for brutality and the jails are equally famous for their horrible conditions. (This writer has seen the jail in Ciudad Juarez and it is indeed horrible.)<sup>112</sup> The citizen can hardly take pride in such a

---

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., for the importance of the writ of amparo.

<sup>112</sup> See, for instance, the account of Roberto Sanchez on the jail conditions in Mexico City, in The Children of Sanchez, op. cit., pp. 220-33.



police system and it probably leads to some alienation from the political system.<sup>113</sup> In the realm of security, the Mexican system includes at least 17 principal agents helping the Revolutionary Family to control and prevent rebellion and violence.<sup>114</sup> In fact it seems highly unlikely that rebellion could succeed. Although there has been a decrease in such methods as murder and torture for political prisoners, the strong state security system still makes it somewhat perilous for opposing politicians to contemplate open (or hidden) subversion. Thus, the Revolutionary Family not only gains the support of groups through rewards and participation in the system, but it also reinforces this support with a strong security system aiding in the prevention of rebellion or subversion.

In the rule adjudication function, then, the following appears most important:

1. Despite an increasing professionalization of the judiciary in Mexico, the President still dominates the judiciary and the adjudication function through control of the appointment of judges and the vast state security system. What structures performed the rule adjudication function in Bolivia? Did the President control the function? What role did the judiciary play?
2. Although the judiciary does not present a direct nor independent threat to the control of the Family, through the writ of amparo some administrative abuses are subject to review and correction. It would appear that the writ serves as a device for correcting a feeling that he can gain redress of grievances from the

---

<sup>113</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 68-78, found this to be the case.  
<sup>114</sup>Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 162-4.

government. Did a similiar device exist in Bolivia? Was there any way for the citizen to feel that he could correct certain abuses committed by the administration?

3. Although Mexico has come a long way from the past, the present police and security apparatus no doubt contributes to the citizen alienation through poor practices while at the same time it contributes to the domination of the Family through control of any opposition to their rule. What was the security system under the MNR? Did it contribute to citizen alienation and/or control of the opposition by the government?

#### H. The Political Communication Function.

The types of structures performing the communication function in Mexico vary from informal face-to-face contacts, as in the case of the Revolutionary Family, to the mass media. Included are traditional structures such as the family and school, "output" structures such as the bureaucracy and the President, and the "input" structures such as interest groups and the PRI. Probably the most important structure in the communication function is the Revolutionary Family and in it the style is still largely personal based on face-to-face contact. Nonetheless, there does appear to be an increasing specialization of communication through interest groups and the mass media. The major task of all the structures in the communication function is the socialization into the revolutionary ideology and the acceptance of the present political system. In so far as can be determined, the various structures appear to be successful in this with the restriction that there still exists a wide discrepancy between the actual and the ideal in the Mexican system. The reason for this success is the general consensus on the values of the

system, and the subsequent elimination of subcultural patterns which could be maintained through fragmented communication patterns and structures.

It would also appear that there is little distortion of information, at least that reaching the President and the Family, where it is most important. Since all the structures of the system are tied to the office of the Presidency, they would seem to present to him rather accurate picture of all the political problems arising in the Republic. Not only does everything lead to the President, but also he in his speeches and through the channels of the PRI can inform the population of the government's desires and policies, Therefore, information distortion in that direction would appear low. Distortion in lower government levels might be greater, but it is difficult to judge at this time without further research.

The autonomy of the mass media structures is real. The mass media in México are free to print or broadcast what they want within the relative context of the present system. However, it should be added that many of the figures in the mass media are themselves members of the Revolutionary Family and therefore do not stray far from the official ideology. Moreover, the government controls the movie industry and has certain controls over television as well as the newsprint for newspapers. With this control it seems unlikely that any mass media would directly confront the Family. Yet Mexico does enjoy a high degree of freedom of expression; and although access to the major structures may be somewhat limited (for the average citizen), an opposing view can be heard.

In the performance of the political communication function in Mexico the following appears most relevant:

1. Most of the structures in the Mexican political system are effective agents for communicating the revolutionary ideology as well as endorsing the present system. With the reduction of subcultural affiliations and the consensus on the Revolution, structures communicating differences from the existing system have been reduced or eliminated. In Bolivia, was the political communication function performed in such a way as to support the existing system? Did the structures agree on that which was to be communicated? Was there an elimination of subcultural fragmentation in the communication process?
2. The President, as center of the entire political system, has little information distortion in Mexico. He and the PRI also serve as effective agents for disseminating information to the people. Was there information distortion in the Bolivian system? Particularly, did the President receive accurate information? Did he communicate accurately to the people the actions of the government? Did the MNR have a role in the communication function?
3. In Mexico the mass media is relatively free from government control. Although the directors of these media are members of the Family and supporters of the system, they are free to express dissenting opinions. To what extent was the mass media autonomous under the MNR? Was it controlled by the government or party? Was there freedom of expression for opposition newspapers and radios?

## CHAPTER III

### THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOLIVIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

This chapter will be concerned with the pre-1952 political system, a system which to a great extent conditioned that which the MNR established after the April Revolution. Not only did the traditional system effect the operation of the MNR in the post-revolutionary era, but that system also exerted a great influence on the members and leaders of the party, who were themselves products of the traditional system and therefore socialized into its values, attitudes, and institutions. After a brief historical review, the primary focus of the chapter will be on the political culture and the political socialization and recruitment functions of the traditional system. Then will follow sections of the interest articulation and aggregation functions especially to determine patterns and developments which might have influenced subsequent political behavior. Of particular importance is the history of the Movimiento during the years from 1940 to 1952 for the specific events which might have effected future party leaders of groups within the MNR. Finally, the governmental functions as well as that of political communication will be examined.

#### A. The Political Culture.

The historical background of Mexico and Bolivia resemble each other to a striking degree. Both countries, prior to the Spanish conquest, were dominated by Indian civilizations which were centralized and autocratically run. If anything, Bolivia was more centralized than Mexico due to the efficiency of the Incan empire and the general lack of competing political

cultures.<sup>1</sup> Although there did exist tribes and Indian groups other than the Incas, the two major geographical areas of the country, the altiplano and the valleys, were dominated by the Inca and adhered to the demands of the empire. As is well-known, the Inca empire was a bureaucratic, centralized, and efficient operation which placed emphasis on loyalty to the Inca and the aristocracy, while at the same time providing a measure of security for the inhabitants. It was, all in all, one of the most effective ancient civilizations in extracting and regulating the lives of its citizens.<sup>2</sup> Although these services were extracted and the lives of the citizens highly regulated, as they were later by the Spaniards, the Indians were well-provided for in terms of food, clothing, housing, and a sense of security engendered by the empire. Although at the time of the Spanish arrival the empire showed signs of disintegration brought on by a feud over succession to the throne, the conquistadores found not only a people totally dominated by Cuzco, but also a people who were loyal to the regime.

The Spaniards grafted their own system onto that of the Inca, with the obvious difference that the general well-being of the Indian received short consideration. The mineral wealth of the Bolivian altiplano required the services of many workers to extract it for the Spanish king. In order to obtain these workers, the Spanish resorted to the mita, a form of forced labor borrowed from the Inca resembling the levees of European feudalism.

---

<sup>1</sup>For interpretations of the history of the Incas, see William H. Prescott, The Conquest of Peru (New York: Mentor Books, 1961); Victor M. Von Hagen, Realm of the Incas (New York: Mentor Books, 1957); and Harold Osborne, Indians of the Andes: Aymaras and Quechuas (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952).

<sup>2</sup>For an interesting structural-functional analysis of the Inca empire, see Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1966), pp. 233-240.

indians were forcefully removed from their villages and transported to the mining communities where most of them endured a harsh life and a good many died from the primitive conditions found in that hostile environment. Additionally, as a result of the repartimiento and encomienda systems other Indians found themselves as virtual slaves on huge fincas and haciendas, and their traditional communal structure, the ayllu, was partially destroyed. The Indians had little or nothing to do with the colonial political structures since their lives were dominated by the local patrón rather than the government. Despite frequent attempts to overthrow the colonial system, most notably that of Tupac Amaru in the eighteenth century, the Indian found himself more and more chained to a way of life which made him no more than a beast of burden for his white master. In spite of intermarriage between the Spaniards and the Indians, forming the mestizo or cholo class, for the most part a caste system was maintained with the whites at the top totally dominating the society and polity.<sup>3</sup>

Although the revolt of the colonies against mother Spain was acknowledged to have originated in the intellectual circles of Sucre, then Chuquisaca, there did not exist then (nor perhaps now) a clear idea of the country to be carved out of the middle of the continent.<sup>4</sup> As a result, when Bolivia was founded in 1825, it was formed out of existing chunks of other areas and had no natural boundaries with its neighbors. Regionalism, even at that time, was highly developed and there was some question, voiced

---

<sup>3</sup>Mestizo refers to the intermarriage of Indian and white. In Bolivia cholo refers to the Indian who moves to the city and adopts Spanish customs.

<sup>4</sup>This confusion was partially due to the overlapping boundaries of the viceroalties of Lima and La Plata and the equally confusing jurisdictions of the audiencias.

by many at the first constitutional convention, whether the central government was to have any power at all over the departments. In fact one provision called for the creation of standing armies by the individual departments which, in effect, reflected the existing lack of control over the military chiefs in these areas.<sup>5</sup> This problem of departmental versus central governmental power was a recurring one throughout the nineteenth century and has persisted to the present day. The first two Presidents of the Republic, Simon Bolívar and José Antonio de Sucre, enjoyed the general support of the populace (with the possible exception of the Indians who had little knowledge of and less interest in political events), but gradually there was an increasing alienation of the aristocracy (consisting for the most part of owners of haciendas) from the political system. In fact they totally abdicated political leadership and the void was subsequently filled for the next fifty years by a series of "barbarous caudillos."<sup>6</sup> These men were primarily cholos who made their way up through the army ranks and then seized power by violent means. Most notorious of these men was Mariano Melgarejo who established a pattern which has seldom been approached for its irresponsibility by any Latin American caudillo, including his counterpart in Mexico, Santa Anna. In addition to numerous social and political acts which offended Bolivians, Melgarejo managed to cede a great area of the country away to Brazil for personal favors received.<sup>7</sup> It may be added that

---

<sup>5</sup>Charles W. Arnade, The Emergence of the Republic of Bolivia (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1957).

<sup>6</sup>This is the title of a popular book by Alcides Arguedas, Los caudillos barbaros (Barcelona: Ed. Tasso, 1929).

<sup>7</sup>Melgarejo has been the subject of numerous books and articles. Among the more interesting is Max Daireux, Melgarejo: Un tirano romantico (La Paz: Ed. Gisbert y Cía., 1958).



the total alienation of the rural Indian occurred during this period owing to the policy of the government to permit the landowners to dispossess the Indians from their ayllus. By the end of the century the number of Indians living the traditional communal life was restricted to the more remote villages of the country.<sup>8</sup>

The era of the caudillos bárbaros came to an end following the defeat of Bolivia by Chile in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884. In addition to the loss of its seacoast, this war aroused the political spirit of the newer middle sectors and the resurgent mining concerns. Bolivian mining had declined rapidly in the early part of the century but prior to the war the silver mines began to operate and new interest was shown in tin. The defeat in the War of the Pacific convinced the groups connected with the resurgence in mining, as well as remnants of the older aristocracy, that the country needed a more rational political system. As a result two political parties, the Liberal and Conservative, were formed which were theoretically based on different approaches to the problems of federalism and the role of the Church, but in reality they were only instruments for the control of the system by a few; neither administration nor policy differed much when either was in power.<sup>9</sup> These parties were soon dominated by the Big Three mineowners, Aramayo, Hothschild, and Patiño. The latter in particular controlled the political system through his control of the international tin market and the total dependence of the Bolivian government on this mineral

---

<sup>8</sup>Arturo Urquidi, El feudalismo en América y la reforma agraria boliviana (Cochabamba: Amigos del Libro, 1966), pp. 174-78.

<sup>9</sup>Herbert S. Klein, Orígenes de la revolución nacional boliviana (La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1968) pp. 13-73.

as a source of revenue.<sup>10</sup> The mineowners or "barons of tin" soon became a "state within a state" totally dominating the political system and the parties, allowing the facade of competition but in reality preventing the emergence of a truly competitive politics which might challenge their pre-eminence. It must be added that this period also saw the emergence of a search for a cultural and intellectual solution to Bolivia's problems, and many of the writers of this period laid the foundations for subsequent nationalistic proposals prior to and after the Chaco War.<sup>11</sup>

This traditional political system remained intact until the Chaco War, despite the emergence of new political parties and the birth of the labor movement in the 1920's. In the intellectual circles of the country there was an increasing interest in the "newer" doctrines of socialism as well as a growing sense of nationalism.<sup>12</sup> This growing nationalism led Bolivia into the senseless struggle with Paraguay and its subsequent defeat in the Chaco War. The defeat was an extreme blow to national pride and the growing middle groups began to question the efficiency and legitimacy of the traditional political system. In addition, the war was responsible for bringing many Indians, many of whom had little or no concept of the government or even of the idea of the Bolivian nation, into contact with the national political system. Accompanying this awakening of political

---

<sup>10</sup>As of yet there is no satisfactory study of Simon Patiño nor of his tin empire. See, however, John Hewlett, Like Moonlight on Snow: The Life of Simon Patino (New York: McBride Co., 1947); Manuel Carrasco, Simon I. Patiño; un prócer industrial (Cochabamba: Ed. Canelas, 1964); and for a general study of the tin barons, Sergio Almaraz Paz, El poder y la caída (Cochabamba: Los Amigos del Libro, 1967).

<sup>11</sup>Klein, op. cit., pp. 13-33; Guillermo Frankovich, El Pensamiento boliviano en el siglo XX (Mexico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956).

<sup>12</sup>See Charles W. Arnade, "The U.S. and the Ultimate Roots of the Bolivian Revolution", Historia (Puerto Rico: University of Puerto Rico, January, 1962), pp. 15-49.

consciousness was the movement of many rural inhabitants into the cities, thereby disturbing a population balance which had remained stable for 400 years; this, in turn, created problems for the government and exposed others to the political system.<sup>13</sup> As a result of the widespread disgust with the mismanagement of the war by both the civilians and older army officers, two younger officers, David Toro and German Busch, seized control of the government in 1935 and inaugurated a regime under the title of "military socialism."<sup>14</sup> While the emphasis was more on the "military" than on "socialism," the Toro-Busch governments did take some measures designed to challenge the existing order. Most notable was the creation of a Minister of Work and the enactment of labor legislation which gave the Bolivian workers, for the first time, the opportunity to organize in order to obtain certain economic and social objectives. It was during this period that the foundations of the future labor movement of Bolivia were established. In a highly popular act, Busch also nationalized the properties of the Standard Oil Company in 1937. This act was symbolic of the nationalistic and anti-imperialistic spirit growing in the country. With the death of Busch in 1938 the mineowners and conservative army officers regained control of the government and tried to ignore or rescind the reforms carried out under military socialism, but their position was being increasingly threatened by the emergence of various parties advocating the overthrow of the traditional system.

---

<sup>13</sup>Unfortunately it is difficult to encounter statistical data with regard to this movement to the cities. Bolivians have told me, however, that many of the veterans of the Chaco, as well as others, began to move to the cities during and after the War.

<sup>14</sup>Klein, op. cit., pp. 263-304; this appeared in English as, "David Toro and the Establishment of 'Military Socialism' in Bolivia," Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. XLV, (February, 1965), pp. 25-52.

After the governments of Carlos Quintanilla and Enrique Peñaranda (1939-43) which were controlled by the oligarchy, the newer elements came into power again through an alliance between young army officers organized into the Razón de Patria (RADEPA) and the incipient MNR. Both groups were sympathetic to the Axis and contained fascist elements such as mystic nationalism and anti-semitism in their ideologies.<sup>15</sup> However, the government was sympathetic to labor, allowing the miners to form the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSIMB) to protect their interests, and generally lending support to other organization activities of labor. The MNR-RADEPA government also held the first National Indian Congress to review the problems of the rural masses. Although nothing came out of this Congress it was indicative of an awakening interest in the plight of the Indians. Unfortunately, this government under its President Major Gualberto Villarroel, also practiced political persecution and this, combined with the growing alienation of the middle groups in the cities, led to its downfall in 1946. Thus the first government of the MNR ended in failure, partially due to a lack of coherent programs, and partially due to the inability of the party to enlist the support of the urban middle sectors. For the next six years, called el sexenio by party historians, the oligarchy returned to power and attempted once again to undo the reforms of the Villarroel regime. This effort contributed to the permanent alienation of the labor movement and helped the MNR to obtain the support of labor groups to overthrow the traditional political system. In 1951 general elections were called and Víctor Paz Estenssoro, the presidential candidate of

---

<sup>15</sup>For an official United State view of these predelictions, see the "Blue Book", United States Department of State, Memorandum: Consultation Among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation (Washington: GPO, 1946), pp. 20-21; for ideology of the MNR, supra, p. 143.

the MNR, won a plurality of the votes, but not the necessary majority required by the Constitution. The military then stepped in and took over the government to prevent the MNR from acceding to power. With this action the MNR began an active subversive campaign and on the night of April 8, 1952, party militia with help from worker militia and the police began the revolt. The next day the government fell and the Bolivian National Revolution started.

So much for the history of Bolivia.<sup>16</sup> What then were the dominant characteristics of the political culture in the pre-revolutionary political system? These may be conveniently divided into two types: 1) the structural differences based on such factors as race, region, and social and economic class; and 2) the political attitudes prevalent in the society which were basically the result of structural differences. We will first discuss the differences found in the social structure and then the patterns of attitudes encountered. On one point there is little debate with respect to the traditional political and social system: it was totally dominated by an elite. This elite, composed of a few mineowners, landowners, and what few industrialists Bolivia had, was not only the political elite, but also dominated the economic and social life of the country. The middle sectors, comprising a small part of the urban population, were the actual political participants

---

<sup>16</sup>As of yet there is no satisfactory history of Bolivia. Klein's work, *op. cit.*, is the most serious and comprehensive to date but it covers a limited period. Another book in English is Robert Barton, A Short History of the Republic of Bolivia (La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1968)., but this is intended to be a general introduction to the country for the non-specialist. Bolivian historians tend to be philosophical and polemical in their approach to history and much is written in the form of personal diatribe. Among the better are Enrique Finot, Nueva historia de Bolivia (La Paz: Gisbert y Cia, 1964); and a series of books by Porfirio Diaz Machicao on the Presidents from Felip Guzman (1925-26) to Penaranda (1943).

in the sense that they formed the political parties and ran the governments, but they were continually subject to the control and direction of the oligarchy. This oligarchy used the government to protect its own financial position, to say nothing of the system as a defense of the social and economic status quo. By and large the elite looked outward; that is to say, they looked to Europe or the United States rather than to the development of Bolivia. They took little pride in their country and preferred to maintain a system which allowed them to spend a good part of their time abroad. Most of them were, in fact, absent from the country, either in Chile, Peru, or Europe. Simon Patiño left Bolivia early in his career and dominated the economic and political life of Bolivia from Paris.<sup>17</sup> Although the mine-owners did spend some of their money for improvement of basic transportation facilities, usually they prevailed on the government to borrow heavily to finance railroads and other projects which helped them and not the majority of the population.<sup>18</sup> The haciendas of the landowners were self-supporting centers of agriculture but they were inefficient in terms of feeding the remainder of the population.<sup>19</sup> As a result Bolivia was forced

---

<sup>17</sup>The unconfirmed story is often told that Patino left the country because the Social Club of Cochabamba refused to grant him membership. This club is an exclusive one dominated by the whites and they were reportedly appaled at the cholo background of Patiño. The rejection of the richest man in the country for basically racial reasons may be indicative of racial differences more profound than illustrated in this paper.

<sup>18</sup>For a somewhat biased account of the role of American Bankers in the 1920's, see Margaret A. Marsh, The Bankers in Bolivia (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928). It is of more than passing interest that this book is well-known by Bolivians---other books in English are not---and that it is required reading in the University of San Simón in Cochabamba.

<sup>19</sup>For a description of these haciendas, see Frank L. Keller, "Finca Ingavi: A Medieval Survival on the Bolivian Altiplano," Economic Geography, Vol. XXVI (1950), pp. 37-50; also Edmundo Flores, "Taraco: monografía de un latifundio del altiplano boliviano", El Trimestre Económico, Vol. XXII (1955), pp. 209-30.

to import food. This elite was white and regarded the Indians as an inferior race, incapable of intellectual or economic improvement. In spite of its total control of the social, economic, and political life of the nation, the elite was almost completely alienated from the realities of the Bolivian masses; in fact it wanted nothing to do with those realities.

Bolivia had, and still has for that matter, a very small middle sector. It was composed of urban businessmen, commerciantes, teachers, students, a few professionals, government employees, administrative employees of the Big-Three mines, and some cholos who had managed to accumulate savings and move up the social scale. The total number probably did not exceed 10% of the population. Despite the small number it was an important group in the society because the actual politicians and administrators came from this strata. Until the Chaco War they supported the oligarchy and the traditional system; afterwards this group supplied the active politicians who were to challenge the existing system. For the most part, however, the middle groups were primarily interested in economic and social advancement and very few took an active interest in politics. Their ideal goals were to imitate the social and economic power of the oligarchy; they did not constitute a political threat to the status quo. Perhaps the major political characteristic of these groups was a fear of the Indians and the workers who represented a threat to their government, the chief cause of which was its endorsement of the labor movement and the first tentative appeals to the Indian masses. Both were unacceptable to the middle sectors. Thus their support for the system was basically passive--with some exceptions---and in a sense they were alienated from the system because they left management of politics to the elite.

The great mass of the population, the rural Indians, who numbers approximately 75% of the populace, were totally isolated and alienated from the political system. The two basic tribal divisions in Bolivia, the Aymara of the altiplano and the Quechua of the valleys, were unassimilated into the society in terms of dress, religion, social customs, or language.<sup>20</sup> Through centuries of oppression and opportunism by the ruling elite, these Indians had learned that they could expect virtually nothing from the ruling groups. Most of them lived out lives of slavery either in the mines of the altiplano or the haciendas scattered throughout the country. They performed certain services for the hacendado (most notably the pongueaje, a form of personal services required of all members of the hacienda), and in return received barely enough land to feed their families. The Indians went on periodic drunken outbursts at fiestas and endured the burden of their lives through the chewing of coca.<sup>21</sup> In turn their white masters regarded them as not much better than beasts, somewhat subhuman, and

---

<sup>20</sup>One of the few attempts made to classify the differences between Indian and Spanish life may be found in Richard W. Patch, "Social Implications of the Bolivian Agrarian Reform", (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Cornell University, 1956), pp. 88-90.

<sup>21</sup>The subject of coca-chewing has been one of much controversy. Some maintain that it has harmful effects; others insist that it is no more harmful than the American coffee break. For a description and analysis of the debate, see Osborne, op. cit., pp. 227-251; also Olen P. Leonard, Bolivia: Land, People, and Institutions (Washington: Scarecrow Press, 1952).



treated them equally with their livestock.<sup>22</sup> Their lives had not changed since the arrival of the Spanish and they had few possibilities of advancement. The majority accepted their lives with "stoic fatalism" and made rare efforts to improve their positions for when they did it would attract the interests of the landowners and result in the confiscation of their land. They took no part in the economic system of the country; instead they existed on a marginal market of barter and exchange within the confines of the hacienda. They were often totally unaware of the existence of any other world than the mining camp or hacienda. Finally, the government was remote, it was outside their level of existence, and the only authority they recognized outside that of their own communal structures was the local patron, whether minewoner or hacendado.

Thus the social structure of Bolivia consisted of a small elite at the top, reinforced by an equally small middle sector, dominating the mass of Indians who lived lives totally isolated and separated from the active life of the nation. The basic division in this society was one of race. The elite and the middle groups were white, the cholos occupied lower positions in the middle groups, and the Indians occupied the lower strata ---considerably lower. The racial differences were reinforced by social

---

<sup>22</sup>Witness the following quote attributed to Hernan Siles Zuazo by Robert J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. 17.

The Indian is a sphinx. He inhabits a hermetic world, inaccessible to the white and mestizo. We don't understand his forms of life, nor his mental mechanisms. The sociologist and the narrator don't succeed in molding the living individual...We speak of the Indian as a mass factor in the nation; in truth we are ignorant of his individual psyche and collective drama. The Indian does not allow himself to be understood, he doesn't desire communication. Retiring, silent, immutable, he inhabits a close world. The Indian is an enigma.

differences based on language, religion, education, clothes, types of housing, employment, and so forth. The division of wealth further reinforced these differences. It was a caste system in which the majority of the population had no role in the political, social, or economic life of the nation.

A major contributing factor to the isolation of not only the rural masses but also the sub-elites based on regional affiliations, was the geography of the country and the attendant problems that arose from lack of communication and transportation.<sup>23</sup> Bolivia is one of the geographical monstrosities of the world, encompassing within its borders some of the harshest and most terrifying terrain to be found anywhere. The country is often conveniently divided into three geographical zones: the altiplano, the yungas, and the oriente; the division masks the reality of the geographical diversity to be found. The altiplano is the tableland existing between the Eastern and Western cordilleras of the Andes. The average altitude is 12,000 feet above sea level and the land, except during the brief rainy season, resembles a lunar landscape. On this tableland are found the majority of the inhabitants of Bolivia especially in the cities of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, the mining centers, and the densely populated area around Lake Titicaca. Almost all of the mineral wealth of the country is located on the altiplano and the work conditions are severely handicapped by the altitude. In spite of the fact that the majority of the population of this zone is engaged in agriculture, the land is hostile and unproductive, requiring constant attention for the small rewards gained.

---

<sup>23</sup>Probably the best description of Bolivian geography is to be found in Harold Osborne, Bolivia: A Land Divided (3rd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 1-48.

The Yungas are described as the valleys which descend from the Eastern Cordillera from just north of La Paz down to Tarija. (More recently they refer usually to the colonized zone outside La Paz of Coroico, Chulumani, and Caranavi.) The major cities in the valleys are Sucre, Cochabamba, and Tarija. These valleys vary in altitude and productivity as well as access to markets. In many of the valleys are to be found isolated communities and farms which have few contacts with the outside world. The major population area is the Quechua-Indian dominated Cochabamba Valley which is relatively rich in soil and has a ready market for the producer. The third zone, the oriente, consists of the lowlands to the East, including the entire Pando and Beni departments which are partly Amazon jungle basins, and partly pampas conducive to cattle growing. However, transportation is virtually impossible except by airplane owing to periodic floods and jungle vegetation. The area around Santa Cruz is relatively wealthy and has offered opportunities for increased agricultural production in recent years, especially after the completion of the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway. Santa Cruz was the victim of the transportation system developed by the mineowners. It had been a major producer of foodstuffs until the first of the twentieth century but subsequent railroad construction made it cheaper to import food than bring it from Santa Cruz. As a result the region almost died.<sup>24</sup> Prior to the completion of this highway the Cruceños---or cambas as they are called in Bolivia---were among the most vociferous of the regionalists in Bolivia, and often they looked more to Brazil and Argentina

---

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 96-100, for a description of the decline of Santa Cruz.

than to La Paz.<sup>25</sup> The southern part of the oriente is dominated by the Gran Chaco desert, one of the most inhospitable regions known to man. Less than 15% of the Bolivian population lives in the oriente which comprises more than 60% of the national territory.

What this adds up to is a country divided by extremes of topography and climate making transportation and communication very difficult. Under the traditional system few efforts were made to surpass these geographical handicaps and the various regions of the country remained physically isolated. The sole exception was the construction of railroads from the mining centers to the sea, but these had little effect on the economic or geographical integration of the country. Regionalism, as a result, was widespread and there was a great distrust of the capital La Paz. All too often this distrust was justified since La Paz collected taxes and returned few services to the outlying regions. Prior to the Chaco War---and after---many Bolivians were more conscious of being Cochabambinos, Cruceños, Benianos, or Paceños, rather than Bolivianos. What this meant was that there existed various subcultures based on regional and local affiliation in addition to the larger subcultural divisions based on race and wealth. It also meant that it was much easier for the rural masses to remain isolated

---

<sup>25</sup>This attitude has not entirely died as can be shown by the manifestation of separatism in the recent (May 1968) meeting of the foreign ministers of the Cuenca de la Plata group in Santa Cruz. At this meeting numerous pamphlets were circulated urging the separation of the Santa Cruz region from Bolivia. It is interesting to note that Bolivian foreign policy over economic integration seems curiously divided between adherence to the Cuenca de la Plata group representing Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil, and the Andean group representing Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Perhaps the reason is that La Paz and the mines must seek an outlet to the West whereas the natural market for Santa Cruz---barring a dramatic improvement in the internal market---is to the East and South.

since they seldom could encounter the structures of government. The importance of the geographical diversity of Bolivia, and its attendant strong regionalism, should not be underestimated for it remains a potent factor in Bolivian politics.

What were the political attitudes of the groups in the society? First, in terms of the distribution of the political orientations of the population, if almost all the rural Indians are placed in a single category, it would seem that at least 75% of the population could be classified as parochials. Of the remaining 25%, which corresponds to the urban population in 1950, the majority were subjects with a few participants.<sup>26</sup> One statistic which might be used is the election returns for 1951 when only 126,000 out of a total of less than 250,000 registered voters cast their ballots.<sup>27</sup> If the latter figure is taken, with a total population of slightly over 3 million, approximately 12% of the population could be classified as subject-participants in the sense that they had enough interest to register to vote. However, if the former figure is taken, indicating a widespread apathy (as well as conscious restrictions of participation) in the political system, roughly 5% could be considered as the actual political participants in the system. This would mean that the entire population could be divided into 80% parochials, 15% subjects and the remaining 5% participants. Without adequate research, now virtually impossible, it

---

<sup>26</sup>The census of 1950, the last the country had, included as urban all communities over 2,000 population. As this would include a good many provincial capitals and other villages difficult to call "urban", the actual figure of parochials may be much higher.

<sup>27</sup>For a discussion of the election returns, see Luis Peñaloza, Historia del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1963), p. 248.

seems hazardous to make a more accurate distinction between the subjects and participants; the important factor to be noted is the fact that approximately 80% of the population were parochials.

In assessing the political orientation and attitudes of these classifications, it may prove beneficial to employ the categories used by Almond and Verba; namely, how did the individual relate to the system as a general object?, how did he relate to the input and output objects of the system?, and how did he see himself within the system?<sup>28</sup> The Bolivian rural masses, as parochials, were simply unaware of the "political system" per se.<sup>29</sup> Their system of authority was based on cultural divisions and their relationship to the world outside their community was through the local patron. Many were totally unaware that they were residents of a country called Bolivia. They had no access to the input side of the political system and no sense of how to articulate their demands. Although they may have been more aware of the output side of the system, through taxes, military service, etc., their sense of relationship was still based on local connections and allegiances, not on national ones. Finally, they had absolutely no sense of participation in the political system. The subjects, consisting of parts of the middle sectors, lower class workers in the cities, the miners and other organized workers, and some Indians living close to cities, were able to see the political system as a separate object and were probably familiar with

---

<sup>28</sup>Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1965), pp. 16-19.

<sup>29</sup>There are two exceptions which will be noted later: Warisata and Ucureña.

its history and general characteristics. However, their general orientation, especially in the case of organized labor, was negative in the sense that they identified the system with their own oppressed condition. The middle sectors were probably less negatively oriented and were essentially passive to the system. The subjects were aware of the structures on the input side but did not use them for articulating their demands or communicating desires. The fundamental reason is that they realized the lack of power they had in the system. Their relationship to the output structures was equally negative, although they were much more aware of government policies and actions. In the case of organized labor, they regarded the government as an instrument for the ruling class to maintain the status quo and the various structures of the political system, the army, police, courts, etc., as part of the oppressive system. The remaining subjects were apathetic to these objects since they knew they could effect them but little. Finally, it is difficult to see how the subjects could see themselves as participants in the system. They basically rejected the system, either actively or apathetically, and could not be expected to see themselves as individuals controlling and directing such a system. The third classification, the participants, consisted of the oligarchy and those members of the middle class who either aligned themselves with the ruling group or opposed it. Their orientation to the political system would be determined by their stance: support or opposition. In the former case they saw the political system as a separate object, designed to perpetuate their dominance and assure their own elite status. They related equally well to the input and output structures, using them to maintain the status quo. They also saw themselves as participants in the sense of protecting their own dominance. The opponents of the system had a somewhat different orientation: they recognized the political system

and rejected it; they were aware of the input objects but deplored the control exercised by the elites; they knew the government structures connected with the output functions and rejected them; and they saw themselves as participants in the system but wanted to drastically alter that system to fit their own preconceived ideas.

From the preceding general statements it would appear obvious that there did not exist a consensus on the proper role of the political system for the society. Throughout Bolivia's history, until the Chaco War and the subsequent Constitutional Convention of 1938, the political system was regarded in the classical liberal sense; that is, it was to do as little as possible in the economic and social sense.<sup>30</sup> Actually the government had played an important role in the building of railroads and in the regulation of the mining industry (always with the support of the mineowners), but the general outlook remained one in which the activities of the government were limited and this was regarded as the ideal. Certainly the oligarchy did not envisage a great expansion of government services. Following the Chaco War the very profuseness of political parties covering every conceivable facet of the political spectrum indicated a lack of consensus on the role of the political system, although almost all the political parties were united on the assumption that some expansion of the role of the government was necessary. Unfortunately this very diversity prevented any rational compromise between and even within the politicized groups concerning the proper role of the political system. This role was not resolved prior to 1952; many would argue that it has yet to be resolved.

---

<sup>30</sup>For an excellent discussion of the Constitutional Convention of 1938 and the implication of "social constitutionalism," see Klein, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-19.



With regard to the levels of political trust and civility in the system, one can safely assume that neither existed at any high level. In addition to the general distrust between the races, and the subcultural differences based on regional affiliations, one must note that the general tone of politics during the period from 1935 to the April Revolution could do little more than contribute to political distrust. Throughout the period there was an increasing polarization of political stances caused by increasing persecution and failure to compromise. For instance, between the miners and the mineowners violence became the chief method of forcing one's viewpoint on the other, and the entire period resounds with numerous massacres, murders, and other political acts of a violent nature.<sup>31</sup> Political leaders fared little better for they were never certain when they might be imprisoned, exiled, or possibly murdered, either by the government or by other políticos. Certainly no one respected the right of the opposition to criticize the government for the simple reason that there did not exist any concept of a loyal opposition; rather, the total effort of all opposition groups was directed towards the overthrow of the existing government by any means possible. To work with the government was to sell-out to special interests, usually the mineowners. Even within the ranks of the opposition parties---and within parties themselves ---there was constant bickering and maneuvering with individual politicians changing their allegiances and alliances to suit the opportunities of the moment. To follow one individual politician during this period is to see an

---

<sup>31</sup>Although there is no historical account treating this aspect of politics, readers are urged to consult, Klein, op. cit., passim; Peñaloza, op. cit., and Agustin Barcelli, Medio siglo de luchas sindicales revolucionarias en Bolivia (La Paz: Ed. del Estado, 1956).

amazing variety of individual and group formations and alliances.<sup>32</sup> In such an atmosphere no one could trust anyone else. Respect for ideologies, lives, or political honor was low, and one can note numerous rather bizarre examples of political behavior, including duels, character defamations, attempted assassinations, etc. In short, it was a political system in which no one trusted anyone else and few expected considerate treatment from others.

One final consideration with regard to the pre-revolutionary political culture which demands attention is the pattern of individual orientation to the political system. Like the Mexican, the Bolivian suffered an identity crisis leading to alienation from the political system, especially in the case of two groups, the politicians and the rural inhabitants. In the case of the latter, their lives were governed by a set of rules encompassing their locale or hacienda. These rules were subject to the individual interpretation of the local patron and he could only be regarded as an instrument for the dominant society. It might be, however, difficult to prove that these Indians suffered an identity crisis in the modern clinical sense since the majority of them no doubt felt their day-to-day lives to be governed and secure under their family and local community rules.<sup>33</sup> In any case the rural masses had such a minute effect on the political system, and in turn were hardly effected by it, that for all practical purposes they can be ignored as significant factors in the polity---the importance of their sense of in-

---

<sup>32</sup>Peñaloza, *op. cit.*, for instance, gives an excellent account of numerous activities of Movimientista leaders during the period from 1946-52. Perhaps the most active was himself.

<sup>33</sup>On the political identity crisis and its application to politics, see Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 42-55; also his chapter in Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1966), pp. 89-112.

insecurity will be seen after the Revolution. The segment of the population which had the greatest identity crisis was the politically conscious urban middle sectors---to be precise the politicians---and here it had the widest possible impact. These politicians were primarily products of the Chaco War; that is to say they either fought in it or regarded it as the major setback to resurgent Bolivian nationalism. The defeat was a rude shock to their hopes and shattered dreams of Bolivian greatness. At the time it called into question the entire foundation of the political, social, and economic order of the country. The problem is that many had identified themselves with this resurgent nationalism and the shock of the defeat could only lead to a personal identity crisis. They had identified with Bolivia and seen it destroyed, and part of their own personalities were destroyed with it. Perhaps this is one of the reasons the post-war politicians hunted so frantically for an all-inclusive ideology which would offer not only Bolivia a new order but also help them in their own personal insecurity. In any case the political struggles throughout the period leading to the 1952 Revolution could not help but contribute to the identity crisis since the politicians could not agree on the basic fundamentals or the legitimacy of the political system. In this regard the Bolivian situation greatly resembled that of the Weimar Republic in Germany prior to the seizure of power by Hitler---there was no consensus on the values of the political system, there was a sense of shame over the loss in the war, and all were searching for a comprehensive program or ideology to alleviate the sense of personal identity loss.

In sum, the Bolivian political culture prior to 1952 was one with wide cleavages throughout the society. These included subcultural affiliations based on regionalism, as well as those based on differences in race and wealth; all contributed to distrust and antagonism between social and political groups.

In a wider sense Bolivia must be considered as in the pre-national stage in that the majority of the population had little sense of belonging to the nation or of participating in the political system. This majority can be considered as parochials; the politically articulate groups were divided among themselves over the fundamental basis of the polity and what role they were to play in the political system. Finally, among the most important political elements, the young politicians, there was an identity crisis stemming from the loss in the Chaco War and the inability to find the legitimate basis of the polity.

#### B. Political Socialization and Recruitment

As should be obvious, the Chaco War was the single most important factor in the socialization process prior to the Revolution. However, the Chaco War was actually the culmination of a series of defeats and national humiliation suffered by Bolivia. Throughout its history Bolivia had been the victim of aggression and territorial ambitions of its neighbors and had always come off second best. In addition to the loss of the Chaco, the loss of its seaport to Chile in the War of the Pacific, and the numerous grants of territory virtually given away to Brazil and Argentina, the country had been the object of foreign "economic imperialism" as well. This latter was to be seen primarily in the cases of railroad construction and management and petroleum exploration and development.<sup>34</sup> One of the most humiliating experiences came in

---

<sup>34</sup>For an analysis of the Standard Oil Company in Bolivia, see Herbert S. Klein, "American Oil Companies in Latin America: The Bolivian Experience," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vo. XVIII (Autumn, 1964), pp. 47-72; for a nationalistic approach by a Bolivian, Sergio Almaraz, Petróleo en Bolivia (La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1958), pp. 90-132. It is interesting to note that the Barrientos government was accused in 1968 of favoring the interests of Gulf Oil over those of national interests, and university students were invoking the image of Busch to provoke the government.

the 1920's when Bolivia was forced to accept American officials to supervise collection of custom duties in order to pay-off debts. In the case of Standard Oil the company had virtually defied the Bolivian government during and before the Chaco War, and the subsequent expropriation of property was one of the few acts on which most Bolivians agreed.<sup>35</sup> The Chaco War, however, was the final blow in this series of national disasters and humiliations and did more than any other single factor to increase national despair. The effect of this catastrophe was to bring into question the entire existing political structure, and the major goal of the young politicians and military officers became the destruction of the traditional system and its replacement with one that could lead to a sense of national pride. From the veterans organizations formed after the war were to spring the various political parties of the era, as well as more specific demands for the expansion of government services. Thus, whereas Mexico did not have a single important event which brought on its Revolution, Bolivia's defeat in the Chaco War galvanized the society into a revolutionary movement to overthrow the existing system.

In terms of the agents prominent in the socialization process prior to 1952, the family was probably the most important---with the possible exception of the political system itself. The difficulty with the type of socialization received by each generation is that it depends on the level of society occupied by the family. For instance, in the rural areas the family no doubt reinforced the existing alienation from the system; first, by

---

<sup>35</sup>The primary reason was that the military felt the oil company had not supported their war effort, and also that Standard apparently lied about the amount of oil it was sending to Argentina in the 1920's.

reinforcing the attitudes of suspicion and distrust towards the whites, and second, by offering the rural Indians the only secure haven against the arbitrary rule of the hacienda. The family thus helped to reinforce the existing status quo and that meant the reinforcement of the peasant's alienation from the political system. Among the elites the socialization process was also designed to perpetuate "things as they were." First, white elite children were taught their so-called natural superiority within the structure of the home---for that matter the tradition still persists in many Bolivian homes. The servants were regarded somewhat as beasts of burden and the general attitude that the Indian was not quite a human being was established and reinforced within the family through the treatment of servants. For male children free rein was given for them to express their macho inclinations, while the females were taught the traditional subservience of the Latin woman. These elites maintained their position through intermarriage, and although late in the period they began to marry the more wealthy members of the "middle classes" they still were taught their innate superiority over the other segments of the population. For the middle sectors and the rising cholo population in the cities it is somewhat more difficult to establish patterns. At least until the Chaco War the emphasis appears to have been on economic and social advance while political education in the families was restricted to general, if passive, support of the existing political system. As the political horizon expanded after the war no doubt many were inducted into positive attitudes towards the political system, but this writer tends to believe that the majority were content to express faith in economic and social advancement and ignore political indoctrination. What was true of the majority of the urban families was that the father occupied a dominant position and his authority was hardly questioned. This might be

less true of rural areas especially after the Chaco War with the death of many Indian males and the subsequent shortage which led to a matrifocal family structure.<sup>36</sup>In all segments of the society the family was the center of social ---and often economic---activities and the extended family was the rule, especially in rural areas where the extended family was an economic necessity because of the work requirements of the hacienda. It can only be suggested that this might have led to an increased sense of distrust for anyone outside the family and increased dependence on relatives---at least the degree of nepotism in the government would suggest that it was regarded as safer to surround oneself with relatives than outsiders.

An additional element in the family socialization process was the compadrazgo system in which a god-parent, usually one who was wealthy or had social status, assumed responsibility for the child. In many cases the compadre was the owner of the local hacienda or mine and in some cases he assumed responsibility for hundreds, even thousands, of children. If one combines this factor with the overwhelming power of the owners in their areas, it becomes obvious that they personally controlled and directed the political, as well as economic and social, lives of a good many people. For the majority the relationship to authority and power was a purely personal one between the owner and the serf. One looked to the other for help and security, the other expected faithful obedience and service. This meant

---

<sup>36</sup>The only existing study of family structure prior to the Revolution is found in Leonard, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-55; also see U.S. Army, United States Army Area Handbook for Bolivia (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), pp. 133-57.

that throughout the country there existed numerous little kingdoms in which life and authority was centered around personal contact.<sup>37</sup>

The school, as the second major agent of socialization, simply did not exist for the vast majority.<sup>38</sup> Few of the rural Indians could expect to receive any schooling at all, and if they did it was only in the primary grades. This was partially due to attitudes of the dominant whites who regarded the Indian as incapable of learning and also to their desire to preserve the status quo and maintain the Indian in his servile status. An indication of the lack of education within the population was that illiteracy in 1950 was estimated at 70% of the population and was probably much higher. In the cities secondary and primary education was available but very limited, not only by a lack of facilities but also by the limited appreciation of education and the need of the urban poor to use their children for economic support. Only a small part of the urban population could afford to send their children to school. The statistics on educational attendance are indicative of the general lack of education in the system: more than 70% of the population never received any education at all; of those that continued only 2.5% were able to finish the primary level, and only 1.5% managed to graduate from high school.<sup>39</sup> Few members of the poorer classes went on to the university; in

---

<sup>37</sup>More often than not this contact was through a system of overseers. The patron only returned for major occasions each year and when he did so he offered free drink and food and acted as the lord of the manor. The day-to-day operations of the hacienda were left to the overseers and the patron, on his rare visits, tended to reinforce his own image as the benevolent dictator.

<sup>38</sup>Descriptions of the Bolivian educational system can be found in U.S. Army Area Handbook for Bolivia, *op. cit.*, 199-226; also Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, "Educational Data: Bolivia:", Information on Education Around the World, (April, 1962).

<sup>39</sup>Oscar Vera, "The Educational Situation and Requirements in Latin America," in Peter G. Snow (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America: A Reader (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 101.



fact very few members of any class managed to get to the university. In 1950 Bolivia had a total number of 12,000 university graduates in the entire population.<sup>40</sup> As for the elite they sent their children abroad on the rather realistic assumption that Bolivian education was substandard in the first place. In truth the education received was of limited usefulness. The pattern followed was that prevalent in Europe in the early nineteenth century which was designed to produce the cultivated man. There was little or no effort to create technical and scientific schools or careers, a factor which helps to explain the acute shortages of técnicos presently. The method of teaching was the traditional European one in which the teacher simply dictated and the students copied. Both the methods used and the material taught would tend to support the existing political system. Despite this general picture of the educational system, the students were highly politicized especially in the universities where they took an active role in political activities. During the 1940's many future Movimientistas were indoctrinated into the ideology of the MNR through their MNR teachers. Victor Paz Estenssoro reportedly turned his classes "into a course on revolutionary politics."<sup>41</sup> These university students formed the more radical wing of the MNR in its early years and later filled most of the important roles in the party and government. It is difficult to estimate the overall effects of this type of socialization, but it seems obvious that it was a training ground for future political conduct and that conduct was rooted in distrust and alienation towards the political system.

---

<sup>40</sup>P.H. Scott, Bolivia: Economic and Commercial Conditions in Bolivia (London: HSMO, 1956), p. 30.

<sup>41</sup>José Fellmann Velarde, Victor Paz Estenssoro: el hombre y la revolución (2nd. ed., La Paz: Ed. Burrillo, 1955), pp. 70-71.

With respect to peer and work groups, two socialization processes appear important. First, among the elite of the nation there existed a close inter-locking social, economic, and political bond. All belonged to the same clubs, attended the same schools, circulated at the same social gatherings, had inter-locking control over the economic wealth of the country, and despite minor differences of political outlook voiced through the traditional parties, they held the same basic political ideology. Since they all knew each other, communication in and between the elites was often based on personal contact and political communication was accomplished primarily through face-to-face contact. The elite was therefore a relatively closed, tight-knit group. It should also be added that for those university students attending in La Paz, friendships and personal connections were established despite political differences, and this made it easier to deal with personalities than with ideologies or programs in the political arena.

The second important point, already alluded to, relates to the labor movement and its effort to obtain economic and political concessions from management and the government. In particular it applies to the miners although vestiges of it can be found in other unions as well. What happened was that the miners, operating in isolated areas of the country, turned to radical programs and ideologies as they became politically aware.<sup>42</sup> Specifically, they tended towards anarcho-syndicalism and later to a virulent form

---

<sup>42</sup>Several sociologists have suggested that those engaged in isolated industries may be more likely to turn to radical political ideologies because of their lack of empathy. See, for instance, Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 104; also William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 215-16. For an application of this theory to Chilean miners, see James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, "Miners and Agrarian Radicalism," in Petras and Zeitlin (eds.), Latin America: Reform or Revolution? A Reader (New York: Fawcett, 1968), pp. 235-248.

of Trotskyism.<sup>43</sup> Their programs called for worker seizure of the mining industry and the use of violent means to achieve their goals.<sup>44</sup> The mine-owners, frightened by this prospect and by fear of personal violence, began to place increasing reliance on violence in turn, using the army as a counter-force to massacre the workers. Often a union leader would simply disappear or be found murdered. In the years from 1930 on there was an increasing intransigence on both sides. The result was that the miners became socialized into violence; that is to say, they rejected any form of compromise and insisted on the use of armed power to try and gain their political and economic goals. The importance of this will be seen later in the anti-government stand taken by them.

One of the most important agents in the socialization process was the government itself. At one time or another the traditional political system managed to alienate virtually every segment of Bolivian society. The regions outside La Paz were disgusted with what they regarded as the outright ignoring of their requests for governmental assistance while they provided the salaries for corrupt officials. As an instrument for the suppression of the rural Indians, the white-dominated government was hated, despised, and distrusted by these same Indians. To nationalists the government was responsible for the national disasters as well as selling away national integrity to foreign interests. To the middle sectors the government was unable to provide the peace and stability necessary for economic development

---

<sup>43</sup>For the early ideological commitments of the labor movement, see Barcelli, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>44</sup>The most notorious of these programs is the Tesis de Pulacayo signed in 1946. Barcelli, pp. 189-92.

and protection of the home. To the workers the government came to represent an instrument for the repression of their demands. To opposition politicians the government represented a personal treasure for the "ins" and they plotted to make sure they would soon enjoy the benefits. To the individual citizen the government represented archaic and corrupt bureaucratic practices, combined with an unjust and sporadic police system which could only help create an attitude of "incivism towards the law"<sup>45</sup> In short, the government itself was a major socialized agent for the alienation and apathy of the citizens.

The recruitment function, as one would expect, was conditioned by the elite structure dominating the country. At least until the time of the Chaco War the elite recruited from either the long-standing middle sectors located in the urban areas, or from the oligarchy itself. After the boom in the tin market in the early part of the century and the subsequent control by the Big Three, the mining companies came to dominate the recruitment function. Generally they would either choose members of the oligarchy to run the government, or they would carefully select and train middle sector elements to represent them. (Interestingly enough, Víctor Paz Estenssoro was recruited by the Patiño interests after the Chaco War and although he only worked a short time it proved to be a somewhat embarrassing point for future MNR historians.) The Aramayo interests even entered politics themselves, particularly Carlos Aramayo who was an active politician. The domination of the oligarchy over the recruitment function began to breakdown after the Chaco War, but with very few exceptions the political leaders still came

---

<sup>45</sup>This phrase is used by Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Pye and Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 541.

out of the white class, not the cholo or Indian. Even those leaders who founded the emergent parties after the War to challenge the system, including the MNR, were almost all from the upper middle class and tended to have political antecedents stretching back into political history.<sup>46</sup> In fact the majority were sons of industrialists, landowners, and professionals. Invariably they attended the Universidad de San Andres (UMSA) in La Paz, specifically the Facultad de Derecho of that university. They were part and parcel of the ruling oligarchy and they came from the very class they were trying to overthrow. Under such circumstances it is not difficult to understand that they were not truly revolutionaries; they were moderates who wanted changes but did not quite see that an actual social and economic revolution was in the making. In the 1940's a few, very few, political leaders began to emerge from the workers ranks, most notable among them being Juan Lechin who had established his leadership over the miners chiefly through his prowess on the football field. With two exceptions no political leaders came out of the ranks of the rural Indians. The exceptions were in Warisata where a nucleo escolar formed in the 1930's was able to train some Indians in leadership and provide them knowledge of the political system;<sup>47</sup> and in the community of Ucurena located near Cochabamba where veterans of the Chaco War formed a sindicato for improvement of land tenure and educational facilities.<sup>48</sup>

---

<sup>46</sup>Almost all of the members of the MNR could claim political activists in their family line. Paz Estenssoro had several members of his family active in politics; the father of Hernán Siles was a former President of the Republic.

<sup>47</sup>For the activities of this school, see the work by its founder, Elizardo Pérez, Warisata: la escuela-ayllu (La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1962).

<sup>48</sup>For the origins and development of the campesino sindicato, see Jorge Dandler-Hanhart, "Local Group, Community, and Nation: A Study of the Changing Structure in Ucurena, Bolivia (1935-52)" (Unpublished Masters Thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin, 1967).

From this latter group a prominent leader emerged, Jose Rojas, who was to have considerable impact on later events. It should be added that both communities received their impetus to organize from members of the urban middle sectors.

The socialization and recruitment functions were thus dominated by the closed oligarchy ruling Bolivia from the top. Entrance into the oligarchy was difficult (as the case of Simon Patiño illustrates) and their control of the remainder of the society led to a general stagnation and socialization into particularistic attitudes. As was the case in pre-revolutionary Mexico, the family system as well as the educational system tended to maintain existing socialization patterns of alienation and suspicion towards the political system. Special socialization patterns of importance were the effects of the Chaco War on the politically articulate and the Indian masses, and the peculiar battle between labor and management, especially in the mines. Finally, the leaders all tended to come from the same social strata, the oligarchy or the middle sectors, and few came out of the lower classes or the Indians. Two differences seem evident in comparison with Mexico: first, the Chaco War served as a major factor in the revolutionary movement in Bolivia whereas Mexico did not have one key factor; second, the labor movement in Bolivia was much more advanced in terms of organization and political demands than was the Mexican labor movement at the time of the 1910 Revolution. Other than these two, the similarities between the two systems are greater than the differences.

### C. Interest Articulation

An analysis of the interest articulation function focuses primarily on the types of interest groups articulating demands and the way in which those demands are made. By far the most potent group articulating its interests

in pre-revolutionary Bolivia was la rosca, the pejorative term used by the MNR to denote the oligarchy.<sup>49</sup> Less a formally organized group than an informal one centered around the rich hacendados, the mineowners, some army officers, a few businessmen, and the older families, the oligarchy maintained its hold on the country through social economic, and family ties. La rosca had actually stayed out of politics until after the War of the Pacific, but then it rapidly gained control over the Liberal and Conservative parties and their two offshoots the Republicans and Republican Socialists, and hence of the political system. The general attitude of la rosca was as much to disdain the country as it was to protect their interests. They regarded the Indians as subhuman and treated them accordingly; labor was a tool of the "communists" and had to be beaten down. They looked outside the country for intellectual and cultural activities. Actually, they were anti-national in orientation since they really did not want the country to develop or change as this could have destroyed their favored status. The concept of government held by la rosca was one of limited activity favoring a few. The only exception to this concept of government service occurred when it was necessary to construct roads or railways for the benefit of the mines. Therefore they supported foreign loans which increased the national debt at no expense to them; they also supported foreign economic enterprises when beneficial to their own positions. In short they supported a system based on the extraction of Bolivian resources for the benefit of a few.

The military represented another interest group of considerable strength

---

<sup>49</sup>La rosca means literally, "the screw". Sadly lacking to this date is a comprehensive study of the oligarchy as it existed prior to 1952.

in Bolivian political life.<sup>50</sup> Surprisingly enough, the military had remained out of politics although passively supporting the oligarchy until the period of the Chaco War. While they were not active in politics they remained a strong veto group which reinforced the existing political system. With the advent of the War the situation changed dramatically. The government was not the only institution to suffer the shock of lack of confidence by the people; the higher ranks of the armed forces also were blamed for the defeat.<sup>51</sup> Prior to the War the Bolivian army had been trained by a German military mission under General Hans Kundt, and it had been regarded as one of the best in Latin America. Many, including the officers, thought the army would have little trouble defeating the supposedly inferior Paraguayan forces. When defeat resulted the younger officers blamed the high command for its ineptness. The immediate result was the overthrow of the Salamanca government, a defeat not only for the government but also for the higher-ranked army officers. The "military-socialism" of the Toro-Busch regimes was not a dramatic break with the past but it did indicate that the younger officers were more and more interested in social and economic problems and in finding solutions for them. Perhaps one indication that the army officers had not moved radically to the left was the opposition of Busch to the Constitutional Convention of 1938 when the politicians, led by elements of the leftists parties, wrote what was to become the most radical constitution in the history of the country---radical in the sense that for the first time the social and economic role and the responsibilities of the state in these

---

<sup>50</sup>For a general history of the Bolivian military, see Col. M. Fernando Wilde C., Historia militar de Bolivia (La Paz: n.p., 1963).

<sup>51</sup>David H. Zook, Jr., The Conduct of the Chaco War (New Haven: Bookman Associates, 1960), passim.



areas was recognized.<sup>52</sup> With the death of Busch the older officers resigned control of the army and supported the efforts of the rosca to return to "normalcy." Nevertheless, numerous younger officers took active roles in the politics of the period and supported the emerging political parties. They even formed their own groups, based on fascist models, such as RADEPA. The role of these officers in the Villarroel government indicated that they supported efforts at reform of the system. However, after 1946, with some exceptions, the army sided with the rosca and when the MNR won the election of 1951 the army refused to support the decision of the electorate.<sup>53</sup> In refutation of the Bolivian electorate the armed forces sided with the oligarchy against any reforms---particularly those suggested by the MNR. The total opposition of the military to the MNR left the party no choice but to destroy that institution once it was in power. In general terms the officers of the army were recruited from the urban middle sectors or from the oligarchy and were invariably white. They had little sense of professionalism and engaged in politics and other outside activities to augment their salaries. Throughout the period the success of the armed forces as an interest group is indicated by the 20% of the budget they annually received. Thus the pre-revolutionary armed forces was the classic picture of the traditional army in Latin America.<sup>54</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup>For the Constitutions of Bolivia, see Ciro Felix Trigo, Las constituciones de Bolivia (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1958).

<sup>53</sup>One notable exception was Rene Barrientos Ortuño who took an active part in the civil war of 1949.

<sup>54</sup>Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1961), gives a breakdown of military types in Latin America.

The Bolivian labor movement was virtually non-existent until the late 1920's and early 1930's; then it developed rapidly.<sup>55</sup> The lack of a labor movement was primarily due to the limitations of workers to the mines where they were severely handicapped by the police system of the minewoners. The first labor conference took place under the auspices of the printers and railroad workers in the period just prior to the Chaco War. It was the Toro government which finally gave the labor movement the opportunity to really organize. A Ministry of Labor was established and a comprehensive and up-to-date, even though seldom enforced, labor code was promulgated. During the same period the new political parties began to make overtures for the support of various unions, but they did not enjoy much success. This was primarily because the labor movement had leaned towards anarcho-sindicalism early in its history and labor leaders continued to believe that the best method for them to gain their political goals was to remain free of any party and/or political commitments. A contributing factor was the fragmentation and lack of cohesion at the national level. For the most part labor remained free of the parties until the 1952 Revolution, although some of the miners fell under the control of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR). The most powerful union in the country, the miner's FSTMB, was founded in 1944 with the backing of the MNR and the first Executive Secretary was Juan Lechin, a party member, who kept this position throughout the years of MNR rule. The FSTMB was successful in organizing the miners but

---

<sup>55</sup>Barcelli, *op. cit.*; also Guillermo Lora, Historia del Movimiento Obrero Boliviano, 1848-1900 (Cochabamba: Los Amigos del Libro, 1967); Luis Antezana, El movimiento obrero boliviano (La Paz: n.p., 1966); and Jaime Ponce G., Thomas Shanley, and Antonio Cisneros, Breve historia del sindicalismo boliviano (La Paz: Instituto Boliviano de Estudio y Accion Social, 1968).

after the fall of Villarroel it was subjected to presecution and that, combined with internal struggles, reduced its effectiveness. Despite the fact that labor was better organized and more politically aware than its Mexican counterpart, it was not noticeably successful in achieving its demands within the traditional political system.

Agricultural interest groups were even less effective. The landowners did not have an organized interest group but tended to work informally through the elite. Although there did exist a few organized groups of producers these were not active or effective in politics. Their lack of effectiveness is indicated by the general policy of sacrificing Bolivian production for import goods, a conscious policy of the government for much of the period under discussion. As for the Indian masses they had, with one possible exception, no formal or informal groups to speak of. The one exception was the sindicato formed in Ucucreña in the Cochabamba Valley soon after the Chaco War.<sup>56</sup> The sindicato was formed by a group of veterans of the War who decided to change the existing pattern of land tenure. They purchased land from the church in Ucucrena and started cultivating the land collectively. With the aid of leaders from the city they also started a school which was to become the focal point for future campesino activity in the region. The landowners of the area woke up to the danger posed by this threat and immediately tried to terminate the project. They were partially successful but the campesinos learned in the process how to organize and make demands on the government and this proved to be important for the future. Despite efforts by the MNR and other political parties the Indians remained largely unorganized and ineffective in the articulation of their demands.

---

<sup>56</sup>Dandler-Hanhart, op. cit.; also Richard W. Patch in all of his works, especially, "Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting," in Richard Adams, et. al., Social Change in Latin America Today (New York: Vintage) 1960, pp. 12021.

As for the middle sectors, they too remained largely unorganized. Business and merchant groups had formal organizations but these were usually circumvented by their members in order to work personally through the oligarchy, at least in making political demands. The students and teachers were both formally organized and played active roles in the politics of the period. The teachers unions in particular were oriented to the left and were effective in strikes and manifestaciones. The Confederación Universitaria Boliviana (CUB) had local organizations at the seven universities of the country and these were useful for getting the students out for demonstrations and attacks on the government---assuming that any degree of unanimity could be reached among student political leaders. Both the students and teachers played prominent roles in the downfall of the Villarroel government. What was true of the teachers was true of the middle sectors in general: they worked occasionally with parties of the left or right, were seldom direct participants in the political system, and their low pay was indicative of a failure to articulate their economic demands successfully. For the most part the political demands of the middle sectors were articulated through the political parties which must be regarded primarily as interest groups.

All of the parties, other than those associated with the existing system, were founded in the decade from the end of the Chaco War to the Villarroel government. Generally they were founded by younger politicians who had fought in the War and who sought some sort of comprehensive ideology as a formula not only for the economic development of the country, but also to create a nation out of what most regarded as a divided and raped Bolivia. They differed from the traditional parties in their virulent nationalism and opposition to imperialism as well as their desire to destroy

the favored position of the oligarchy. The following parties appear most important to this analysis:<sup>57</sup>

1. The Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) was formally founded in 1934, although an older party of the same name had been founded several years previously. The leaders included José Aguirre Gainsborg and Tristán Maroff. The latter, whose real name was Gustavo Adolfo Navarro, had spent several years in Europe where he became absorbed in the doctrines of socialism.<sup>58</sup> When he returned he became familiar with the works of José Carlos Mariátegui and other Peruvians and decided to apply the formula of socialism and indigenismo to Bolivia. Although he subsequently dropped out of the POR, Maroff was important since his ideas influenced an entire generation of Bolivian political leaders. The POR soon became a Trotskyite party affiliated with the Fourth International. The party remained small but did manage to gain some influence in the miners unions and other labor groups. In fact the program adopted by the FSTMB in 1946, known as the Tesis de Pulacayo, was written by Guillermo Lora, a member of the POR. Soon after the 1952 Revolution many of the Poristas joined the MNR.

2. The Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR) was but one of many parties founded by the so-called Cochabamba group headed by José Antonio Arze, Ricardo Anaya, and Arturo Urquidi.<sup>59</sup> Unlike previous attempts by this

---

<sup>57</sup>The original programs of these parties may be found in Alberto S. Cornejo, Programas Políticos de Bolivia (Cochabamba: Imp. Universitaria, 1949); also Mario Rolón Anaya, Partidos y políticos en Bolivia (La Paz: Ed. Novedades, 1966).

<sup>58</sup>Arnade, "The Ultimate Roots...", *op. cit.*, p. 44; also Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), p. 213.

<sup>59</sup>For the early history of the PIR, see Miguel Bonifaz R., Bolivia: frustración y destino (Sucre: Imp. Universitaria de Sucre, 1965).

group, the PIR managed to hang on. It was and is a Marxist party, but one chiefly devoted to an intellectual form of Marxism. Many of the more analytical, if polemical, studies of Bolivian reality have come from Piristas.<sup>60</sup> The PIR was primarily limited to urban intellectuals and never did manage to widen its membership base greatly, although it did have some control over the railroad workers and some miners prior to 1952. It also was instrumental in aiding the campesinos of Ucareña to organize and José Rojas was a member of the PIR before 1952. In 1940 the PIR ran José Antonio Arze for President and surprised everyone by winning more than 10,000 votes. This should have given the party the advantage over the other parties of the left in gaining mass support but it failed. More than likely this was due to the intellectualism of its leaders, their close association socially with the oligarchy, and their inability to see the PIR in terms of a modern broad-based mass party. Although the PIR was Marxist in orientation, it never joined the Third International and remained free of Moscow dominance. As a result, a splinter group formed the Partido Comunista de Bolivia (PCB) in 1950 and this became the official Communist party for Bolivia. The major mistake made by the PIR was to support the oligarchy after the defeat of the Villarroel government. In the period from 1947-50 there were massacres in the mines and since the PIR was identified with the government it lost the support of the miners and other labor groups.

3. The Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB) was founded in 1937 in Chile by a group of university students headed by Oscar Unzaga de la Vega. This

---

<sup>60</sup>Included among these works are Ricardo Anaya, Nacionalización de las minas de Bolivia (Cochabamba: Imp. Universitaria, 1952); José Antonio Arze y Arze, Sociología marxista (Oruro: Ed. Universitaria, 1963); and Urquidi, El Feudalismo en América..., op. cit.

was a fascist group which placed a great emphasis on a mystical nationalism, imitated the corporate state of Mussolini in its program, and was openly anti-semitic. For most of the period prior to 1952 the Falange remained a small coterie of intellectuals centered in the universities, although it did make some headway in recruiting army officers. But the FSB had to await the gradual disillusionment of the middle sectors with the MNR to expand into a political party of much proportion.

4. Another political party founded in 1944, while not especially important prior to 1952, was the Partido Social Democrata (PSD). This party was a Christian Democratic one following the "neoliberal" line of the Church and the newer social and economic encyclicals of the Pope. Actually it remained small and ineffectual until rather late in the rule of the MNR.

5. Finally, as the focus of this paper, it is necessary to investigate more profoundly the ideology, background, and composition of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR). No one can quite agree on the date of the founding of the MNR, although several specific dates are given in the various party pronouncements.<sup>61</sup> It seems more than likely that the party was formed somewhere in the period from 1937 to 1942 by a small group of intellectuals sharing the same pessimism and opposition to the traditional political system, while at the same time having no concrete

---

<sup>61</sup>Among the dates commonly given are January 25, 1941, by Augusto Céspedes, El dictador suicida (La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1968), p. 264; May 10, 1941, the day of the signing of a declaration by the founders; and June 7, 1942, the anniversary of the signing of a controversial bill by Busch and also the signing of the Bases y Principios del MNR. Walter Guevara Arze probably is closer to the truth when he said the party was founded sometime between 1936 and 1944. Quoted in Richard W. Patch, "The Last of Bolivia's MNR?" American University Field Staff Newsletter (April, 1964), p. 7.

program of their own. Several distinct groups were represented in the founding of the party, notably a group of veterans of the Chaco War (almost all of the fundadores were veterans of the fighting in the Chaco) calling themselves the Estrella de Hierro led by Víctor Andrade. This group was somewhat conservative and demanded specific benefits for the veterans as well as a more nationalistic approach by the government. A second group was composed of a group of journalists and intellectuals centered around the newspaper La Calle led by Augusto Céspedes and Carlos Montenegro, two of the better political writers of Bolivia. This group was extremely nationalistic and used La Calle to mount attacks against imperialism, both foreign and by the mineowners, as well as against the inadequacies of the government and the oligarchy.<sup>62</sup> A final group was composed of lawyers, public servants, and university professors (often one man held these three posts at once), chief among them being Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Hernán Siles Zuazo, and Walter Guevara Arze. What brought these three groups together was a common desire to overthrow the system which had humiliated them and the nation in the Chaco War.

The ideology and program of the founders reflected this general discontent.<sup>63</sup> The first party program, called the Bases y principios del MNR ---sometimes referred to simply as the "Green Book"---was formally signed

---

<sup>62</sup>Montenegro's views are expressed in Nacionalismo y coloniaje (Buenos Aires: Ed. Pleamar, 1967). This book became one of the idealized statements of MNR ideology. Céspedes' earlier ideas are expressed in Metal del Diablo (La Paz: m.p. 1946).

<sup>63</sup>This program can be found in either Cornejo or Rólon Anaya, op. cit.



the 7th of June 1942. Surprisingly enough, this document was to remain the basic statement of MNR ideology throughout the years, although after the Revolution it was seldom referred to and numerous attempts were made to replace it. The introductory paragraphs were primarily an indictment of the ruling oligarchy, an oligarchy which had been nothing more than a tool for imperialism: imperialism by the mineowners, imperialism by the British (who owned the railroads), imperialism by Yankees, imperialism by international judaism, and imperialism by international masonry. The Bases y Principios charged that all the elements of the traditional oligarchy, the army, the government, and the mineowners, had contributed to this "national mutiliation," to this Bolivian "inferiority complex." The document went on to enunciate the goals of the MNR: for the consolidation of the state and the fatherland, against false democracy, against pseudo-socialism, for the MNR, and for the economic liberation of the Bolivian people. By "false democracy" the founders meant the ending of special privileges to foreign concerns, and they called for the reform of governmental institutions and laws. In being against "pseudo-socialism" the party denounced as "anti-national all possible relations between international political parties and the maneuvers of Judaism, between the liberal democratic system and secret organizations, and the invocation of 'socialism' as a means of introducing foreigners in our internal or international politics..." Then the Bases y Principios made a whole series of demands: exclusion of foreigners from the army, equal salaries for foreign and Bolivian technicians, nationalization of the public services, a scientific study of the agrarian problem, the union of the middle classes, the workers, and the campesinos against the superstate and its servants, compulsory retirement of all army

officers over 65, colonization of the uninhabited lands of the oriente, and the death penalty for speculators, usurers, black marketeers, liars, and traffickers in vice. They also demanded the identification of all Bolivians with the desires and necessities of the campesino and proclaimed that social justice was inseparable from the economic liberation and sovereignty of the Bolivian people.

There is, as many have pointed out, much that strikes of fascism in this first program of the MNR.<sup>64</sup> The structures against Judaism, the call for an indo-mestizo race, the demands of discipline, and the strict morality, all bear resemblance to similar traits displayed at the same time in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. There is little doubt that the founders of the MNR were favorably impressed with the virulent nationalism advanced by Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco. However, the three major ingredients of this document, nationalism, indigenismo and economic independence, go back into Bolivian history. By far the most dominant of these three themes in the first program is nationalism. It was directed against foreign elements---the oil companies, mines, railroads, etc. Although the solution to the problem was none too clear, nationalization seemed to be understood as the method for Bolivia to regain control of its own resources. The influence of Marxist thought was felt but none of the fundadores were ardent Marxists. They expressed opposition to any international socialist movement. They indicated their basic desire for a Bolivian solution to a Bolivian problem. In fact the founders of the party never did offer a planned program to

---

<sup>64</sup>Both Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, The Tragedy of Bolivia: A People Crucified (New York: Devin-Adair, 1958); and Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, op. cit., comment on the fascist overtones of the MNR.

achieve economic independence; they vacillated between various approaches. Thus in effect the nationalism of the founders of the MNR was a negative nationalism similar to that displayed in the countries of Asia and Africa in which the major goal was to rid the country of foreign domination. Concrete proposals for reconstruction of the nation were to be offered later.

The party began to formally organize when Paz, Siles, and a few others were elected to the national legislature in 1940. They formed a bloque parlamentaria which attacked the government of Quintanilla and thus began to recruit elements from within the ranks of politicians. The party expanded its organizations to the major cities in the next few years. Sometime during this period the founders apparently made a decision that Víctor Paz should be Jefe del Partido. According to Guevara Arze (perhaps not the best of sources since he has become a violent enemy of Paz), they decided to consciously set out to make him a nationally known figure.<sup>65</sup> The Peñaranda government asked Paz to accept the Ministry of Finance, but he only stayed in office eight days due to a controversial act of the government favoring the mineowners. It did, however, help to make him nationally known. The big break for the MNR came with the Catavi massacre of miners by the army in December, 1942. In the parliamentary investigations which followed, Víctor Paz gained some fame for his attack on the government and no doubt contributed to the defeat of the Peñaranda government.<sup>66</sup> In order to hasten the government's downfall, the MNR entered into secret conversations

---

<sup>65</sup>Walter Guevara Arze, P.M.N.R.A.: exposición de motivos y declaración de principios (La Paz: np.p., 1960), p. 56; also a very bitter article by Guevara Arze in Los Tiempos, February 23, 1969, in which he reiterates the claim that Paz was selected primus inter pares and then betrayed them all.

<sup>66</sup>For the speeches of Paz Estenssoro in the Congress, see Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Discursos parlamentarios (La Paz: Ed. Cantan, 1955).

with the military group, RADEPA. In 1943 the two were able to overthrow the government and the MNR had its first opportunity to rule.

It had to slide in the back door, however, since the United States refused to recognize the new regime unless the MNR was thrown out of the government.<sup>67</sup> The party formally left the government but as soon as recognition was extended it rejoined the military. Despite the efforts to assist the labor movement and the first Indian Congress, the MNR-RADEPA government did not accomplish much. The party had no specific plans for government and was unable to carry out any of its proposed nationalizations or development schemes. Perhaps the major characteristic of the Villarroel government was the amount of political persecution of the regime. The government of Villarroel, with the cooperation of the MNR, persecuted, imprisoned, exiled, and murdered opposing politicians.<sup>68</sup> It was this aspect of the regime, together with the alienation of the urban middle sectors and the growing disenchantment with fascist doctrines after the defeat of the Axis, which led to the overthrow of the party by a genuine popular revolt in 1946.

The MNR subsequently faced many problems, not the least of which was maintaining organizations in the country when most of the leaders were exiled or imprisoned. The first problem to be faced was that of a new ideological orientation and the answer was supplied by Walter Guevara Arze in

---

<sup>67</sup>Ostensibly for the Peronista and Nazi support received by the party. See U.S. Department of State "Blue Book," op. cit.

<sup>68</sup>One of the more despicable events was the murder in Oruro of several prominent politicians, among them Luis Calvo, a highly respected Senator. The MNR made several attempts to disassociate itself from these murders most notably Armando Arce, Lós fusilamientos del 20 de noviembre de 1944 y el Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (La Paz: Talleres Graficos Bolivianos, 1957); for an opposing view see Ostra Gutierrez, op. cit., pp. 42-57.

his Tesis de Ayopaya, a campaign speech delivered in April, 1946.<sup>69</sup> He began with the customary indictment of the rosca and stressed the need for a party theoretical doctrine to govern political reality---this was the beginning of a search for a "theory" of the national revolution which was to echo from every MNR pulpit through the years. He then proceeded to rule out several existing doctrines as inapplicable to Bolivia. Nacifascismo could not exist in Latin America or Bolivia because it was a contradiction within capitalism and capitalism is possible only in highly developed countries. Although Latin America had its share of ignorant, disorganized caudillos, it had nothing approaching the organized violence of the Nazis. He then turned to socialism; the problem with socialism is that it is not a universal abstract theory, but must be applied to each individual country's reality. Socialism is only possible in larger countries like the USSR, China, Brazil, or the United States. Bolivia could not have a socialist state for the simple reason that it lacks a proletariat capable of assuming direction of the state. As far as liberal democracy is concerned, this system is only possible in a country which does not have widespread inequalities. He concedes that democracy is one of the most serious conquests of Western Civilization, especially the concepts of human dignity, equality, and happiness; but Bolivia has such a gap in social classes, it is so unequal, that liberal democracy simply cannot work. The only solution, according to Guevara Arze, is a "national revolution" which will eventually create the necessary conditions for democracy in Bolivia. The major road-block to this national revolution in a semi-colonial country such as Bolivia was imperialism. Therefore the solution was to overthrow those who aligned

---

<sup>69</sup>This speech may be found in Cornejo, op. cit., pp. 147-77.

themselves with the imperialists---la rosca---and to nationalize the tin mines and the railroads. Other than these two references there were no further concrete proposals; the goal was to create a Bolivian nation, one that would destroy every vestige of foreign domination.

This particular speech of Guevara Arze's, which became part of official party ideology, bears a great resemblance to the "guided democracy" of Sukarno, or the "tutelary democracy" suggested by some scholars.<sup>70</sup> The Bolivian masses are thought to be incapable of self-direction and the solution is to permit certain leaders, those who conceive the exact nature of the national revolution, to guide the rest of the people. Many of the leaders of the MNR, especially those of the right wing of the party led by Guevara Arze, were to continue to believe the masses incapable of self-direction after the 1952 Revolution. This theoretical statement also showed that the MNR continued to regard its major goal as the complete destruction of the existing system. Although they had the formula for the national revolution, no one was quite sure what that was to mean in practice. Other than the nationalization of the mines, there was little attention paid to specific proposals and plans following the revolution. At this stage the party was content to issue millennial appeals for the destruction of the existing system but offered no methods for arriving at the construction of a new system.

Party historians call the period from 1946 to 1952 el sexenio and it was primarily a period in which the party tried to overthrow the government by plotting with other parties for a golpe de estado or by outright

---

<sup>70</sup>Most notable is Edward Shils in Political Development in the New States (Gravenhage, Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1962).

civil war, as was the case in 1949.<sup>71</sup> Party leadership was fragmented and the period was marred by numerous disputes between leaders. Surprisingly enough, Víctor Paz emerged as the outstanding leader and almost all accepted him as Jefe del Partido. Not without trial, however, for he was forced to defend his leadership several times, especially in the nomination for the Presidential campaign of 1951.<sup>72</sup> The organizations of the party expanded and contracted with the circumstances, but the MNR never did manage to become a truly mass political party and it remained essentially limited to urban residents of the middle sectors. The miners and other labor groups stayed out of the party, although certain factory workers were recruited into the Comandos de Honor, the clandestine fighting unit formed for the takeover in 1952. One effort was made to recruit campesinos in the Cochabamba Valley in 1949-50 by students but this failed miserably due to a lack of communication between the students and peasants. For the most part the party remained a group of politicians without mass support who engaged in numerous plots and other subversive activities.

In 1951 Paz won the election and the military prevented the legislature from deciding the outcome of the election as required by law. The justification given by the military for their intervention was an alleged

---

<sup>71</sup>See Peñaloza, op. cit.; and Fellman Velarde, Víctor Paz Estenssoro ..., op. cit., for histories of this period.

<sup>72</sup>The most important struggle occurred over the Presidential nomination of the party in 1951. Some party members supported Franz Tamayo, a noted writer but not a member of the party, for the official candidacy. Fortunately for Paz, the younger and more radical elements of the party supported him.

pact signed between the MNR, the PCB, and the FSIMB which called for worker government and the destruction of the Armed Forces.<sup>73</sup> The MNR immediately began to look for supporters to overthrow the government and found them. Two of the more important groups were the miners and the national police. On the night of April 8 hostilities broke out and although originally the outlook was not favorable for the MNR, the support of the miners militias proved crucial and the following day the oligarchy fell.

The MNR, on arriving in power, was still a small party dominated by intellectuals with few organizations for the masses. The labor sector had never been integrated into the party hierarchy and no peasants were found in the party. It lacked a concrete program of action, although during the sexenio a gradual hardening of the revolutionary line became evident in such matters as nationalization of the mines. There was no plan for specific agrarian reform, although a good many Movimientistas were convinced that something had to be done in el campo. What it did have was a virulent form of nationalism directed against foreign imperialism and the rosca, as well as a vaguely formulated desire for economic development coming chiefly from Paz Estenssoro.

---

<sup>73</sup>The results of this pact and the pact itself have been the subject of a good bit of debate in Bolivia. The MNR has consistently maintained that the government attempted to perpetuate a fraud in order to justify the intervention of the military. Opponents have equally maintained the validity of the pact. The pact itself, or at least those aspects announced by the government, included provisions for the virtual independence of the FSIMB and the PCB from the prospective MNR government. After the 1952 Revolution this became essentially the case since both were allowed a good deal of freedom by the MNR. Nonetheless, in view of Bolivian electoral tactics, which include the use of forged and fraudulent documents to discredit the opposition, one must be wary of accepting the pact at face value.



The second major consideration under interest articulation is the means by which the interests are articulated. Given the predominate role of the oligarchy in the political system during the time under discussion, it should not appear strange that the means used by the rosca were primarily informal personal contacts. Due to the closed nature of the elite, it was much easier to express demands through personal friend or employees rather than using institutional channels. This same pattern was characteristic of the military as well as those other middle sector interest groups capable of gaining access to those governing. Very little of the interest articulation function was performed by institutional or formal channels for the simple reason that it was unnecessary for some and had no results for others. The single exception to this might be the case of the Legislature when it was actively functioning (1940-43), and also the Constitutional Convention of 1938 when interest groups were able to make their demands formally through individual legislators or delegates. However, these exceptions seldom affected the actual decision-making of the government and were more an indication of what groups wanted than what they received.

The other means of articulating interests were through violence and physical demonstrations. In fact this became the method of articulating demands. When the military was dissatisfied with civiliam government (or threatened by a reformist government as in 1951), the quickest way to protect their interests was simply to take over the government. The parties also resorted to violence when they were in power. Throughout the period ~~the~~ labor movement discovered that they could expect nothing from the government unless they employed such tactics as strikes, riots, and demonstrations. The miners, teachers, students, and other organized groups may have tried to articulate interests through institutional channels, but

the rate of failure no doubt helped to contribute to a belief that it was useless and rewards were more likely through the use of physical means. Unfortunately, all too often this produced counter-violence from the government or military and the groups were defeated. The climate of violence was especially true of the miners who resorted to violence as the chief means of articulating their demands. By 1952 they realized that they could expect nothing from the government working through regular channels---assuming that such channels were even open which they were not---and they placed reliance on their own armed power. After the Revolution this attitude was not altered for the miners nor for other groups, and physical confrontation remained the major means of articulating demands in the political system.

Despite the formulation of the labor code, of numerous specific laws and regulations covering many aspects of life, the style of articulating demands was primarily latent, diffuse, and affective. When political groups such as the parties articulated interests, it was in terms of such notions as "something is wrong," "the system must be changed," "we need drastic reform," etc., but the truth is that few had concrete programs or ideas of how to accomplish these changes. The new parties offered chiliastic hopes of a new world but they often did not have the faintest idea of how to realize these hopes. Gradually, of course, their programs began to change and become more specific, but for much of the period they simply opposed imperialism, the oligarchy, and the existing political system without offering any concrete plans of their own; much of their program was negative in that it was a reaction to something, not a plan for something.<sup>74</sup> The labor unions were not much better although they did make

---

<sup>74</sup>By and large this is still true with regard to Bolivian political parties; they respond rather than propose.

specific demands---more often than not unrealistic---for wage increases as well as improvements in working conditions. Major appeals were millennial and not directed towards realistic and realizable goals. The military was also somewhat confused about what it wanted, although from 1946 on it seemed to want nothing more than the maintenance of the existing system. The only group that seemed to know exactly what it wanted was the rosca, and they wanted nothing more than to maintain their superiority in the society and the polity. Therefore any threat to their position was countered by specific action and they formulated demands in concrete terms to protect their economic and political status. For the majority the articulation of demands was primarily a reflection of a deep-seated hostility and uncertainty concerning the political system.

#### D. Interest Aggregation

If interest aggregation is considered to be the process of combining various demands into meaningful policy alternatives which can be converted into authoritative decisions, it is clear that the performance of this function was dominated by those groups who controlled the system, i.e., the rosca. If an interest group was in a position to implement its demands itself, it was done, if it was not nothing happened. Thus the policies formulated were actually articulated demands that were not compromised through a process of bargaining with other groups. Normally the rosca, operating through its middle sector representatives, the military, or consultations among the elite, performed the aggregation function for their own interests. Compromise (read aggregation) often occurred within the rosca itself---especially in conflicts between the Big Three tin barons---when it was necessary to protect their positions. But in terms of the aggregation

of diverse interest emanating from the groups in the polity, aggregation simply did not occur. There are two possible exceptions to this latter assertion: 1) the Constitutional Convention of 1938 could be regarded as an effort to create a new legal basis for the society through reconciliation of divergent views. Unfortunately, the military and the rosca refused to support the new constitution and its changes were ignored. 2) In one sense the legislature during some periods could be viewed as a structure of interest aggregation. However, the power of the executive over the legislature prevented any demands or policies formulated from having much effect on the political system.<sup>75</sup> Hence it can be stated that from 1935 to 1952 the aggregation of interests consisted of the articulation of specific group demands into policies for the system: whether it was the younger army officers, the oligarchy, the MNR, or any combination of groups, policies tended to reflect specific and particularistic interests, and were not compromises reached between contending points of view. The "thin line" between interest articulation and interest aggregation did not exist in the pre-revolutionary Bolivian political system.

The two structures, the political parties and bureaucracy, which are to perform the aggregation function, in accordance with the theory of Almond, did not perform the function. The political parties were limited to small groups of middle sector politicians who lacked and could not gain mass support. Most of the parties were ideological and offered comprehensive programs which made compromise with other political parties a difficult matter.

---

<sup>75</sup>These powers include the right to send bills to the Congress for approval, almost complete control of the budget, appointment powers, etc. For a formal description of constitutional powers, see Ciro Felix Trigo, Las constituciones de Bolivia, op. cit.

Each party was convinced its program of political change was the right one. They were ineffective in aggregating demands from different groups in the society, between the different parties, and sometimes within the same party. Nor was the bureaucracy effective as an aggregation structure either. A major requisite for it to perform this function would be unity **and** cohesiveness. In the period from 1935 to 1952 there were so many changes of government and turnovers of personnel throughout the administrative structures that such cohesion and unity was impossible to find. A United Nations team sent into Bolivia in 1950 reached the following conclusion with respect to the administration:

It is now the belief of the Members of the Mission---and in this belief they are supported by the opinion of every Bolivian with whom the matter was discussed---that the explanation of the paradox [of Bolivia's natural wealth versus its actual development] is to be found in the governmental and administrative instability that has consistently marked the history of that nation.<sup>76</sup>

Cabinet officers were changed so often that a consistent policy was impossible. These changes extended into all levels of the bureaucracy and most administrative posts were looked upon as an immediate source of personal income. Standards of appointment were based on personal friendships, family, and contacts with the elite. Practices such as bribery were common. Under these circumstances it is not difficult to see that the bureaucracy did not emerge as an aggregative structure for the system.

---

<sup>76</sup>United Nations, Report of the United Nations Mission of Technical Assistance to Bolivia (The Keenleyside Report), (New York: United Nations, 1951), p. 2. One of the chief recommendations of this commission was the assignment of professional bureaucrats from the United Nations to supervise administrative decisions of the Bolivian government. The MNR abrogated the agreement on coming to power as an invasion of national sovereignty.

### E. Governmental Functions and Political Communication

From the preceding discussion it should be obvious that the rule-making function was performed by whatever group happened to be in power at the moment. In fact the interest articulation, interest aggregation, and rule-making functions were often performed simultaneously by the same structures. If the rosca dominated the government it made the demands and saw them transferred into rules. The same was true for the military and the MNR under the Villarroel government. When these groups made the rules they acted through the President and the executive wing of the government. In most cases rules and regulations were promulgated by the executive branch without consultation with other political groups, the legislature, or at times other members of the executive. It should be added that for much of the population the rules were made for them by local hacendados or mine-owners. In the big mines the rules and regulations of the political system were rarely enforced and the most important aspects of political life were governed by the power of the mineowner; the same was true of the haciendas.

The structure commonly identified with the function of rule-making, the legislature, did not perform this function in the pre-1952 system.<sup>77</sup> While it may have been formally responsible for many laws and bills passed, these often came to the Congress from the President and he rarely accepted much legislative interference. Most of the rules were promulgated by executive decree due to the great number of times the country was placed under a

---

<sup>77</sup>The only existing study of the pre-revolutionary political structures is Andrew W. Clevon, The Political Organization of Bolivia (Washington: Carnegie Foundation, 1940); also see, Moises Alcazar, Drama y comedia en el Congreso: crónicas parlamentarias (La Paz: Talleres Graficos Bolivianos, 1957).

state of seige (martial law) and the additional fact that the legislature was not in session for much of the time. One service performed by the Bolivian Congress which might be considered under the function of rule adjudication was the interpellation of Ministers. Under this procedure the legislature could insist that light be shed on government policies and perhaps force revisions; more often than not the power was used solely to embarrass the government. It was the interpellation of the Ministers of Government by Víctor Paz Estenssoro and Ricardo Anaya in 1942 concerning the Catavi massacre which eventually led to the downfall of the Penaranda government. Thus, indirectly this could be considered as adjudication of government actions.

The office of the President was responsible for formally making the rules and for applying and enforcing them. In most cases the rules made by the President were done so after consultation with the particular group to which he was indebted at the moment. If the mineowners wanted a special bill or regulation, they communicated their desires directly through their representatives. The same was true of the army and the oligarchy in general. There was, however, an almost total lack of institutionalization of this process in the executive branch. Normally communication of demands for rules was made personally to the official charged with responsibility in a general area. An example can be found in the case of the sindicato of Ucur-ena over their difficulties with the landowners.<sup>78</sup> The campesinos wanted assurance that their lands would not be seized by the landowners and with the assistance of several politicians from the cities, notably Eduardo Arze Loureiro, were able to get a Presidential decree signed in 1939 giving

---

<sup>78</sup>Dandler-Hanhart, op. cit., pp. 67-69.

the colonos the right to purchase land. The monastery that had granted them the land, however, refused to recognize the validity of the decree. The Bishop of Cochabamba and the landowners applied pressure to the Minister of Agriculture and the decree was subsequently revised to suit the decree of the landowners. (It should be added that the Minister was later convicted of accepting a bribe from the landowners.) Thus the pattern of making the laws within the executive was one based on personal access to responsible officials; that these officials were invariably members of the oligarchy or its supporters precluded certain groups from achieving access.

The executive applied and enforced the rules but several comments are in order with respect to this application. First, laws and regulations were seldom applied uniformly throughout the nation, if for no other reason than that much of the population---particularly the Indians---was totally immune to the acts of the government. Furthermore, the more distant one was from La Paz the less likely the severe application of the laws, owing to a lack of strong administration and the prevalence of regional interests. Some of the mines and haciendas were very isolated and many regulations, especially those relating to working conditions, were never enforced; things went on as they had for centuries. Due to lack of transportation and communication, other communities for all practical purposes found themselves isolated from the effects of laws and regulations promulgated in La Paz. A second factor was the poor performance of the bureaucracy. Due to constant turnover of personnel, lack of uniformity in the application of laws, regional cuadillos, etc., the bureaucracy was not very helpful in the enforcement of the rules already on the books. Third, for many urban citizens there existed a strong "incivism" towards the law. This was manifested in a general attitude of opposition toward the existing rules; Bolivians avoided paying taxes, obeying



street signs, following administrative procedures, and so forth. (This attitude is still strong for many citizens; one indication is the open smuggling of goods into the country despite many laws against it.) This incivism developed into something of a game between the citizen and the government over the observance of the rules. A fourth factor is that at certain times the laws were arbitrarily applied with harshness and severity. The military would suppress a worker revolt, the government would imprison opponents without benefit of trial, the entire system would ignore the fundamental constitutional order for immediate gain. The dichotomy between the ideals and the actualities could only help to contribute to a general attitude that the rules were arbitrary in the first place; this in turn increased the alienation to the system, thereby making the rules that much more difficult to apply. Finally, the range of laws effecting the Bolivian population was not extensive; that is to say that the extractive and regulative capabilities of the political system (although not necessarily the hacienda system) were limited. In spite of social and economic legislation under various administrations, as well as the mobilization during the Chaco War, the truth is that the traditional system endorsed the concept of eighteenth century liberalism: the less the government did the better. Those laws which were existent were seldom applied. As a result, the government had a limited effect on the lives of most of the citizens of Bolivia.

This lack of governmental effectiveness was especially evident in regard to the rule adjudication function since the vast majority of the population never had anything to do with the judiciary, or for that matter with the police forces of the state. Although the rural inhabitants were probably aware of the police and feared them, most of the punishment or judgments they received were rendered by the local patron or by the communal

officials of the Indian villages. For all practical purposes they never encountered the rule adjudication structures of the political system. For the urban dweller, those who encountered the police apparatus could be expected to hold attitudes of alienation since the Bolivian police were noted for their barbarity and disregard for personal rights and safety. The jails were among the worst to be found anywhere in the world, and Bolivia was one of the few countries in the world where the prisoner was expected to feed himself. The judiciary itself was limited in scope, having few powers to review government policies or decisions, and limited itself largely to divorce actions, commercial litigation, and other civil suits. Although there was considerable changeover of judicial officials, their general standards were often high. This was probably due to the tradition of the law schools to produce civilized, urbane judges common to eighteenth and nineteenth century European models. It is certainly true that their personal standards, in both judging the law and individual comportment, were much higher than those of the judges following the 1952 Revolution. In a peculiar sense the rule adjudication function was performed by the opposition political parties, la rosca, or the military. They decided whether and if the laws were being applied correctly and if they did not accept them they adjudicated the laws and the system itself through the simple expedient of overthrowing the government. In general, then, it would appear that the rule adjudication function led to citizen alienation and that the structures performing the function (with the possible exception of the Armed Forces) were not very effective within the political system.

As would be expected from the previous discussion, the political communication function was performed primarily by informal face-to-face contact within the elites. Given the high rate of illiteracy, the isolation of the

population, and the lack of radios and radio stations, the majority received their political information through limited contact with local officials, their patron, or else they received no information at all. The pattern of political communication reinforced the divisive tendencies in the political culture. The newspapers which existed were primarily owned by members of the *rosca* and echoed their sentiments down the line. This was particularly the case with La Razon, a newspaper reportedly owned by the Aramayo interests. (It was later destroyed by the MNR.) El Diario was another Pacena newspaper which, although privately owned, was assumed to be faithful to the Patino interests. In Cochabamba Los Tiempos, directed by Demetrio Canelas, also supported the oligarchial interests. There were, of course, exceptions such as La Calle and Masas, the POR newspaper, but these had limited circulation (for that matter all of the newspapers had a limited audience) and enjoyed a precarious existence due to frequent harassment from the government. Due to a lack of objectivity in reporting the news, the existing mass media tended to simply reinforce already established attitudes towards the political system, and certainly did not contribute much to a rational solution to political problems. The communication structures were not useful for mobilization of the masses for the simple reason that they did not reach the masses. On the other hand, the level of information available to those directing the government was also very limited; they might know that certain groups wanted certain things, but these demands were seldom expressed in specific terms. In such a system there was a high degree of information distortion owing to the lack of communication between and among the interest groups and the fact that the rule-making and rule application structures were isolated from the people.

The political communication function was both a reflection of the divisions within the society and a contributor to those divisions.

The traditional political system of Bolivia, like that of Mexico, was one of elite domination with the majority of the population being parochials within the political system; this majority was alienated and distrustful of the system. Major subcultural divisions in the pre-revolutionary system were based on regional and local allegiance, racial differences, and a social structure with wide divergencies in wealth, status, and influence. Few groups were able to articulate their interests rationally within the political system. Many resorted to violence as a method of presenting their demands. The aggregation function was normally performed arbitrarily at the top by a select group of individuals representing specific interests. In general the governmental functions were performed inadequately and mirrored the elite dominance of the society.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE POLITICAL CULTURE, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION, and RECRUITMENT

This chapter will analyze the changes in the political culture, both structural and attitudinal, which have taken place since the 1952 Revolution. The political socialization function will be analyzed in terms of the content of the socialization process, the agents involved, and also the contribution to the socialization process of the ideology of the National Revolution. The recruitment function will consist of a study of the leaders of the MNR and also the recruitment of new leaders into the system after 1952. These three functions are discussed in the same chapter because of the obvious close relationship between them.

#### A. The Political Culture

Before embarking on an analysis of the post-revolutionary political culture, a brief review of the revolutionary reforms and of the economic and political events of the years from 1952 to 1954 will give the reader a background for what follows. More specific discussions especially those relating to political differences within the MNR will be described in future selections. The Revolution itself, which consisted of social and economic changes of the basic structures of the country, was brought about by the following governmental actions: nationalization of the mines, agrarian reform, destruction of the armed forces, universal suffrage, expansion of the educational system, and other social and economic measures. The major plank upon which the MNR was elected in 1951 was nationalization of the Big Three tin mines. The party wasted little time in establishing a commission soon after the Revolution to consider this move, but the miners soon took matters into their own hands, seizing some of the mines and chasing off the technical and administrative personnel. Worker control over the

201  
mines was institutionalized through two mechanisms: first, co-gobierno, which involved the sharing of political and administrative decision for the country between the government and the Central Obrero Boliviano (COB), the all-inclusive labor organization founded soon after the Revolution. Under co-gobierno the COB had the right to select the ministers of Mines, Campesino Affairs, Labor, and Transportation with the cooperation of the unions involved. In effect co-gobierno gave to the workers control over the major decisions in the nationalized mines. The second mechanism was control obrero which meant that labor had the right to veto any decision of management or the government in not only the nationalized mines, but also in any other work situation. The actual decree nationalizing the Bpg Three was signed October 31, 1952, and these mines were placed under the Corporación Minera de Bolivia (CCMIBOL), a semi-autonomous agency of the government. Thus the major plank of the Movimientista government ended in the nationalization of the mines by the government but with effective control over them in the hands of the labor leaders; many of these union leaders were, in turn, almost totally independent of the MNR.

The second major reform, the agrarian, was for all practical purposes carried out independently of the government.<sup>1</sup> It started in the Cochabamba Valley under the leadership of José Rojas and the sindicato of Ucureña

---

<sup>1</sup>In recent years a considerable debate has taken place between anthropologists studying the nature of the agrarian reform. Some have maintained, notably Richard Patch, that the agrarian reform was a spontaneous movement started in the Cochabamba Valley and rapidly spreading throughout the country. Patch and his followers maintain that the MNR and the government had very little control over the actual seizure and distribution of land. Others, including Dwight Heath and Charles Erasmus, contend that the government was responsible for the reform and actually implemented it without interference from the campesino sindicatos. Actually the difference may stem from the particular area studied by the anthropologist. Patch is basically right in asserting that the reform took place independent of the government in the Cochabamba Valley and probably in the region around Lake Titicaca. Heath and Erasmus were equally correct in the assessment of their regions, respectively Santa Cruz and Tarija, in maintaining that the

and rapidly spread over areas of the altiplano and the valleys. Indians simply seized the land without any authorization or support from the government; leaders of the left were especially prominent in efforts to organize the campesinos. An agrarian reform commission was eventually established under the domination of Nulfo Chávez Ortiz, a renowned leftist, and after several months of work arrived at a satisfactory compromise over the legal requirements of the reform. Accordingly, the Agrarian Reform Bill was signed at Ucareña on August 2, 1953.<sup>2</sup> The second major reform of the MNR was also carried out without noticeable leadership from the party or government and the campesinos were also somewhat independent of party organization.

The third major reform was the destruction of the armed forces and the concomitant establishment of the armed militias of the party, campesinos, and workers. The continual opposition of the army left the MNR no other choice than to dramatically reduce its influence after 1952. The budget for the army was severely reduced, many officers demoted or exiled, and government precedence given to the armed militias. The MNR gave arms to almost

---

government and not the sindicatos took the lead in reform. For the purposes of this paper the position of Patch is adopted since it was in the Cochabamba and Lake Titicaca areas that the campesinos were better organized and more active politically. For a discussion of this problem, see Jorge Dandler-Hanhart, "Local Group, Community, and Nation: A Study of Changing Structure in Ucareña, Bolivia (1935-52)," (unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin, 1967), pp. 13-18.

<sup>2</sup>The comments of this decree are found in Ley de la reforma agraria: Reglamentación y demás resoluciones complementarias (La Paz: Ed. Trabajo, 1953); for an analysis of the reform, see Richard W. Patch, "Social Implications of the Bolivian Agrarian Reform," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Cornell University, 1954); and Dwight B. Heath, "Land Reforms in Bolivia," Inter-American Economic Affairs Vol. XII (spring 1959), pp. 3-27.

all the groups in the society and Bolivia became an armed camp with any group capable of using violence and force to achieve their goals. These acts of violence led many Movimientistas, particularly those associated with the right wing of the party, to believe that the army had to be re-established as a counterforce to militia irresponsibility. In late 1953 the decision was taken to reinstitute the armed forces with an ostensibly new role as colonizer and developer of the country<sup>3</sup>. From that point on the armed forces increased in power until it was back to its original position as arbiter of the political system.

Another major reform was the granting of universal suffrage by decree on July 21, 1952. This decree granted the right to vote to all Bolivians over 18 years of age, regardless of literacy and property qualifications, and thus effectively enfranchised the peasant masses for the first time in the history of the country. By 1964 over one million votes were cast but universal suffrage had mixed results due to the manipulation of votes by political leaders. The campesinos were seldom given the opportunity to vote against the MNR; in fact they seldom saw any other ballot than that of the MNR<sup>4</sup>. As a result of this manipulation the middle sectors in the cities

---

<sup>3</sup>The role of the military under the MNR is discussed in William H. Brill, Military Intervention in Bolivia: The Overthrow of Paz Estenssoro and the MNR (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1967); and David Ríos Reinaga, Civiles y militares en la revolución boliviana, 1943-1966 (La Paz: Ed. Diffusion, 1967).

4

Proof of electoral manipulation is difficult to come by, but almost all Bolivians accept it. After discussions with Peace Corps Volunteers following the elections of 1964 and 1966, it is obvious that a good deal of manipulation of the vote was carried out in the countryside. In some cases the pink ballot of the MNR was the only one to arrive at the electoral posts---in Bolivia voting is done through colored ballots representing the different parties. In at least one case related by a Volunteer, armed guards prevented any but the ballot of Barrientos from entering the Cliza area.



were overpowered by the campesino vote and they soon came to regard their voting as entirely useless. In national elections their recourse was not to vote, to cast blank ballots, or to vote for the Falange Socialista Boliviana.<sup>5</sup> The alienation of these sectors as a partial result of cynical manipulation of the ballot was to result in a basic schism in party ranks.

The economic story of the early years of the Revolution was one of general disaster. First, the government in providing the workers with numerous benefits, plus the irresponsibility of many of the labor leaders, led to a drop in over-all production in the economy. This was most important in the mines where production fell off rapidly, depriving the country of necessary funds to carry out its development plans.<sup>6</sup> In other words, while the costs of the government were going up, the revenues were reduced because of the loss of production in the nationalized mines, the source of virtually all the government's income.<sup>7</sup> To compensate for this loss of revenue the

---

<sup>5</sup>Hispanic American Report, Vol. XV, p. 542-43, mentions that the Congressional election of 1958 produced 42% of an absentee record, despite the fact that voting is required in Bolivia and can invoke a penalty. Of those who did vote in La Paz, the MNR received 36,400 and the FSB 28,834.

<sup>6</sup>The economic history of the Revolution is told by Cornelius H. Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 1952-65: The Revolution and Its Aftermath (New York: Praeger, 1966); also see David G. Greene, "Revolution and Rationalization of Reform in Bolivia," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 19, (winter 1965), pp. 3-25.

<sup>7</sup>The reasons for the decline in production are hotly debated by many commentators. Two general views emerge: those who believe the drop was primarily due to factors beyond the control of the MNR such as the price fall after the Korean War and lack of new investment by the mineowners; the second view holds that the irresponsibility of the workers and the lack of control over the nationalized mines lowered production. For the first view see Robert J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958); or virtually any Bolivian writer on the subject, notably Amado Canales C., Mito y realidad de la Corporación Minera de Bolivia (La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1966); the second view is primarily an American one and maintained by both Greene and Zondag, op. cit.

government resorted to the simple expedient of printing more money. The result was tremendous inflation 'which [saw] Bolivia's total money supply increased from Bs11.3 billion to Bs382.3 billion. During the same period the free market rate of the dollar rose from Bs250 to Bs8,565, while the cost of living index in La Paz, whose base was 100 in 1931, skyrocketed from 5,664 in 1952 to 276,483 in 1957.'<sup>8</sup> In addition to the loss of revenues from the mines, agricultural production fell to almost nothing as the campesinos could provide very little surplus from their mini-fundios and the new lands in the oriente were not yet producing sufficiently for the cities. The result was a good deal of hardship for those in the cities, especially the middle sectors who were hardest hit by the inflation and lack of food. These groups found their savings wiped out, their wages frozen by the government, food hard to find, while at the same time the workers were better fed and received higher and higher wages. Politically the result was a general alienation of these middle sectors from the MNR government.

Two economic plans, the Stabilization and Triangular, were carried out by the MNR government at the insistence of the United States<sup>9</sup>, both were to have far-reaching political effects. In order to stop the rampant inflation, Siles adopted the Stabilization Plan in 1957. This plan called for the freezing of wages, the elimination of subsidies to the miners

---

<sup>8</sup>Zondag, op. cit., p.55.

<sup>9</sup>Two American reports played important roles in the adoption of these plans. The Eder report and the Ford, Bacon, and Davis reports were commissioned by the United States for the Stabilization and Triangular Plans respectively. Amado Canelas, op. cit., devotes almost his entire book to an indictment of the Ford, Bacon, and Davis report.

commisaries, called pulperías, the reduction of black market activities (this posed a threat to many party members who were getting rich smuggling goods into the country), and other strict economic measures.<sup>10</sup> In spite of opposition from labor, Siles enforced some of the measures of the Plan (except for the provision for reducing subsidies to the pulperias) and managed to stabilize the economy. The Triangular Plan was also forced on Bolivia by the United States and called for the rehabilitation of the nationalized mines. Formulated in 1963, the chief provision of this plan was a reduction in the number of miners. COMIBOL was by that time losing \$15 million a year and the United States was concerned that it was wasting money supporting the MNR government.<sup>11</sup> The political result of the implementation of this plan was the defeat of the miners by the army and campesinos and the subsequent alienation of these miners from the government.

Politically the history of the MNR was one of constant struggle between the left and right wings of the party for control, as well as individual efforts to obtain the Presidency. The left wing of the party was represented by labor leaders who endorsed the principle of co-gobierno and their own independence from party organizations. The right wing was largely composed of the old guard---guardia vieja---founders of the party

---

<sup>10</sup>The implementation and effects of stabilization are exhaustively investigated by Mr. George Jackson Eder, Inflation and Development in Latin America: A Case History of Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia (Ann Arbor: Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Michigan, 1968). Mr. Eder was the official responsible for the Stabilization Plan and his book is not only an interesting account of the Bolivian economy, but also of the political difficulties encountered at the time.

<sup>11</sup>In 1963 COMIBOL had a deficit of 231.6 million pesos versus 76.6 million for the government. It is interesting to note that in 1966 the figures were somewhat different (after the military suppressed the miners): COMIBOL had a surplus of 49.7 million while the government showed a deficit of 177.6 million. USAID, Economic and Program Statistics, (La Paz: March, 1968), p. 31.

who were much less vehement in their economic ideology and resented the power of the labor and campesino leaders. The two branches alternated in power over the years: in 1953 an attempted coup of the right left the labor leaders in power; in 1954 Lechín "burned" himself politically by proposing a change in the universities which threatened their cherished autonomy; in 1956 the left came back into power through the election of Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz as Vice-President; in 1957, due to their opposition to the Stabilization Plan, Siles removed the leftists from power and brought back members of the right wing. The two major struggles within the party which followed revolved around the question of Presidential succession, but behind these aspirations were fundamental differences in ideology and group composition. In 1960 Walter Guevara Arze broke with Paz Estenssoro because he thought he should have received the Presidential nomination.<sup>12</sup> Guevara Arze formed the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Auténtico (MNRA) which soon changed its name to the Partido Revolucionario Auténtico (PRA). Although he was unsuccessful in his election bid his departure was important for it marked the point at which the middle sectors abandoned the MNR. The second crisis came in 1964 when Juan Lechín, apparently under the belief that it was his turn to become the Presidential candidate of the party, saw his aspirations crushed by the nomination of Paz. Lechín, who had lost much of his power with the miners, then broke with the party eventually forming the Partido Revolucionario de la Izquierda Nacional (PRIN). The departure of many of the labor leaders left Paz Estenssoro no other choice than to fall back on the army as

---

<sup>12</sup>In a remarkable, for Bolivia, explanation of his reasons for leaving the MNR, Guevara Arze also explains some basic difficulties of party leadership in P.M.N.R.A.: Exposicion de motivos y declaraciones de principios (La Paz: n.p., 1960).

a base of support. This became evident in the party convention of 1964 when Paz had to seek the support of the army; later he was forced to drop his own candidate, Federico Fortún Sanjinés as the Vice-Presidential candidate and accept General Rene Barrientos Ortuño as his running mate. After the election Barrientos retired to Cochabamba where he was able to enlist the support of campesino leaders for his coming golpe. Later students and teacher revolted in the cities and the military intervened and asked Paz to leave the country. Thus in spite of the social and economic changes of the Revolution, the MNR was unable to basically alter the structure of the political system and ended up as a small clique of politicians who had managed to alienate the majority of the population.

What then were the changes in the political culture which took place after the Revolution of 1952? Perhaps most important was the incorporation of most of the citizens into the social, economic, and political life of the nation. For the first time in Bolivian history many became aware of the existence of a Bolivian nation and of the political system as a separate object. Although the majority cannot be classified as participants in the system now, it does seem safe to assume, as in the case of Mexico, that Bolivia has changed from a predominately parochial to a subject political culture. As will be seen shortly, the incorporation of the rural masses was not accomplished without difficulty and one views the results with mixed feelings, but at least the majority are now aware of the political system and react to it. As in Mexico, this is primarily an awareness of the outputs of the system, but the rural citizenry also know that they can make demands on the system and can expect certain results if they are

organized. Although their sense of relatedness to the political system may be based on manipulation by unscrupulous campesino jefes, or in close, personal ties with the President, the fact is that the peasants are now aware of their own strength and can receive something from the government if they present a unified front. To divide the population into the classifications of Almond is somewhat hazardous due to lack of empirical data but this writer would tend to believe that approximately 70% of the population could be classified as subjects. This would include the majority of campesinos located in close proximity to urban centers--in Bolivia this means virtually all of the farmers. Most of these subjects are passive to government activity, although they are aware that the government can provide certain services such as roads, schools, water works, agricultural specialists, and so forth. However, they do not generally regard themselves as participants in the system and tend to leave the making of demands on the system to either their own leaders or government officials such as the local Prefecto. One would have to include certain members of the middle sectors as subjects due to their apathetic response to the political system. A further 15% of the population can be classified as participants in the system. These are primarily urbanites although one would have to include some campesinos in Cliza, Ucureña, Sacaba, and a few of the other heavily politicized zones of the countryside. For the most part, the participants are members of the middle sectors although one would have to also include a good part of the miners, the factory and railroad workers, as well as other unions in the cities such as the taxi drivers and black marketeers. It also includes the secondary and university students and the teachers. In short, the participants are primarily urban, educated, middle sectors who control the country, both

politically and economically. The final 15% classified as parochials includes those peasants who still live in areas so isolated that the political system simply does not play a role in their lives. Although many of the isolated pueblos and communities are now in contact with the outside world, the fantastic geography of Bolivia insures that there will almost certainly be some isolated groups and individuals. Also included are some of the primitive tribes of the Pando and Beni. A comparison of the classification of the population between the pre-and post-revolutionary political cultures would appear as follows:

	<u>Pre-1952</u>	<u>After 1952</u>
Parochials	80%	15%
Subjects	15%	70%
Participants	5%	15%

Perhaps the most amazing fact, in comparison with Mexico, is the remarkable speed with which the political culture was fundamentally altered. After all, for almost 400 years nothing had changed in Bolivia, at least for the Indian masses, and now the entire structure of the society has been altered. In the long run this might prove to be the major contribution of the MNR: the incorporation of most of the population into the active social, economic and, one hopes, political life of the country.

As for the structural differences which existed in the pre-revolutionary political culture, many have persisted and created fundamental problems for the political system. Most notably, regionalism continues, both under the MNR and presently, and offers a persistent threat to national viability. Rivalry between the three major cities, La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, continued after the Revolution, and in many

ways actually increased. This was especially the case with Santa Cruz<sup>211</sup> because since 1952 the area has grown tremendously and has become the new economic center of the country. Colonization and development of land resources around Santa Cruz have greatly increased the agricultural production of the nation, especially in rice and sugar; and discovery and exploitation of oils and gas in Santa Cruz as well as Camiri have shifted the economic center of the country eastward. It should be noted that it was the conscious policy of the MNR to develop the oriente and other regions may have been irritated by it. In spite of these efforts, however, many Cruceños felt, and still feel, that the central government does not return enough in services for what it extracts in resources and taxes. In addition, the development plans of the MNR often were contradictory as in the case of supporting colonization projects in Santa Cruz, the Yungas, and the Chapare; all of these produce the same products and markets were limited. In general, however, the MNR consciously followed a policy to reduce the isolation of communication in the country. Several road projects were carried out such as Routes 1 and 4 from Cochabamba to the Chapare, and 2 and 3 linking Santa Cruz with other areas of the Beni (None of these projects are yet terminated, but they were contracted by the MNR government). Air service to such isolated zones as the Beni and Pando was also increased and some efforts made to integrate them economically into the country. At least the MNR left a heritage that no subsequent Bolivian government will be able to ignore; this was the conscious effort to economically integrate the country through improved means of transportation and communication.

Political regionalism flourished under the MNR. In at least two cases local bosses ruled much as the early caudillos during and after independence. In Santa Cruz Luis Sandoval Morón, and in the Beni and Pando, Ruben Julio Castro, established satrapies in which they held



absolute power with little interference from the central government or the MNR. Eventually both were eliminated, Sandoval Morón by the army and Julio Castro through the simple expedient of bringing him to La Paz, but they were examples of a phenomenon rampant under MNR rule. This was the prevalence of local leaders who ruled their territories without interference or control from La Paz. In numerous isolated mining camps, former haciendas, communities, towns, and cities, one leader was paramount and the MNR was forced to work through him to achieve whatever goals it wanted. Often the power of these independent caudillos was backed by militias loyal to them and the government was relatively powerless to enforce its point of view---this was true at least until 1962 when Paz began to use the army to suppress these independent centers of power. Occasionally the party, or individual leaders, made attempts to undermine leaders in some regions, notably José Rojas in Ucureña, but by and large the country was dominated by these local caudillos. Thus, although many citizens became aware of the national political system, their everyday lives were still dominated by local leaders, and this could only help to perpetuate subcultural differences based on regional allegiance.

Another of the subcultural differences found in the traditional system, that between the races, is somewhat more difficult to explain. Although the antagonism between the Indian and the white appears to have been reduced, it might have been replaced by hostility based on the differences between the cities and the countryside.<sup>13</sup> To the ever-

---

<sup>13</sup>There are indications that this division between the city and the campo existed before the Revolution. Specific reference was often made to "Los del campo," and "los del pueblo," before 1952. See Jorge Dandler-Hanhart, op. cit., pp.44-49. However, this writer would tend to believe that basically the relation was one of race.

lasting credit of the MNR, its major goal was the incorporation of the Indian into national life. As one government poster announced, "The Indian has spent 400 years serving us, let us devote the next 50 years to serving him." The agrarian reform, universal suffrage, and other social and economic reforms were designed with the idea of aiding the integration of the peasants into the political system. Despite these goals the question still remains as to the extent to which the Revolution altered fundamental attitudes of the white and Indians. At first there can be few doubts that the majority of the urban middle sectors at least theoretically supported the general goals of incorporation and integration. However, they soon began to reject the methods and results of these goals and in the process may have come to doubt the wisdom of the reforms all together. It is the opinion of this writer that relations between the two races deteriorated greatly in the first years of the Revolution, but a new foundation may have been laid for better understanding in the future. After the April Revolution many of the campesinos went on a rampage and treated many hacendados, as well as other whites, with special cruelty and barbarity. They also managed to eliminate a good part of the livestock reserves of the country in spontaneous feasts. These acts, combined with the general shortage of food in the cities, no doubt helped to convince the whites that the agrarian reform was a miserable failure and the Indians irresponsible brutes. Then too, the MNR used the campesino militias to frighten the cities either bringing in the militias to inflict damage or using them as a constant threat in case of any trouble. A particular gruesome event was the invasion of Santa Cruz by the Ucureña militia in 1959 when numerous atrocities were committed against the civilian population. Soon the urban population had a great fear of the campesino militias

[ than those of the miners, and the MNR utilized this fear to enforce 214 ]  
tranquility. On the other hand, the city residents continued to regard the peasant as an ignorant, befuddled boor who was manipulated by irresponsible politicians and agrarian jefes. They feared the campesinos not only for their violence but also because their own vote was totally ineffective against the mass vote from rural areas. There were numerous indications of the growing estrangement between the city and the campo, not the least of which was the total failure of city merchants to make any effort to sell goods to the campesinos on the ground that these farmers either did not want goods or had no money to pay for them. Even in the market place contact between campesino and urbanite was limited, especially until production was enough to supply the cities, and the result was not only political suspicion but also a total lack of social and economic relations between the city and the country.<sup>14</sup> In the last few years there has been a decided improvement in the situation, but for much of the period of MNR rule there was a definite breakdown in communication between the urban resident and the campesino, and this was reinforced by the virulent form of confrontation politics practiced during the period.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup>In many respects the breakdown in communication, as described by middle sector members, resembles that currently found in Mississippi and other states of the Deep South. Whites complain that they can no longer even talk with Negroes without realizing that the type of communication they refer to was based on a servant and master system.

<sup>15</sup>An example of the improvement is the dramatic surge of the First National City Bank in recent months in Bolivia. The bank came to the country three years ago and is now by far the biggest bank in the country. The chief reason is the large number of campesinos who have deposited their accounts. While FNCB has made a conscious effort to attract campesinos, their actions appear to be based on the faith that they have in only that bank. Personal conversation with Gerald Kangas, Assistant Director, First National City Bank, April 3, 1969.

While the political differences based on race were perhaps increased, the Revolution did destroy forever the caste system which until then had strangulated Bolivian society. The lines between Indian and white became further blurred and it became easier for the Indian to move up the social ladder. Richard Patch believes that a new culture is being formed composed of the best elements of both the Spanish and Indian subcultures.<sup>16</sup> This new culture is a fusion of both Indian and white customs and attitudes and the effect has been to reduce the previous divisions within the society based on such factors as language, dress, religion, etc. Many changes are helping to reduce these differences; for instance, the presence of transistor radios and even newspapers in the campo has allowed the campesino to have an awareness of events in the cities and even beyond, something denied him in the old system. The expansion of schools in rural areas has helped to educate the peasant and also to teach him the Spanish language. Finally, the purchase of trucks both by individuals and entire communities, and the improvement in the transportation system have allowed the campesinos to visit the cities frequently with the result that they are participating more and more in the economic life of those cities.<sup>17</sup> Thus at least socially and economically the Revolution has reduced basic cultural differences and helped to increase mobility in the system.

---

<sup>16</sup>Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting," in Richard Adams, et. al., Social Change in Latin America Today (New York: Vintage, 1960), p. 150.

<sup>17</sup>The purchase of trucks and tractors by campesinos has recently been phenomenal. In one three month period Grace and Company sold over 100 trucks and 40 tractors to campesinos located primarily in the Cochabama Valley. This is another indication of the increasing participation of the campesino in economic wealth. Personal conversation with Rudy Veirerra, Sales Representative of Grace, Cochabama, May 4, 1969.

The subcultural differences based on extreme wealth largely disappeared after the Revolution. Immediately after 1952 the white oligarchy either had their power destroyed through nationalization or seizure of property and many of them left the country never to return. Those who did stay lived in considerably less wealth. The truth is that for much of the early period Bolivians found themselves equally poor; there was virtually no superior class based on wealth. With the defeat of the rosca, the failure of an entrepreneurial class to emerge, the general lack of production and the economic difficulties encountered, Bolivia was without a group of people with much money. Eventually a new economic elite began to emerge with its wealth based primarily on political access and economic manipulation through the government, but this elite did not have the economic resources of the rosca.<sup>18</sup> Until late in the rule of the MNR the middle sectors also suffered due to government controls, lack of markets, and a general unwillingness to invest in the country. For those who did manage to accumulate wealth the government was regarded as the chief instrument for achieving it. For the rural masses life was still harsh, with Bolivia ranking near the bottom in Latin America in terms of per capita income, but increasingly the campesino has found it easier to purchase bicycles,

---

<sup>18</sup>One of the basic problems in conducting research in Bolivia is to determine such matters as corruption of officials. It is virtually impossible to prove such actions. After discussions with many Bolivians this writer would tend to believe that many of the Movimientistas used political power to personally enrich themselves.

radios, sewing machines, and other material goods which were almost totally denied him before the Revolution.<sup>19</sup> The growing participation of the campesino in the economy of Bolivia is one of the most significant social changes inaugurated by the MNR. In spite of the poverty of the majority of the population, the party was responsible for initiating the process by which the rural masses were able to start up the economic scale and this has helped greatly in the reduction of subcultural differences based on wealth.

In turning to the second major element in the political culture, attitude changes, it should be noted that Bolivia requires a group-by-group analysis due to differences in orientations found in social and economic groups. Perhaps the most important group, both in terms of sheer numbers and for the future development of the country, is the campesinos. The rural masses were, it will be remembered, totally isolated from the traditional political system; many were even unaware of its existence. There have been numerous changes in this outlook, but without

---

<sup>19</sup>Per capita income in Bolivia is variously estimated at between \$85-120 annually. However, there are no basic statistics or data available to reliably estimate personal income for the campesinos. This writer feels it has been underestimated. The campesinos provide most of the goods they use for home production and these are not included in income estimates. In addition, there is evidence that the campesino is making much more cash income than previously thought. Ronald J. Clark has just completed a three year study of the agrarian reform and its consequences and when his material is published it may do much to dispell ignorance about the life of the campesino. In one such study he found that campesinos on the altiplano spent slightly over \$100 per year on articles. Ronald J. Clark, "Land Reform and Peasant Market Participation on the Northern Highland of Bolivia," Madison: Land Tenure Center of the University of Wisconsin, 1968, LTC reprint No. 42). In another study of the Cochabama valley, Jorge Dandler-Hannart estimates that many campesinos are making more than \$10,000 annually, or a little less than U.S. \$1,000.

adequate field research most of the observations which follow lack a scientific base. They are, rather, observations based on the experience of the writer. First, the campesino has definitely changed from a parochial to a subject in the political culture. The agrarian reform and the organization of campesino unions have introduced the peasant to the political system, albeit with mixed results. What is important is that now the campesino is aware of the nation of Bolivia, and that he also knows there are political structures operating within its political system. In this context it is important to remember the division between the Aymara-speaking Indians of the altiplano and the Quechua-speakers of the valleys. The Aymara have been much more difficult to organize and to introduce into the political system than the Quechua. Recent programs of the government and of the Church have had some success on the altiplano, but for the most part the campesino movement was restricted to the valleys, especially to Cochabamba.<sup>20</sup> Thus the sense of relatedness to and knowledge of the political system will depend a good deal on the area where the farmer is located. For instance, the highly politicized campesinos in the towns of Punata, Cliza, Ucuřeña, Sacaba, Tarata, and others will work through their sindicatos and local leaders to achieve political goals and they are often very successful. On the other hand, some towns have no organizations and the individual is only loosely related to the political system. This is true of some areas of the altiplano and also in Santa Cruz. As will be seen, the pattern of interest articulation was also highly effected by the area from which the campesino came.

It is also difficult to determine the exact nature of the relationship between the campesino and the political system. There can be little

---

<sup>20</sup>Harold Osborne, Indians of the Andes: Aymaras and Quechuas (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), p. 212.

doubt that many made contact through the political party, especially in those areas where party organization was strong and the benefits of the agrarian reform appeared to come from the party structures. The MNR was regarded as the instrument whereby the campesino received his land and this no doubt helped to create a sense of identity with the party.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, the pattern of personal relatedness to power and authority also prevailed in the campo. This was especially true in the sense that the campesino tended to see the government in terms of a sense of personal identity with the President, whether he be "Don Víctor," "Don Hernán," or "Don Rene." The sense of personal identification was often aided by legal requirements, most notably the signature of the President of the Republic on the forms for the new land titles. This requirement made it appear as if the President was personally giving the land to the campesino. In other cases the President came to a village or community and personally gave money for such projects as schools, sanitary facilities, or a water system. (Neither Paz nor Siles approached Barrientos in the extent of their personal dispersion of funds to rural villages; the latter somewhat resembled Lazaro Cárdenas in his rapid trips throughout the country giving away money.) Thus, the campesinos still tend to believe that if they can reach the President personally he will come and grant them the funds necessary for their projects. Personalismo was also maintained by the rural agrarian jefes who managed their areas as the caudillos of old and thereby

---

<sup>21</sup>One interesting event observed by the writer occurred at Ucureña on the "Día del Indio" August 2, 1967. When President Barrientos arrived by helicopter approximately 10,000 campesinos awaited him at the memorial to the Agrarian Reform Bill. As Barrientos assumed the dias, thousands of hands went up in the air with the "V" sign of the MNR. Immediately campesino jefes shouted for them to stop making the sign and the hands were soon lowered, but it was clear that the campesinos were confused.



helped to perpetuate the pattern of personal authority similar to that of the old patron. The structures---with some exceptions---in the campo were relegated to insignificant positions and most of the politicians preferred to base their appeals on demagogery and personal manipulation of the campesinos. In general it can be said that the pattern of relatedness of the campesinos to the political system did change from parochial to subject, but that the former pattern of personal authority remained.

Another attitudinal pattern of the campesino which merits attention and is related to his view of himself as a participant in the system is the seemingly/paradoxical behavior of active political participation coupled with general apathy. The campesino alternated his political behavior between active participation, usually in the form of parades, demonstrations, concentrations, etc., and then reverted back to a general apathy and alienation towards the political system. Several factors might explain this paradoxical behavior: first, one would not expect that after centuries of opposition and alienation that the campesino would totally alter his attitude of distrust towards the government, the white elite, or the cities; second, the campesino is not stupid (contrary to the belief of many urban residents) and must have realized that he was often manipulated by politicians interested in their own welfare and not necessarily that of the campesino. The latter factor was heightened by the constant mobilization of the campesinos for political purposes. While granted that it is possible to maintain some interest ~~through~~ speeches, parades, or possible free chicha and money, there can also be few doubts that after many such mobilizations the campesinos would tend to become somewhat disgruntled, especially if these mobilizations happened to coincide with important periods of farming.<sup>22</sup> A growing

---

<sup>22</sup>In July and August, 1968, a series of events proved interesting in Cochabamba. Under stress from student and teacher attacks, the Prefecto!

disenchantment with interference in their duties could only lead the campesinos to seek peace and tranquility rather than follow the constant demands of their political leaders. One indication of this apathy was the total failure of the campesinos to support the government in 1964; one could speculate that perhaps the reason (at least in those areas where General Barrientos had not won over the leaders) was that the peasants were simply tired of being asked continually to come to the cities in support of the MNR government. A contributing factor to apathy was the extravagant claims and promises made by local leaders, promises which could not be kept and thereby must have created a sense of distrust in the campesino for his own leaders. Olen Leonard, in a study of attitudes on the altiplano, discovered the following general attitudes among the campesinos:

The MNR gave us land, but since then they have done nothing. Our local leaders promise us many things but they never deliver. Here everyone is a member of the party but no one participates.

We lose a great deal of time in political meetings. The local leaders talk much but say nothing. The evil with the party is the local leaders. All of them must be removed. They know very little and they are not honest.

The politicians have made us stupid and the party [MNR] has promised us so much that I personally do not believe their promises. They told us that after the agrarian reform we would all change, that we would become gringos but this is not the truth. The only ones who have benefitted really are the politicians; now they even have automobiles.<sup>23</sup>

---

of the Department, Col. Luis Reque Terán, continued to mobilize campesino militias in the valley and they either surrounded the town or came in for various purposes. After three or four such occasions, a giant rally was held in the stadium and all campesinos were supposed to attend. However, very few showed up and subsequent discussions with Peace Corps Volunteers indicated that the campesinos were tired of coming to the city, especially as it was the time for planting potatoes.

<sup>23</sup>Olen E. Leonard, El cambio económico y social en cuatro comunidades del altiplano de Bolivia (Mexico: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1966), pp. 68-9. Translations by the writer.

The very real danger with such a pattern of attitudes is that the campesino might possibly return to his former alienation from the political system and retire to his own limited life. Despite the general introduction of the campesino to the political system, and the change from a basically parochial to subject outlook, there still exists some doubt as to the self-perception the campesino has of his own role in the system.

Another major group in Bolivia, the miners, also retained elements of previous behavior that had influenced their attitudes toward the political system, and led to a somewhat ambivalent perception of their own roles. In fact the attitude of the miners toward the government was primarily one of unbridled hostility. Partially this attitude could be attributed to past political experience during el sexenio and before. Through co-gobierno and control obrero the miners were also able to totally dominate the nationalized mines and in a sense excluded the government from their areas. When government interference did come in the mines, it was often in the form of force employed by the government. This tended to reinforce the hostility and suspicion of the miners. It should be added that the sense of personal authority remained a key factor in the mines. The miners regarded their leaders, such as Lechín, Mario Torres, and others, as personal gods and in turn these men used personal political appeals to maintain their followings. Lechín, for example, is reported to have been the godfather of a good many miner children. Despite the overwhelming position of Lechín in the miners hierarchy, other leaders were equally adept at establishing their own centers of power in the isolated mining camps and the old pattern of authority based on the patron persisted. The rejection of the political system by the miners, combined with the structures of the COB, may have led to a peculiar view of themselves in the political system. While they could

view themselves as participants, they did not see the system itself as something to which they owed allegiance; rather they identified the system with their own structures.

With regard to other groups in the society it is far less easy to decipher clear patterns of group attitudes. No doubt the military was at first somewhat alienated from the system, but as new elements were recruited, the size of the armed forces increased, its share of the budget increased, and the power base expanded, a more realistic and instrumental view of the government apparatus emerged. Certainly the military were indoctrinated better than any other group into the meaning of Bolivia and their sense of participation in economic development may have engendered an attitude that they were active participants in the system. Because of inflation, government policies favoring the miners and campesinos, numerous strikes and other violence committed by the militias and the government, as well as the constant feeling that they did not matter much in the political system, the middle classes tended to reject the Movimientista government emotionally. As will be seen later, they were generally unsuccessful in using the input structures to satisfy their demands and this may have contributed to a general rejection of the system. Added to this was the continual fear created by the acts of the Control Político. One indication of this attitude was increasing support for the Falange and a general desire to return to the pre-revolutionary days when their status was not quite as questionable. Thus, while the middle groups may have seen themselves as participants, they also tended to believe that others had usurped their natural right to lead the nation. Again, as in the case of the miners and campesinos, such an attitude could lead to general apathy, rejection of the existing political system, or an

attitude of lack of faith in their own capabilities.

This ambivalent attitude of self-participation in the political system led these groups, especially the middle sectors, to a general belief in the low degree of their own political competence. The middle sectors by and large lacked any faith in their own ability to lead the nation and had even less faith in the political competence of the miners or campesinos. One of the great paradoxes of Bolivian politics, at least to this observer, is that the middle groups have a very low estimation of their own ability to lead the political system, but at the same time most of the leaders come from this social stratum. Everyone is ready to make complaints against those who govern, but no one has any confidence in those who might replace existing rulers, and this often includes any movement or party of which the individual is a member. The result of this lack of confidence is a mystic reverence by the middle sectors for the "man on the white horse" who can safely lead the country. This charismatic leader, either of the Castro or John Kennedy type, is regarded as virtually the only solution to present or future chaos in the political system.<sup>24</sup> Perhaps this might help to explain why the middle sectors welcomed the overthrow of Paz Estenssoro by the far more dynamic Barrientos in 1964. To the middle sectors, both the MNR and presently, none of the current political parties or groups appear competent to lead the nation and they hope that somehow, someday, a leader will emerge who can inspire them and lead the country out of its morass. The explanation of this attitude may lie in their ambivalent

---

<sup>24</sup>The dramatic death of President Barrientos in April, 1969, seemed to convince the middle sectors that he was the kind of strong leader necessary to the stability of the country. Previously they had generally felt he was not very effective as a President.

view of their own participation in the system, and also their lack of a well-formulated sense of class values and ideals.<sup>25</sup> In this regard the attitude of the middle groups is critical for they are the actual administrators of Bolivia and if they somehow feel themselves incompetent to rule they certainly will not perform very well.

The sense of incompetence is found in other groups of the society as well which is not surprising due to the insecurity of the middle sectors; that is, this sense of incompetence, could be expected to filter down to other groups. A key reason for the attitude of incompetence on the part of the campesinos may have been the general failure of leaders from their own ranks to emerge. However, as leaders are emerging currently, the campesino may improve his attitude towards his own abilities. Oddly enough, the military no longer suffers as much as previously from a sense of incompetence. One reason is the prominent role played by the military in their civic action programs and various development projects. They could thereby gain a sense of competence in building the nation. The recent defeat of Che Guevara has helped the military to achieve a sense of competence with respect to their military duties. As a result the military is probably the only group in Bolivia which currently has a sense of competence in their own abilities---both militarily and in running the country---and this factor will help them to stay in power in the future.

The general level of political trust prevailing in the MNR system

---

<sup>25</sup>The writer has used the terms "middle sectors" and "middle groups" throughout this paper because he feels that the small Bolivian middle "class" does not have the necessary value system and class identity to be correctly termed a class. For a corroborating opinion, see James Malloy, "Revolution and Development in Bolivia," in Cole Blasier (ed.) Constructive Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), pp. 186-87, 212.

was not noticeably changed from the total lack of such trust found under the traditional system. Quite frankly, no one trusted anyone else. Partially this was the responsibility of the MNR for having perpetrated those acts which lead to a lack of trust. Political persecution, combined with the dubious practices of the Control Político, were no doubt a major factor in the maintenance of a lack of trust. Poor administrative practices, corruption and graft, also contributed to a lack of faith in the MNR. However, to this writer, there are indications that the lack of trust in fellow citizens is a facet of all social relations in Bolivia, and not simply a manifestation of lack of faith in the political competence or performance of others. Although it is dangerous to "explain" political phenomena through the use of other social practices, it may be instructive to note such practices found in Bolivian society which generally seem to indicate a lack of trust in others. The rivalry and distrust between the races and between the city and the countryside have already been noted. Another indication of distrust is the construction of Bolivian homes with high fences, often topped with broken glass or barbed wire, effectively isolating the inhabitants from their neighbors or the street. The watchdog, the locked gate, and the high fence are omnipresent facts of Bolivian life. Social relations are also centered around the family and outsiders are not readily admitted into social affairs. There is a great reluctance to go outside the immediate family, often numbering more than a few, for any type of social activity. Another indicator could be the lack of credit extended in commercial negotiations, especially to the lower classes. (Often in the past this has been fully justified due to the Indian's failure to see his debt as a duty to repay.) Although the situation is changing rapidly with the establishment of cooperatives and

the expansion of internal markets, it still remains an economy based on cash. This pattern is upheld in political relations as well. Unless one has a close personal relationship, bordering on the familiar, political trust is simply not given to others. Throughout the polity there is continual doubt and suspicion over any political act or statement. This distrust extends to the government and its major spokesmen; no one believes anything the government does is not motivated by the desire of those in power to enrich themselves.

Because political trust does not operate at a very high level and has not noticeably improved over the traditional system, the level of civility or of political courtesy has also remained very low in the post-revolutionary political system. Given the lack of trust, a sense of political incompetence, and a general failure to agree on the nature of the political system, the MNR was unable to improve on political civility. In general the pre-1952 pattern of political relations was maintained in that all factions practiced such tactics as murder, exile, persecution, etc. There did not exist any concept of a loyal opposition and politics was not regarded as a process for discussion and bargaining over the table. Because all groups employed violence there was little hope for political civility. Interestingly enough, however, this does not mean that personal relations based on social contact were not based on courtesy. Given the nature of the political elite and their common background, as well as common social relations, courtesy was to be found in normal social activities. The only problem was that these social attitudes were not transferred to the political system.

In general most Bolivians still tended, and for that matter tend now, to regard the political process as a discordant one rather than



harmonious. Despite the emergence of the revolutionary ideology, there was no fundamental agreement on the norms of political action. As will become evident in the chapters on interest articulation and aggregation, there was no standard method for making or achieving demands, and the functions of rule-making and rule application were often arbitrary and without relation to the inputs. Then too the extreme organizational complexity of both the government and the party during the MNR period impeded rational administration as well as the development of knowledge of how the government actually worked. Under these conditions it was often difficult to tell exactly what the regime consisted of, what it was doing, and where it was going. The political process itself was confusing and many simply did not understand it, nor made any effort to understand it; rather they regarded the operations of the political system as the maneuvering of a few who were looking out for their own benefit and not attempting to resolve major problems.

With respect to personal political attitudes, it should first be mentioned that Bolivians seem to suffer from a massive inferiority complex prevailing the entire country. Whether this is the result of individual lack of security, sense of incompetence, or of collective inferiority is difficult to prove, but evidence of this complex is such that it is difficult to dismiss it without some discussion. The causes of this inferiority complex apparently stem from the disastrous record of wars and territorial losses suffered by the country, its isolation from the rest of the world, and its abject poverty. Bolivians feel inferior to their neighbors, especially Argentina, Brazil and Chile. They are particularly agitated by the prospect of further territorial aggrandizement which might eliminate the country

all together.<sup>26</sup> The isolation of the country reinforces this inferiority complex since Bolivians feel cut-off from the rest of the world and subject to the whims and desires of their neighbors and the international tin market. The poverty of the country, and its dependence on foreign aid as well as foreign largesse in the acceptance of Bolivian products, also contribute to the feeling of isolation and inferiority. The lack of national integration combined with dependence on the outside world have somehow made the people feel there is not much hope that they can conquer their own problems. The sense of inferiority prevades the entire social system, both individually and collectively, but it is most likely to focus on the political system itself and the result is a feeling that there will never be a satisfactory political solution to the problems of Bolivia. While one would think the National Revolution might have engendered some pride in the political system and the nation, this apparently was not the case since many Bolivians believe they even failed to carry out the Revolution successfully. Bolivians are apt to say, "we cannot do anything right so why should we expect the politicians to rule the country in a just and honorable fashion?" A striking example of this attitude was the recent death of Che Guevara. At first Bolivians were somewhat incredulous that the armed forces had actually captured and killed Che and thereby destroyed the guerilla movement. Then as they came

---

<sup>26</sup>An example of this fear was the Time magazine riots throughout the country in 1958. Time had published a spurious article stating that the country would be better off if it was divided up and given to its neighbors. The result was a general attack on American property and installations in the country. Time, by the way, is regarded as an official voice of the United States government in Bolivia.

to understand that it was actually Bolivian soldiers that were involved, and not U.S. Green Berets, they began to take some pride in their own military. But rapidly their attitude turned to one of cynicism and they began saying, "even Che Guevara could not succeed in Bolivia, the country is a total failure."<sup>27</sup> The importance of this inferiority complex is that Bolivians have little pride in their country and less faith in the capacity of the political system to actually resolve basic problems. Perhaps this attitude is changing but it will take many more years before national pride is at a sufficient level to insure general system support by the citizenry.

In terms of personal identity crises, there can be few doubts that many individuals suffered from a sense of personal insecurity which could have led to an identity crisis. In the chaotic situation after the Arpil Revolution many politicians were in essence seeking a meaning for their own lives within the framework of the new reality. The problem for these politicians was that they had difficulty identifying with the political system for the obvious reason that the system itself was in a state of near anarchy. The economic collapse, the establishment of independent bases of power, the lack of coordination and cooperation in the government, and the failure to develop a systematic ideology of the Revolution were all contributing factors in making the political system itself virtually useless as a device for identification to escape personal insecurity. Unlike Mexico, the MNR never did become an instrument for channeling aspirations and desires and identity to the office of the Presidency as an alter-ego. There was no over-all institution nor political figure to identify with, including the National Revolution; as a result personal insecurities continued and no doubt were increased. Given the predominance of local chieftains, jefes,

---

<sup>27</sup>These changes in attitude were observed by the writer in his classes at the Universidad de San Simón (UMSS) in Cochabamba. Currently the students seem to be returning to an idolization of Che.

or politicians, the solution was to identify with and transfer loyalty to the local leader. Therefore, for the average citizen, farmer, miner, or bureaucrat, identification was most often made with the local politician with the greatest influence over that individual's life.<sup>28</sup> In the case of the miners this individual was Juan Lechín, Mario Torres, or any other of a dozen sindicato leaders; for the campesinos it was José Rojas or Toribio Salas; for the cambas of Santa Cruz it was Luis Sandoval Morón, and so forth. There was some identification with the President, either Siles or Paz, but not to the extent which has developed in Mexico. Perhaps this indicated that Bolivia had not yet reached the stage of Mexico in the elimination of subcultural affiliations based on region or locale and the predominance of the local leader.

Given the prevalence of regionalism, together with much of the disorder occurring after the Revolution and the subsequent ability of local leaders to isolate themselves from central authority, it should not be surprising that Bolivians in general failed to develop a sense of empathy with their fellow citizens. This lack of empathy was reinforced by the relative isolation of much of the population, especially the miners, the colonizers, and many of the campesinos. In fact, evidence suggests that the agrarian reform might have contributed to isolation of the campesinos through the creation of minifundios and the lack of cooperation and contact between neighbors.<sup>29</sup> Since many lacked a sense of empathy, they

---

<sup>28</sup> A major contributing factor in identification with political figures may be the lack of national heroes in Bolivia. With the exception of the historical figures of Simon Bolivar, Marshall Sucre, and the hero of the War of the Pacific, Eduardo Abaroa, Bolivia has no other national heroes. Teachers claim that because of the lack of national heroes, schoolchildren tend to identify with foreigners. For information and opinions expressed on teachers and students, the writer is indebted to the following members of his classes: Jorge Trigo, Hans Moeller, Guido Espinoza, Wilfredo Mendoza, Maria Esther and Humberto Yugar.

<sup>29</sup> Immediately after the Revolution there was an apparent breakdown of the traditional cooperation between the peasants in many areas.

also lacked the ability to work with others, especially in the political system. As in Mexico the concept of dignidad has come to mean that the individual seldom works with others for fear of somehow or another destroying his own individuality; personal insecurity and isolation are therefore increased. Another symptom is the lack of faith in personal relations with others. While it is difficult to relate and determine exactly the relationship of these attitudes to the political system, it would seem that cooperation in many endeavors, including political ones, would be difficult because of the lack of empathy.

For individual political leaders and their followers, personal insecurity may have been the result of the socialization process before and after the Revolution. For instance, one of the factors contributing to a sense of personal insecurity was the presence of millennial appeals throughout the political system prior to and immediately after 1952. These appeals and calls for action were based on the assumption that the National Revolution would totally alter the political, social, and economic life of the country, and more important, create a new political system based on rational, orderly politics. As the campesino from the altiplano remarked, "They told us after the agrarian reform we would all change." Naturally these changes did not occur and the politicians found themselves trapped by their own extravagant claims; they had to continue making millennial appeals in order to retain the support of their followers. But these politicians must have realized many of their statements were false and this could only increase their sense of insecurity in their power positions. Interest group leaders found themselves promising more than they knew the limited resources of the government could provide. They were thus caught in their own trap by the claims they had made prior and after the Revolution. In

addition, the actual political practices helped to reinforce a sense of insecurity in the politicians due to the mercurial temperments of the participants. Politicians were never sure how long they would be in office or in leadership roles, when they might be imprisoned or forced into exile, end up in a concentration camp, or perhaps be murdered. In such an atmosphere it was somewhat difficult to have a feeling of security either in the system, in one's fellow citizens, or in yourself. In short, the political socialization process lent itself very well to the perpetuation of personal insecurity among the elite.

It is difficult to trace these developments back to the basic socialization process due to the lack of substantive research. It would appear that the same discontinuities found in the socialization process in Mexico would also be encountered in Bolivia. For instance, the family tended to create an ambivalent attitude towards authority. In the typical Bolivian middle sector family, with which this writer has had some experience, and from which came the vast majority of Bolivian politicians, the father is the authority symbol.<sup>30</sup> However, there are some difficulties with the manner in which his authority is exercised. First of all, for the male children there is often little or no authority exerted. In general the male child is given the run of the household and not only left to himself, but also is expected to show a good deal of independence and freedom of action---the ideal macho. Seldom if ever is discipline used by the father and when it is it is totally arbitrary. If the father does resort to occasional

---

<sup>30</sup>The writer had the unusual opportunity to live with a Bolivian middle sector family for seven months in 1964-65. He was fully accepted into the family as a member and actively participated in economic, social, and political decisions. It was a rare and rewarding experience for which he is extremely grateful.

beatings or a measure of punishment, he will afterward feel guilty and make amends to the child. Thus the child feels no strong authority over him and when it is used there is often no rational explanation. Also, in the average Bolivian middle sector (but not in the lower classes or campesinos where the child early assumes certain tasks), the male child is rarely given any responsibility or duties to perform in the household. The lack of responsibility does not change as he grows older, and most Bolivian teenagers spend their time in the plaza or streetcorner where they are readily available for demonstrations. One could speculate that the lack of responsibility of the male child, combined with an authority exercised if at all arbitrarily, would lead to an ambivalent attitude towards authority and therefore lead to the first discontinuity with respect to personality structure in the socialization process.

In the schools this ambivalence is reinforced. In the first place, the Bolivian teacher, following the European model, is an absolute dictator in the formal sense. He dictates to the class and expects the students to obey without questions, noting precisely everything he says. In practice, however, this model breaks down. The students exercise a political power over the teacher which is difficult for foreigners to comprehend. The students exercise a political power over the teacher which is difficult for foreigners to comprehend. The students virtually dictate who passes or fails a class, who will be their teachers, and who will run the school system. Through strikes they can often force their will on the Minister of Education and in league with the teachers they often demonstrate for political goals, especially under the MNR when many teachers were anti-Movimientista. Thus in practice the student is introduced to an authority which is

neither respected nor exercised with any degree of consistency.<sup>31</sup> It must be added that in the secondary schools the students take formal part in the political system through their own organizations, and also in cooperation with university students in demonstrations against the government. The methods they learn are those of violence and direct confrontation and they early become used to the arbitrary exercise of power by the government as well as their own power in forcing the politicians to accede to their demands.

This socialization process reaches its apex at the university. The students exercise considerable political power within the universities due to the principle of co-gobierno between administration and teachers on the one hand and the students on the other. Their political power allows them to block any action in the university whether political or educational. It should be added that the teachers can often do the same.<sup>32</sup> Students often spend more time in the universities in strikes, parades, demonstrations, writing proclamations, etc., than

---

<sup>31</sup>In any one year under the MNR the schools were seldom open the required number of days, primarily because of student and teacher strikes. In 1964 the military government simply advanced everyone a grade after the interruptions of October and September, rather than reconvene school for final exams. Again in 1968, the government closed the schools down due to a teacher strike and advanced everyone a grade without benefit of exams. Often these actions are stimulated by financial considerations, but they would certainly contribute to a lack of respect for legal requirements in education.

<sup>32</sup>In 1966 the students at UMSS in Cochabamba had a "revolution" which demanded the restructuring of the university to suit the development needs of Bolivia. Their actions were eventually blocked by the faculty which balks at any reform threatening their privileged position. See Craig Byck, "Revolution and Frustration: The University Revolution at San Simon," (Unpublished Research Paper, Cochabamba: July, 1967).



they do in the pursuit of knowledge. Perhaps due to the development goals of the MNR, in recent years there has been introduced throughout the Bolivian universities a general feeling of the total irrelevance of the current university education.<sup>33</sup> University students realize that their system of education is totally out-of-date and does not fit the development needs of the country; but they are also trapped by the concept of the professional which forces them to think in terms of being doctors or lawyers and not specialists in agronomy or geology. As a result their revolts are as often or not, more unconsciously than consciously, a rejection of not only the political system (which is the usual object of their attacks), but also of the university as it presently exists. Students who study under nineteenth century concepts and methods, in inadequate buildings, without modern facilities, soon realize that what they are receiving as education has little to do with the reality of Bolivian needs.<sup>34</sup> The political system then becomes an obvious target for their frustrations especially since the structure of the university makes it difficult to attack. Students also take an active part in the political life of the country, but often without the basic knowledge of the problems faced by the government because

---

<sup>33</sup>In one study of university attitudes it was discovered that only 9% of students at UMSA in La Paz believe that what they are studying will help their country. See, Instituto Boliviano de Estudio y Acción Social (I.B.E.A.S.), Los estudiante y la universidad: estudio de actitudes (La Paz: I.B.E.A.S., 1966), p. 30.

<sup>34</sup>Much of John Powelson's criticisms of student ignorance in economics is based on his teaching at both UMSA and UMSS in Bolivia. See Powelson, America Latina: La revolución económica y social actual (New York: McGraw-hill, 1964), especially pp, 1-34. After two years as an Exchange Professor at UMSS, the writer can testify to the general awareness and frustration of these students concerning the type of education they receive.

there was under the MNR, and is now, a total lack of dialogue between the students and government. This lack of dialogue in turn, contributes to an air of unreality in all the student demands. Students were and are alienated from the system, want to change it, but have not the faintest idea of how to do it or what to do if the government falls. An excellent example was the participation of university students in the downfall of the Paz Estenssoro government in 1964; afterward the students were gradually shunted aside by the military and politicians for the simple reason that they lacked the necessary skills to fulfill administrative posts. One wonders if the estrangement of the Bolivian university student from the existing political system would change no matter what the composition of the government; they seem to exist in a permanent state of alienation. One of the specific measures taken by the MNR government in an effort to turn out the specialists and technicians needed for development was the creation of the Instituto Tecnológico Boliviano (ITB). What the party was trying to accomplish was to avoid the rigid professional curriculum of the universities and create a "new generation of bright young men" devoted to Bolivian development.<sup>35</sup> The universities naturally objected to the ITB, chiefly on the grounds of invasion of university autonomy, and this was apparently no small factor in the alienation of teachers and students from the MNR political system. One of the first acts after the fall of Paz was the incorporation of the ITB into the regular university system, thereby effectively destroying it as a source for the technicians and specialists Bolivia needs so badly.

Another of the discrepancies found between theory and practice in Bolivian life relates to the Church. (It should be stressed that,

---

<sup>35</sup>Malloy, "Revolution and Development in Bolivia," op.cit., p. 218. ]

unlike Mexico, comparison in the discontinuities in the socialization process is not being made between democratic ideals and practice; rather we are searching for discontinuities in the Bolivian socialization process which could contribute to personal insecurity, an authoritarian personality, or other factors introducing psychological dimensions in political attitudes.) The middle sectors of Bolivia play nominal allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church but with the exception of women it has no reality; that is to say that despite nominal church affiliation, few actually attend and even fewer put much stock in the moral and ethical teachings of the Church.<sup>36</sup> Children, at least male children, seldom attend church after they reach secondary school age and with the exception of marriages, baptisms, and death, the vast majority rarely see the inside of a church. For the campesinos church attendance is equally rare, without even considering the fact that the peasants have fused a religion from their Indian past with Catholicism to form a mixture devoted to agricultural seasons.<sup>37</sup> One can only speculate that these uncertain religious practices could contribute to an ambivalence towards authority, especial moral authority, and therefore reinforce the attitudes established in the family and school.

The sense of ambivalence also is found in peer groups, especially those relating to work. Most Bolivians, other than the campesinos, belong to some form of labor union if they are regularly employed, but the

---

<sup>36</sup>The writer is indebted to many American priests for his information concerning the role of the Church in Bolivia. He would especially like to thank Fathers Leo Sommer, Chuck Dahm, and Pat Riordan.

<sup>37</sup>Osborne, Indians of the Andes, op. cit., pp. 226-30. That this fusion is limited only to the Indians can be refuted by practices common to middle sector families in Cochabamba. When construction is started on a new house, not only is a priest brought in to bless the event, but also a llama foetus is placed under a cornerstone and a c'oja is made out of coca leaves, a fire, and a devil figure.

extent of their participation in union affairs is normally minimal.<sup>38</sup> Despite strong constitutions favoring mass participation in the direction of union affairs, for the most part these activities are directed from the top by a few union leaders who remain in control for long periods of time; a situation generally encountered throughout the world. In the case of unions the dichotomy between expressed goals and actual behavior seems to approximate closely that found in Mexico in that professed norms of union democracy are ignored and a closed oligarchy runs union affairs. Since this phenomenon is found world-wide, it would be drastic to suggest that it is the root cause of not only union difficulties but also authoritarian patterns toward the political system; rather it probably serves to reinforce the already established ambivalence towards authority found in the socialization process of the home and school.

It is less easy to find a direct relationship between the discontinuities in the socialization process and the prevalence of the authoritarian personality that Scott encounters in Mexico. One can observe continual evidence in Bolivia of the authoritarian syndrome, but this writer is reluctant to state categorically, that the authoritarian personality is a dominant one in the political system.<sup>39</sup> Certainly

---

<sup>38</sup> Union membership and practices are discussed in U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Law and Practice in Bolivia (Washington: BLS Report No. 218, 1962).

<sup>39</sup> An interesting (and so far as this writer knows, the only) study of political attitudes is IBEAS, Estudio regional del Noreste Boliviano (La Paz: IBEAS, 1966), especially pp. 50-58. The study was a comprehensive effort to describe the social, economic, and political problems of the Riberalta and Cobija areas. Certain discrepancies in the collation of the data make the results somewhat suspicious. It should also be mentioned that this zone is the most isolated of the country; Riberalta is more closely tied economically to Brazil than Bolivia. Nonetheless, the data is interesting and included as the only sample of Bolivian political attitudes currently available.

there are manifestations of a rejection of authority in a subordinate role. At the same time there is a widespread sense of personal insecurity,

---

Using a limited sample from already defined social classes, the study applied the Strole scale of anomie to the population:

Table "A"  
Social Category (in percentages)

	<u>High</u> 82%	<u>Middle</u> 85	<u>Low</u> 87
ANOMIE High			
Middle	10	12	10
Low	8	3	3

Evidently the people of Riberalta have a high degree of social alienation and, as the study concludes, there exists a widespread sense of powerlessness (falta de poder).

The "F scale of Adorno measuring the degree of authoritarian personality was also applied to the sample with the following results:

Table "B"  
Social Category

<u>Authoritarianism</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Middle</u>	<u>Low</u>
High	55	63	79
Low	45	37	21

The results are striking and indicate the prevalence of a high degree of authoritarian personalities in the population. The study ascribes the presence of such personalities to the strong degree of machismo in the population. It concludes that machismo and the authoritarian personality result in the following characteristics: the male is afraid of the group and therefore isolates himself from group contact; individuals refuse to work together in any cooperative venture; there is general worship for the individual who asserts himself over others; religious participation is rare; sexual conquests are accumulated to display one's prowess and manliness; The study mentions that male assertiveness is less than other areas such as the Beni, and one can see this is the reduced number of personal body attacks and lower consumption of alcohol. While one may dispute the conclusions of the study, the large percentage of those having traits of the authoritarian syndrome is amazing.

Finally the study attempts to measure the sense of identification

isolation, and anomie in many segments of the population. Perhaps 241  
most important is that there was no sense of identity and a great deal

---

of the citizens with respect to their community, department, and nation:

Table "C"

<u>Identification With</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Middle</u>	<u>Low</u>
Riberalta	5	10	52
Beni	25	12	24
Bolivia	70	27	24

The figures are, again, amazing, especially in terms of identification with the nation for the upper and middle classes and the lack of such identification for the lower. This could indicate that the upper classes are government employees sent, somewhat unwillingly, to Riberalta. For the lower classes the lack of identification with their country indicates that Bolivia has yet to conquer the problem of identification with the political system.

While there is a great amount of reluctance to apply these results to other areas of the country, primarily because of the extreme isolation of Riberalta, the data does indicate that Bolivia may suffer from severe problems due to lack of identification of its citizens with the political system, a widespread prevalence of social anomie, and the presence of the authoritarian personality.

L

└

of personal insecurity among the elites under the MNR. This insecurity was exacerbated due to the polarization of the political struggle and the lack of national identity. Middle sector politicians seemed to display a certain evidence of authoritarianism in their own exercise of power. Throughout much of the period these politicians made continual reference to the inability of the masses to govern or participate in the political process and thereby rationalized their own use of power.<sup>40</sup> What does seem certain is that given the widespread disorder of the Revolution, the sense of insecurity prevailing in the society, and the discontinuities in the basic socialization process, one could expect to find a good many individuals who would have personality structures similiar to that of the authoritarian syndrome.

Finally, in comparison with Mexico, the following conclusions appear to be applicable to Bolivia:

1. As in Mexico the Bolivian National Revolution resulted in a change from a basically parochial political culture to a predominately subject one. Most of the citizens are now at least aware of the political system and relate to it primarily through the output functions. Certain ambivalences were encountered in the self-perception as participants in the system among the campesinos, miners, and middle sectors.
2. Although some efforts have been made to reduce subcultural affiliations based on regionalism, Bolivia has not been as successful in eliminating these allegiances as has Mexico.

The anarchy prevailing after the Revolution probably reinforced

---

<sup>40</sup>Most notable was Walter Guevara Arze who first stated his elitist concept in his program of Ayopaya in 1946, found in Alberto S. Cornejo, Programas políticos de Bolivia (Cochabamba: Imp. Universitarias, 1949), p. 170; and continued the concept in his P.M.N.R.A. op. cit., p. 57.

allegiance to local political bosses. Other structural differences in the society, however, namely those based on race and wealth, were considerably reduced under the MNR.

3. As in Mexico there appear to be some discontinuities in the socialization process, especially as it relates to personality formation. Personal insecurity and a possible authoritarian syndrome may be the result of discontinuities in the family, school, religion, and other primary structures of the society. In particular the elite appear to suffer from an identity crisis and from personal insecurity; this was not the case in Mexico.
4. Patterns found in the political culture relating to a sense of incompetence, political trust, and political courtesy did not change noticeably from those under the pre-1952 system. All are found in much lesser degrees than is apparent in Mexico.
5. Equally, Bolivia did not develop the degree of system pride which was found in Mexico. The President was neither a symbol of national unity nor an alter-ego with which the citizens could identify; the MNR was not capable of providing an instrument for channeling demands to the President. Simply, the MNR was unable to develop the symbols and structures to overcome the basic insecurities of the citizens and the elite in Bolivia.

#### B. The Political Socialization Function.

It will be remembered that one of the most important developments in post-revolutionary Mexico was the evolution of the Revolutionary Creed. This creed was a comprehensive statement of Mexican goals and ideals which has received the support of the majority of Mexicans and offered a rallying point for the unification of the country. Furthermore,



the elite in Mexico has accepted the revolutionary ideology and works for its implementation, using the educational system and the government itself to socialize the Mexican people into the goals of the Creed. What happened in Bolivia? First, and perhaps most important, the elite in Bolivia was never able to gain the unity of purpose found in Mexico. One of the reasons for this lack of unity might well be that in Bolivia the elite was not forced to undergo a long period of struggle after the Revolution which could have contributed to some degree of unity. While it is true that during el sexenio, or for that matter since the Chaco War, the politicians had struggled to defeat the rosca, they had achieved very little unity even within the ranks of the MNR. When the Revolution came it happened so fast and with so little opposition that there was no opportunity to "forge under fire" a united elite devoted to the goals of the MNR---assuming that these goals were known. In fact what happened was that members of other parties, especially members of the PIR and POR, nominally joined the MNR, but were, at the same time, able to maintain their independence through their own bases of power. From the start the basic problem was that there was no consensus on the goals of the Revolution; everyone was for certain reforms but the divergencies on tactics and methods were great. Immediately a division within party ranks over methods to be employed developed and over the years this division became institutionalized in the two wings of the MNR. The continual struggle for power by individual politicians tended to obscure the fact that the elite never was sure of the ideological goals they were pursuing, and through the years it became virtually impossible to obtain any marked degree of unanimity. Thus in Bolivia an elite unified on the goals and practices of the Revolution did not develop and was a major factor in the subsequent failure of the MNR.

What was the substance of the revolutionary ideology in Bolivia? First and foremost, it must be pointed out that Bolivia had no formal statement of its revolutionary ideology, at least not to the extent of the Querétaro Constitution in Mexico. While it is true that various revolutionary reforms received formal sanction through promulgation by Presidential decrees, constitutional legitimacy was denied the MNR government until the formation of the Constitution of 1961; by then the party was split into various warring factions and ideological cohesion almost impossible to reach. What is important is that there did not exist a formal, identifiable statement of the revolutionary goals which could be transmitted to the citizens with ease. Given the importance throughout Latin American society to formal, ideal statements, this lack of a formalized ideology was probably a major drawback in the support of certain sectors of the population for the Revolution. While it is difficult to trace exactly the effect of this lack, it does seem fair to say that it was probably more troublesome to transmit certain goals in the school system as well as by direct socialization by the government. Nonetheless, there were definite elements and commitments in the ideology of the MNR and these demand analysis and comparison with Mexico.<sup>41</sup>

Perhaps the major ingredient of the revolutionary ideology was the concept of Bolivianidad, roughly translated as Bolivian nationalism. Put quite simply it referred to the effort to construct a strong and viable nation, integrated and self-supporting economically, politically

---

<sup>41</sup>Three major ideological programs stand out: Walter Guevara Arze, Plan inmediato de la Política Económica del Gobierno de la Revolución Nacional (La Paz: Ed. Letras, 1955); Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Programa de Gobierno, 1960-64 (La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1960); and MNR, Programa de Gobierno, 1964-68 (La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1964).

representative of all the groups in the society, and spiritually an incorporation of all the past greatness of the Incan and Spanish Empires fused into a modern whole. The concept of the Bolivian nation, in turn, referred to several different factors. The major element was the elimination of the rosca and foreign imperialism which was to be done through the nationalization of the mines, the agrarian reform, and state seizure of foreign interests as in the case of the British-owned railroads. The state was to direct and control the resources of the country as well as to intervene in the economy at any point necessary. However, from the start there was considerable disagreement over the extent to which the state was to function in the economy, and these differences were never resolved.<sup>42</sup> The left wing of the party favored state socialism and total control of the economy by the government.<sup>43</sup> The right wing of the MNR was less ideologically assured than the left but generally tended to support private ownership of property, capitalism in one form or another, and foreign investment in Bolivia.<sup>44</sup> The positions were never reconciled but gradually a more pragmatic approach emerged (chiefly from Paz Estenssoro) which allowed for private investment in certain areas where the government lacked the resources or the ability to manage an industry.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup>The most important differences resolved around compensation for the mineowners, the Stabilization crisis, control of the railroads, exploitation of petroleum, the type of agrarian reform, and the Triangular Plan.

<sup>43</sup>See, for instance, Central Obrera Boliviana, Programa ideológico y estatutos de la Central Obrera Boliviana (La Paz: n.p., 1954). The most articulate of the leftists was Nuflo Chaves Ortiz, see 5 ensayos y un anhelo (La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1963).

<sup>44</sup>There was no recognized spokesman for the right. Guevara Arze is most representative, but also see statements made by such leaders as Jorge Rios Gamarra, Zenon Barrientos, and Alfredo Ovando Candia during the conventions of 1956 and 1960.

<sup>45</sup>One of the more controversial acts was the granting of oil concessions to Gulf Oil after 1956. Many refused to recognize the government's concessions and it has remained a major bone of contention in Bolivian politics. For a discussion of the problem, see Enrique Mariaca, Mito y realidad del petróleo boliviano (Cochabamba: Los Amigos del Libro, 1968).

In general the attitude which dominated was that the state was to retain control over the major industries of the country, including mining, petroleum, and the railroads, was to foment industrial development in light industry in order to make Bolivia self-sufficient in clothing, food, and other necessities, and was to allow private capital to invest in other industries and factories needed by the country. In many cases, despite a noticeable improvement in the number of such enterprises, economic activities were handicapped by tax policies of the government, to say nothing of control obrero and the difficulties with the workers.<sup>46</sup>

Another aspect of building the new nation was to make Bolivia self-sufficient in the production of food stuffs. Although an important ingredient of this formula was the agrarian reform, that is to say the re-distribution of land to the campesinos and the destruction of non-producing haciendas, for the most part the dynamic aspects of agricultural development referred to the colonization of new lands. Colonization was thought to be the answer to the problem of over-population on the altiplano and the valleys. Therefore the virgin lands in the Santa Cruz area, the Yungas, and the Chapare were to be opened up, chiefly by government agencies (and the army) encouraging colonizers to move and also promoting the necessary infrastructures in the development areas.<sup>47</sup> Using new methods, new government

---

<sup>46</sup> Amado Canelas O, Mito y realidad de la reforma agraria (Cochabama; Los Amigos del Libro, 1966), pp. 51-68, ~~tries to show that the MNR greatly~~ favored the middle classes after the Revolution by showing the number of increased firms and those importing goods into the country. However, the tax structure was such that it fell almost entirely on the importers and businessmen who had no other choice than to pay. Other segments of the population, namely the campesinos, did not pay a proportionate share of the taxes. See Zondag, op. cit., pp. 72-74.

<sup>47</sup> For assessments of the colonization projects, see Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia's Developing Interior", American University Field Staff Newsletter (March 1962); also Alexander T. Edelmann, "Colonization in Bolivia: Progress and Prospects", Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 20, 4 (Spring 1967), pp. 39-54.

institutions, and new land, Bolivia would then not only become self-<sup>248</sup> sufficient in such crops as rice, sugar, corn, and wheat, but would also be able to export these crops to its neighbors for needed cash.<sup>48</sup> An equally important aspect of agricultural development was the construction of access roads (again, by the army) and highways to link the productive areas to their markets in the cities. In short, the government was to take the lead in providing the necessary services for colonization as well as for increased agricultural production.

Politically the new nationalism meant the unification and integration of the country, as well as the destruction of the traditional system. The elimination of regionalism was thus a goal, although in practice the MNR more often than not reinforced regional affiliation.<sup>49</sup> Another goal was the incorporation of the campesino masses into the political system, and the universal voting act was therefore considered one of the ideological foundations of the MNR regime. In theory another goal was democratization of the political system through increased participation of the masses. The only problem was that there was considerable disagreement among the elite as to the extent to which the masses were capable of self-government. The politicians believed they would have to lead the masses until such time as the latter were ready for self-government, a concept, incidentally, encountered in Mexico.

Perhaps one major difference between Bolivian nationalism and that of Mexico is that the revolutionary ideology was not directed outward

---

<sup>48</sup>It should be noted that these promises have largely been fulfilled, and after the initial drop in production following the Revolution, Bolivia has managed to increase production of foodstuffs far beyond pre-revolutionary days. See Zondag, op. cit., pp. 141-51.

<sup>49</sup>Victor Paz Estenssoro admitted as much himself in Informe a la VII Convención Nacional del MNR (La Paz: Ed. del Estado, 1956), passim.

to quite the extent found in Mexico.<sup>50</sup> The chief reason is probably 249  
that Mexico was almost totally dominated by foreign interests whereas  
Bolivia was controlled by native interests who may have lived abroad.  
As a result the rosca was regarded as the chief enemy and it was regarded  
as a national elite, although thoroughly anti-national in attitude  
and action. It was less easy to focus on foreign interests because of  
the predominate role played by the native oligarchy; however, this  
did not deter them from severe attacks on the British and Americans.  
There was and is a decidedly anti-Yankee attitude in Bolivia, as well  
as a great fear of Chile and lesser hostility towards Argentina and  
Brazil. The gringos serve as a convenient scapegoat for Bolivian  
ills, especially because of the predominate role played by American aid  
since the 1952 Revolution.<sup>51</sup> An added point of friction was the selling  
of surplus tin reserves by the United States when Bolivia needed the  
additional revenues to carry out its program of economic development.<sup>52</sup>  
The United States appears in the familiar role of despised benefactor in  
Bolivia, especially among the students and opposition politicians  
(or MNR leaders when it served their purposes), but anti-Americanism  
does not extend deeply into the society. The one rallying point for  
all Bolivians, regardless of ideology or party, is opposition to Chile.  
Bolivia's demand for an outlet to the sea is perhaps the only cause on

---

50

Richard W. Patch also maintains that Bolivian nationalism was not directed outward to a high degree, in, "Peasantry and National Revolution;" in Kalman H. Silvert (ed.), Nationalism and Development (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 126.

<sup>51</sup>For statistics relating to the amount of U.S. aid, see USAID, Economic and Program Statistics, op. cit., pp. 37-42.

<sup>52</sup>See, for instance, the speeches made in Congress against the United States by Mario Torres Calleja, the prominent miner leader, contained in La ayuda americana: una esperanza frustrada (La Paz: n.p., 1962).

L

└

which all Bolivians agree and it is rather easy to whip up public enthusiasm against real or supposed Chilean aggression. This was especially true in the Lauca River dispute in 1962.<sup>53</sup> It is also easy to manipulate public opinion with respect to Brazil and Argentina and their supposed designs on the petroleum reserves in the South of the country as well as the newly-discovered iron ore deposits at Mutun.<sup>54</sup> By and large, however, the opposition to imperialism was directed at the anti-national elite and foreign interests came in a poor second.

An important element of Mexicanism was the adoration of the mestizo as the representative of the best of the Indian and Spanish cultures. While the fusion of the two cultures was important to the revolutionary ideology, the cholo himself was not idolized and no official cult made of the racial mixture within the society.<sup>55</sup> If

---

<sup>53</sup>The Lauca River dispute has called forth a new batch of books condemning Chilean aggression and demanding the right of Bolivia to the sea. Among them are the following: Rolando Moya Quiroga López, Momento internacional: desviación de las aguas del Río Lauca (La Paz: Tall. Graficos, 1962); Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, La desviación del Río Lauca (La Paz: n.p., 1962); Federico Nielsen Reyes, Volveremos a la vecindad del mundo (La Paz: Tall. Novedades, 1967); José Fellman Velarde, Memorandum sobre la política exterior boliviana (La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1967); and Jorge Escobari Cuicanqui, El derecho al mar (La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1964).

<sup>54</sup>Recently an airfield---probably built by smugglers---was discovered on Bolivian soil and attributed to Brazilian aggression. See El Diario, May 9, 1969.

<sup>55</sup>Bolivian artists made a vain effort to imitate the Mexican muralists and some of their efforts can still be found adorning the public buildings of La Paz. Unfortunately, these artists were not the equals of Orozco, Siquieros, and David Rivera in Mexico.

anything adoration of the ancient virtues of the Indian were more in evidence than the mixed values of the cholo.<sup>56</sup> Official ideology and Indian were more and government--sponsored murals depicted the life and past heritage of the Indian in glowing terms.<sup>57</sup> In comparison with Mexico, however, not much was made of the mixture of white and Indian found in the cholo.

The official ideology of the Bolivian Revolution and the MNR was established through a series of measures, usually Presidential decrees since the legislature was not in session until after 1956, incorporating the various reforms.<sup>58</sup> The first was, of course, the nationalization of the Big Three tin mines which occurred on October 31, 1952. There were some minor disagreements in party ranks concerning the type of nationalization and whether compensation should be given to the owners, but in general the party was united on the assumption that nationalization was necessary. COMIBOL was given widespread powers in both mining and marketing the tin as well as a good amount of autonomy from the central government---a factor which contributed to its overall inefficiency and domination by the workers.<sup>59</sup>

The ideology of labor centered itself in the structure of the COB and in the two principles of co-gobierno and control obrero. The left wing of the MNR insisted on co-gobierno between the COB and the government as the very mainstay of the revolutionary ideology. Labor,

<sup>56</sup>This is most readily seen in the literature of the Revolution which has exemplified the Indian origins of Bolivia. Representative work of Jesus Lara, Carlos Medinacelli, and Fernando Díez de Medina all stress Indian, rather than mestizo, culture.

<sup>57</sup>The government has also taken the lead in supporting archeological investigations into pre-Inca civilizations in Bolivia.

<sup>58</sup>The official decrees can be found in Bolivia, La Revolución Nacional a través de sus decretos mas importantes (La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1955).

<sup>59</sup>A defense of COMIBOL is given by Guillermo Bedregal, at that time director, in COMIBOL: una verdad sin escándolo (La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1963).



operating through the COB, had the right to veto government decisions in any question relating to labor itself.<sup>60</sup> Co-gobierno also meant that the unions in certain key areas such as the mines, railroad, and factories had the right to nominate or veto the appointment of the Minister charged with carrying out policies in their work specialty. By and large the left was successful in maintaining the principle of co-gobierno in the early years of the Revolution, and they managed to dominate both the party and the government. Control obrero consisted of the right of the workers to veto any decision of management in the mines, factories, or any other place of business. In practice it often meant that the workers ran the plants and management was often hopelessly defeated over questions such as wages and dismissal of workers. Probably no other measure was so instrumental in the alienation of the business and commercial leaders of the country for they were helpless under control obrero. These two concepts, co-gobierno and control obrero, were the ideological mastheads of the left wing of the MNR but they were far from accepted by other elements in the party or the middle sectors of Bolivia.

Another major plank of the revolutionary ideology was the Agrarian Reform Bill. It was much more controversial than nationalization of the mines and revealed major schisms within party ranks. The commission assigned to write the bill consisted of representatives from all the major viewpoints of the party and they were often hard-pressed to reach agreement---they were also under constant pressure to finish it before

---

<sup>60</sup> Nuflo Chávez goes even further and says that the COB should be the actual government with the administrative and party organs serving as ideological goals, whatever that means. Chávez, 5 ensayos y un anhelo, op. cit., pp. 116-19.

the campesinos seized all the land.<sup>61</sup> Within the commission debate vacillated between the leftist view endorsing confiscation of the land without compensation and the establishment of state and collective farms to the rightist view which endorsed compensation and redistribution of the surplus population in virgin lands to the East. The compromise reached in the commission was one of the few ever achieved by the MNR and represents a comprehensive effort to restructure Bolivian agriculture on a realistic basis. It should be noted that despite the compromise, the implementation of the reform itself was under the control of the left wing through the Minister of Asuntos Campesinos, Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz. At the same time the dynamic leader of the Ucuireña sindicato, José Rojas, was brought more and more into the left wing of the MNR.

Although the Agrarian Reform became part of the revolutionary ideology, there were many difficulties in establishing the structures, similar to COMIBOL or the COB, which embodied the ideology. Ostensibly the Minister of Campesino Affairs was charged with official responsibility for the reform and a complex system of agrarian courts (juzgados) was used as a base in the countryside. However, the campesino sindicatos often acted as the organizations responsible for the reform and channeled demands and requests through their organizations to either the Ministry of Campesino Affairs or the executive. At the same time party structures might be working or competing with these other organizations. The Minister of Agriculture and other organizations competed as well. All this added up to a complex administrative structure dominated by political infighting, corruption and graft, and cynical manipulation of the campesinos by aspiring politicians. Perhaps the Mexican ideology was more

---

<sup>61</sup>Robert J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), pp. 62-64, discusses the composition and difficulties of the commission.

fortunate in this respect since they could pin their hopes on the ejido, but in Bolivia there was no such ideological or structural foundation and the result was the small, individually-owned plot barely sufficient for the campesino's needs. In short, while the agrarian reform was the accepted ideological goal of the Revolution, the implementation of the reforms and the structures responsible for carrying it out did not enjoy much support among the populace.

Another bulwark of the revolutionary ideology was the destruction of the armed forces and the glorification of militias of the workers and campesinos. After the Revolution the MNR disbanded the army, many officers fled, and the government began to distribute arms to the militias. For the first two years of the Revolution these militias were dominant and idolized as part of the revolutionary program. Eventually the right wing of the party began to realize that a counterforce was necessary to check the growing irresponsibility of the militias and the decision was taken to revitalize the armed forces. In the continual struggles between the two wings of the MNR the right increasingly placed reliance on the military and under President Siles the army was able to consolidate its strength. In the meantime the militias were losing their revolutionary drive and many disintegrated, the remainder becoming personal armies of various political leaders. By 1963 the army was able to challenge the last of the miners militia strongholds at Catavi and defeated it. Shortly thereafter military rule over Cliza and Ucuireña restricted the activities of the strongest campesino militias in the country. From that time on there was little question but that the MNR was dependent on the armed forces for military support and the revolutionary goal of elimination of the military was dead. It should be added that the militias never were supported by urban

residents and they regarded this revolutionary goal of worker and campesino militias with abhorrence.

Other reforms were designed to improve social and economic conditions for the people. Perhaps the most important was the education to include the rural masses.<sup>62</sup> Much has been done to improve education but, unfortunately, Bolivian education was so underdeveloped prior to the Revolution that it appears doubtful that the country will ever be able to provide adequate educational facilities for all, especially in the light of improved health standards which have greatly increased the percentage of young people in the population. The most spectacular gains in the education system were made in rural areas where many communities found themselves with schools (often constructed by the community itself) for the first time. The spirit caught on and there were consistent efforts by the government to provide teachers and facilities for rural schools; often it was unable to meet its goals but at least the desire was present.<sup>63</sup> One organizational problem has greatly effected the quality of teaching in rural areas: rural school teachers were placed under the Ministry of Campesino Affairs rather than the Ministry of Education. Often this meant that in questions of salaries or improvements in local conditions, the rural teachers found themselves confronted by the sindicatos and as this occasionally meant armed violence the teachers started spending more time in the cities than at their working sites. Added to this was the fact that the poorer students

---

<sup>62</sup>The number of nucleos escolares in rural areas expanded from 76 in 1952 to 286 in 1964 with over 200,000 students enrolled in such schools. See Marcelo Sangines Uriarte, Educacion rural y desarrollo en Bolivia (La Paz: Ed. Don Bosco, 1968), pp. 207-8.

<sup>63</sup>In spite of the commitment of the MNR to education, it was still estimated that in 1964 Bolivia had an illiteracy rate of 63%. It was also estimated that only 6% of the students finish secondary education and 72% never get beyond elementary school. See Zondag, op. cit., pp. 168-9.

tended to become rural teachers in the first place.<sup>64</sup> If the campesino students received an inferior education they at least had some opportunity to study and this was fundamentally different from the traditional system. In spite of expansion of the school system in both the cities and the campo, Bolivia still ranks near the bottom of Latin American countries in terms of school attendance; at the same time it ranks among the highest in terms of budget allotment for education and this was a major contribution of the MNR ideology.<sup>65</sup>

Other social goals, especially improved health standards for the people, were less exalted goals of the revolutionary ideology. They have become accepted aspects of the government program but few pay them more than passing attention. Perhaps the most important facet is that the people now expect the government to provide minimum health standards and facilities to the population and therefore the role of the government itself in such fields is accepted and expected.

It was the political realm in which there was a conspicuous failure to build either the basic concepts or the institutions of the revolutionary ideology. The major formal ingredient was the universal suffrage act which was more or less accepted by all, even if the manipulation of the campesino vote angered and alienated city

---

<sup>64</sup>The attitudes of these teachers may be responsible for the poor education received. In one study it was discovered that high percentages of rural teachers held such beliefs as the following: they had to divorce themselves from the traditional customs of the campesinos, the campesino is lazy, the campesinos need someone to continually look after and control them, and they could never expect much success in their work due to their own isolation. In Marcelo Sangines Uriarte, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-83.

<sup>65</sup>Prior to the Revolution the percentage of the national budget devoted to education was never more than 10%. After 1952 the share consistently climbed until it reached over 25%. For additional comments on education, see U.S. Army Area Handbook for Bolivia (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), pp. 199-226.

voters.<sup>66</sup> No other element of the revolutionary ideology was politically<sup>257</sup> acceptable to all Bolivians. The major reason was that the MNR tried to establish itself as the institution representing the ideology of the Revolution, and it was expected that it would be the base of the new creed. With the splits in the party leadership and the rather hazy concept of membership in the first place, unity on party affairs became impossible, especially when half the party regarded the COB as the instrument of the Revolution. Ostensibly the MNR ruled in the liberal tradition of previous constitutions, notably that of 1947.<sup>67</sup> In reality it did not use the Constitution, either in the formal sense of protection of civil rights or in the use of the institutions specified by the Constitution to perform certain specific tasks. A new Constitution incorporating the revolutionary changes was not issued until 1961. There was, therefore, a lack of a concrete, formalized statement of what the movimientista regime stood for. In fact the party never could formulate an ideology of its own and the party program formulated prior to the Revolution remained the basic declaration of its goals. The MNR did manage, however, to put forth rather detailed programs of government

---

<sup>66</sup> In the early months of 1969 there were repeated calls from various rightist leaders for a restriction of the suffrage based on property. Although such a restriction seems unlikely, it is indicative of the extent to which these political leaders still oppose universal voting.

<sup>67</sup> Professor James Malloy maintains that the MNR leaders could not divorce themselves from their liberal past; the past which socialized them into the values of traditional liberalism. Personal conversation, La Paz, August 31, 1968.

action, especially those of 1956, 1960, and 1964.<sup>68</sup> All three of these statements were highly detailed and pragmatic approaches to basic problems and reflected the desire of MNR leaders (probably Paz more than any other) to respond to the country's needs with specific solutions. Nonetheless they were not widely read formalized statements with which the people could identify, and a major failure of the MNR might have been the lack of a political ideology of the Revolution that attracted the people and gave them something to esteem and value.

The ideology of the Revolution was thus a hodgepodge of nationalism, economic development, social change, etc., but it was never formalized and never became part of the folklore of all the people. Everyone knew that there had been a Revolution, that the social and economic base of the society had changed, and with few exceptions the general desirability of these changes was accepted, even if the institutions for implementation of the reforms were not. The problem was that there was not agreement on the political changes or a consensus on the political system of the MNR. The primary reason was the failure of the party to construct a political ideology or the political structures which could attract all the elements of the society. Actually the situation was similiar to that in Mexico in that the major focus was on social and economic change; political change was to come at some undefined later date. In other

---

<sup>68</sup>See footnote no. 40 above. Also invaluable are the various Presidential messages of Siles and Paz Estenssoro: for example, Paz Estenssoro, Mensaje del Presidente de la República al Honorable Congreso Nacional in 1955, 1956, 1963, and 1964. All were published in La Paz by the Ed. del Estado. For Siles, Mensaje al Honorable Congreso Nacional (La Paz: Ed. del Estado, 1959). In these "state of the union" messages both Presidents were highly specific in their summations and recommendations.

words there was no political revolution; although the fundamental base of the system was altered by the incorporation of the campesinos, the structures were not changed and therefore politics continued much as before in actual practice. Unlike Mexico, Bolivia did not manage to channel political change into a useful instrument such as the party of the National Revolution.

Starting with a vague idea of what was to be transmitted, the next question is how successfully did the population become socialized into the revolutionary ideology? The primary socializing agent, the family, was not basically altered by the Revolution and remained the major source of political attitudes. In the countryside there was still a basic distrust of the city and the political system that was transmitted through the family structures. In spite of the agrarian reform and the general reverence for the MNR by the campesinos, this writer would tend to support the view that the campesinos were still suspicious of the actions of the government and its representatives. The campesino had insufficient time to develop a well-defined set of values for self-protection, and in such cases the individual is likely to fall back on older, traditional attitudes which can offer him some security. This is particularly the case in a revolutionary setting where change is rapid. Therefore the campesino probably learned from his family to have many reservations about the government and its leaders. This attitude, however, is gradually breaking down, but it will be some time before the campesino begins to take an active role in politics and use his family as an instrument for



the socialization of specific ideologies. It must be added that the isolation and lack of communication in the campo would make transmission of revolutionary goals somewhat difficult.

The middle sectors appeared to have the greatest discontinuity in the specific socialization process into the values of the revolutionary ideology. This was especially the case with the two major reforms of the Revolution, nationalization of the mines and the agrarian reform. Basically the middle groups rejected both in practice although perhaps agreeing in principle. Because both of these reforms presented threats to their social and economic status (and through universal suffrage, their political preeminence), they could only rant and rave about the lack of responsibility of the miners and the deprivations suffered from the chaos in the countryside. In addition, the financial insecurity and administrative practices of the MNR regime would probably be transmitted to family members by disgruntled businessmen. The number of politicians imprisoned, exiled, or in some other way persecuted by the MNR would also contribute to alienation from the political system and the revolutionary ideology. Evidence for this estrangement can be encountered in almost any discussion with a member of the middle groups.<sup>69</sup> Whereas in Mexico the middle sectors tend to support the Revolutionary Family and the Revolutionary Creed, under the MNR it appears that the family was a basic instrument for teaching hostile attitudes towards the party and its ideology.

In the school system the MNR made an outright attempt to indoctrinate

---

<sup>69</sup>The effect of political socialization on the children who grew up under the MNR is currently unknown. It is hoped, however, that two studies currently under the direction of the writer will be of some service. One is a study of political attitudes at the University of Cochabamba and the other of secondary student attitudes in the city and countryside.

the children into the goals of the National Revolution.<sup>70</sup> Explanations of the basic reforms were made and efforts to create national heroes of Busch, Villarroel, and the MNR leaders intensified. Without basic investigations it is difficult to assess this attempt at socialization, but the school system may not have been very effective for transmitting ideological goals for several reasons. Perhaps most important is that in spite of an increase in those attending school, the secondary and university systems were still dominated by members of the middle sectors; it could be expected that attitudes of alienation began in the family would persist in school. Another reason could have been the opposition of the teachers to the regime. In the scale of values of the MNR education ranked high, but in the allocation of resources the teachers rated low and their salaries were abysmally inadequate. Therefore a good many of them joined the opposition and were openly anti-MNR. Although the vociferous may have been few, they controlled the teachers unions and therefore set the general tone of opposition. The universities remained centers of anti-MNR feeling after the abortive attempt of Lechin in 1954 to establish "workers universities." The universitarios regarded this as a threat to their cherished autonomy and reacted violently against the MNR. It was a blow from which the party never recovered and the university students continued to gravitate to the more radical parties of both the left and right. In any case the professors remained basically opposed to the regime, especially when Movimientista professors moved on to government posts and were gradually replaced. It would appear, then, that the educational system was not

---

<sup>70</sup>The major textbook for Bolivian secondary "civics" courses is Educacion moral, cívica, y política (La Paz: Ed. Juventud, various editions for the six levels of secondary), written by Alipio Valencia Vega, a prominent Movimientista.

very successful in the outright socialization of students into the ideology of the Revolution. One major change in Bolivian education should be noted, however, and that was its tendency to increasingly focus on national problems. Heretofore emphasis had been placed on European and world affairs and Bolivia was neglected; now the Bolivian educational system tends to place stress on Bolivian problems and this has awakened a whole generation of youngsters to the plight of their nation.

The other primary socializing agents are less easy to discuss. From rudimentary evidence it would appear that the Church was somewhat opposed to the Revolution (but not nearly to the extent found in Mexico), but this probably had little impact beyond the women of the cities, who were already opposed to the Revolution due to the violence and threat to their homes. After the Revolution the coming of various missionaries of the Church, chiefly Northamerican Dominicans and Maryknolls, helped to align the more progressive elements of the clergy with the social and economic goals of the Revolution. Without more basic research it would appear that the most that can be said about the Church is that it did not exercise much influence one way or another over the socialization process---which in itself is a reflection of Church power in Bolivia. As for the community as a socialization agent, enough has already been said concerning the prevalence of regionalism to establish that various cities and towns themselves served as focal points for opposition to the La Paz government.

The socialization process within the secondary agents was fragmented. In the case of interest groups, most continued to emphasize special socialization patterns reflecting their own particular views of the political system. For instance, the miners were socialized into actively hostile attitudes towards the government, although not

necessarily toward the MNR. This attitude was a holdover from their previous hostility reinforced through co-gobierno and control obrero concepts, as well as the relative isolation of most of the mining camps. Business groups tended to reject both the MNR and the revolutionary ideology and other organizations of the middle sectors supported this point of view. It should be added that the MNR made a conspicuous effort to socialize all groups into the revolutionary ideology. Bolivians were continually flooded with speeches, marches, and other demonstrations of patriotic fervor devoted to expressing the goals and ideals of the National Revolution. A conscious effort was also made to make the MNR the Revolution. Wall posters, the party newspaper La Nación, as well as Radio Illimani, maintained a continuous flow of symbolic output concerning the Revolution and the MNR. The difficulty is to determine how effective this symbolic output was; and, of course, the reason one must question its effectiveness is the disparity found between expressed ideals and actual practices. Corruption, poor administration, violation of civil rights, manipulation of voters, all practices contrary to revolutionary ideals, contributed to a growing cynicism toward the revolutionary ideology and the regime. In short, it was the MNR and the government which probably played the major role in the discontinuity of the specific socialization process into the revolutionary ideology.

In comparison with Mexico the following conclusions seem merited with respect to the socialization process:

1. The Bolivian political elite did not achieve the measure of unity and agreement on goals of the Revolution to the extent which developed among the Revolutionary Family of Mexico. Although most agreed on the necessity for change, there was

considerable differences as to methods and degree of change. Without a unified elite, it became increasingly difficult to reach a consensus on the revolutionary ideology as political feuds and personalities became more important than issues and ideology.

2. The most important element of the revolutionary ideology, as in Mexico, was nationalism, or a desire to forge a new integrated, developed nation. As such, the major enemy was the national oligarchy and not foreign interests. Also, as in Mexico attention was focused on social and economic changes rather than basic structural alterations of the political system. Perhaps the major difference was the success of the PRI in establishing itself as a structure of the revolutionary ideology and the failure of the MNR to do so. Another marked difference was the formalization of the Revolutionary Creed in Mexico through the 1917 Constitution and the failure of the MNR to construct any formal statement of revolutionary goals. Several institutions were established as structural embodiments of the revolutionary ideals, but these failed to gain the support of the people in practice.
3. Strangely enough there does not appear to be the degree of discontinuity in the specific socialization process into the revolutionary ideology in Bolivia that prevailed in Mexico, especially with respect to the difference between democratic ideals and authoritarian practices. The chief reason appears to be that groups in the society managed to maintain their own socialization processes into attitudes distinct from those of the MNR regime. In other words, particularistic

socialization patterns were maintained. Although there did exist discontinuity between theory and practice with respect to government actions, and this contributed to alienation and non-acceptance of the revolutionary ideology, the MNR did not have much success in the elimination of subcultural socialization into specific attitudes. While it would be unfair to expect such a basic change in twelve short years, the MNR did manage to destroy some of the values of the traditional system and introduce new concepts related to the development of Bolivia which can be expected to produce some results in the future.

### C. The Political Recruitment Function

In the case of Mexico there are few doubts that an elite ruled the country. That elite is well-defined and limited, yet it is also united around the revolutionary ideology and the maintenance of the present system. In Bolivia the elite which governed under the MNR is less easy to define. First, the old rosca was thoroughly destroyed by the 1952 Revolution; they either fled the country or stayed in a considerably reduced economic and political position. These people still exist in a limited number and comprise a small minority totally opposed to the goals and practices of the Revolution---and they are only too willing to tell interested foreigners of the excesses committed by the MNR regime. Although they may still be recognized social leaders of their communities, and some have recovered their economic strength, for the most part they stay out of politics. There is a possibility that their lack of participation will change as their sons and daughters enter the political arena. The new elite which replaced the rosca was composed of middle sector politicians who had previously worked for the oligarchy.

The MNR also recruited administrators and technicians, especially in the later stages of the Revolution, into the elite although these were not necessarily strong party affiliates. Another element nominally recruited into the party were the labor leaders of the left, but in reality they maintained their own power base apart from the party and government. Finally, a few campesino leaders emerged under the MNR and they could be regarded as being on the fringe of the political elite. Taken as a whole the elite was rather limited and consisted primarily of politicians and administrators; the social and economic elite was somewhat separated. What is important is that the new elite was dependent on its political power and not on economic wealth, although many of them took advantage of their political status to enrich themselves. It should be noted, however, that a new economic elite began to emerge under the MNR. These economic leaders were mainly Yugoslavs, Jews, and Arabs (a collective term in Bolivia used to refer to anyone from the Middle East), many of whom came to the country before or after World War II.<sup>71</sup> This economic elite consists of some manufacturers, small shop owners, and other comerciantes who have survived the Revolution by dint of hard work and investment in the expansion of their interests. Generally speaking, the new economic elite has not taken a great deal of interest in politics, but has been content with endorsing whatever government can assure them peace, tranquility, and economic progress; normally they do not regard the MNR regime as such a government. Indications are strong that their lack of interest is now changing, especially with the appearance of ethnic

---

<sup>71</sup> A division appears to have taken place with native Bolivians being professionals such as doctors and lawyers and the immigrants taking commercial positions. While there are many exceptions the division normally holds up. It can be expected to break down as more of the sons of immigrants attend the university for professional training.

groups leaders in student politics.<sup>72</sup> But for the most part the elite which predominated during the years of the MNR was a purely political one using their political power as a base for dominating the polity and society.

The new elite had little cohesion; under no circumstances could it be called a 'Family.'" At first, it is true, they were united around the common goal of defeating the oligarchy and reforming the social and economic systems---although much less agreed on the need for reform of the political system. After continual struggles, ideological as well as personal, the new elite split and was never able to recapture the degree of unity of the early days of the Revolution. As will become apparent, one of the key reasons for the failure to maintain their cohesion was that there did not exist any single structure through which the members of the elite could meet to resolve their differences. Theoretically the party structures should have performed the task but they totally failed and the result was a fragmented elite. Each politician sought to protect his own independent source of power against any infringement from the government, the party, or fellow politicians. Unlike Mexico there was no agreement on the system itself, nor on the role of the elite within the system, and although each may have been trying to protect his own position in the elite, there was no collective agreement on the preservation of all. Whether it was the party leaders, union leaders in the mines or

---

<sup>72</sup> The head of the Federación Universitaria Local (FUL) in Santa Cruz is Japanese and two students of German extraction are leaders in Cochabamba; others may be found in La Paz and Oruro.



countryside, or government bureaucrats, all were out to make as much for, and of themselves as they could; they realized others were doing the same and did not trust them. It was this split within the elite, more than any other single factor, which eventually accounted for the defeat of the MNR.

There were three distinct stages in the recruitment of party leaders by the MNR: the first was the founding of the party by the generación del Chaco; the second came during and immediately after the Villarroel government; and finally the third period occurred from 1952 to 1954 when party ranks were swollen by many new members. Each of these stages was marked by the recruitment of different elements into the party and each had important consequences for the future of the party.

In the first stage the party was little more than a coterie of intellectuals somewhat hazily concerned with the problems of Bolivia. Most of them had either fought in or been greatly effected by the national humiliation of the Chaco defeat and they wanted a general restructuring of the existing system through a resurgence of Bolivian nationalism. In fact their major goal was the foundation of the nation itself. As members of the elite themselves, they were basically reformers, not revolutionaries, and therefore had no concept of the party as an instrument of revolution.<sup>73</sup> This was an attitude many of the fundadores were to retain throughout the history of the party. They regarded it as a social and political "club" devoted to reform and intellectual discussion, but they were not ready to form a modern

---

<sup>73</sup> Herbert S. Klein makes the distinction between revolutionary and reformer in Origenes de la revolución nacional boliviana (La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1968), Chapter VIII. This appeared in English as 'David Toro and the Establishment of 'Military Socialism' in Bolivia', Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol XLV, (February 1965), pp. 25-52.

political organization for the capture of power and the incorporation of the masses. The following table presents some basic biographical data on the founders:<sup>74</sup>

Table I: Biographical Data on the Founders  
of the MNR

Name	Birthdate	Region	Education	Occupation
Víctor Paz Estensorro	1907	Tarija	UMSA	Lawyer
Hernán Siles Zuazo	1913	La Paz	UMSA	Lawyer
Carlos Montenegro	n.a.	n.a.	UMSA	Journalist
José Cuadros Quieoga	n.a.	Cochabamba	University	Journalist
German Monroy Block	1914	La Paz	UMSA	Lawyer
Fernando Urralde Chinel	1914	La Paz	UMSA	Lawyer
Walter Guevara Arze	1912	Cochabamba	UMSA	Lawyer
Alberto Mendoza López	1905	La Paz	UMSA	Lawyer
Jorge T. Lavadenz Flores	1907	Santa Cruz	UMSA	Engineer
Rigoberto Armaza Lopera	1907	La Paz	UMSA	Lawyer
Augusto Céspedes	1904	Cochabamba	UMSA	Journalist
Eufonio Hinojosa Guzmán	1915	Cochabamba	UMSA	Lawyer

a=university studies outside the country

The early leaders of the party were for the most part young intellectuals who enjoyed a three-pronged career of lawyer, government employee, and journalist/writer. As a group the most interesting characteristic was their comparative youth. The oldest of the founders, Augusto Céspedes, was only 37 in 1941, Paz was 34, Siles 28, and Guevara Arze 29. The average age at the time of the Revolution was approximately 42. Other group characteristic included service in the Chaco War (Paz was a sergeant of artillery), almost universal attendance at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés in La Paz, and graduation by the

<sup>74</sup>Biographical data on Bolivian leaders is extremely difficult to find. This material was obtained from books, articles, newspapers, and interviews. A spotty source (Paz was not even included) is Quién es quién en Bolivia (La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1959).

majority from the law school. Almost all of them came from the big cities of Bolivia, specifically La Paz and Cochabamba. Finally, with no exception, they were the sons of the gente decente. All of them came from distinguished families with long records of political participation in the traditional system; Siles, for example, was the natural son of President Hernando Siles, while Paz could claim Senators and other office holders in his family tree.

The second stage in the recruitment of party leaders came during and after the Villarroel regime. Younger leaders were recruited chiefly from among the ranks of students, but also included were a few labor leaders, three of whom, Juan Lechín, German Butron, and Adrian Barrenchea, were to play important roles in party history. With the exception of these three, the group characteristics of the newer leaders were basically similar to those of the founders. The following table gives some information on these leaders:

Table II: Biographical Data of Selected MNR Leaders  
Recruited in the Period from 1943-1946.

Name	Birthdate	Region	Education	Occupation
Juan Lechín Oquendo	1914	Corocoro	elementary	Union Leader
Víctor Andrade	1905	La Paz	University	Teacher
Vicente Alvaraz Plata	1924	La Paz	UMSA	Student
Federico Alvaraz Plata	1916	La Paz	UMSA	Lawyer
Julio Manuel Aramayo	1909	La Paz	UMSA	Doctor
Manuel Barrau Pelaez	1909	Uyuni	University	Engineer
Adrian Barrenchea T.	1904	Potosí	secondary	Union Leader
Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz	1923	Santa Cruz	USMA	Lawyer
Felix Equino Zaballa	1904	La Paz	USMA	Teacher
Federico Fortún Sanjinés	1913	La Paz	USMA	Pharmacist
Arturo Fortun Sanjines	N.A.	La Paz	USMA	Lawyer
Roberto Mendez Tejada	1920	La Paz	USMA	Lawyer
Luis Peñaloza Cordero	N.A.	La Paz	USMA	Journalist
A. Perez del Castillo	1920	La Paz	USMA	Lawyer
José Sanchez Peña	1907		University	Engineer

Most of these leaders were young, many of them had served in the Chaco War, some had received instruction from veterans of the war, and

they came primarily from the urban middle sectors. In addition to the above named, several such as José Fellmann Velarde (or Felman Velarde as it sometimes appears), Guillermo Bedregal, Alfredo Franco Guachalla, and Roland Requena, had been students of Víctor Paz or Luis Peñaloza at UMSA. In general, with the exception of older leaders such as Andrade, these leaders were more radical and revolutionary than the founders of the MNR. During el sexenio they formed the revolutionary vanguard of the party and regarded the older members who wanted to work within the traditional system with some suspicion. This group continually struggled with the older leadership for control of the party and they often received the support of Paz Estenssoro in these struggles. As this group was more revolutionary and more romantic, they were to suffer the largest degree of disillusionment following the Revolution, and it was from this segment of the leadership that the more cynical and corrupt Movimientistas were to come.<sup>75</sup> One other characteristic of future leadership should be mentioned and this was the recruitment of two important families into the MNR; the Fortún Sanjinés and Alvarez Plata brothers were all to play important roles in subsequent developments.

The third and final stage of recruitment immediately followed the

---

<sup>75</sup>For the romanticism of this particular group, see José Fellman Velarde, Una bala en el viento: biografía de la revolución boliviana (La Paz: Ed. Fenix, 1952).

April Revolution.<sup>76</sup> Politicians of all stripes joined the MNR, not necessarily out of any ideological conviction, but solely to obtain favorable positions. Furthermore, to remain outside the party was to face the danger of being identified with the hated rosca. The majority of these leaders were labor union directors and former Piristas and Poristas who did not really abandon their more radical ideologies. Through the COB and their own union organizations they were able to remain outside the party structures and for all practical purposes were independent. Prominent among them were Mario Torres, Edwin Moller, Juan Sanjines Ovando, and Angel Gomez. It is difficult to classify them as party members because they did not operate through party structures, but simply lent their names to membership lists. Another group of leaders entering party ranks at this time consisted of army officers, notably Alfredo Ovando Candia, and other government employees, including teachers, who were more or less forced to join the party in order to keep their jobs. While the labor leaders formed the bulk of the left wing of the MNR, these bureaucrats tended to support the right wing. Neither group was devoted to the party itself, although the right wing members tended to work more through party channels than those of the left. It was this third group of leaders which was to lead the opposition to Paz and Siles who were to be the leading architects in the eventual destruction of the party.

---

<sup>76</sup> There is a possibility that a fourth stage of recruitment may have taken place following 1961 when Paz made a conscious effort to replace older political leaders with younger técnicos devoted to him and Bolivian development. Personal conversations with Christopher Mitchell, Ph. D. candidate, Harvard University, Cochabamba, March-April, 1969. Mitchell's main source of information was interviews with some of these tecnicos, most notably Carlos Serrate Reich.

In Bolivia despite constant changes of administrative personnel, there was actually very little turnover within the elite itself and recruitment of new elements into the party or government was highly restricted. This is in contrast to Mexico where there was a periodic replacement of personnel every six years, thereby opening up the system and offering those who desired it a chance to receive government employment. The general failure to recruit new elements into the leadership was particularly evident in the case of two groups, the students and campesinos. With regard to the latter it was perhaps expecting too much for campesinos to emerge immediately after the Revolution. A few leaders did come out of campesino ranks, among them José Rojas, Toribio Sala, Manuel Veizaga, and Salvador Vásquez, but for the most part the MNR did not try to create leaders from campesino ranks; rather the party leaders spent most of their time trying to gain control over the campesinos.

Another conspicuous failure of the MNR was the lack of recruitment of students into the party. After the attempt of the left wing to take over the universities there was a decided exodus of student leaders from party ranks. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that after 1954 the MNR simply did not have much success in recruiting young people into the party; but then it did not make many efforts to do so in the first place. The failure of the MNR to attract younger Bolivians eventually proved disastrous and demands some explanation. In the first place there were no job openings for the youth and they were forced to seek employment elsewhere; in fact, a good many left the

country never to return.<sup>77</sup> This is a recurring problem in Bolivia and unless the country can find some means of employing those who graduate from university or secondary school it is going to lose many of its best-qualified people.<sup>78</sup> Secondly, due to the divergence between technical and scientific needs and the failure of the educational system to meet these demands, many students lacked the necessary training to be recruited into government positions. Third, the comparative youth of the MNR leaders meant that there was little replacement by virtue of age and the government could not expand employment without overburdening the system. Most of the Movimientistas were so young when they came to power that they could look forward to many more years in power. In turn, the students may have believed that there was little hope for employment under the MNR regime. Thus they flocked to the opposition parties, not only for ideological reasons, but also because of future job opportunities.

---

<sup>77</sup>P. Federico Agullo, S.J., El Contingente de bolivianos en el exterior (La Paz: Ed. Don Bosco, 1968), estimates that over 300,000 Bolivians reside outside the country. While a good many of them are agricultural workers in Argentina, others are qualified professionals and specialists unable to find work in Bolivia. Another source states that over 40,000 teachers, technicians, professionals, and other members of the middle sectors have gone to Argentina alone in recent years. Los Tiempos, March 13, 1968.

<sup>78</sup>One report of the OAS estimated that Bolivia would need over 390 agricultural specialists to implement its 1962 ten-year plan, see Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development, Inventory of Information Basic to the Planning of Agricultural Development in Latin America: Bolivia (Washington: Pan American Union 1963), p. 26. Yet when the School of Agronomy of the University of Cochabamba graduated 26 such specialists in 1968 (the first large class the School had turned out), only 3 of the students found work with the government. Others left the country to seek work abroad. An interesting comment on Bolivian education is that none of the graduates sought or would accept work for private enterprise; they all wanted and expected government employment.

Finally, it must be added that the party itself made no strenuous efforts to recruit students. One of the few areas where leadership roles were open was in the reformed armed forces. Due to the retirement or exile of many army officers, the military had many positions open and as a result a good many of the best young people joined the military. The recruitment of these youths will play no small role in the future as an entire generation of capable young persons found employment in the military. In all the other leadership roles of the society, both party and government as well as labor unions, positions were relatively frozen for the entire period of MNR rule.

Despite the lack of recruitment of new elements into the leadership, there was some degree of mobility within the leadership itself. This was chiefly the result of the division between the left and right wings of the party. When one or the other wing of the party fell from power there was a change in the upper echelons of the party and the government. Positions in the Cabinet and in the National Political Committee of the MNR were changed after the election of 1956, as well as during the campaign, during the Stabilization crisis of 1957, in the election of 1960 and also that of 1964. These changes probably had a greater effect on the right wing members than those of the left since the latter retained their posts in the COB and their respective labor unions. These alternations in power also probably had some effects on lower echelons of government and party. The more powerful local caudillos were seldom effected by changes at the national level.

One final factor of leadership, also encountered in Mexico, was the high degree of multiplicity and interchangeability of roles. Given the small elite in Bolivia and the lack of recruitment of new leaders,



many of the Movimientistas filled several leadership roles at the same time. The classic example was Juan Lechín who in the period from 1960-1963 was Vice-President of the Republic, Senator from Oruro, Ambassador to the Vatican, Executive Secretary of both the FSIMB and the COB (a position he had held in both organizations since their inception), and was the leader of the Sector Izquierda of the party. Other leaders were no less adroit at holding several posts at the same time. It was not uncommon for a leader to be a member of the Comité Político of the party, a member of the cabinet, a Senator or Deputy, leader of a functional or organizational cell of the party, perhaps of a union as well, and at the same time maintain his private law office open to the public. There appear to be several important consequences for this pattern of leadership based on multiplicity and interchangeability of roles. First, it undoubtedly made it much more difficult to recruit new leaders for the simple reason that the existing leaders co-opted all the positions and were continually looking for new ones to enhance their power and prestige. In contrast to Mexico, when new jobs were created they were not filled by new leaders but usually taken by those already in power. Second, it may have made it very difficult for these leaders to determine exactly what role they were playing at any particular moment. One of the more illustrious examples was that of Lechín in 1963 when, as Vice-President, he was called on to implement the Triangular Plan. At the same time he was also Executive Secretary of the FSIMB and part of the Plan called for the reduction of supernumerary personnel in the nationalized mines. Thus Lechín was in the unique position of having to reduce his own base of power. Under the circumstances he decided the most expedient policy was to leave the country on an inspection tour of unions in other countries. Apparently Lechín also left with the

assurance that he would be the party candidate for the Presidency in 1964. Yet another consequence of this multiplicity of roles was that it was often difficult to differentiate between the party and the government or, for that matter, between any of the structures. Since the leaders could represent many different structures and organizations, it was difficult to tell what interests were being represented through an individual politician's actions. In most cases either the interests of the COB, the government, or a specific group were being pressed and the party's interests were largely ignored. Another consequence was that it helped to perpetuate personalismo and reduced the structural stability of the system. Since there was so much confusion over the individual's role, and since structural lines were blurred, it was easier for the politicians to depend on their own personal relations with each other rather than try institutional channels of communication and articulation through the party or government. The common background of most of the leaders facilitated personal communication and they were often able to meet in informal situations to resolve differences or make claims. Thus, in reality, the elite depended on personal connections as much as under the traditional system and there was a corresponding lack of structural and institutional relations.

One specific recruitment function which merits attention was that of recruiting the President. In Mexico this process has been institutionalized and has contributed greatly to the stability of the system. Obviously, Bolivia did not develop the same process since it was more or less the Presidential succession crisis of 1964 which precipitated the fall of the party and that of 1960 resulted in the defection of a major sector of the MNR. The first Presidential

succession in 1956 caused few difficulties, primarily because it was obvious to all that Siles, as Sub-Jefe del Partido, deserved the nomination for his successful work during and after the Revolution; indeed many had thought in 1952 that Siles should have assumed the Presidency himself instead of waiting for Paz's arrival from Buenos Aires. In 1956 the party was united behind the candidacy of Siles (Guevara Arze had tried to win the nomination but accepted his defeat), and the only question was the nomination of a running mate. Eventually Nuflo Chaves Ortiz was selected due to the predominate strength of the left wing in the party convention. It may be added that Paz surrendered the office amicably and left for England in order to avoid being associated with the problems connected with the Stabilization Plan, as well as to offer Siles the opportunity to govern without interference.

During the Siles years the right wing of the party gradually came to dominate (especially after the left dropped out of the government over the Stabilization Plan), and the candidate generally conceded to have the support of this wing in the nomination of 1960 was Walter Guevara Arze. He was at the time the Minister of Government and used his position to assure not only the loyalty of the police and party structures throughout the country, but also to intimidate his opponents of the left. Unfortunately these latter actions made Guevara Arze totally unacceptable to the left, and since they had the numerical superiority not only in the party structures but also in electoral strength, Guevara was not acceptable to either Siles or Paz for the threat his candidacy would pose to the very existence of the MNR. Eventually Paz returned to the country to receive the nomination with the support of the left wing and Lechin became the Vice-Presidential

[ candidate. Guevara left the party to form his "authentic" version 279] of the revolutionary movement. Many of the right wing members also left the MNR although several returned after the election to occupy official positions.

In 1964 it appeared once again that there was an obvious candidate in Juan Lechín. Lechín had apparently made a bargain with Paz, either in 1960 or during the crisis over the Triangular Plan, that he would become the party candidate in 1964. Víctor Paz then secured the passage of an amendment to the constitution allowing for the reelection of the President after the normal four year term, but most thought the amendment did not apply to him and thereby barred him from succeeding himself. When Lechín returned to the country in the Spring of 1963 he was accused of being involved in the illegal drug traffic, an obvious indication that the government was trying to discredit him and the Sector Izquierda. This suggested that Paz had different ideas about his own candidacy. Consequently, he surprised no one by announcing his candidacy and set about controlling the party machinery for the nomination convention. Lechín, in turn, bolted from the party, formed the PRIN, and left Paz at the head of a small maquinista headed by Federico Fortún Sanjinés. This left Paz dependent on the will of the military.

Whatever the reasons Paz might have had for running for the Presidency, it is obvious that the departure of the left was the final blow. The MNR was never able to stabilize or institutionalize the Presidential succession and, as so often in the history of Bolivia, this inability resulted in the downfall of the government. One could speculate forever on Paz's personal reasons for not relinquishing the Presidency, but it can be said unequivocally that the MNR did not solve the problem of Presidential succession; the problem has yet

[ ]

to be resolved and until it is Bolivia can expect no long-range stability for the political system. Mexico at least appears to have solved the problem and nowhere is the comparison between Bolivia and Mexico more revealing than on the question of Presidential succession.

In comparing the political recruitment function in Mexico and Bolivia the following statements appear relevant:

1. Whereas Mexico is ruled by a united elite which supports the system and their own predominance in it, Bolivia did not manage to create such a cohesive elite under the MNR. The elite was fractionalized and for the most part leaders tried to maintain their independence from the party or any other outside interference.
2. In general the MNR system did not recruit new elements into leadership roles. Lack of recruitment was most noticeable with regard to younger students and may have resulted in the alienation of these students. The freezing of leadership roles helped to reduce initiative and new approaches and policies due to the desire to protect one's own interests.
3. Perhaps even more than Mexico there was a high degree of multiplicity and interchangeability of roles among the small elite. In addition to reducing the availability of new posts, this might have increased the propensity within the system to depend on personal power and relations, and therefore reduced the need to develop institutional channels of articulation or communication within the party or government.
4. Whereas Mexico has successfully resolved the question of Presidential succession and therefore reduced a major threat to the stability of the system, Bolivia was not able to resolve this

problem satisfactorily, and it eventually resulted in the alienation of major segments of the party and the subsequent downfall of the MNR government.

## CHAPTER V

### THE FUNCTION OF INTEREST ARTICULATION

Under the function of interest articulation the primary focus is: 1) the structures which perform the function of articulating demands within the polity; 2) the methods used by these structures to make their demands; 3) the channels used to reach the decision-making apparatus; and 4) the style of interest articulation, especially the degree to which the modern Parsonian variables replace the traditional variables in the manner of making demands. In this chapter the various interest groups most prominent in the MNR system will be discussed and compared with similar groups in Mexico. These groups include labor, agriculture, the middle sectors, the Armed Forces, students and teachers, opposition political parties and, interestingly enough, the United States government. The various methods employed by these groups to articulate demands will be investigated; at the same time the channels they used will be analyzed. Finally, the style of interest articulation will be briefly discussed.

#### A. The Structures of Interest Articulation

In contrast with the case of Mexico, Bolivia under the MNR was not dominated by a united elite utilizing the office of the Presidency or the party organization to channel interest group demands. Therefore, if any meaningful comparison with Mexico is to be made, the first major problem encountered is that of ascertaining exactly where demands were actually made in the system. Whereas the Revolutionary Family was and is able to control and dominate virtually all the interest groups in the Mexican system (and in most cases actually

established them), in Bolivia the majority of interest groups were not established by the government, were not controlled from the top, and for all practical purposes were independent of the government and the party. The reasons for this lack of control will be discussed further in the sections on interest aggregation and rule application; but in order to understand the pattern of interest articulation it is necessary at the outset to describe the lack of centralized authority. Due to the nationalization of the mines and the seizure of land by the campesinos, the MNR and the government lost control over the two most important segments of the population. For the twelve years of MNR rule the party was involved in a constant struggle to capture the support of these two groups. With the continuance of local rulers in different regions, the geographic isolation of many of the mines and campesino sindicatos, and the subsequent lack of penetration of the party and/or government into these areas, it was often virtually impossible for national leaders to exert any authority over these independent bases of power. In addition, various "autarchial entities" among them COMIBOL, YPFB, the Banco Minero, Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano (LAB), etc., were administered independently of centralized budgetary or executive control, and thus offered further bases for autonomous action against government or party goals. What all this means is that the MNR and national leaders did not have control over the interest articulation function, to the extent exercised by the elite, the PRI, and the government in Mexico.

The following interest groups were most important during the MNR period of rule:

1. Labor. Organized labor was by far the most important and powerful interest group in Bolivia following the April Revolution. Within labor ranks



it was the miners organizations that were the strongest not only because of the dependence of the government on revenues from the mines and the armed power of the miners militias, but also because the miners dominated the COB. As a group, however, the labor movement was not well-organized and suffered from ideological, organizational, and personal disputes among the leaders and members which effectively hampered a united labor movement. To a certain extent the causes of these divisions are to be found in the period prior to the Revolution.

In the first place, the Bolivian labor movement had a history of violence, factionalism, and a tendency towards ideological division. In the early years of the movement the anarcho-syndicalists were most prominent and their insistence on violence and the general strike found fertile ground in a country in which the workers could expect literally nothing from their employers or the government. As a result of both the intransigence of the employers and persecution by oligarchial-dominated governments, moderation, compromise, and a bargaining were not prominent practices or beliefs among labor leaders or their followers. Labor continued to be attracted by the more radical ideologies, including anarchism, Trotskyism, and other virulent forms of social protest. The miners' attitudes, stated in the Tesis de Pulacayo (1946), with its emphasis on violence and worker independence from government control, best reflected the predominant ideology of the labor movement. The MNR had little success in uniting labor prior to the Revolution; in fact the movement was divided and fractionalized with most of the leaders pertaining nominally to the POR or the PIR. Juan Lechin, leader of the miners and a member of the MNR,

was outside regular party channels and acted independently of party authority.<sup>1</sup> One indication of labor independence was the pact signed between the FSTMB and the MNR in 1951 calling for the establishment of workers councils and the independence of the FSTMB from the party and the government.<sup>2</sup> Prior to 1952 the MNR, or any other political organization, had very little control or influence over the national labor movement. That "movement" in fact consisted of isolated leaders with some authority over a few workers; central leadership was all together lacking.

In the Revolution of April 8-9, the miners militias played a key role in the defeat of the traditional system; and in turn these militias were not only independent of party direction, but they also fully intended to remain free of any government or party domination. On April 17 the COB was founded as an independent source of power for labor free of the MNR and the government.<sup>3</sup> The goal of the COB was actually to govern the country, especially the mines, while assigning the party and the government a rather vague role as intellectual leader of the Revolution. As one commentator noted, "it [the COB] did not constitute a desired characteristic of the National Revolution."<sup>4</sup> He referred to the fact that the leaders of the MNR, chiefly Paz

---

<sup>1</sup>In the exhaustive history of the MNR by Penalzoza, not one reference can be found linking Lechin to the structures of the MNR until immediately prior to the April Revolution. See Luis Peñaloza C., Historia del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, 1941-52 (La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1963).

<sup>2</sup>The authenticity of this pact has already been questioned, see infra, p.187 Chapter III.

<sup>3</sup>The COB was to be a "vertical" organization to control directly all union activity in the country. Jaime Ponce G., Tomas Shanely and Antonio Cisneros, Breve historia del sindicalismo boliviano (La Paz: I.B.E.A.S., 1968), p. 60.

<sup>4</sup>Agustin Barcelli S., Medio siglo de luchas sindicales revolucionarios en Bolivia (La Paz: Ed. de Estado, 1957), p. 253.

Estenssoro and Siles, regarded the COB and the intentions of the labor leaders as disastrous and they preferred to make the MNR supreme. A showdown was inevitable and soon occurred over the publication of an article in the official newspaper of the COB.<sup>5</sup> The article called for nationalization of all industries and total domination of the government by the workers operating through the COB. The right wing of the party, which was at the time under strong attack by labor leaders, attacked the article as "communist" and insisted on the elimination of the more radical elements from COB leadership, and subsequent subordination of the labor movement to the MNR. Strong action by the National Political Committee of the MNR and various Movimientistas in the COB avoided an open breach between the party and labor. (Some argue that a personal agreement was reached between Paz and Lechín allowing the labor sector increased power in the government and party.) At this time most of the important labor leaders formally joined the MNR, particularly leaders from the POR and PIR, but the extent to which they abandoned their former ideologies and allegiances, as well as the concepts of control obrero and co-gobierno, is open to question.

Soon after joining the MNR the labor leaders formed a separate faction within the party called the Vanguardia Obrera Movimientista (VOM) which eventually changed its name to the Sector Izquierda. In reality it was the same leaders dominating the COB, and they continued to operate relatively free of party and government authority. Finally, an abortive attempt by leaders of the right wing, primarily older members of the MNR, left the labor leaders in control of the party executive committee and the government. This attempted

---

<sup>5</sup>This article appeared in Rebelión, the organ of the COB, and can be found in Lydia Gueiler Tejada, La mujer y la revolución (La Paz: n.p., 1959), pp. 120-21.

coup in January, 1953, almost destroyed the right wing as a major influence on party decisions and left the labor leaders totally in charge of the Revolution. It needs to be remembered that many of them were operating less through party machinery than through the COB. Labor demanded and got the right to nominate four ministers of government: the Minister of Mines and Petroleum occupied by Lechín; the Minister of Campesino Affairs headed by Nuflo Chávez; and the Ministries of Public Works and Transportation and that of Labor, the latter dominated by the factory workers, and the former by transportation workers. Since these Ministries were charged with carrying out the major reforms of the Revolution, they had effective control over the Revolution. Two were especially important: Lechín, in addition to being Minister of Mines, was also Executive Secretary of the COB, and Secretary for Mining on the Political Committee of the MNR; Chávez was Minister of Campesino Affairs, Executive Secretary for the campesino national organization, and also Secretary for Campesino Affairs on the CPN. This meant that these two individuals held an enormous amount of power within the system and were not particularly responsible to anyone, not even the President. Furthermore, the creation of semi-autonomous agencies, each under the domination of a powerful union, aided labor leaders in controlling the political system since these agencies were often not dependent on central authority. With control obrero and co-gobierno the workers in these agencies could not be forced to acquiesce to government demands, especially in view of the armed power of the workers militias and the absence of military power in the central government. Thus in the first years of the Revolution labor was the most powerful interest group and union leaders were able to receive satisfaction for whatever demands they might present to the government --- in fact they were more often than not simply presenting demands to themselves as leaders of government agencies or the COB. From a high point

reached in 1955 when labor controlled the government, the party, and the economy, the story of the ensuing years was one of the efforts of the regular party leaders (and the President) to gain some degree of control over the unions and the independent leadership of the COB. It was also an effort to rationalize the process of making demands and giving in to labor confrontations. As much as it was the history of the effort to insure party and government dominance, it was also the story of the disintegration of the COB and the labor movement.

The COB itself was a complex organization embracing the vast majority of Bolivian workers. In 1960 the Central's major groups were the miners(52,000), factory workers (28,000), railroad workers (25,000), construction workers (15,000), state employees (12,000), and chauffeurs (12,500).<sup>6</sup> These alone comprised almost fifty percent of the total number employed outside the field of agriculture. Others included in the composition of the COB were the National Federation of Campesinos (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia), printers, all the workers in transportation, teachers, bank employees, private employees, craft workers, street vendors, university and secondary students, painters, and municipal workers.<sup>7</sup> However, this very heterogeneity in membership was an important factor in the lack of unity in the labor movement, especially in relation to the structure of the COB. This organization was governed by a Comité Ejecutivo Nacional (CEN) in the periods between the

---

<sup>6</sup>United States, Department of Labor, Summary of the Labor Situation in Bolivia (Washington: GPO, 1958). There is some doubt in the mind of the writer about the accuracy of these figures; for instance, the railroad workers are listed at 25,000, yet in 1968 they numbered less than 5,000. The changes could be due to elimination of superfluous workers or redefinition of classification of workers, but it appears likely the figures cited are inflated. Since they come from the U.S. Embassy, one of the few reliable sources of information available, they must be accepted.

<sup>7</sup>See Central Obrera Boliviana, Programa ideológico y estatutos de la COB (La Paz: n.p., 1954), for a complete description of the structure.

various national conventions --- in themselves relatively inefficient bodies handicapped by internal divisions.<sup>8</sup> The CEN was under the domination of the Executive Secretary; as this post was always held by Juan Lechin, the COB came to be identified with the FSTMB and was often little more than a spokesman for the miners. Under the CEN were seven functional councils composed of workers in similar industries: the extractive council was composed of the miners and petroleum workers, as well as the rubber workers in the Beni; the industrial workers council was composed of factory workers, construction workers, printers, and those employed in flour mills; one council dealt exclusively with workers in transportation and communication; a fourth was composed of the campesinos; the salaried workers council consisted of teachers, bank employees, public workers, etc.; a "popular" council was composed of craft workers, tenants, and street vendors; finally, the seventh council was composed of student groups and artists. All of these plus the four Ministers of State appointed by the COB, representatives from regional councils; and members of the Sector Izquierda who were elected to Congress composed the COB's National Congress. The organization was further complicated by departmental councils in each of the nine departments, and by the fact that each union had its own national congress, executive council, executive secretary, regional bodies, and local unions.

Siles was later to charge that one out of every three workers in the country was a union official (and therefore exempt from actual work), and if one looks at this complex organizational set-up it is not difficult to

---

<sup>8</sup>In both the Second (1957) and Third (1962) Congress of the COB internal splits produced walkouts of major sectors,

see why.<sup>9</sup> However, with so many competing organizations, the potentiality both for conflict and for the fragmentation of the labor movement was heightened. First of all, the workers within each council were often diametrically opposed to each other in terms of demands to be made on the government and expectations concerning satisfaction of these demands. An example of this internal conflict was the extractive council in which the miners and petroleum workers theoretically found themselves linked together. In reality the government carried out a systematic policy of decapitalization of the nationalized mines in order to pay for the development of petroleum resources.<sup>10</sup> Since the miners were therefore paying in the long-run for the development of the assets of the petroleum workers conflict was inevitable. The miners controlled the COB and the petroleum workers were effectively blocked from presenting their demands through that agency; they turned, instead, to Yacimientos and made their demands directly on that agency. The miners worked through both the COB and COMIBOL. Since YPF and COMIBOL were both semi-autonomous agencies, not directly controlled by the government or party, demands did not reach the latter two structures. Within and between the other councils internecine warfare was equally evident. Workers in the railroads were opposed by those of LAB who wanted more resources devoted to the

---

<sup>9</sup>Hernán Siles Zuazo, Mensaje al Honorable Congreso Nacional, 6 de Agosto de 1959 (La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica, 1959), p. 69. One example is that in the nationalized mines by 1956 the number of employees working outside the mines was more than double those working in the mines. In 1952 the two groups were about equal. See Amado Canelas O., Mito y realidad de la Corporación Minera de Bolivia (La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1966), p. 48.

<sup>10</sup>James Malloy, "Revolution and Development in Bolivia", in Cole Blasier (ed.), Constructive Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), p. 206.

national airlines. Most of the salaried workers also abandoned the COB and preferred to work directly within their own government agencies to present demands; this was especially the case with the workers in the social security agency (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores de Seguridad Social), the teachers, and the bankers. The intellectuals seldom bothered to work through the Central, especially after the abortive attempt to take over the universities. The campesinos never did form a potent wing within the COB and preferred to work through the Ministry of Campesino Affairs to present their demands.<sup>11</sup> As the struggle for power continued fewer and fewer union leaders preferred to work through the COB, and they tended to build their own access points to the decision-making process. Eventually the COB was nothing more than a spokesman for the miners, and then not all of the miners' unions worked within the organization.

Perhaps the major reason for the failure of the COB was the existence of structures such as YPF, COMIBOL, and other autarchial entities because it made it possible for independent action by union leaders without the necessity of cooperating within the Central. This independence stemmed from control obrero and co-gobierno. Under co-gobierno the unions were able to dominate the government agencies most concerned with their welfare through control of the nomination and selection procedures for administrators. Government officials were chosen by the unions (at the very least they held a veto over appointment) and if a particular administrator was unacceptable to the unions, or if he refused their demands, they went on strike until he was

---

<sup>11</sup>Noel Pierre Lenoir, Revolución: Altitude 4,000 metros (Buenos Aires: Ed. Catterra Lisandro de la Torre, 1958), p. 91.



either replaced or their demands were met---in many cases the official was subject to physical threats from the workers.<sup>12</sup> Through control obrero the workers had immediate control over their superiors because they could veto any decisions made by managers or technicians. The general result, at least until 1957, was that labor demanded more and more and continually received their demands; if they did not receive them they simply refused to work. The government could do little to correct the situation since it lacked control over the militias and could not subdue the independent caudillos flourishing throughout the system. It soon became apparent, however, that a way was open for the government and the party to subjugate the individual labor leaders for as Barcelli comments, "every director looked more to his own union interests with a view of maintaining his own power than to the general interests of the working class or the destiny of the Revolution."<sup>13</sup> Therefore, the task of the party and the government was clear: it had to separate individual leaders and then bring them into the party and government structures one by one, isolating those who refused to subordinate themselves to national leadership.

The first attempt was made during the Stabilization Crisis when Lechin and the FSTMB opposed the implementation of the Plan. First Siles was able to get rid of the leftist Vice-President, Ñuflo Chávez, and thereby destroy the control the former Minister of Campesino Affairs had over the campesinos. Then Siles replaced all the labor leaders in the Cabinet and the Political Committee of the MNR. In a remarkable display of personal

---

<sup>12</sup>This was especially true in the nationalized mines where the isolated directors were at the mercy of the workers. See Canelas, op. cit., passim.

<sup>13</sup>Barcelli, op. cit., p. 330.

courage, Siles managed to defeat the miners and enforce some of the provisions of the Plan. It was remarkable because Siles went to the mines and pleaded with them to support the government; at the time he had no other weapon than his personality and persistence. 1957 marked the first time since 1952 that labor had been forced to back down and agree to government demands.<sup>14</sup> Although Siles was never fully successful in implementing all the provisions of the Stabilization Plan (chiefly the reduction of subsidies to the miners commissaries), he did manage to break the dominant hold of labor over the Revolution. However, there was no group strong enough to take over control and the last two years of the Siles administration consisted of a truce between government and labor. Neither wanted to challenge the other and neither had the power to defeat the other. Although a good many strikes were called during these years, few demands were met, and there was a general suspension of decision-making. At least Siles was successful in his goal of stabilizing the economy and stopping rampant inflation.

When Paz Estenssoro returned from London to accept the Presidential nomination in 1960, he was forced to seek the support of the miners and the COB due to the split in the right wing which followed Guevara Arze. With his election, Paz found himself again more or less at the mercy of labor leaders and they returned to dominate party and government posts---although not to the extent of the 1953-55 period. The policy of co-gobierno was also revived, but the COB was not as effective nor as independent as prior to 1957. Labor had enough power to effectively check any actions of the government and

---

<sup>14</sup>One of the tactics adopted by Siles, and one commonly employed in Bolivian politics, was the establishment of a "new" FSTMB to lure away those workers not fully committed to Lechin.

therefore few decisions were made for the first two years of his administration. Eventually the loss of revenues in the nationalized mines, combined with United States pressure, forced Paz to accept the Triangular Plan and the stage was set for another confrontation between the government and the miners. This time the President had the necessary military force to actually subdue the recalcitrant miners. While he was maneuvering for the confrontation, Paz also managed to isolate certain union leaders, such as Juan Ovando Sajnines chief of the railroad workers, and woo them into support of the government. At this juncture he also persuaded Lechin to leave the country. Then with the Armed Forces and the campesino militias he moved against the mines and successfully defeated the militias of the workers. For the first time since 1952 the government was actually in control of the nationalized mines and this signaled the defeat of the labor movement as the major interest group of the Revolution. The defeat was not only the result of the power of the military, but also a result of the internal divisions within labor ranks and the constant personal bickering between individual leaders.<sup>15</sup> Thus by 1964 the COB was destroyed as an effective structure, the labor movement was fragmented and ineffective, and the labor leaders had long ago lost interest in presenting a unified front to the government. It only needs to be added that for twelve years labor was not an integral part of the MNR structure; more often than not it was an opponent of the party.

One other phenomenon, also noted in Mexico, deserves mention: the general prevalence of the same leaders in union ranks for the entire period.

---

<sup>15</sup>The fragmentation was increased by the creation of a competing organization, the Central Obrera Bolivia de Unidad Revolucionaria(COBUR) by the Minister of Work Anibal Aguilar, to contest with the COB.

Most of the labor leaders who came to power in 1952 still occupied their posts in 1964. In many ways their tenure was remarkable, especially due to constant imprisonments, exiles, and periods of hiding from the government; in spite of constant harassment they maintained their power. These leaders were generally corrupt, inefficient, and opposed to any basic change in their privileged positions. In some cases they became extremely wealthy from their power; for example, mine union leaders received rake-offs from the percentage of ore produced in their mines, from the profits of the commissaries, and even from taxes placed on the trucks and jeeps of COMIBOL to enter mine areas. These new wealthy often moved to La Paz where they formed a group of bon vivants frequently seen in night clubs and restaurants. They also became isolated from the workers and advocates of the status quo. When the military came to power in 1964 it was relatively easy to dismiss these older leaders, who long ago had become estranged from their followers, and thereby bring the unions under government control.<sup>16</sup> The labor movement is presently in the same situation as it was prior to 1952: it is totally controlled and dominated by the military.

With respect to labor as an interest group, the following comparisons should be made with Mexico:

1. Labor leadership and the labor movement was not controlled in Bolivia to the extent that developed in Mexico. The labor movement was independent of the MNR from the start and wished to maintain that freedom. Labor was not "a creature of the state." Through their independent militias, the

---

<sup>16</sup>A new labor code was formulated which greatly restricted the activities and freedoms of the unions. See Ponce, Shanley, and Cisneros, op. cit., pp. 116-20; also Anexo I.

COB, semi-autonomous agencies, the lack of insulation for government administrators, and the principles of co-gobierno and control obrero, the labor groups in Bolivia managed to remain relatively free from not only party influence, but also government authority.

2. Due to this independence of power, labor was not necessarily sacrificed to the over-all development needs of the economy, as was the case in Mexico. Until 1957 labor was in a favorable position and able to receive satisfaction for their demands. After that a stalemate ensued in which few decisions were taken. Due to the military power of the militias, the government had to wait for the Armed Forces to have enough power to enforce government decisions in the mines. To hasten the fragmentation of labor, the government tried to divide the movement through bribes, political corruption, and the creation of competing structures. The dramatic use of force in 1963 alienated the major segment of the labor movement from the party and helped to hasten the defeat of the MNR.

3. Both in Mexico and Bolivia the leadership of labor was stagnant and corrupt. Perhaps the key difference was that in Mexico the leaders were dependent upon the government for their power whereas in Bolivia much depended on the personal capabilities of the union leader.

2. Agriculture. As previously mentioned, the MNR had not been very successful in efforts to recruit campesinos prior to the Revolution. It is also doubtful that the party had a clear idea of an agrarian revolution, although some plans for reform had been suggested.<sup>17</sup> The only well-organized

---

<sup>17</sup>One plan formulated by Paz Estenssoro talked vaguely of the need for reform but was not specific in describing how this was to be done. See Luis Antezana, El movimiento obrero boliviano (La Paz: n.p., 1966), pp. 35-36.

campesino union prior to the Revolution was the Sindicato de Ucureña del Valle headed by José Rojas, a PIR sympathizer. After the April Revolution efforts were started by Rojas and others in the Cochabamba Valley to organize the campesinos; the campesinos were aided in their efforts by members of the COB.<sup>18</sup> In November, 1952, campesinos in the Ucureña area began the process of seizing the land, driving off the landowners, and dividing the land among themselves. The movement rapidly spread as Rojas sent teams of organizers throughout the valleys and altiplano explaining the seizure of land and enlisting campesinos in his sindicato. At first the leaders of the MNR (with the exception of some labor leaders) paid little attention to this movement, but eventually they awakened to the danger of continual seizure of the land without government supervision. No doubt party leaders were also aware of the growing political power of the campesino sindicatos and their armed militias. Rojas was initially cool towards the MNR and remained somewhat aloof from the party. The MNR in turn attempted to establish a rival, Simon Aguilar, in the Cochabamba Valley to contest with Rojas for leadership of the movement, but this effort failed. Then Nuflo Chávez, Minister of Campesino Affairs, aided by the labor leaders from the COB, was given the task of enlisting Rojas in the MNR and he was successful. With the signing of the Agrarian Reform Bill at Ucureña, the formal enrollment of the campesino sindicatos in the MNR was noted. At this time the campesino movement

---

<sup>18</sup>At present there is some confusion over the origins of the campesino movement. Apparently there were two existing organizations in the Cochabamba Valley, that of Rojas which was dominated by the COB leaders, and that of Sinforoso Rivas of Quillacollo more or less under the rightist leaders of the MNR. Eventually the Quillacollo sindicato was surpassed by that of Ucureña. See Manuel Carballo, "Agrarian Reform in Bolivia," (Unpublished Senior's Thesis, Faculty of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1963), pp. 55-58. Present confusion about the origins of the campesino movement may be dissipated by research currently under Jorge Dandler, Ph.D. Candidate, Wisconsin University.

was well-organized under the Ucurena sindicato and also under nominal allegiance to the MNR. The story of the campesinos from 1953 on is one of gradual disenchantment with the official party, disintegration of the movement, and constant efforts by individual politicians to gain control over the peasant unions.

The organization of the campesino unions and their relationship to the party and the government was extremely complex. The national organization, the Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CNTCN), claimed over two million members, but it was not a very effective body and only played a minor role in electoral campaigns.<sup>19</sup> It was loosely tied to the COB but did not operate strongly in that organization. The different federations based on locale, namely departmental federations such as those on the altiplano and in Cochabamba, were far more important, although they also suffered from internal divisions hampering unity and general effectiveness. In addition there were a good many local sindicatos that were often quite independent of their area federation. This proliferation of organization, once again, provided the vehicle for local caudillos to dominate their regions. In addition to the sindicato organizations, two other parallel sets of organizations extended into the campo: the first was the administrative mechanisms of the Ministry of Campesino Affairs charged with carrying out the agrarian reform; the second was the party structure which theoretically extended into each province and canton. To analyze the role each of these sets of structures played is difficult; much depends on the particular area, proximity to the city, access to other leaders, and the

---

<sup>19</sup>Peter P. I. Lord estimates the number of potential campesino union members at 500,000, in The Peasantry as an Emerging Political Factor in Mexico, Bolivia, and Venezuela (Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, LTC No. 35, 1967), p. 50.

power of the local jefe. In Cliza and Ucureña, for instance, all lines of communication were dominated by the sindicatos themselves; but in other areas the party organization or that representing the Ministry of Campesino Affairs might be paramount. There was considerable confusion created by these complex organizational lines and channels for making demands, and also because of the continual struggle for control of one or another structure as a power base. In practice, however, one man usually came to occupy all three posts, dirigente of the sindicato, agente of the Ministry of Campesino Affairs, and jefe of the MNR comando for his region. These local leaders totally dominated their respective towns and cantons and few were able to challenge their superiority. In not a few cases these leaders employed members of their sindicatos as thugs to intimidate or murder any campesino who tried to go outside the local chain of control---this use of personal violence has by no means diminished in the countryside and persists as a continual pattern of political behavior.<sup>20</sup> The pattern of personal authority was therefore maintained in the campo, and the MNR and the government were forced to work with these powerful local leaders if they wanted something done. Nonetheless, it should also be stressed that these leaders had to produce some results for their followers, and therefore the campesino did have channels for making some demands on the political system. The major difficulty was that the process of making demands was not seen as an institutional one, but rather one that depended on personal access to those in power.

---

<sup>20</sup>Cases of violence are widespread in the countryside. In a recent case in Cliza, Mecedonio Juarez, a leader of the sindicato in Cliza and a Diputado Nacional, was shot in full daylight in the plaza of Cliza by a leader from Ucureña. See Los Tiempos, November 26, 1968.



After Rojas entered the party several political leaders almost immediately set-out to undermine his strength and capture the sindicatos for themselves. To a certain extent Víctor Paz and Siles remained aloof from the struggle, although they accepted the ideolization of the campesinos and insisted on the general support of the agrarian jefes for the party and the government. The first político to attempt to undermine Rojas was Ñuflo Chávez, but his forced retirement from the Vice-Presidency effectively removed him from the scene. In 1957 Rojas was elevated to the position of Minister of Campesino Affairs, and only then did he begin to lose his hold over the unions in the Cochabamba area.<sup>21</sup> Before the election of 1960, Walter Guevara Arze made the most serious attempt to destroy Rojas when he supported Miguel Veizaga, a resident of Cliza, as a rival for campesino affections; in doing so he was taking advantage of a long-standing feud between the two communities. (Some speculate that Siles supported Guevara in this effort.) Rojas returned to the valley and open warfare erupted between the militias of Cliza and Ucureña. Throughout the electoral campaign of 1960 numerous murders and other atrocities were committed by both sides. This fighting has continued intermittently since.<sup>22</sup> Another serious outbreak in 1963 brought on by the instigations of the Sector Izquierda to win over

---

<sup>21</sup>Rojas reportedly traveled in a limousine and adopted certain city manners. The inability of the campesino leaders to return to the campo after city life and appear unchanged is apparently one of the tactics employed to deprive them of their political following.

<sup>22</sup>This fighting has not been eliminated between the two communities. In September, 1968, the writer attended the dedication of a hospital in Cliza. President Barrientos was to dedicate the hospital but did not appear, apparently because he had advance word that trouble was to come. About noon armed campesinos from Ucureña invaded Cliza and fired off several rounds without apparent damage. The reason for their action was jealousy over the location of the hospital in Cliza.

the campesinos resulted in the establishment of a military government in the Cliza-Ucureña prior to the elections of 1964; for all practical purposes the campesino "movement" in the valley was dead. (It should be added that the military occupation gave the Armed Forces the opportunity to win over the campesinos for the coming struggle with Paz and the MNR.) The campesino militias by this time had declined considerably as a military force and there was not much to fear from them. By 1964 the campesinos in the Cochabamba valley, by far the most powerful interest group in the countryside, were divided into warring factions and as a movement were ineffective.

The problem on the altiplano was somewhat different but no less confusing and the result was the same. Here the Indians are mostly Aymara, primarily concentrated in the Lake Titicaca region(at least in terms of proximity to La Paz and therefore to political power), and they have shown some reluctance to organize and maintain sindicatos. The attitudes of suspicion and distrust towards the whites and the government are still encountered on the altiplano, and therefore these campesinos have been somewhat less successful in presenting demands to the government than their counterparts in the valleys.<sup>23</sup> The problems were essentially the same: divided leadership, efforts by politicians to gain control over the unions, overlapping and confusing administrative structures and channels, and the lack of cooperation and coordination between local unions. Following the Revolution the first major party leader to emerge on the altiplano as a campesino leader was Vicente Alvarez Plata, Oficial Mayor of the Ministry of Campesino Affairs. He was apparently making some headway with the campesinos

---

<sup>23</sup>The prevalence of traditional forms of authority on the altiplano has been investigated by William E. Carter, Aymara Communities and the Bolivian Agrarian Reform(Gainesville: University of Florida Monograph No. 24, 1964).

in the Lake Titicaca region when he was murdered in a remote village; according to his official eulogy it was by a "few bad elements in the MNR."<sup>24</sup> The next to emerge was Toribio Salas who almost achieved the status of Rojas on the altiplano, but he apparently conflicted with Paz Estenssoro in the election of 1960 and was subsequently expelled from the party and hounded by the criminal courts. Lechín also made an effort to gain campesino allegiances using the miners as proselytizers and one powerful sindicato, Achacachi, was under his domination. The fatal split with the MNR in 1964 cut short his chances of success. The final candidate was a man much respected and admired by many Paceños, Felipe Flores, who was enjoying some success with the campesinos when he was murdered in broad daylight in front of the Ministry of Campesino Affairs in El Prado, the main thoroughfare of La Paz.<sup>25</sup> During this struggle for power on the altiplano Paz remained aloof and above the battle, attempting to become the new patron of the campesinos, but one can legitimately question whether he was not consciously trying to create dissension among his subordinates to prevent any one of them from gaining too much control over the campesinos and thereby threatening his position; to do so would have been a direct challenge to his political preeminence.<sup>26</sup> It should also be noted that in terms of access points and

---

<sup>24</sup>Bolivia, Vicente Alvarez Plata: Mártir de la Reforma Agraria (La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones de la Presidencia de la República, n.d.), p. 58.

<sup>25</sup>According to official reports Flores and his assassin shot and killed each other simultaneously. Most Paceños believe both were shot by agents of the Control Político.

<sup>26</sup>The timely death of two would-be aspirants to campesino allegiance also brings into question the political methods employed by Paz.

structures, the campesinos of the altiplano probably were more closely tied to the structures of the Ministry of Campesino Affairs than other campesino groups. This was due chiefly to the site of the Ministry in La Paz and the ease with which the campesinos could present their demands; to those who have strolled by the Ministry on any one working day the sight of many, often hundreds, of campesinos waiting to be heard within is indicative of the increasing participation of the campesino in political affairs.

Although there were differences within the agricultural sector in the pattern of interest articulation based on ethnic distinctions between Aymara and Quechua, on different regions of production, on proximity to the cities, and on older regions versus the newly colonized areas, Bolivia did not have the same divisions in this sector found in Mexico. The primary reason is that the Bolivian agrarian reform did not result in a proliferation of different types of farms and farm production. There were few differences based on small versus commercial farms, or on collective versus individual agricultural exploitation. The agrarian reform gave land to everyone and the predominant type of production was based on the small, privately-owned minifundio employing time-honored methods of production. Everyone was alike in mediocrity. With the possible exception of some cattle farms in the Beni and the larger sugar and cotton fincas in the Santa Cruz region, there did not exist vast differences in types of farms or production. In the case of these few larger producers, it was often easier to work either through the most powerful local personality (the local caudillo), through the Corporación de Fomento (CBF), or in the case of sugar and rice through their own cooperatives. One of the most effective organizations of this type was the Comité Nacional por la Comercialización de Arroz (CONCA) which has played a major

role in the pricing and marketing of rice.<sup>27</sup> In few cases was it necessary for any of the producers to make demands through the party since other channels were open to them.

The major differences existing in the agricultural sector were those based on personal conflicts between local leaders. These leaders continually struggled with each other for domination of one region or another. Once a leader dominated his own small village there was a desire to expand his power; inevitably he then encountered others trying to do the same thing. Superimposed on these local struggles was the one between national leaders trying to gain a base of support in the campo. After a few years of this internecine warfare the bigger federations, such as the Ucuña sindicato, began to break up, and each village and community formed its own branch usually dominated by one man. This pattern persists in the countryside and has created a confusing picture of the interest articulation function. While there is seldom any unity on the national or regional level, several local leaders can make demands on the local representative of the government. This means they travel to the provincial or departmental capitol and speak personally to the Prefecto or Sub-Prefecto to try and receive satisfaction for their demands. If these methods fail they will often send delegations to La Paz to the Ministry of Campesino Affairs or even to the President.<sup>28</sup> Under the MNR the picture was even more confusing because there were more

---

<sup>27</sup>United States Army, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Bolivia (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), p. 485.

<sup>28</sup>The writer is indebted to many Peace Corps Volunteers for information concerning the pattern of interest articulation of the campesinos. He would like to especially thank Larry Crowley, Steve Smith and Mike Peraino.

local strongmen and there was a general lack of discipline and institutional stability; dependence was placed almost entirely on personal connections between agrarian jefes and urban politicians. In such a bewildering situation the agricultural sector was hard-pressed to adequately present or receive satisfaction for their demands.

In comparison with Mexico the following conclusions appear valid for the agricultural sector:

1. Agricultural groups were not as independent or as potent as the labor sector in Bolivia. Neither were they totally controlled from the top by the elite, the President, and the party as in the case of Mexico. At first the campesino movement was somewhat controlled by the sindicato of Ucurena but over the years the competition between competing unions and leaders led to a general disintegration of the movement.

2. The extreme complexity of government, party, and union structures in the campo aided in the fragmentation of the campesino movement. The articulation of demands was also fragmented due to the prevalence of many open channels. The control exercised by the party was minimal. This is totally unlike the situation in Mexico where government and party structures channel demands into the system and insure direct control from the top.

3. Although Bolivia does not have basic divisions in the agricultural sector based on different types of production such as ejidos versus commercial farms, it does have divisions based on the Aymara-Quechua split and on different agricultural regions. The chief result of these divisions was to contribute to the fragmented pattern of leadership. This, in turn, provided an opportunity for various individual politicians to try to gain control over the campesinos. No one was successful in this effort (which may be due

to the objections of Paz Estenssoro) and generally the movement disintegrated into warring factions and independent caudillos.

4. Due to lack of control of the party and the government, caciquismo was maintained and reinforced. As in Mexico authority was based on personal relations. The pattern of interest articulation was also based on personality and did not achieve the degree of institutional stability found in Mexico.

3. The Military. The Armed Forces were completely discredited after the April Revolution. They were identified with the traditional regime and had participated in the fighting against the MNR forces. As a result the party, especially the left wing, called for the complete destruction of the Armed Forces and their replacement by the armed worker and campesino militias. In fact these militias were systematically armed by the government; in other cases they simply seized arms caches of the military. In a short time virtually every single group in Bolivia had its armed militias which diligently participated in parades, drills, and military maneuvers; occasionally they practiced armed warfare against each other. After the first few years most of these militias were disbanded but two important ones remained: those of the miners and those of the campesinos. Both were used frequently by the government or by their own leaders for political purposes. For instance, a permanent garrison of campesino militia was maintained at Ucureña consisting of 1500 men, and they were ready to be employed in the campo or the city against any threat to the government.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup>U.S. Army Area Handbook, *op. cit.* p. 340. For a description of the organization and tactics of these militias, see Oscar Daza Barrenchea, Sistematización armada de la Revolución Nacional(La Paz: n.p., 1959).

The only other important militia group surviving the first years was a permanent garrison maintained in La Paz consisting of regiments reportedly personally under the control of various politicians.<sup>30</sup>

Immediately after the Revolution most of the officers of the Armed Forces either resigned, went into exile, or joined the MNR; the latter did so with the same attitude as the Poristas and Piristas in labor ranks, who joined the party to keep their positions and avoid persecution. The military officers that joined the party tended to gravitate to the right wing, probably due to their social origins as much as to their opposition to the dominant role played by the labor leaders. In the attempted coup of January, 1953, right wing members such as Luis Peñaloza and Jorge Rios Gamarra teamed together with Lt. Col. Milton Delfín and Majors José Ibañez Vaca and Jose Claros to overthrow the "communists" and "procommunists" then predominating in the government, meaning Lechin and the other labor leaders. In a remarkable series of letters published in Presencia in January, 1964, General Alfredo Ovando Candia, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, explained to Paz Estenssoro his participation in the attempted coup.<sup>31</sup> He acknowledged himself as the intellectual leader of the revolt and said it was against the Communists, i.e., Lechín, and that he intended to take them prisoners and exile them to Chile. He went on to point out that since the party had denounced Lechín as a communist and anarcho-syndicalist in a public letter of December 29, 1963, his attempted revolt was therefore

---

<sup>30</sup>There were suppose to be two regiments personally loyal to Paz Estenssoro, one to Ruben Julio Castro, and another to Anibal Aguilar.

<sup>31</sup>General Alfredo Ovando Candia, Letters to Víctor Paz Estenssoro, in Presencia, January 6, 7, and 10, 1964.



justified and everyone should admit the mistakes of the past ten years. He then went on to pointedly remark that Paz was as responsible as anyone else for maintaining the communists in power. This article suggests the change in status that had taken place in the position of the military from 1952 to 1964, and the question is: how did the military manage to return to power?

In the middle of 1953 the decision was taken to reinstitute the Army; a decision taken by those party leaders who were growing worried over the irresponsibility of the militias. A careful campaign was conducted to reassure public opinion that the Army would not return to its previous role in the political system. Instead it would have a new role, that of colonizer and economic developer of the interior of the country. Later the military was aided in this role by the "civic action" programs instituted by United States Military Missions throughout Latin America as a device to counteract Castro-type subversive warfare. The military academy was reopened as a "proleteriat" college for sons of the workers, peasants, and MNR members. In reality the military college continued to serve primarily members of the middle sectors, those sectors not necessarily closely identified with the aspirations of the MNR.<sup>32</sup> At the same time officers who had been suspended or retired were readmitted into the military with the condition that they join the MNR and swear allegiance to the party.

The first sign that the military was regaining its strength was the employment of some troops in the Stabilization Crisis of 1957. Throughout the period of Siles' rule the military continued to increase in strength

---

<sup>32</sup>Other groups were not excluded from recruitment to the military college. One of the current strengths of the Armed Forces is a large number of rural-recruited members who can communicate well with the campesinos.

as it aligned itself with the right wing of the party and the American Embassy. One important sign of increasing power was that Siles himself had troubles with military leaders.<sup>33</sup> At the same time the military did contribute a great deal to the opening up of new territories in the oriente, building roads, schools, clearing land, etc. This type of civic action was something which no previous Bolivian Army had accomplished, or for that matter been interested in accomplishing. It may be added that this type of training may have given the officers and men alike a sense of duty and pride in the development of their country, as well as the political skills to administer development projects.

At the same time the Armed Forces continued to increase its own strength within the party through contributing more members to the National Political Committee as well as increasing the size of the service comandos vis-a-vis other groups within the MNR. By 1956 the leader of the Air Force Comando was Rene Barrientos Ortuño; he was one of the heroes of the civil war of 1949, highly popular among the military, and one of the few general officers with a long membership in the party.<sup>34</sup> A prominent member of the Célula Militar was Ovando Candia who apparently suffered no setbacks from his participation (or ideological leadership) in the abortive coup of 1953. Ovando had been a member of the Falange and only joined the MNR after the April Revolution. In the election of 1960 the military played a key role by refusing to support Guevara Arze in his split with the MNR.

---

<sup>33</sup>See particularly his two messages to the Congress, Mensaje...1959, op. cit., pp. 107-20; and Mensaje al Honorable Congreso Nacional 6 de Agosto de 1960 (La Paz; Dirección Nacional de Informaciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1960), pp. 97-120.

<sup>34</sup>For a laudatory biography of Barrientos, see José Antonio Llosa M., Rene Barrientos Ortuño; Paladín de la bolivianidad (La Paz: Emp. Novedades, 1966).

This was somewhat unusual because many of the officers were probably closer to the thinking of Guevara than they were to either Lechin or Paz. One can only speculate that perhaps a bargain was reached calling for increased participation of the military in the government and the party. One obvious sign was that the military delegation to the National Political Committee was increased to five and General Eduardo Rivas Ugalde was made Minister of Government, one of the most powerful Cabinet positions.

Throughout the period the size of the Armed Forces was increasing as well as their share of the budget.<sup>35</sup> Often the military used external threats such as the Lauca River dispute with Chile to magnify the dangers, and thereby provide a rationale for an increase in their size and weaponry. Another factor which placed the Armed Forces in a commanding position was the decline of the milicianos. The party militia had long since faded into armed gangs, and the miners and campesino militias were also degenerating. One primary reason for this decline was the restriction of new arms and ammunition to the militias; a policy consistently pursued by the military. In fact by 1964 most of the militias were using ancient weapons and had very little ammunition for those guns available. The miners had resorted to using their peculiar weapon, dynamite, due to lack of ammunition; there were also efforts to rearm them with new weapons from Cuba and Czechoslovakia. At the same time the Armed Forces was receiving new weapons and training from the United States, and these modern arms turned the balance of power to the military. In a Bolivia which was dependent on armed power in the political system, this superiority of firepower was an extremely important factor.

---

<sup>35</sup>Actually the size of the budget allotted to the Armed Forces was not increased as much as its share of American aid received. See Sergio Almaraz, Requiem para una republica (La Paz: Impr. Universitaria, 1969), p. 25.

The major showdown between the miners militias and the military took place over the implementation of the Triangular Plan in 1963. In this case the Army was able to defeat the miners (with the aid of campesino militias) and forced through the provisions calling for a reduction in the working force. This meant that a major threat to the regime, one that could have been used by Lechin in the Presidential campaign of 1964, had been eliminated. It also meant that the Armed Forces could now be regarded as the major buttress of the government or as its major opponent if it so chose. The withdrawal of the Sector Izquierda from the party in 1963 left Paz Estensoro with no other choice than to seek the support of the military in his campaign for the Presidency. In the series of letters previously referred to, Ovando Candia darkly hinted at the future role the military was to play.<sup>36</sup> In addition to accusing Paz of "opening the doors" to communists and Piristas, he added that few Presidents have had the opportunity to create a new Bolivia, yet "you have frustrated the hopes of the Bolivian people, and it is no secret that eighty percent of them are now opposed to you." He continued, "you have surrounded yourself with adulation from those who hope to get something from you, but in the hour of proof, they are not going to defend you." He goes on to say that the MNR is living in its last stages and that Paz should not seek reelection because "...I consider it a great error for you to run and I am saying these things because I have no fear." Just to say these things to El Jefe was proof in itself of how powerful the military had become; it was also a personal testimony of the political power of General Ovando. Paz must have taken cognizance of this power because in the next party convention General Rivas Ugalde was selected as Executive

---

<sup>36</sup>Letters, op. cit., January 6, 1964.

Secretary of the party, while Ovando was elected to the newly-formed National Council. Barrientos, however, was defeated in his attempt to gain the Vice-Presidential nomination by the party maquinita under the control of Federico Fortún Sanjinés. The military did not accept this decision and within a few weeks let it be known that Fortún was totally unacceptable to them. Paz, by this time desperately seeking allies for the forthcoming electoral campaign and aware of the power of the military, dropped Fortún from the slate and replaced him with Barrientos. After the election Barrientos retired to the Cochabamba valley where he began an active campaign to assume the Presidency.<sup>37</sup> Thus the Bolivian political system had returned full circle to where it had been in 1952: the military was the "ultimate arbiter" of political affairs.

In comparison with Mexico it is obvious that the MNR was unable to eliminate the military as the most powerful force in the political system, although a valiant effort was made. Equally obvious is that the officers were not loyal to the party or to the political elite. The decision to reinstitute the Army was critical, but given the alternatives and the lack of power of the central government, it is difficult to see what other choice the party leaders had. While the military was the major power group in the defeat of the MNR, that military is a considerably different group than it was prior to 1952. The officers are an elite devoted to the development of Bolivia, to the economic and social integration of the country. Perhaps more important, the military elite was the only unified elite in the country

---

<sup>37</sup>According to Jorge Dandler Barrientos was making efforts to gain campesino support for the Presidency as early as 1962. Private conversations with Mr. Dandler, Cochabamba, May, 1969.

by 1964, and there was no other group powerful enough to contest their seizure of power.

4. The Students and Teachers. Of all the failures of the MNR, none stands out more than the inability of the party to recruit new members from among student ranks, or to instill any enthusiasm for the goals and policies of the party and the National Revolution in younger Bolivians. This failure may well be common to most types of political parties in the underdeveloped world especially those devoted to independence or national revolution. The problem appears to be that the leaders of these movements are interested in solving the basic problems of their societies. This problem-solving approach makes it necessary for party leaders to urge the youth of their nation to work hard, study, and complete their educations in order to further the technical and industrial development of the country. There is little romanticism in their appeals, and the youth tend to reject the simple formula of hard work. All too often there does not seem to be much development or advancement, either in personal terms or for the country, and many find employment difficult to obtain. The result is a lack of commitment on the part of the students, who feel little identification with their leaders and less desire to follow their apparent undramatic leadership. A "generational gap" develops between students and political leaders and the potentiality for conflict, ~~and misunderstanding~~ increases.<sup>38</sup> Into this gap rush extremist parties who can offer romantic crusades, who offer change and the chance of leadership, and who also offer panaceas for the solution of the basic problems of the country. In many countries, including

---

<sup>38</sup>Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962) p. 22.

Bolivia, the conflict is exacerbated because the leaders of the independence movement (or national revolution) are themselves relatively young and they can look forward to many more years of leadership. The youth, on the other hand, are faced with a closed leadership which may seal-off avenues of advancement. This dilemma of the generational gap and a closed leadership was essentially that faced by the MNR after the 1952 Revolution.

After April 9 the MNR enjoyed the overwhelming support of the students and teachers throughout the nation. No doubt part of this support was due to the large number of present or former Movimientista professors who had been able to indoctrinate their students. In addition, it is common policy for students in Bolivia to support whatever party happens to be out of power. Another aspect was the universal optimism that a new age was dawning on the Bolivian nation. The MNR took advantage of this enthusiasm and made extensive efforts to organize the youth of the country. A separate Juventud del MNR was established with its own national convention, Jefatura, and other organizations. The Juventud was theoretically given representation in the highest councils of the party, and a few of the more prominent students became members of the party almost immediately, among them two leaders of the Avanzada Universitaria, Mario Guzmán Galarza and Anibal Aguilar. The party further subdivided the youth organizations into Avanzadas Superiores which included not only secondary students but also youthful workers throughout the country; the Milicias Juveniles for youths between the ages of thirteen and eighteen; and the Brigadas Pre-Juveniles for youngsters from ten to thirteen.<sup>39</sup> In practice these organizations seldom actually existed and the Avanzada Universitaria remained the major focus of MNR activity.

---

<sup>39</sup>See Estatuto Orgánico del MNR (La Paz: n.p., 1960).

The blunder of the Sector Izquierda in the party convention of 1953 was the beginning of the alienation of the students. Lechín and the left which controlled the convention pushed through a program calling for "workers universities."<sup>40</sup> These universities were to be for the working proletariat and were to teach Marxist doctrine (dialectical materialism) and other political instruction. This effort was almost immediately opposed by the university students as an attempt to deprive the universities of their autonomy. (After the controversy the universities themselves established such schools.) Although Paz was quick to chastise Lechín and the motion never passed, the damage was done and the students began to desert the MNR. Another incident which may have played an important role in the alienation of the students was the "intervention" of the MNR in the University of San Simón in Cochabamba in 1955. On this occasion armed workers and campesinos invaded the university. The universities of the country called a national congress and deplored the action. At San Simón there was a subsequent change of internal administration which led to a Pirista dominated administration and from that time on the MNR had small influence in university politics. After 1955 both the Confederación Universitaria Boliviana(CUB), the national governing body for the universities, as well as the Federaciones Universitarias Locales(FUL), which govern each university, were dominated by members of other parties; the MNR was relegated to a miniscule number of students without power.

Although the students tended to gravitate towards the more radical parties, specifically the Partido Comunista and the Falange, it would be a mistake to assume that any one group dominated the politics of the university. In reality the political groups composed a bewildering kaleidoscope of parties,

---

<sup>40</sup>El Diario, February 8, 1953.



frentes, sectors, branches, etc.<sup>41</sup> As in the case of other interest groups in the society, the university political scene was one of continual shifting of alliances and positions based on personalities, conflicts between students and teachers, between various faculties, and even between universities. These groups could not even agree on opposition to the MNR. From those students who remained with the Movimiento there were signs of dissatisfaction; as early as August, 1953, the national convention of the Juventud hinted that the students were being ignored by party leaders.<sup>42</sup> The Avanzada Universitaria nominally aligned itself with the left wing of the party, but in reality it was considerably to the left of the more conservative labor leaders. The lack of communication and frustration of the students is exemplified by the statements made at the Third National Congress of the Avanzada in 1963.<sup>43</sup> The students opened their attack by stating, "In ten years of government, the guardia vieja(old guard) of the MNR is as emaciated by its ideological weaknesses as by its failures. Therefore it is necessary that the youth of the party pledge itself to begin a new battle."<sup>44</sup> The strident note of the students is sounded in a series of resolutions calling for the support of the Cuban regime, "the pride of Latin America and the world," the necessity for carrying out a Castro-type revolution in Bolivia,

---

<sup>41</sup>The writer would like to extend his gratitude and appreciation to Sr. Hans Moeller for his help in cataloging the political struggles at the University of Cochabamba from 1954 to 1964.

<sup>42</sup>Students to the National Convention of the MNR in 1953 also complained that many Movimientistas were enriching themselves in office. El Diario, February 6, 1953.

<sup>43</sup>Avanzada Universitaria del MNR, Documentos de la III Conferencia Nacional de Avanzada Universitaria del MNR(La Paz: Ed. El Progreso, 1963).

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., pp. 45-56.

and the denunciation of Yankee imperialism.<sup>45</sup> The students then condemned the party for failing to carry out the National Revolution far enough, for refusing to adopt a coherent ideology and program, for falling under the domination of the United States through its aid program, and for maintaining the capitalists and bourgeoisie in power. They also accused the MNR leaders of becoming rich and corrupt, of being permanently disorganized and incapable of coherent government, and finally, of creating the "cult of personality"---an obvious reference to Víctor Paz---which was leading the party down the path to destruction. The complete divorce between the students and the political leaders was apparent, and the MNR should have taken steps to try to win the students back to the party. Nothing, however, was done. The final insult to the MNR came on October 29, 1964, in an abortive attempt by university students of La Paz to march on the Palacio Quemado, the Presidential residence. Milicianos broke up the march and firing erupted between the two groups; the students were eventually forced back into the university and after several hours of savage gun battle surrendered. Before they did so, however, they managed to damage severely the Ministry of Public Health, one of the few modern office buildings in La Paz. The damage was extensive and costly, and the very fact that the students could damage a public building in a country which can ill-afford such excesses illustrates the frustration of the students and the gap which existed between them and the leaders of the MNR.

The failure of the MNR to control the teachers of Bolivia represents

---

<sup>45</sup>Among Bolivian students there is a general inability to see the social and economic changes since 1952 as revolutionary. They still tend to believe in "revolution" as a cure for all Bolivian ills.

a different type of mistake, but one no less important in the final analysis because the teachers, along with the students, furnished the spark which led to the fall of the party. It was a series of strikes in September-October, 1964 by the teachers supported by the students which created the public unrest inviting a military takeover. There can be few doubts that the teachers were manipulated by extremists, notably from the left, but the fact is that they had a legitimate complaint: they had not received a salary increase in several years.<sup>46</sup> The MNR did more for the expansion of Bolivian education than any other previous administration, but it was unable to make the financial sacrifices to increase teacher salaries. The party tried to organize the teachers, both urban and rural, into organizational cells, but without notable success. Most of the teacher union leaders belonged to parties of the left or right, but the division within leadership ranks prevented the teachers from speaking with a united voice and made it easier for the MNR to respond to their demands. One problem was that the teachers in Bolivia were generally from the poorer middle sectors and therefore somewhat insecure in status. When they faced the power of the miner and campesino militias, they may have felt intimidated and insecure economically and psychologically, and therefore they gravitated to those parties which promised to enhance their prestige. A more basic problem, however, was that the teachers wanted material benefits, specifically a higher wage, and these were not forthcoming; hence the teachers abandoned the MNR. Although the teachers may not appear as a very important interest group since they only number approximately 20,000, they are articulate. When they are joined by the students in the streets and gain the support

---

<sup>46</sup>See supra, pp. 347-51.

of parents concerned with the closing of the schools, they represent a formidable threat which no Bolivian government can afford to ignore. Unhappily, the Bolivian teachers remain underpaid and most are forced to work at another job in order to make ends meet. Unless the situation changes Bolivian education will remain substandard, and the teachers will pose a constant threat to whatever government is in power. Ironically, despite the prominent role played by the teachers in the defeat of the MNR in 1964, they were denied pay increases by the military government although pay for military officers was increased by 100 percent. One can only hope that someday a Bolivian government will realize that support for the nation's teachers in the form of higher wages and benefits will not only insure their loyalty to the government, but will also aid in the solution of some of the problems of Bolivian education.

1. In summary, the MNR was not at all successful in attracting the students either to the party or to the National Revolution. Rather, the students turned toward more radical political solutions. Students rarely articulated demands through regular party or government channels but took to the streets in demonstrations against the government.

2. Another conspicuous failure of the MNR was its inability to attract the teachers of the nation. In Mexico the teachers formed part of the Revolutionary Family and endorsed the PRI, the elite, and the Revolution through the popular sector. But in Bolivia the teachers were not successful in presenting their demands and therefore ended in opposition to the government and the MNR.

5. Business, Professional, and Other Middle Sector Groups. It is important to remember that the Revolution destroyed the economic base of the rosca, and that for much of the period under consideration there did not emerge

a new economic elite to replace the oligarchy. In fact, the economic situation for business in general was so depressed and stagnant that the associational groups normally linked to interest articulation by the middle classes failed to develop. The small internal market, divided interests of business, and the lack of economic growth, led the middle sectors to articulate their interests piecemeal through individual action. Until very late in the MNR period, then, interest articulation by middle sector groups was highly restricted.<sup>47</sup>

The constituents of the middle sectors such as the comerciantes, industrialists, and professionals initially welcomed the National Revolution with some, albeit reserved, enthusiasm. Their enthusiasm did not last long. Although the party continued to call itself the "party of the workers, the campesinos, and middle class," for all practical purposes the middle sectors deserted the MNR very early; and the MNR was never able to recapture them.<sup>48</sup> The party did not have a popular sector equivalent to that of the PRI, but it did have functional cells as well as those based on urban geographic zones which the middle sector could join. Some did enroll in the Zonal Comandos but these organizations soon died. Others were more or less forced to join the professional cells of the party such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc., but they did so less out of support for the MNR than for the

---

<sup>47</sup>For the activities of the middle sectors, including professionals and businessmen, the writer is indebted to informal discussions with many Bolivians. We would like to express special thanks to the following: Fred Antaki, Werner Guttentag, Gaston Malpartida, Ramiro Galindo, Eudoro Galindo, Maria Julia de Lanza, Alicia Ferrufino, Luis Rodriguez, Jaime Alarcón, Manolo Alarcón, and Raul Novillo.

<sup>48</sup>Paz Estenssoro himself admitted the failure of the MNR to attract the important elements of the middle sectors in Los profesionales en el proceso revolucionario (La Paz: n.p., 1959).

simple reason that a party card was necessary to obtain titles or to work. However, the party never had any success in recruiting what few manufacturing and industrial leaders there were; these tended to work through their own Cámaras whenever possible, but more often they depended on personal contacts within the leadership and they did not join the MNR. Although some businessmen did support the MNR until the Stabilization Plan (primarily because they were receiving preferential treatment under the import laws), after 1957 it is safe to say that without exception the businessmen of Bolivia opposed the Movimientista government. Interestingly enough, one of the more potent business groups within the party structure was the Célula de Importadores which consisted of the black marketeers who consistently defied the government in the importation of illegal goods.

Several factors seem important in this alienation of the middle sectors from the MNR. Chief among them was the debacle in the nationalized mines and the general irresponsibility of the workers. The middle groups attributed the loss of revenue in the mines almost exclusively to the irresponsibility of the mine leaders and not to any inherent factors in the market. It must also be remembered that with control obrero the business men of Bolivia found themselves virtually "at the mercy" of the workers: they could not fire them, they could not enforce any kind of discipline, and in many cases they were even forced to stay in business after their plants and shops were total economic losses.<sup>49</sup> The strident demands for further nationalization of all industries from the Sector Izquierda also contributed to their alienation from the MNR. The inflation following the Revolution had a drastic

---

<sup>49</sup>In one case the owner of a small paint factory simply told the workers they could run the shop as they liked and he never came back. Private conversation with Jaime Alarcón, La Paz, November-December, 1964.

effect on the middle sectors, especially those with savings and fixed incomes. Many individuals became paupers overnight as their savings were wiped out; in a society so conscious of social status this was a hard blow. These middle groups were often virtually ignored by party and government decisions in favor of the workers and campesinos. Finally, the increasing red-tape, corruption, and general inefficiency of the MNR government also contributed to increased alienation. Many business men complained of the unjust tax system as well as the necessity to pay more and more to officials to remain in business.<sup>50</sup>

Another reason for the alienation of the middle sectors was the threat posed by the campesinos. First, it should be remembered that following the agrarian reform there were severe food shortages in the cities, and this shortage most effected the middle sectors. They then blamed the irresponsibility of the campesinos and the mis-management of the reform on the government. Stories of unmitigated gluttony and cruel acts to hacendados no doubt lent credence to their beliefs.<sup>51</sup> One cannot escape the conclusion that many were supported in their attitudes of general campesino incapacity by the prevailing white attitude toward the Indian as being below normal in human brain capacity. Yet another factor in their alienation was the manipulation of the campesino vote by the MNR. After 1958 it became increasingly apparent that the MNR did not enjoy an electoral majority in the cities, but with the overwhelming margin captured in the countryside

---

<sup>50</sup>The writer was personally acquainted with a small shopowner who originally paid bribes to only three officials. This number soon grew to ten with the ante always increased. He was by no means an isolated example under the MNR.

<sup>51</sup>Carballo, op. cit., pp. 49-51.

it did not make any difference.<sup>52</sup> Thus, most middle sector groups saw their votes as completely useless, and they began to wonder if they were ever to have any electoral effect on the political system. As a result they tended to gravitate to those groups and parties which promised the defeat of the MNR by any means possible. Finally, it must be added that the continual violence in the cities, the demonstrations, shootings, persecution, etc., could only help in the alienation of the middle sectors. They were the ones who had the most to fear from the violence of the armed militias, and they were the ones who saw their relatives, friends, and associates persecuted and imprisoned by the Control Político.<sup>53</sup> In short, the MNR could not offer these groups what they wanted---security, stability, and the chance to earn money.

---

<sup>52</sup>Election results for La Paz have already been cited, *infra*, Chapter IV, Footnote No. 5. The 1958 election results for the cities versus the provinces in the departments of Cochabamba, Oruro, and Tarija are equally convincing:

		MNR	Opposition(Combined)
Cochabamba---	City	11,614	9,016
	Province	20,647	1,939
Oruro	City	4,878	6,268
	Province	15,772	2,954
Tarija	City	2,652	1,741
	Province	29,346	976

This data does not include null and void votes cast. *El Diario*, July 26, 1958. The writer is grateful to Marcelo Quiroga for accumulating the data.

<sup>53</sup>That the fear of the Control Político was present this writer can personally testify. However, the reality of political persecution for the middle sectors is less easy to affirm. Certainly some of them suffered a good deal under the MNR. On the other hand, observation convinces one that most of those persecuted were members of the lower middle classes or working classes and that they often suffered for sins committed by their middle sector superiors. Perhaps because of family connections there appears to be some reluctance to actually persecute members of the middle sectors. This phenomena requires further research.



The basic reaction of the middle sectors to the regime was one of rejection both of the MNR and the National Revolution. Many left the country; others joined those parties trying to overthrow the government, still others lived in the past and dreamed of a return to the pre-1952 society. As a result of these attitudes, the middle sectors did not actively present their demands into the system. In those cases where demands were made they were often as not ignored, as in the case of the teachers. Businessmen normally discovered that it was more rewarding to work through friends and associates within the government, either depending on close personal relations or the dispensation of cash. The interest groups associated with the middle sectors were ineffective in the articulation of demands. As a result the middle sectors were isolated and alienated from the system, and they were generally denied access as groups to the decision-making apparatus.

In Mexico, thus, the middle sectors, including professionals and most of the businessmen, supported the Mexican Revolution and the PRI. They formed an important part---ultimately the dominant part---of the Revolutionary Family, enjoying access to the elite and the President, and thereby gaining many of the benefits of the system. In Bolivia the opposite was true. The middle sectors became alienated from the government, did not support the MNR regime, and were generally denied access to the political elite and to the decision-making process.

6. The Bureaucrats. An analysis of the bureaucrats and administrators under the MNR is difficult. Not only is there a dearth of reliable information on this group, but the pattern of their interest articulation was also complex.<sup>54</sup> First of all, in comparison with Mexico, there was no one group

---

<sup>54</sup>For administration under the MNR, see Lee S. Greene, "Administration and Technical Assistance in Bolivia," in John M. Claunch(ed.)

which articulated the demands of the bureaucrats to the party or government. In July, 1954, the Political Committee of the MNR recommended that all holders of official position be removed unless they belonged to the MNR, and it may be safely assumed that party membership was normally a prerequisite for holding public office.<sup>55</sup> The overall organization created to voice the demands of the bureaucracy was the Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores del Estado(CNTE) which theoretically worked through the COB. However, evidence is scanty that it ever did so; in fact evidence is lacking about any of its activities.<sup>56</sup> One reason that it may have been relatively useless is that there were a whole host of other unions devoted to specific administrative tasks. Among them were the following: Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Bancarios de Bolivia, the two teachers unions, the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores de Seguridad Social, the telegrafistas union FESTRE, and the Trabajadores Municipales. If one adds the workers in the railroads and Yacimientos, it becomes obvious that a good many of the bureaucrats had unions of their own which operated within the respective branches and agencies which most concerned them. Although most of these administrators

---

Political and Social Problems of Public Administration in Underdeveloped Areas (Dallas: Arnold Foundation Monograph No. 4, 1959), pp. 28-46; Allan Rene Richards, Administration: Bolivia and the United States(Albuquerque: Dept. of Government, University of New Mexico, 1961); Arthur Karasz, "Experiment in Development: Bolivia Since 1952," in F.B. Pike(ed.), Freedom and Reform in Latin America(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1959); and Albert Lepawsky, "Revolution and Reform in Bolivia: A Case Study of the Root and Brand of Public Administration in a Developing Country," in W. J. Siffin(ed.), Towards the Comparative Study of Public Administration(Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1957). It should be pointed out that none of these articles deal with the bureaucrats as an interest group.

<sup>55</sup>Ponce, Shanley, and Cisneros, op. cit., Annex IV, p. 1.

<sup>56</sup>Evidence concerning the CNTE or the bureaucrats is difficult to encounter. In conversations with Bolivians there appears to be some confusion over the role of the CNTE. Most agree that its activities were restricted because of the presence of specialized unions. Written evidence is equally scanty.

were members of the party, and belonged to their respective cells in their government agency, few actually used party structures to articulate their interests. Generally the specific union in each agency, Ministry, department, etc., was the vehicle for making demands against the government. Throughout the period of MNR rule there were numerous strikes and other collective actions by the bureaucrats operating in various agencies, but one can find little evidence of an over-all unity of action.<sup>57</sup> The number of strikes itself is an indication that the bureaucrats were not receiving the benefits of the system and therefore could not be regarded as major supporters.

During the MNR regime few efforts were made to improve the over-all performance of the bureaucracy. A National Civil Service Commission was appointed to establish standards of recruitment and performance, but as far as can be determined nothing came out of this effort.<sup>58</sup> Time-honored methods of public administration found in the traditional system continued such as corruption and bribery, administrative red tape, nepotism, poor budgetary practices, chronic deficits, inefficiency, etc. Perhaps more important in terms of the lack of the bureaucracy to articulate their interests successfully was the attitudes of the bureaucrats themselves. Most of them were not secure in their positions and continually faced the threat of replacement. Their salaries were low and many worked at other jobs to make ends meet. As a result their primary objective while in office was to make as much money as they could to protect their future. Collective action was not likely

---

<sup>57</sup>The dissatisfaction of public employees is indicated by the large number of strikes by these workers. See the Hispanic American Report for evidence of the number and intensity of these strikes.

<sup>58</sup>See Oscar Gandarillas V., La administración pública como instrumento del desarrollo: Bolivia (Washington: Pan American Union, 1966), pp. 10-15.

when the chief source of funds was through bribes and kickbacks to individuals. In addition it should be noted that the strong sense of individualism and dignity found in Latin society is most prevalent in the middle sectors, the very sectors from which the majority of the bureaucrats came. The sense of individualism would be a strong deterrent to collective action.

There is no indication that the MNR was able to win over the majority of the bureaucracy to the goals of the party or the National Revolution. Certainly most bureaucrats were party members, but they tended to focus on their own welfare within their own agency, rather than the over-all benefits of the bureaucracy. They were not major benefactors of the system and therefore had no reason to support it to the extent that has developed in Mexico. Thus one of the major political groups in the country, one necessary for successful government, was not noticeably an ardent supporter of the regime, and tended to focus on its own limited problems to the exclusion of system development or the needs of the country.

In summary, unlike Mexico the bureaucrats were not strong supporters of the MNR political system. One reason was that they did not receive the benefits of the system to the extent of Mexico. Another reason was that there was no over-all control or unity within the bureaucratic sector, and it tended to divide among agency and department lines rather than pursuing common goals and aims.

7. Women. Although it may appear strange to include women as a separate interest group (which was not done in the case of Mexico), the truth is that under the MNR government the women often did act as a group in making demands to the political system. One of the major contributions to Bolivia made by the MNR was the prominent role it played in the emancipation of the Bolivian woman. The MNR early embraced the feminine movement and converted it into

an important auxiliary of the party.<sup>59</sup> With the Revolution of 1952 the Bolivian woman began to move towards greater equality, and while the movement is by no means complete, the emancipation of women is far beyond what it was under the traditional system. Presently the Bolivian woman is no longer regarded as primarily a child bearer and figurehead in the white and chollo sectors, and the Indian woman has achieved a higher status than that assigned in the traditional system in which she was not much above the llama in social status.

At least one woman took prominent part in the fighting of April; Lydia Gueiler Tejada organized and led the "Grupos de Honor" in the city of La Paz which formed the military units used by the MNR in the street fighting.<sup>60</sup> Even before this, however, the women of the MNR had made a dramatic entrance into national politics in their justly famous hunger strike of April, 1951 which dramatized to the nation the injustices perpetrated against the party by the military government. After the Revolution the Comando Feminina began an intensive drive to recruit new members into the party and apparently had some success, especially among the street vendors, vendors in the public markets, and with members of the middle sectors whose husbands were either employed or seeking employment with the government. This drive was initially successful, but by 1957 Lydia Gueiler was complaining that the local women groups were nothing more than bridge clubs and that there was a remarkable coincidence between membership in party cells and the wives of

---

<sup>59</sup>The history of the involvement of women in the MNR is told by Lydia Gueiler Tejada, op. cit., passim.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., pp. 43-52.

party leaders.<sup>61</sup> Thus the party organizations for women soon became nothing more than cliques of party leaders' wives with a few avowed politicians acting independently. One other woman's organization did achieve a measure of fame (or infamy, depending on the point of view) during the years of MNR rule, and this was the Barzolas. Named after one of the martyrs of the Catavi massacre, María Barzola, the Barzolas were a feminine militia supported by the government (or the COB) who were used in parades and demonstrations as shock troops against dissidents. The ferocity of these women fighters in street battles was witnessed by the writer in one confrontation between a few Barzolas and a larger number of secondary students in the Plaza Murillo. The women attacked and disbanded the students with little difficulty.

At the national level several women were elected to the legislature and others were selected for the Political Committee of the MNR, among them Lydia Gueiler, Rosa Lema Dolz, Carmela Baptista, Irma de Gutierrez, Lidia de Oblitas, Ela Campero, and Rosa Morales de Rodriguez. The women were given the position of Minister of Social Assistance and dealt with such problems as welfare, maternity clinics, juvenile delinquency, family problems, etc. However, the MNR still faced some opposition from the femininas who claimed they were discriminated against in the party organization, especially because they did not have separate representation in the national convention.<sup>62</sup> In addition, the most vocal of the feminine leaders happened

---

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., pp. 147-48.

<sup>62</sup>In both the conventions of 1960 and 1964 the Comando Feminina requested separate representation at the convention, rather than being sent as representatives of different departments and special districts.

to belong to the left wing of the party and they readily joined the chorus of protest for a more radical approach to Bolivian problems. Despite these complaints, the fact remains that the MNR was instrumental in emancipating the Bolivian woman to an extent seldom encountered in the rest of Latin America; it also allowed women to participate actively in the political system, and it enjoyed a modicum of success in gaining the support of women groups.

8. Political Parties. The two types of parties found in Mexico, those more or less permanent and those based solely on individual aspirants to the Presidency, were also encountered in Bolivia. Of the latter type, the PRA and the PRIN, respectively the parties of Walter Guevara Arze and Juan Lechin, were the most prominent; but they were actually splinter groups of the MNR and they will be considered in the next chapter. There was, however, a basic difference between the permanent opposition parties in Mexico and those in Bolivia: the Bolivian parties did not accept the political system of Bolivia under the MNR and did not try to work within it. The reason for this intransigent attitude of nonacceptance of the political system is difficult to determine, but the truth is that neither the MNR nor the opposition parties made any efforts toward achieving a mutual accommodation within the system. There is a great danger of getting into the proverbial "chicken and egg" argument over who started what and who responded; the truth appears to be that neither side was interested in compromise, neither side was prone to work with each other to resolve differences, and both resorted to violence, plots, and intolerance in dealing with each other. The MNR tried to eliminate the opposition; they in turn continually plotted to overthrow the government by whatever means were available. Naturally this

conditioned the entire political atmosphere and prevented the development of any concept of political compromise.

All of the parties in Bolivia were small and could claim few actual members.<sup>63</sup> In terms of group characteristics the parties in Bolivia during the MNR period, were usually dominated by a small clique of urban, middle sector leaders with scattered members at the base. Leaders continually struggled with each other for party dominance, splinter groups were common, and parties with the same name representing a particular person or faction not at all uncommon. Not only were struggles within parties often encountered, but one also finds a continual shifting of alliances and pacts between parties creating a kaleidoscope of disturbing complexity---until one realizes that much of this activity had little impact on the political system. In fact one could say that one of the reasons the MNR stayed at least twelve years in power was that the opposition was so weak it could not present a threat to the party. The opposition parties most prominent during the years of the MNR were the following:

a. Falange Socialista Boliviana.<sup>64</sup> The Falange eventually became the major opposition to the MNR. Although it was at first small, it soon began to incorporate and gain the allegiance of the middle sectors as they fled

---

<sup>63</sup>Membership records of the political parties are almost impossible to find in Bolivia. Party leaders are reluctant to discuss membership although they often claim far more members than the party actually has. The only statistic useful for calculating membership is voting but these may inflate actual membership because voters voted against the government rather than for the party.

<sup>64</sup>The program and brief history of the Falange can be found in Mario Rolón Anaya, Política y partidos en Bolivia (La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1966), pp. 243-267; also see Enrique Acha Alvarez and Mario Ramos y Ramos, Unzaga: Mártir de América (Buenos Aires: Artes Graficas, 1960); and Mario R. Gutiérrez G., Predestinación histórica de Bolivia: libertad y dictadura (La Paz: Tall. Graficos Bolivianos, 1966). Sr. Gutiérrez is currently the leader of the Falange.



the MNR. Although it was at first small, it soon began to incorporate and gain the allegiance of the middle sectors as they fled the MNR. The FSB mellowed in terms of its earlier fascism and simply endorsed a strong nationalism with mystic reverence for the State and the Church. In many ways it underwent the same changes as the Spanish Falange, which the FSB regards as its progenitor. By 1958 the FSB probably had as much support in urban areas as the MNR, but it made little headway with either campesinos or labor groups. Students composed a good part of its active strength. Most important, the Falange never abandoned violence as the major tool for seizing power, and it continually plotted the overthrow of the government. (However, one should have some reservations about the actual number of attempted coups since the avowed ideology of the FSB allowed the MNR to use it as a bogeyman and whip up public enthusiasm for alleged attacks on the nation.) Its most serious attempt was in April, 1959, when it tried to seize the city of La Paz one Sunday morning.<sup>65</sup> After this attempt Oscar Unzaga de la Vega, leader of the party, was either murdered or committed suicide, and the FSB was subjected to a wave of persecution which effectively hampered future operations. By 1964 the Falange had declined considerably and was no longer the chief opposition party, but rather one of many.

b. The Partido Social Cristiano(PSC).<sup>66</sup> Basically the PSC attracted the same groups as the Falange, that is the urban middle sectors who were disenchanted with the MNR. After the April debacle it probably replaced

---

<sup>65</sup>Richard W. Patch, "The Bolivian Falange," American University Field Staff Newsletter(April, 1959).

<sup>66</sup>The PSC was formed as a splinter group of the older Partido Social Democrata(PSD), although the latter continued in existence it declined considerably in importance. The party platform can be found in Rolon Anaya, op. cit., pp. 541-55.

the FSB as the major spokesman of these sectors. This party was affiliated with the newer social and economic reforms of the Church and it attracted a good many women to its standard. It had some success with teachers, students, and white-collar workers. The basic problem of the PSC was that it had not yet developed the extensive net of organizations in the society necessary for political effectiveness; this has changed recently (as has the name of the party to the Partido Democrata Cristiano(PDC)) and now these organizations proliferate. The party did accept the National Revolution, but wanted a "rationalization and institutionalization" of the reforms, meaning in practice a disciplined labor and campesino movement. Actually the PSC was not as active as the Falange in its efforts to violently overthrow the MNR, and therefore did not suffer the same degree of political persecution. An interesting comment on Bolivian politics is to note that Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas, a prominent leader of the PSC, was protected from persecution by his half-brother, Hernán Siles.

c. The Partido de la Union Republicana Socialista(PURS) and the Partido Liberal(PL) were two older parties representing elements of the rosca, the traditional oligarchy, and older politicians.<sup>67</sup> Membership was limited to older people in La Paz and a few other cities. They tended to reject the Revolution altogether and although they were used by the MNR as a focus of opposition to the regime, they were so small and ineffective as to be relatively worthless.

---

<sup>67</sup>The programs of the PURS and PL can be found in Rolón Anaya, op. cit., pp. 191-238.

d. The Partido Comunista Boliviana(PCB).<sup>68</sup> The PCB was also limited in size, maintaining a consistent voting strength of approximately 10,000. Its membership consisted of urban intellectuals, certain industrial workers, some ferrovarios, as well as some miners unions. Two union leaders, Ireneo Pimentel and Federico Escóbar, with strong followings in the mines of Catavi, were often identified with the PCB. Interestingly enough the PCB was not overly persecuted and hampered by the MNR, but then the party did not pose a direct threat to the government either. (Generally speaking the MNR was more tolerant of the leftist opposition than that of the right, but the reason may have been that the left accepted the National Revolution.) The government did not start open persecution until the opposition of Pimentel and Escóbar to the Triangular Plan. In fact the PCB acted much as the Communist Party in Mexico, not openly threatening the government, and thereby was allowed to operate freely within a limited sphere. It must be added that the effectiveness of the PCB was hampered by internal divisions based on allegiance to Moscow, Havana, or Peking.

e. The PIR and the POR were decimated following the Revolution when most of their leaders, especially union leaders, joined the MNR.<sup>69</sup> Both continued their attacks on the government, but these were primarily intellectual attacks accusing the MNR of not going far enough in the Revolution. Basically both parties accepted the Revolution and argued over various tactics

---

<sup>68</sup>The party programs of the PCB are found in Ibid., pp. 449-85; also see Partido Comunista Boliviano, Documentos: primer congreso nacional del PCB(La Paz: Publicaciones del PCB, 1958), and Documentos II congreso nacional del PCB(La Paz: Publicaciones del PCB, 1964).

<sup>69</sup>For programs and history of the POR and PIR, see Rolón Anaya, op. cit., pp. 325-401.

to follow in its application. The PIR almost disappeared after the Revolution as its members either joined the MNR or the PCB. With the intervention in the University of Cochabamba, it was revived under Ricardo Anaya and Arturo Urquidi, but it remained a small, though vocal, group of intellectuals with almost no popular base. The POR split into two factions, one led by Guillermo Lora, the other by Hugo Gonzalez Moscoso.<sup>70</sup> Both groups were limited in numbers, although they had some support among miners, other workers, and a few campesinos, and engaged in an intellectual battle which diverted their attention from the MNR. Neither the PIR nor the POR suffered much persecution from the government for the simple reason that they were not regarded as major threats by the MNR.

Thus the parties in Bolivia did not constitute a direct threat to the MNR at least until the breakaway of the two wings of the party, the formation of the PRA and PRIN, and the subsequent opportunity this gave opposition groups to maneuver against the remaining MNR. The exception was the Falange which did constitute some threat primarily because of its urban composition. These parties were limited to small numbers with the leadership involved in continual struggles both internally and externally. The leftist opponents generally supported the Revolution; and although they may have participated in plots to overthrow the government, they did not offer a formidable challenge to the MNR. They were therefore left relatively alone to follow their own internecine battles and write articles. On the

---

<sup>70</sup>Guillermo Lora is probably the most prolific of Bolivian writers and has written numerous articles, books, and pamphlets attacking the MNR and defending the position of the POR. Perhaps his best in La revolucion boliviana: analisis critico(La Paz: Tall. Graficos Bolivianos, 1963).

other hand the parties of the right, specifically the Falange, did not accept the system and represented those sectors of the population who tended to reject the National Revolution and the new political system. The FSB continued to plot the overthrow of the government and the MNR responded in kind by intimidating and persecuting rightists. Therefore, a concept of the loyal opposition working within the political system did not emerge in Bolivia.

In comparison with Mexico, therefore, the important point to be noted is that in certain sectors a concept of loyal opposition did not emerge. As in Mexico the leftists seemed to get along far better with the existing system than the rightists. The latter in both systems tended to reject the Revolution and the political system, but in Mexico the important elements have been admitted into the system and a degree of accommodation reached. This did not occur in Bolivia.

9. The United States. Although it may appear somewhat peculiar to include a foreign government in the section dealing with interest groups, the truth of the matter is that the United States government had as much effect and made as many demands as any other political interest group in Bolivia. Unfortunately, information on the role of the United States is lacking and very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.<sup>71</sup> What follows

---

<sup>71</sup>There are numerous articles on the foreign aid program of the United States to Bolivia. See, for instance, the following: C. Fred Bergsten, "Social Mobility and Economic Development: The Vital Parameters of the Bolivian Revolution," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. VI., No. 3 (July, 1964), pp. 367-75; Heliodoro Gonzalez, "The Domestic Effects of Foreign Aid; The Failure in Bolivia," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XIV., No. 2 (Autumn, 1961), pp. 77-88; Carter Goodrich, "Bolivia: Test of Technical Assistance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXII, (1954), pp. 473-81; S.G. Hanson, "Fraud in Foreign Aid: The Bolivian Program," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XI, No. 2 (Autumn 1957), pp. 65-89; Richard W. Patch, "An Anthropologist's Approach to Economic Aid," American University Field

is composed of some facts, speculation, and information obtained from discussions with Bolivians as well as with official Americans in Bolivia. The United States made the decision to back the MNR government in 1953 primarily due to Bolivia's economic collapse and the fear on the part of the United States that this would provide a welcome opportunity for the communists to step into the country. A quick loan from the International Monetary Fund staved off disaster and the U.S. then offered a revised and improved aid program. This program called for the purchase of tin at a price favorable to Bolivia, a doubling of the technical assistance funds, and an offer to discuss the long-range solution of the economy with a subsequent proposal to send an economic commission to study the Bolivian economy. In the next few years aid was increased tenfold until by 1957 the United States was providing fifty percent of the entire Bolivian budget. Other types of aid were also increased, among them the shipment of surplus food under P.L. 480 to avoid starvation (a reality in the early years of the Revolution), and the augmenting of technical personnel.

As a result of the Eder report, the United States began to put pressure on the government to stabilize the economy.<sup>72</sup> Henry Holland traveled to La

---

Staff Newsletter (April 1961); Patch, "Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting," in Richard Adams, et. al., Social Change in Latin America Today (New York: Vintage, 1960); William S. Stokes, "The Foreign Aid Program in Bolivia," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (December, 1962); and United States Senate, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, Administration of U.S. Foreign Aid in Bolivia (Washington: 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960).

It should be pointed out that few of these articles touch on the political role of the United States in Bolivia. This information must come from sources within the government and neither the U.S. nor the Bolivian officials are inclined to discuss these matters.

<sup>72</sup>The story of the U.S. role is told in George Jackson Eder, Inflation and Development in Latin America: A Case History of Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia (Ann Arbor: School of Business Administration, University of Michigan, International Business Studies No. 3, 1968).

Paz to convince Paz Estenssoro that unless restrictive measures were taken to curtail inflation, the United States would be forced to reduce its aid to Bolivia since the aid being given was a total waste due to currency manipulation. Thus the first major step taken by the government, one that cost it certain support in the mines and other sectors of the economy, was taken at the insistence of the U.S. A second major decision for the government was also the result of United States pressure and another report dealing with the mines, the Ford, Bacon, and Davis report. This was the Triangular Plan which was also forced on the government by the United States. (Although it must be admitted that Bolivia in turn applied pressure by announcing negotiations with the Soviet Union for aid in the restructure of the mines.) This Plan resulted in the estrangement of the miners and also catapulted the Army into the strongest position in Bolivia. Finally, as a conscious policy of the United States government, the Bolivian military was helped in its process of rebuilding by the United States Military Mission. Although the goal of the U.S. may have been related to its hemispheric position and less to a desire to actually help the military, the truth is that it altered the balance of power in Bolivian politics.

These are formal acts of the government of the United States, but there are indications that U.S. interference in Bolivian politics went even further. Informed sources state that a major opponent of the Presidential aspirations of Juan Lechin after 1962 was the American Ambassador, Ben Stephansky. Stephansky apparently disliked Lechin intensely and vetoed any American support in Lechin's candidacy for the Presidency. Stephansky explains his reasons:

I worked out a deal with him[Lechin], over the protests of my own AID people, whereby the US would stock the mine commissaries and maintain employment at its then current levels artificially

with counterpart funds for six months, in return for Lechin's support of the Triangular Plan. The US kept its side of the bargain, which was very tough for us to sell in Washington, but Lechin welched, and pulled every dirty trick in the book for nine months...he had a chance to show courage and vision and control over his membership; he might have been able to erase 15 years' worth of bad image with the rest of the country but he didn't.<sup>73</sup>

While one may deplore the rather naive picture of Lechin's power in the mines, the truth is that Stephansky's position probably encouraged Paz to run again in 1964. Another example of personal intervention centers around the American military attache, Colonel Edward Fox. Col. Fox may have encouraged the military leaders, especially his old friend Barrientos, to overthrow the MNR government, assuring them that the United States military would aid and approve their actions.<sup>74</sup> If this is true it would appear that the military was working counter to the Embassy since Ambassador Henderson was fully committed to the Paz Estenssoro forces.

Other than these two cases, neither of which is substantiated by irrefutable facts, it does seem possible and probable that the American presence constituted a strong and potent interest group in Bolivian affairs primarily because of the role of U.S. aid. The budget for the Bolivian government barely covers the operating costs of the administration; sometimes it does not even cover salaries. In such a case almost any new project must receive U.S. financing. The result is that the focus of a good part of the-

---

<sup>73</sup>Interview with Mr. Christopher Mitchell, Washington, August 5, 1968. Used with the permission of Mr. Mitchell.

<sup>74</sup>The only written statement of the involvement of Col. Fox appears in Sergio Almaraz, op. cit., pp. 30-31. Informed sources say that Sr. Almaraz would never have permitted the book to be published had he been alive---he died at the end of 1968. It should be added that in spite of the vociferous tone of many of his books and articles, Sr. Almaraz is recognized as an extremely honest writer.



demands from the polity is the American Embassy and USAID headquarters. They furnish the funds for virtually any new project in the country. One interesting phenomenon has resulted which may prove of great interest both in Bolivia and in the United States: a good many Peace Corps Volunteers are gaining political experience through access to the highest points of decision-making within the Bolivian government and the American community. Particularly as spokesmen for the campesinos, the Volunteers carry campesino demands to the Ministries in La Paz, often to the President himself, and then can establish contacts with official Americans for the funds necessary for their projects. Not only is this an unusual experience for American youths, but it also has helped the campesinos to understand the process of articulating demands. It is another example of the predominant role played by the United States government in Bolivian politics, and an illustration that the U.S. often makes the key decisions for the political system. On that point there can be no comparison with Mexico.<sup>75</sup>

#### B. METHODS AND CHANNELS OF ARTICULATING DEMANDS

For most of the period under the MNR the major method of articulating demands was through some means of physical demonstration. The MNR, faced with a bewildering number of demands, often could not reach basic decisions on the allocation of resources; as a result interest groups soon learned that trying to obtain answers to their demands was almost impossible through

---

<sup>75</sup>At first glance it would appear that the expropriation of oil holdings in Mexico in 1938 is a similar case. However, the Mexican government reacted to American pressure, it was not forced into the decision by the U.S. government. In Bolivia the U.S. government actually made decisions. There is a basic difference between the two cases in that Mexico had several paths to choose while Bolivia was forced into its choice by the U.S.

the party, not to mention certain paths within the formal structure of the government. The recourse of these interest groups, then, became a sudden confrontation with the government, usually a strike, parade, demonstration, or some other form of physical confrontation. In the first years of the Revolution the propensity towards armed violence or street manifestations was heightened by the presence of the militias, and the concurrent absence of armed strength on the part of the government. Throughout the polity strikes, walkouts, demonstrations, parades, and just about every conceivable method of physical confrontation were employed.<sup>76</sup> During the Stabilization crisis one could find one or more strikes in the country every single day.<sup>77</sup> These included campesinos, workers in the mines, railroads, oil-fields, sugar mills, and all other types of industry; it also included students, teachers, public employees of Ministries and agencies, housewives, civic groups such as the pro-Cochabamba committee, football players, and street cleaners; also included were doctors, lawyers, dentists, and even members of the Cabinet on the occasion; finally it included the President when Siles went on dramatic hunger strikes to enforce the provisions of the Stabilization Plan. When groups were not striking or protesting against the government they might have been against each other; one study of demonstrations taking place between 1954 and 1964 at the University of Cochabamba indicates that there were as many manifestations against another group in the

---

<sup>76</sup>For an accurate picture of the number of strikes it is necessary to consult the newspapers of Bolivia. El Diario carried a daily boxscore of current strikes in 1957. Other sources which can be used to gain some insight into the number and types of strikes are Alfredo Franco Guachalla, En torno a la cuestion social (La Paz: Ed "16 de Julio", 1964); and Saturnio Rodrigo (pseud.) Diario de la Revolucion Nacional (La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1955).

<sup>77</sup>See Siles, op. cit., in his two messages for the number of lost working days and the effect on production.

university as there were against the government.<sup>78</sup>

The success of these types of demonstrations is less easy to diagnose. In certain cases it did put sufficient pressure on the government and some demands were met, although probably not to the extent desired by the interest group involved. In the majority of cases, however, it would appear that the demands were simply postponed and later the interest group would resort to the same type of tactic as internal pressure again increased within the group. Other times it was relatively easy for the government to promise something which would stall the demand. This occurred several times with respect to demands from the Beni and Santa Cruz for increased revenues from the government. At other times the government would grant a small part of the demand and ignore the more significant aspects as in the case of the teachers, who were seldom given an actual salary increase but were rewarded other less costly benefits. The plain fact is that the government simply did not have the resources to meet all the demands emanating from the political groups; it had to postpone demands and hope to avoid a political crisis. In a certain sense, then as now, these types of physical demonstrations may have served to release frustrations over such fundamental work problems as low salaries. If a worker could take to the street and shout his objections at the government, with the full realization that there was little possibility of receiving satisfaction for his demands, he could return to work feeling that at least he had voiced his frustrations and could continue to work until they built-up again. In other cases these demonstrations were imminently successful, especially in the case of the miners and campesinos

---

<sup>78</sup>See infra, Footnote, No. 41.

who could use their militias to back up demands. Finally, it should be added that the entire climate of the Revolution created an atmosphere of violence and physical presentation and these traits continued long after the Revolution itself was waning.

An interesting study by Maria Teresa Camacho sheds some light on the nature of demands made and the response of the government.<sup>79</sup> Mrs. Camacho made a study, using newspapers, of the types of demands in the years 1964-67, after the fall of the MNR, but much of the data would be applicable to the Movimientista years. She divided the demands into economic, political, and social types. Out of a total of 180 demands classified, the economic were 86, political 77, and social 17.<sup>80</sup> However, the political demands include fulfillment of legal requirement and these often include economic demands. In terms of the methods used to express demands, the following means and percentages were found: complaints to news media, 30.33%; resolutions, 20.52%, strikes 10.05%, public demonstrations 9.09%, stoppages 6.07%, threats to strike 5.93%, meetings with public officials 3.09%, armed marches 2.03%, and road blocks(a favored tactic of the campesinos) 1.09%. It should be noted that violent means have probably declined considerably in recent years due to the power of the military. In what she calls the "conversion of demands into outputs," or the response of the government, the following methods were employed: ignored demands 48%, postponed demands 23%, immediate peaceful solution 9%, legal measures 8%, detention of leaders

---

<sup>79</sup>Maria Teresa Camacho, "A Systems Analysis of Bolivian Political Life," (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Texas at El Paso, 1968). Especially the tables in the Appendix.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., pp. 36-44.

5%, armed intervention 5%, exile of leaders 2%. Once again, these figures may be somewhat different than under the MNR regime, but they indicate an amazing ability of the government not to respond to expressed demands of interest groups---and that was equally true of the MNR.

Elite representation was much less pronounced than in the case of Mexico. The primary reason was the lack of a unified elite to receive demands. However, at the local level the caudillo generally received whatever demands were made. For instance, an interest group in Santa Cruz would probably achieve more working through Luis Sandoval Morón than trying to use the institutional channels which might have been available. Occasionally it may have been more fruitful to circumvent the local leader, but there was the inherent danger that in attempting to do so the wrath of the caudillo would be engaged. In some cases direct appeals to the President were helpful as in the case of the campesinos who could make known their needs to the President on one of his trips to the countryside, and he would personally give them money or the object desired. This device was used by Paz Estens-  
soro (and even more by President Barrientos), but probably not to the extent of Cárdenas in Mexico. It must be added that representation among the elites themselves was probably high; that is to say that among the leaders there was considerable dialogue concerning the respective needs of their groups. Just how successful this dialogue was is difficult to determine, but the large number of strikes, etc., would seem to indicate a breakdown in the negotiation of demands within the elite itself. The reason might well have been the desire of each leader to retain control over his group by not compromising himself.

The other method of articulating demands, through formal and institutional

channels, requires some explanation of those channels and the problems encountered by the interest groups. In the first place, the MNR did not serve as a mechanism for articulating demands for most of the groups in Bolivia. With the exception of some of the earlier acts of the Revolution, which were carried out by the Political Committee of the party, the MNR structures did not relate well to the government structures. Thus, the MNR was somewhat useless as a mechanism to which groups could formulate demands. There is another factor relating to the general disintegration and fragmentation of the government which is of more importance. Given the lack of central control by the government over its constituent elements whether party leaders, regional jefes, union leaders, or government institutions, it was much easier for a group to make demands directly to the particular agency, organization, or individual which could grant them. Rather than making demands to the legislature, the party, or the President (the potential aggregating structures), a certain interest group would articulate "raw" demands to whatever agency or organization was most concerned with that particular group. For instance, the miners articulated demands to either COMIBOL or the Minister of Mines; the petroleum workers made their demands on YPF; teachers dealt with the Minister of Education; students made their demands on their respective groups within the university or the Minister of Education (often to the Minister of Finance for additional funds); railroad workers dealt with the agency running the railroads which they totally dominated; sugar workers made their demands on the CBF, etc. At no point in the political system did a real aggregation of these interests take place, and it was a race between the various groups to beat the others in making demands on the limited resources available. Several institutional factors were important in this race: first, there was no unified budget control and the central

government was often at the mercy of various agencies who could obtain loans and finances separated from its control. The United States Aid Mission played an important role in this fragmentation since they could offer funds to the various agencies without necessarily working through the Presidency, the legislature, or the party. Although Presidential approval was often necessary, he was in no position to oppose a loan which would "develop" some aspect of the country. (It must be added that the United States was not the only contributor to this fragmentation since other governments and international agencies also dealt with individuals and departments within the Bolivian government.) Second, many of the government employees in these agencies were organized and could cooperate with workers in presenting demands. More often than not administrators and workers competed with each other for the same resources and this created friction within each sector. Third, the President had much less control over all the government institutions and agencies that was the case in Mexico. Although the President theoretically stood at the apex of the system, decisions were often made without his knowledge or participation; and the allocation of resources was not necessarily dominated from his office. Most important was the fact that he did not have a united elite aiding him in the running of the country. Each political leader was more interested in cultivating his own personal power than in subjecting himself and his group to the President and/or the needs of Bolivia.

It would appear that the problem was not a lack of channels in which to articulate demands, but the proliferation of such channels without any central control being exercised throughout the system. Interest groups had little difficulty in finding a channel to present demands; the sole problem

was whether the resources would be available to fulfill those demands and whether the group could exert enough pressure to beat other groups to the scanty funds in existence. In comparison with the Mexican system the obvious difference was the lack of control exercised by the President over the system, especially in the period from 1958-62. Without exaggerating, he was an arbiter of independent groups and structures revolving around him, but he was often helpless to force them to acquiesce to his requests. He could take credit for some of the success when resources were allocated in such a manner that groups were relatively contented, and when those resources were not adequately allocated he took most of the blame; in either case the control of the situation was not his.

Finally, the writer would like to quote at some length an interview with Carlos Serrate Reich, former private secretary to Víctor Paz and ex-Minister of Education from August to November 1964.<sup>81</sup> The case cited involves the demands of the teachers and illustrates not only the methods of articulating demands, but also sheds some light on the decision-making process as well as the general tone of Bolivian politics:

Q: When you were Minister of Education, how were the demands of the teachers expressed, formulated?

A: It was done through a formal statement of demands, delivered to the Minister, by a delegation from the Federación Nacional de Maestros Urbanos. They, of course, had a whole internal system for reaching decisions, with Federaciones Departamentales and a National Congress. The situation when I came in as Minister was a bit special, and you have to understand a little history and a little about the structure of the teacher's

---

<sup>81</sup>Interview with Carlos Serrate Reich, La Paz, May 13, 1969. The interview was conducted in the following manner: the writer sent a list of questions to Mr. Christopher Mitchell, Ph. D. Candidate, Harvard University, then residing in La Paz. Mr. Mitchell then interviewed Sr. Serrate, transcribed the responses, and sent them back to Cochabamba. For this service the writer would like to express his sincere gratitude to Chris Mitchell.



union. For two years before I came in the Minister of Education had been Ciro Humboldt and he, in all frankness, controlled the union through the venality of its dirigentes. You see, the MNR never got control of the national teacher's union, the leaders were quite right wing, and they could be bought, though not directed from within the union. There were other leaders of the union though, primarily in La Paz (Federacion de La Paz), who were leftists and who realized that Humboldt was paying off the right-wing leaders. Just before August 6, 1964, the national federation held a Congress in Cochabamba and voted full powers to the dirigentes to call a strike any time they felt it would be best. They also voted a "non-negotiable" demand of an increase in their sueldo básico [basic salary] from 205 to 470 pesos bolivianos. Humboldt, seeing that his game couldn't be played anymore, told Paz he didn't want to be Minister of Education in the new Cabinet; when I took over the Ministry he told me there were "tacks on my chair, and a great big bomb underneath it."

The terms of the teachers' congress strike vote put a hot potato in the hands of the dirigentes: unless they got a certain fixed figure and no less, they would have to call a strike or be accused by their left-wing rivals, who were always trying to unseat them anyhow, of having "sold out" the strike, which in fact had been done many times before. The 205-peso basic salary had been set in the Stabilization policy of Siles in '57, and since then the teachers had always been pressing for more. The government had never touched the sueldo basico but had bought peace through bonos [bonuses], special extra payments for books, for housing, and so forth; now the teachers didn't want any more bonos since only an increase in the basic pay would be reflected in the aguinaldo [special Christmas bonus] at the end of the year. In addition, the congress was very clever and sent some rank-and-file members along with the dirigentes to call on me so that the leaders couldn't make a deal with me whereby they would be paid off---the delegation represented all areas of the country, though sometimes in the past it has been primarily leaders from the Federation of La Paz. They came to my office and gave me the formal, written demand and I simply accepted it---at the same time, as well, they were holding street demonstrations.

Q: And how was the problem handled by the government---what sorts of consultations did you have with other Ministers, or with the President? Who made the final decision?

A: I took the set of demands to Paz, and said, "here are the teacher's demands---of course you already know about this, from the press and the street demonstrations." "What can we do?" Paz said, "Well, Doctor, you know we do not have any funds, so we cannot give them anything." "Nothing?", I asked. "They've practically declared the strike already, though they are still working for the moment." "Well," he replied, "we will have to look around and see if in the final analysis we can't give them perhaps 10 pesos more per teacher per month." I protested that this was very unrealistic; that this time they were really out for blood, and we would have to try and do better. So, through Paz, I made an appointment to see the Minister of Finance, Escobar, a bookkeeper who neither before, since, nor at that time, had anything to do with politics---or any political sense. I went to see him and he said that at that time of the financial year there wasn't any money;

the best he could do, he said, would be to scrape up \$7,000 for me, and I could use it for salary increases. \$7,000 among 23,000 teachers, urban and rural combined! I decided this had to go to a cabinet meeting since the Ministry of Education could not resolve the question alone, both through lack of funds and because it was political, not technical, and because I couldn't get anything out of Hacienda. Generally problems were solved and decisions taken between the Minister concerned and the President, but when the problems spilled over like this one, we would take it to the Cabinet.

Meanwhile, all this time I was holding meetings with teachers' delegations, who just laughed at me when I said the President said there were no funds, and when I talked about common sacrifice and the work of the Revolution. But I gained time by saying perhaps something would come of a new meeting with Paz or with the Minister of Finance, or by juggling the funds of the Ministry, taking from other areas to put into salaries--- something which is very difficult since 98% of Education's budget goes for teacher salaries. There was a special element in these negotiations, if you can call it that: the teachers' leaders knew about the coming coup of Barrientos, if not of Ovando, and were really following political orders and ambitions to bring down the government---the salary increases were not really that important to them. Indeed in Cochabamba the teachers' leaders were encouraged to strike by Col. Luis Reque Teran who was Prefecto. We found out later that Reque Teran had had a meeting in the University with the teachers, Prinistas, Praistas, Falangistas, and others, and had told them to go ahead and strike, that the coup was all prepared and they could help bring it about.

Well, anyhow we had the cabinet meeting and the Minister of Finance made the same statement to me---he did not have the funds. Naturally none of the other Ministers wanted to say, "Okay, I'll contribute some of my budget to Education," since they were already working on tight margins as it was. Paz did not let me in on his complete strategy, but I could tell that he did not consider the strike very important---he saw it as part of the Barrientos plot, which he knew about, and he was just waiting for the golpe attempt to break out so he could decapitate Barrientos politically with the help of Ovando, in whom he had the greatest confidence. Paz, in other words, was waiting for an overall solution to the crisis, rather than solving problems like the teacher demands one by one. The upshot was, in the Cabinet, that we appointed a Ministerial Commission to meet once again with the teachers' delegation; it was made up of myself, plus the Ministers of Labor, Campesino Affairs, and Finance.

The Commission really messed things up. Whereas I had been playing for time, making jokes with the teachers, offering them coffee, being very polite, the Commission members just said, straight out, "No." Escobar from Finance made his same little speech---what did it matter to him? Rojas who was at Campesino Affairs then (and who was in on the plot with Barrientos) said he had nothing to say since whatever increases the urban teachers got would be applicable to the rural ones as well. And the Minister of Labor said the whole thing would be settled in his Ministry, only to have the teachers point out to him, quite correctly, that the Education Code exempted them from the jurisdiction of the Labor Code, and thus the Ministry of Labor. So the meeting just ended like that, with fixed positions on both sides, and the teachers went away to sign their strike decree..

When I heard that they were doing that, I ordered the suspension (not clausura[closing], just a temporary measure until further notice) of the school year. This kept the initiative in my hands, and when the teachers declared their strike a week later they had already been locked out! By closing the schools I had denied the unions the opportunity to use the students in their demonstrations, since all the students were on vacation---using students after they arrived for the school day was a favorite tactic of the teachers. So they had to use just their own membership, bolstered by people from the opposition parties that were in on the coup, but it wasn't nearly as bad as it would have been with the students involved.

As I told Paz, at that stage it was impossible to deal with the union because the right-wing group, known as the maestros democráticos, in control of the national federation, was competing with the leftist La Paz group to see who could make the most radical demands and take the most Jacobin positions---each was trying to be more papist than the Pope. So I proposed to Paz that we make a two-pronged approach: we would get Humboldt to pay off, once again, the right-wingers, and I would give a turn to the left in the Ministry to win over the leftists, who could not be bought. Paz said fine, and that is what we did. Humboldt called in all his former "friends" to the Ministry of Government, which he held, and put a lot of money in circulation to cool them off. Then I appointed a woman as my Oficial Mayor, a leftist nationalist respected by the La Paz teachers' federation; I also appointed, as Director General de Educación, a priest who, though a Franciscan, also had very good relations with the leftist teachers. And that is how we worked it; on September 22 the right-wingers signed an agreement to bring an end to the crisis, without a salary increase, and although the leftists at first refused to sign, my lady Oficial Mayor persuaded them and they came like little sheep to my office and signed. The next day we opened the schools again and the group planning the coup was really angry because we had denied them the demonstrations and street fights that accompany a large-scale teacher strike. Of course we continued to have problems; on September 23 the Falange called out the students from Colegio Bolivar for a street demonstration for more blackboards, more desks, more chalk, etc., and in Cochabamba the teachers never did accept the agreement since they were still being encouraged by Reque Teran.

Q: Would it have been possible to find some other money for salary increases from United States aid?

A: Not really, though we did have one possibility. There would be U.S. money for a massive basic education(alfabetización) campaign, and I proposed to the teachers' leaders that they accept longer hours for a massive four-year campaign of this sort; in return they would get 150 pesos worth of food every month from the Americans. But no, they wanted cash in the form of an increase in the basic salary for their then-current work hours; after that they might be interested in the extra work for the basic education campaign.

Q: You say this pattern was abnormal because of the impending coup. How had similar problems been handled in the past?

A: Well, as I said, in many cases dirigentes were just bought off.

Otherwise, the general pattern was this: after about 1958 the teachers were always making demands, they would present them at the beginning of the year and the government would play for time. By about August the teachers would realize that nothing had happened, and the pressure from them would begin in earnest. The government would then start really buying them off and playing for a little more time, because in October the school year closed anyway. In general, though, it was necessary to close down the school year early; in those years it almost never completed the 200 days required by law, it would be 180, 165, and so on depending on how tough the demands were that year. Sometimes, if the leaders were not bought off or could not prevent a strike, they would be arrested and sent into exile. Other times it was sufficient to threaten them with the Control Politico and San Roman---actually we had to put this type of pressure on the leftist leader in September, 1964. But despite all that the teachers did they never touched the sueldo basico, just got a bono for this or that after two years fight or so for each one.

This interview has been quoted at such length because it is so illustrative of the entire political process under the MNR. Demands were articulated in unrealistic terms, in fact they were basically articulated as political demands. Since the government could not respond to the demands in economic terms, they either bought off the leaders of the union, exiled them, or tried to ignore them. Due to a lack of resources, the government vacillated, unable to make any decision; more important, the President, as the center of decision-making, was himself unable to reach a decision and tended to overlook the rather minor problem of teachers salaries. This case was not an exception under the MNR, it was the rule.

One additional factor is that under the MNR there was no indication that institutionalization of articulation was increased. If anything, especially in the early and late stages of the Revolution, interest articulation was more fragmented than in the past. There was never a definite trend towards institutionalization as in Mexico. One factor that might help to explain the lack of institutionalization was that Bolivia did not have the number of specialized interest groups competing in the political system that is found in Mexico. Neither did Bolivia have the same degree of diversity of

economic and social groups.

1. In comparison with Mexico Bolivia placed more emphasis on physical confrontation and elite representation than on formal and institutional channels for articulating demands. Due to the divisions within the elite even elite representation was less successful than in Mexico. Physical methods predominated. There was no indication of an increasing institutionalization of demands taking place in the system.

2. The primary problem was not a lack of channels for articulating demands but the lack of control over these channels. The Bolivian President did not have the control over channels of either the party or the government encountered in Mexico. As a result interest groups could make their demands on structures directly and this tended to increase the fragmentation of the system.

### C. THE STYLE OF INTEREST ARTICULATION

As in the case of Mexico it is difficult to determine the exact style employed in the articulation of interests. The greater share of demands emanating from interest groups appear to have been specific and manifest requests for political or economic action. Usually the interest groups presented their demands, in one way or another, in a formal, written manner. Often these requests had no relation to any economic or political reality, but they were certainly specific enough. At other times demands were diffuse and particularistic, especially in the case of labor unions who often simply made some demand for total change without understanding exactly what they desired. Demands made by regional groups were also diffuse and latent, lacking concrete provisions. A character trait found throughout Bolivian society may be responsible for the formulation of demands in general terms:

this trait is the propensity to propose grandiose schemes with little basis in reality. For instance, university students continually demand reform of both the political and educational system, but they seldom present any specific requests for such change. The common tactic is to start at the top, i.e., with a general idea or concept, and then work down to the specifics of implementation. However, the stage never seems to come for the proposal of concrete action.<sup>82</sup> This unpragmatic approach may make assessment of Almond's variables more difficult. On the other hand, it must be remembered that many of the interest groups in Bolivia had direct access to their respective administrative structure and therefore were in a position to make specific demands based on personal communication between administrators and workers or their leaders. Occasionally demands may have been unrealistic, but this may have been a tactic employed to make sure that something was obtained. Thus both the traditional and modern styles were found operating side-by-side within the system. Unlike Mexico, however, it is difficult to see a trend towards the more modern variables. The prevalence of violence and elite representation and the failure to develop institutional channels for articulation of demands would seem to indicate that no such trend is present.

#### D. SUMMARY OF THE INTEREST ARTICULATION FUNCTION

In Bolivia there was no direct control of the interest group structures

---

<sup>82</sup>The writer has frequently encountered this attitude among university students in Cochabamba. They can formulate vast plans but are totally incapable of translating these plans into concrete action. For a similar viewpoint expressed with respect to the general problem of planning in Bolivia, see Cornelius H. Zondag, The Bolivian Economy 1952-65: The Revolution and Its Aftermath (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 223-27. Mr. Zondag's conclusion with respect to the 1962 Ten Year Plan is that it "constitutes too much an intellectual exercise and is not enough of a blueprint for development which should provide the specific guidance for the executing and financing agencies." p. 227.

as in Mexico. Neither the party nor the President nor the elite dominated the interest groups. In the case of labor the structures were almost independent of the government and party. The agricultural sector was also fragmented and somewhat isolated from central control. The most important comparison with Mexico in terms of groups is that the Bolivian Revolution and the MNR did not manage to gain the support of the articulate middle sectors. Businessmen, professionals, and other representatives of these sectors were isolated from the party and often denied access to the political system as groups. Two other important groups, the students and the military, were not satisfied with the regime and eventually opposed it although for different reasons. The opposition parties in Bolivia, especially those on the right, refused to accept the system and worked to overthrow it by violent means, whereas in Mexico an agreement has been reached which allows for limited participation by the opposition. The Bolivians also had to contend with a foreign interest group which made the most important decisions for the political system. Violence and other physical methods of presenting demands was not reduced in Bolivia, and this increased the possibility of instability throughout the system. The lack of control of the Bolivian President over the channels of interest articulation often meant that there was no control or direction over the presentation nor resolution of demands. Mexico, in almost every respect, seems to have evolved a political system in which the interest articulation function is dominated from the top, but also one in which the interest groups can make their demands heard. Bolivia on the other hand did not develop a system with control from above; it did not have a system dominating the interest group structures, and it failed to reduce the incidence of violence in the system. The primary reason for this failure was the

lack of any aggregating mechanism which could translate demands into effective action while at the same time retaining control over the constituent elements of the political system.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE FUNCTION OF INTEREST AGGREGATION

The function of interest aggregation is perhaps the most difficult to analyze under the MNR controlled political system. The reasons for this difficulty will become apparent shortly, but it must be stressed now that a departure from the format of previous chapters is necessary. First of all, a brief review of the aggregation function as it was performed in Mexico and the leading questions suggested in Chapter II will be reviewed. The nature of the performance of the aggregation function in the Bolivian system will follow. Finally the MNR as an aggregative structure will be discussed and compared with the PRI in Mexico. A short section will follow on the specific "tasks" performed by the MNR in the political system.

What needs to be stressed with regard to this chapter is that it concentrates on a structure (the MNR) rather than on the function itself. Almond suggests that this approach may be justified due to overlapping and confusing performance of the interest articulation, interest aggregation, and rule making functions by the same structures.<sup>1</sup> When this occurs it is extremely difficult for the scholar to separate the function from the structures performing the function; in fact he must concentrate on the structure rather than the function. While the performance of these three functions is not necessarily overlapping in a given

---

<sup>1</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1966), p. 99.

political system, the relative absence of the performance of a function can make analysis equally difficult. The basic problem with the Bolivian political system from 1952 to 1964 was the lack of performance of the interest aggregation function. Therefore the focus of this chapter will be on the reasons the structures, particularly the MNR, did not perform the function of interest aggregation.

A. The Function of Aggregation in the Bolivian Political System Under the MNR

Almond states that the function of interest aggregation is that of converting demands into general policy alternatives. Interest aggregation may occur at many points in the political system, but he uses the term to refer to the "more inclusive levels of the combinatory process---the structuring of major policy alternatives---and also [to] distinguish it from the final process of authoritative rule making."<sup>2</sup> While this definition is none too clear (what exactly is a "major" policy alternative?) Almond seems to feel that somewhere in the system preliminary to the actual authoritative rule making, someone or some structure must make a prior decision uniting or resolving various views and demands. The structures which perform the aggregative function may also be encountered throughout the political system. However, the focus should be on "what structures play the major role in aggregating interests."<sup>3</sup> In the developed system two specialized structures appear to perform the function, the government bureaucracy and the political party. From there Almond passes to an analysis of the styles of interest aggregation, but as we have seen in the case of Mexico this classification

---

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 100.

was not very useful and will not be discussed with relation to Bolivia.<sup>4</sup> Almond then deals with the specific problem of the fragmentation of the interest aggregation function and this is especially important for the subsequent discussion of Bolivia. Finally, he takes up the political party in the performance of the function, stating that "the structural-functional approach may also be used to consider the way a particular structure performs a wide range of functions...the modern political party is an especially interesting structure to consider in terms of this possibility of multifunctional approach."<sup>5</sup> Although the relationship of the MNR to the functions of socialization, recruitment, and articulation has already been discussed, his approach would seem to include the specific "tasks" discussed in regard to the PRI in Mexico. This brief outline of the interest aggregation function was felt to be necessary due to the slightly different approach used in this chapter, and also due to the confusing performance of the function under the MNR regime.

In Mexico it was found that the President was the "final aggregator" in the sense that he made the ultimate decision about general policy alternatives. One of the chief structures which aided him in the performance of this function was the official party. The questions are: to what extent was the President the final aggregator in Bolivia? What

---

<sup>4</sup>The MNR seemed to have elements of all three styles without any particular one predominating. It was traditional in that regional and local bosses dominated party structures. It was somewhat ideological in its opposition to the rosca, but pragmatic in the formulation of its programs or government. Frankly the concept of styles as related to political parties is not well enough defined to be employed in the case of the MNR.

<sup>5</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 114.

structures assisted in the performance of the function in Bolivia? Did the MNR serve as a useful instrument for the aggregation of interests? The answers to these questions are relatively simple: the President with a few exceptions was not the final aggregator in the system, in fact no structure could be termed the "final aggregator;" the MNR did not serve as an instrument for aggregating demands; and finally, the aggregation function in its "less-inclusive" levels occurred throughout the political system and was performed by many structures. Throughout the Bolivian political system there was an apparent breakdown in the function of interest aggregation. No one structure, no one office, no one person had the ability or the power to "convert demands into major policy proposals." With the exception of the Stabilization and Triangular Plans no major policy decisions were made. The reforms early in the Revolution were actually "raw" demands articulated into policies by the specific interest group involved. With the exception of the two plans mentioned, both of which did not receive notable support from party members, there was a paralysis of the ability to transform demands into effective policies. The interesting question, of course, is why? The obvious answer is that within the system there was no structure where major decisions could be made; rather there was a fragmentation of the decision-making structures which led to and reinforced a subsequent fragmentation of the aggregation function. If we review the structures mentioned by Almond and those found in Mexico which performed the function, it becomes obvious that in Bolivia the structures did not perform the function adequately in order to prevent a breakdown in the conversion of demands into policies. For instance, with few exceptions the President lacked the power---or resources---to enforce decisions against various sectors within the polity.

The best period to see this phenomenon was from 1958 to 1962 when the President and the central government, in order to avoid a direct clash with the miners, simply did nothing. The government had no power over the nationalized mines, and COMIBOL continued its downward plunge into further and further debt. In the period prior to 1957 the President was not the focus of power, but was one of many who tried vainly to increase his power vis-a-vis the other more or less independent groups in the political system. After the decision to revitalize the mines in 1962, the President was dependent on the armed might of the military and could make no decisions contrary to their interests. Although the Cabinet might sit for a discussion of a problem, it was incapable of resolving it for the basic reason that resources were not available.<sup>6</sup> The President, whether Víctor Paz or Hernán Siles, simply lacked sufficient power to make basic decisions and was at the center of a conflicting and confusing demand process which prevented him from converting demands into effective policies.

Another "structure" (albeit an analytic structure) which aided the President in Mexico to aggregate interests was the unified elite, the Revolutionary Family. In Bolivia, however, there was no such unified elite anxious to assist the President or the MNR to effectively aggregate interests. Each member of the elite was primarily interested in maintaining his own independence from the central decision-making apparatus and was not ready to compromise his own position with those of other groups in the society. Individual politicians pursued their own goals

---

<sup>6</sup>Interview with Carlos Serrate Reich, La Paz, May 13, 1969.

and policies to the exclusion of major policies for the entire political system.<sup>7</sup> At first glance the period of party rule immediately following the April Revolution would appear to indicate that policy decisions were made in the executive committee of the party, but in reality each representative on the committee was a captive of his particular group and was forced to follow its dictates to the exclusion of major policy decisions for the country as a whole.

The government bureaucracy, a structure mentioned by Almond, was equally ineffective at aggregating demands. As he noted, however, "in order for the bureaucracy to aggregate effectively, a system with a strong and effective decision-making center outside the bureaucracy itself is generally necessary. Without such a center the bureaucracy may not be able to maintain its autonomy and coherence. Particular agencies can become, in this case, 'colonized' by powerful interest groups who are their clients."<sup>8</sup> This is precisely what happened under the MNR. The President and the MNR, the only potential structures to operate as effectively outside centers of decision-making, did not perform as such. The bureaucracy itself, unlike the case in Mexico, did not form a united group able to make demands and present a strong front against the government or other groups in the political system. As a result most of the bureaucracy became "colonized" by their respective groups working within their agencies and Ministries. Those bureaucrats working in COMIBOL or

---

<sup>7</sup>See James Malloy, "Revolution and Development in Bolivia," in Cole Blasier (ed.), Constructive Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), pp. 212-216.

<sup>8</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 101.

the Ministry of Mines, for example, were threatened by the miners and the unions and seldom, if ever, acted contrary to the demands of the workers. The same is true to a lesser extent of the employees of the Ministry of Campesino Affairs. Those who worked in the country-side faced beatings or other physical intimidation and could seldom act in an independent capacity opposite the demands of the campesinos.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, in other government Ministries and agencies, especially the Ministry of Work and YPF, government bureaucrats simply could not act contrary to the expectations of the workers. The government bureaucracy was not insulated against direct demands from groups that were their "clients." Thus general policy decisions were impossible to reach in the bureaucracy and most administrators concentrated on specific tasks within their own particular branch--in a mad fervor to avoid confrontation with the groups they represented.

The political party, the other structure mentioned by Almond, did not serve as an effective aggregative mechanism for reasons that will be discussed in subsequent sections of the chapter. It is the contention of this writer that the MNR could have served as a structure of interest aggregation, similar to the PRI in Mexico, but that the failure to do so was primarily the result of personal differences among political leaders in the party. In fact, following the 1952 Revolution, the MNR was the only instrument which might have been used to effectively aggregate interests, but the subsequent battles among party chieftans destroyed the potential of the party as an aggregative mechanism.

---

<sup>9</sup>Manuel Carballo, "Agrarian Reform in Bolivia," (Unpublished Senior's Thesis, Faculty of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1963), p. 55.

Almond points out that in a political system where specialized and differentiated structures of interest aggregation fail to develop, several characteristics may be found.<sup>10</sup> For instance, without such specialized structures the decision-making apparatus tends to be overwhelmed by the number of demands emanating from the system and may be immobilized with respect to meeting demands. There are so many demands coming from the system that the decision makers are swamped and rather than make any decision, they tend to postpone them in order to avoid conflict with the various groups. This appears to have been the case in Bolivia. Demands were coming from virtually every group in the society but nothing much seemed to emerge as coherent policy. Several factors appear important to the Bolivian form of immobilism: first, it should be remembered that prior to the Revolution, especially during "el sexenio" many political leaders made exorbitant claims of coming improvements with a change in the government. These millennial appeals resulted in attitudes on the part of many that a new day was coming when the basic conditions of their lives would be drastically altered. After the Revolution, despite some improvements, many were disappointed with their slow advance and they continued to apply direct pressure on their leaders for more and better improvements. Their leaders in turn had to respond by continually making public demands, many of them unrealistic, on the government. A second major factor contributing to immobilism in Bolivia was that the government often lacked the resources to respond to demands. It was continually in financial difficulty and there was never enough money to meet even a fair share of the demands emanating from below.

---

<sup>10</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 105-108.



As one commentator expressed this dilemma:

Forced by the situation to rely on demand satisfaction, but lacking a resource base capable of meeting fully the demands made on it, the various MNR governments had to maintain themselves through a complex process of robbing Peter to pay Paul. It was a self-defeating process which, while it allowed the government to cling precariously to the symbols of political power, blocked any real national development by draining the country's already limited capital resource base as well as most of the capital which entered in the form of foreign aid.<sup>11</sup>

Third, the government in many cases lacked the authority or power to enforce those decisions **taken**. Independent sources of power in the political system prevented the government from effectively distributing resources or allocating them in a **rational** manner. The miners as well as other groups often paid little heed to government decisions and acted as if the government had no authority---which it effectively did not have. Fear or cynicism would lead to a general reluctance to make any decisions in such an atmosphere. Finally, as Almond notes, immobilism seems to have a built-in mechanism which insures that decision-makers, once they fail to make decisions, will continue to do so in order to preserve their own status and power. Leaders do not want to jeopardize their own role in the system. While it may be somewhat difficult to state that political leaders in the MNR government were totally opposed to new policies and decisions, it would not be far wrong to say that many did not want to disturb the status quo and present themselves as targets for interest group antipathy. There was a growing tendency to do nothing on the assumption that new decisions could have destroyed their own power positions.

---

<sup>11</sup>Malloy, op. cit., p. 214.

Almond then introduces another aspect of the interest aggregation function, the degree of fragmentation found owing to the lack of differentiation between the interest articulation, interest aggregation, and decision-making structures. He talks of a system in which each of the interest groups threatens to disrupt the system if its demands are not met and those of other groups are. This type of political system is not necessarily immobilized by the volume of demands but by the degree of fragmentation and conflict facing the elite. It should be added that the problem would be even more acute if there existed fragmentation within the elite itself, as was the case in Bolivia. Almond adds, "A fragmented pattern of interest aggregation is generally associated with a fragmented political culture: a fundamental division in the values and aspirations of different groups in the society."<sup>12</sup> This was the pattern of both interest aggregation and the political culture found in post-Revolutionary Bolivia. The political culture was divided on the basis of regionalism, or race, on economic wealth, on ways of life, on language, and, most fundamentally, on the legitimate structures of the political system. There did not exist a basic consensus on the political values or institutions of the political system. Groups were quite prepared to see the political system itself fail as long as they were granted their own particular demands. Labor especially was ready to cast down the entire system in favor of its own interests. Few were prepared to accept resource allocation to other groups in the society. No one wanted to peacefully bargain over resources; all either demanded and received or threatened to disrupt the system. The fragmentation was most notable within the elite itself. The political leaders could not reach agreement on decisions, nor over the allocation of resources; each leader tried to maintain his own power position

---

<sup>12</sup>Almond and Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

at the expense of the MNR, the government, and the nation. Labor leaders, rather than accepting the need for postponing certain demands for economic reasons, continued to demand and disrupt the economy through strikes and other means. Agrarian jefes and politicians strove to capture campesino groups through any means possible, rather than attempting to resolve the basic problems of the countryside.<sup>13</sup> Leaders of the MNR did not try and work together to resolve major differences; each attempted to cultivate and maintain his own base of power. Finally, the two Presidents, Paz and Siles, did not make energetic attempts to unite the elite; often it appeared that they favored divisions in an effort to enhance their own superiority.<sup>14</sup>

Thus under the MNR government the function of interest aggregation was fragmented with resulting immobilism in the decision-making structures. With few exceptions, decisions were not made; they were postponed. In the Bolivian system there did not exist a conversion of demands into major policy alternatives. Decisions were made at lower levels but these were seldom transferred into policies applicable to the entire system. The structures capable of performing the aggregation function, mainly the President, the MNR, and the government bureaucracy, did not do so.<sup>15</sup> The

---

<sup>13</sup>Amado Canelas O., Mito y realidad de la reforma agraria (La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1966), p. 10.

<sup>14</sup>Richard W. Patch, "The Last of Bolivia's MNR?" American University Field Staff Newsletter (April, 1964); also Patch, "Personalities and Politics in Bolivia," AUFS Newsletter (May, 1962).

<sup>15</sup>One student of Bolivian politics, Professor James Malloy of the University of Pittsburgh, has compared Bolivia under the MNR with the international political system. He believes that the central government was somewhat like the United Nations; it was charged with responsibility for maintaining the peace but totally lacked the means to insure such peace. Groups and individuals resembled more nation-states with their own sovereignty, rather than the government being sovereign over its citizens. In a conference dictated at IBEAS in La Paz, September 1, 1968.

primary reason for the failure of these structures was a fragmented political culture as well as a fragmented political elite, and the lack of power of the central government over its constituent elements. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the reasons why the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario did not emerge as an effective aggregative structure; the next chapter will consider the role of the President in both the aggregative and rule application function.

### B. The MNR as an Aggregating Structure

In his discussion of the immobilism of a one-party system, Almond notes that the lack of decision-making can result from several factors, among them the internal cohesiveness of the party and the centralization of decision-making structures. This section will discuss the organization and structure of the MNR with the major focus on the reasons the party failed to develop as a major aggregative mechanism. Attention will be centered around problems of organization, membership, leadership, and intra-party disputes and comparison will be made with the PRI.

1. Organization and Structure of the MNR. The MNR had an imposing and complex organizational structure.<sup>16</sup> The national party convention was regarded as the highest organ of the party. It was theoretically to be held every two years for the purpose of approving party programs, party principles and rules, to study and approve reports of the leadership, and to criticize these leaders for their conduct.<sup>17</sup> Although it was required to meet every two years, party conventions were only held in 1953, 1956, 1960, and 1964. One "extraordinary" convention was held in 1962, but as it coincided with the tenth anniversary of the National Revolution

---

<sup>16</sup>This structure is described formally in the Estatuto Orgánico del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (La Paz: n.p., 1960).

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 9, Art. 17.

it was primarily a propaganda device and accomplished little.<sup>18</sup> Although the convention was supposed to be the major decision-making structure of the party, the fact that conventions coincided with Presidential election years indicates that they served a different purpose. This purpose was to announce party candidates for office, especially for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency, and also as a propaganda device to signal the strength of the "monolithic" MNR. Debate in the convention was rare and criticism of party leaders virtually non-existent. The one exception was the convention of 1956 when a genuine debate between the two wings of the party developed over the goals and tactics of the Revolution.<sup>19</sup> This convention indicated that the national conventions could have served as useful instruments for airing internal difficulties and reconciling divergent viewpoints without fragmentation within the party. The convention was composed of representatives from the various regional and functional organizations, but for the most part was controlled by the politicians in La Paz. In fact considerable difficulties emerged, especially in the convention of 1964, due to the manipulation of the delegates by the Executive Secretary and the Comité Político.<sup>20</sup> In none of the conventions was there a serious effort to contest the leadership of either Paz Estenssoro or Siles. By and large the major purpose of the national convention appears to have been

---

<sup>18</sup>The number of delegates to this convention was only 75. Normal attendance at conventions was over 200.

<sup>19</sup>This debate can be found in El Diario and La Nación in various articles and messages, January-February, 1956.

<sup>20</sup>Several accusations were hurled at Executive Secretary Federico Fortún Sanjinés by local organizations, especially those in Oruro. See La Nación, January 17, 1964.

the endorsement---and not necessarily selection---of official party candidates and the announcement of party unity for the forthcoming election; in the light of the walkouts of two sectors in 1960 and 1964 the effectiveness of the convention as a propaganda device must be questioned. Interestingly enough, the MNR convention does not appear to have been much different in purpose than that of the PRI.

Other national organizations included the Jefatura, the Executive Secretary, the Comité Político Nacional (CPN), the High Tribunal of Honor, and the Control Político. The Jefatura, comprising a separate organ within the party structure, consisted of the Jefe, Víctor Paz, and the Sub-Jefe, Hernán Siles.<sup>21</sup> Both were approved by acclamation at the party conventions ---a clear violation of the Estatuto Orgánico which required election by secret ballot.<sup>22</sup> The formal requirements for the Jefatura were ten years of party membership, a proven revolutionary path, and an identification with party principles and the rights of the Bolivian people.<sup>23</sup> The Jefe was charged with representing the party in all national and international affairs and his speeches and statements were interpreted as the basic ideology and program of the MNR. The Sub-Jefe was to replace the Jefe in the event of his incapacitation or absence from the country. The only time this occurred was during the Presidential term of Siles when Víctor Paz served as Ambassador to the Court of St. James.

---

<sup>21</sup>Paz occupied the position of Jefe since the founding of the MNR. Siles replaced Rafael Otazo as Sub-Jefe during the sexenio when the latter was expelled from the party.

<sup>22</sup>Estatuto, op. cit., Art. 23, p. 13.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., Arts. 24-30, pp. 13-14.

The major difficulty in assessing the role of Siles and Paz as party chiefs is in determining when the two Presidents acted as party leaders, and when they acted as President of the Republic; that is to say, to what extent either conceived of the party as separate from the government. Indications are that neither was particularly adept at running purely party affairs. They could and did step in when confronted with a crisis, but neither appeared to have devoted much time to reconciling party differences or reconstructing party organization. Both made frequent exhortations to party members and leaders for a better revolutionary theory or for more planning of strategy and tactics, but neither translated these abstract pleas into concrete action for the MNR.<sup>24</sup> The problem was that in order to restructure or reorganize the party to make it more effective the President had to take the lead, and neither Paz nor Siles appeared anxious to start such a campaign. The attitudes of the two leaders were important; Paz, for example, explains his own estimate of the party:

Bolivia is a very backward and poor country...there was only a small middle class from which we [the founders of the MNR] came. We got caught up, once we were in power, in the functions of government more than those of the party. There was only a small number of capable people since we could not draw on the old ruling classes. The party machinery fell into the hands of second, third, and fourth-rate bureaucrats.<sup>25</sup>

If the party was left in the hands of these bureaucrats, Paz had no other person to blame than himself for his neglect of the party organizations. One party leader said that Paz simply got tired of all the miniscule problems involved in reconciling party differences and decided to ignore them

---

<sup>24</sup>In their messages to the nation and especially in messages to the party conventions both Presidents made frequent appeals for better theory but not much was said about organizational changes. See the Bibliography for a list of these speeches.

<sup>25</sup>Interview with Christopher Mitchell, Lima, August 20, 1968. Used with the permission of Mr. Mitchell.

in favor of government problems.<sup>26</sup> The identification of the party with the government may have been the crux of the difficulty since it was much easier to work through government structures---or personal contacts ---than through the more diversified and remote party organizations. The truth of the matter is that both---though Siles less than Paz---elevated themselves to a position superior to internal party difficulties and left matters in the hands of subordinates who often acted in their own special interests.<sup>27</sup> Often this led to a reinforcement of divisive tendencies since local and regional leaders were left alone and national party officials devoted more time to personal enrichment. In fairness to both Paz and Siles it should be remembered that they were trying to carry out a social and economic revolution to change the nature of Bolivian society, and they overlooked the necessity of tending to minor political problems within the party.

Between the conventions the Comité Político Nacional was regarded as the actual executive of the party. As such it was charged with supervising the Jefatura and the Executive Secretary, enforcing party discipline, supervising the party militia, the party newspaper, La Nación, the party radio, Radio Illimani, as well as directing the MNR Instituto de Capacitación Política, a training school for potential leaders.<sup>28</sup> The CPN was also to supervise and direct the Parliamentary Cell of the MNR when the legislature was in session.<sup>29</sup> In actual fact the Comité was usually

---

<sup>26</sup>Personal Interview with Dr. Nuflo Chávez Ortiz, La Paz, January 12, 1965.

<sup>27</sup>This was especially the case with Paz after 1962 when he left the control of party machinery in the hands of Fortún Sanjinés.

<sup>28</sup>Estatuto, op. cit., Art. 36, pp. 16-18.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.



dominated by the Executive Secretary and subordinate to the President. The composition and membership of the CPN varied over the years depending on internal party politics and the importance attached to the committee by the President. The CPN was organized in specific secretariats devoted to certain tasks, i.e., international affairs, finance, armed forces, youth, etc., and usually the delegate to the CPN was a member of the interest group most concerned with the specific secretariat. For example, the Minister of Foreign Relations headed the party secretariat for international affairs, a general usually headed the one devoted to military affairs, the Executive Secretary of the Avanzada Universitaria headed the youth secretariat, and so forth. The CPN reached the apex of its power in the period after the Revolution when the legislature was not in session, and the revolutionary reforms emerged from the Comité as executive decrees. It should be remembered, however, that the representatives of the committee were less party members than delegates of specific interest groups. Thereafter the CPN gradually declined in power as independent bases of power were established and personality differences prevented rational bargaining among the politicians. Much depended on the role assigned the CPN by the President. During the crisis over stabilization Siles relegated the Comité to an inferior role due to the preponderance of leftist members. It regained some importance in the second term of Paz, but declined again as it became the personal machine of Federico Fortún Sanjinés. While the CPN and the Executive Secretary had considerable power over the local and regional organizations, especially for conventions and during elections, there was not the degree of control exercised by the central committee that was encountered in Mexico. More than likely this was due to the lack of power of the government itself and the plain fact that party organizations lacked the authority to discipline local leaders. In many cases the authority

exercised was deeply resented, ignored, or served as a basis for alienation of local leaders from party organizations and channels of communication.<sup>30</sup>

The MNR also had an elaborate machinery for party discipline, although in reality it seldom operated. Heading the list of organs was the High Tribunal of Honor which had structures under it in the department and special comandos. These bodies tried cases involving crimes committed against the party or the government, offenses against the Penal Code, offensive public behavior, and other crimes against party discipline.<sup>31</sup> They seldom exercised their powers although the High Tribunal did formally expell both Lechin and Guevara Arze from the party---significantly after both had formed new parties and left the MNR. Another organ of party discipline, the Control Político, was also charged with enforcing internal rules and preventing dissidents from openly opposing the party.<sup>32</sup> Theoretically the Control Político was to make sure that internal criticism was maintained within the party channels---the MNR operated under the concept of "Democratic centralism" found in communist parties---but in reality it became the security apparatus of the state.<sup>33</sup> As such it was primarily

---

<sup>30</sup>Christopher Mitchell, "Bolivia's MNR: Organizational Structure and Its Consequences," (Unpublished research paper, La Paz, January, 1969), pp. 4-7.

<sup>31</sup>Estatuto, op. cit., Arts. 43-48, pp. 21-25.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., Arts. 49-55, pp. 27-31.

<sup>33</sup>Hernan Siles Zuazo, Mensaje al Honorable Congreso Nacional 6 de Agosto de 1959 (La Paz: Direccion de Informaciones, 1959), p. 119.

employed as an instrument to investigate, imprison, intimidate, torture, and even murder opposition politicians. Nothing in the entire rule of the MNR is so unsavory as the activities of this secret police. The majority of Bolivians greatly feared this agency for its arbitrary acts and despite exclamations from both Siles and Paz that they knew nothing of its sordid activities, it appears more likely that most of the actions were carried out with the knowledge, if not the direction, of the President.<sup>34</sup>

The official party also had a considerable formal structure for the territorial units consisting of Department and Special Comandos, rural organizations for the Province, Canton, and Sub-Comandos Especiales located in certain districts, as well as an urban organization of municipal and zonal comandos. The most important of these structures were the nine Departmental Comandos and the twenty-one Special Comandos. Theoretically party affairs were governed in each department by the Departmental Comandos but in practice this vertical arrangement tended to break down. One reason was that Special Comandos located in important mining towns, oil centers,

---

<sup>34</sup>The activities of the Control Político have been the subject of much speculation and endless debate among Bolivians. There can be few doubts, however, that the agency committed many crimes against individuals. Some of the personal testimonies include the following: Alfonso Kreidler, 13 años de resistencia (La Paz: Tall. Gráficos Bolivianos, 1968); Hernán Landivar Flores, Infierno en Bolivia (La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1964); and Mario Peñaranda Rivero, Entre los hombres lobos de Bolivia (La Paz: Instituto de Ediciones Americanas, 1965). Shortly after November 4, 1964 an illustrated magazine was sold in La Paz which depicted graphically some of the tortures committed by agents of the Control Político.

One politician, José Antonio Rico Toro, admitted to the writer that he had been beaten with a rubber hose by the Control Político, Personal Interview, La Paz, January 15, 1965. One further testimony: on November 4 the writer joined a group of university students as they sacked the house of Claudio San Roman, head of the Control Político, and recognized as a brutal man. In the house the writer saw personally what appeared to be a small torture chamber in the basement.

or inaccessible villages were accorded equal rank with the department and were so isolated or powerful that they seldom felt the authority of the Department Comando. There were exceptions such as that of Santa Cruz, but in general the Departmental Comando exercised authority over the major city in which it was located. Many of the lower organizations were dominated by a local jefe who had access to higher officials in La Paz and who did not want to and often did not submit to departmental authority. It should be also noted that in many cases party organizations overlapped with sindicato or union structures and it was difficult to determine which particular organization a leader was utilizing, or if the party organization was working at all.<sup>35</sup> The CPN control of these organizations was non-existent except in the periods prior to conventions and during elections. One of the few actual operating structures of the MNR was the Zonal Comando organized throughout the major urban zones of the cities.<sup>36</sup> Immediately after the Revolution these organizations were established (although some were operating before the Revolution) and carried out extensive work of recruitment, indoctrination, and other party activities. Eventually they began to show signs of deterioration and by 1964 were either non-operative or simple cadres of government employees who attended to maintain their jobs.<sup>37</sup> The MNR made few efforts to try to revitalize these urban organizations.

---

<sup>35</sup>See the complaints to the labor leaders toward Federico Fortún Sanjinés in Dinámica del MNR: orientaciones y directivas para la militancia del partido (La Paz: Comité Político Nacional del MNR, 1963), pp. 29-47.

<sup>36</sup>Personal interview with Jorge Alurralda Palma, Oficial Mayor de Cultura and head of a zonal comando in Sopocachi La Paz, January 14, 1965.

<sup>37</sup>The writer is personally familiar with one Zonal Comando located in the suburb of Sopocachi which had an estimated 200 members shortly after the Revolution, but by 1964 there were no more than 5 regular-attending members, all of them government employees.

The MNR also had an entirely separate organizational structure established along "functional" lines. Every party member was required to be a member of a territorial unit as well as in the party organization in his work area. National Células were established for miners, campesinos, the Armed Forces, teachers, professionals, railroad workers, petroleum workers, government employees street vendors, etc. These national organizations or Células also had corresponding organizations down from Department to province and the local level. The division of responsibility between the functional and territorial units was difficult to define although the former was to have jurisdiction over all matters relating to work and the latter over all other party activity.<sup>38</sup> The functional units were probably the most important and potent of the units of the party, but the difficulty is that they seldom acted purely as party organizations.<sup>39</sup> Generally the party structures, leadership and membership coincided with that of the national or local union organizations and they acted as interest groups separated from party channels. A few of the functional organizations, especially those in the cities, did play important roles in the party. Generally these were professional groups such as engineers, lawyers, teachers, etc., with others such as street vendors and black marketeers also participating.<sup>40</sup> The unions and campesinos, however, did not utilize party channels to any great extent and preferred to work through the COB, their individual unions, or government structures immediately concerned with their interests.

---

<sup>38</sup>Estatuto, op. cit., Arts. 59-77, pp. 32-39.

<sup>39</sup>Mitchell, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>40</sup>The professional functional groups could sometimes be quite effective in applying pressure on the government for specific tasks. Engineers and lawyers probably had more success than other party células.

Despite this rather elaborate machinery, the MNR was not an effective organization.<sup>41</sup> The primary reason was lack of control from the top over constituent elements of the party. Totally unlike Mexico, the lines of control and access to the decision-making apparatus did not flow down from the President through the party to the local and state level. There was no party control over the independent unions located the various parts of the country and only limited control over the campesino sindicatos. The exception to this fragmentation and lack of central direction was in the national elections for President every four years. In the battle for control of the delegates to the national convention, and in the subsequent electoral campaign, the national party leadership exerted some authority over lower organizations; it was expected that these lower structures would adhere to the demands of national leadership and also provide an MNR majority in their respective electoral districts.<sup>42</sup> For the most part, however, party machinery was blocked by independent caudillos at the local level who could accept or reject the national party leadership, and who could work through personal contacts within the government or COB rather than using party structures. One factor to be noted in comparison with Mexico is that the MNR did not try to adjust its organizations to the changes in the polity. Probably this was because it started as a well-organized, dedicated organization and gradually eroded; whereas the PRI started as a loose confederation of independent chiefs and then exerted some authority over its constituents. The key factor in the success of the PRI and the

---

<sup>41</sup>As many party leaders admitted. See, for instance, Fortún Sanjinés, *op. cit.*; also Guillermo Bedregal, La revolución boliviana y las tareas del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario: autocrítica y consigna (n.p.: n.p., 1965), passim.

<sup>42</sup>This control was especially evident in the election of 1964 when the CPN intervened in internal elections of the local party organizations in Potosí, Oruro, Llallagua, and Santa Cruz. See La Nación, April 22, April 23, and May 5, 1964.

failure of the MNR appears to have been the general lack of power and authority of the President and the central government in the Bolivian system. The Mexican President (especially Cardenas) could force groups to work through the party, but the Bolivian President, lacking a unified elite, never had the authority or power to channel demands into the MNR structures.

2. Party Membership. The total membership of the MNR is a figure constantly debated and questioned. Party leaders, especially Paz Estenssoro, often claimed that the MNR had over a million members, but election statistics were used as a basis for this exorbitant claim.<sup>43</sup> As these election returns included the mass of campesinos who had little choice but to vote for the MNR, and who often had no direct connection with party organizations, Paz's figures seem somewhat exaggerated. Actual party members probably totaled no more than 100,000.<sup>44</sup> The difficulty with classifying the number of party members is the definition of exactly what constituted party membership. In spite of a formal oath requirement many Movimientistas were affiliated to the party without benefit of formal or informal membership.<sup>45</sup> Others were listed as party members but had no

---

<sup>43</sup>MNR, Secretaria de Prensa del Comité Político Nacional del MNR, Bolivia: triunfo del voto universal 31 de Mayo de 1964 (La Paz: Ed. Burrilo, 1964), pp. 72-74.

<sup>44</sup>The writer derived this figure from election returns for the Jefe of the Departmental Comando of La Paz in April, 1962. About 40,000 voters cast their ballots and La Nación estimated that this was more than ninety percent of the members in La Paz. Excluding the campesinos of Cochabamba and other loosely-identified party "members," it would appear unlikely that the country as a whole could have had much more than 100,000 members. See La Nación, April 2, 1962.

<sup>45</sup>For the formal requirements, see Estatuto, op. cit., Arts. 82-85, pp. 40-42. One source who asked not to be identified testified that in 1963 and 1964 many members entered the party without benefit of required formal pledge.

connection with party structures. For instance, a union leader might join the MNR (while still retaining his independence through the COB) and the members of his union would then be classified as members of the MNR. The problem was that these workers were totally insulated against party penetration by their own leaders who consciously tried to protect their organization against party and/or government structures.<sup>46</sup> In effect they were indirect members of the party in the manner of some labor members in Great Britain, but without the same sense of class identity found in the latter. These union members were not subject to party discipline, took little part in purely party affairs, and only "belonged" to the MNR in the sense that they voted for its candidates every four years under the careful guidance of their leaders. Essentially the same situation prevailed in the countryside, although here there was probably a greater degree of identification with the party on the part of the average campesino. His local leader no doubt professed his membership in the party much more readily than the union or miner leader, although he was equally prepared to maintain the independence of the local sindicato from higher party organizations. Thus for a good many of the so-called members of the MNR, they were first campesinos, miners, workers, loyal to their local organizations; after that, they assumed that they were also members of the national or local party organization. In reality they were shielded from party structures by their local bosses who were not anxious to see party penetration in their respective power bases.

On the other hand there were a good many urban residents who were direct members of the party. This was especially true early in the Revolution when party membership was a requirement for obtaining any employment,

---

<sup>46</sup>Fortun Sanjinés, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-38, 42-46, blames the anarcho-syndicalist tradition and the "communists" for maintaining the union organizations separated from the party.



receiving food, and protecting oneself against the perpetual outcries against la rosca. Formal membership required compliance with a staggering list of duties and obligations.<sup>47</sup> In some cases, especially in the Zonal Comandos, membership also required frequent attendance at meetings, indoctrination in party goals and ideals, and general acceptance of the MNR as the government. An effort was also made to fill the social life of members with the establishment of social clubs, fútbol teams, and other similar organizations. Later these groups died out and party membership was primarily regarded as a means to either obtain or retain government employment. The MNR also maintained a formal set of structures for indoctrination of party members; most important of these were the party newspapers (as well as official government voice), La Nación, Radio Illimani, and the School for Political Training. La Nación was not very successful as a newspaper mainly because it was so blatantly pro-MNR and pro-government that educated people turned to the more reliable and better newspapers such as Presencia and El Diario. It was useful, however, for communicating the goals and tactics of the MNR to party members. Radio Illimani generally reached a different audience, the campesinos of the altiplano, and it is somewhat difficult to estimate its impact. The School of Political Training (Instituto de Capacitación Político) was maintained as a cadre-training school with prominent party leaders and professors, such as Raul Garcia and Alipio Valencia Vega, giving courses on the economic goals of the National Revolution.<sup>48</sup> While the school was admirable in design it failed in purpose since it placed no emphasis on practical

---

<sup>47</sup>For a list of these duties and obligations, see the Estatuto, op. cit., Art. 83, pp. 40-41.

<sup>48</sup>See Raul A. Garcia, Historia del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (La Paz: Escuela de Capacitacion Politica del MNR, n.d.).

matters of politics and those who attended did so primarily to gain admittance to the government bureaucracy.<sup>49</sup> In comparison with campesinos and miners, however, many urban residents did belong to party organizations and felt the prevalence of party efforts to indoctrinate them into the goals of the MNR.

The feeling of participation in party activities was of short duration and was virtually dead by 1964. Enthusiasm for party affairs ended as well as attendance at party meetings. The majority of party members continued to attend government functions such as parades and demonstrations, but they seldom took an active part in their own local or national party activities.<sup>50</sup> One problem similar to that of Mexico was encountered in party finances. Although the party did deduct certain sums from government employees, usually one percent of salary, there was no actual duty for party members to pay regular dues.<sup>51</sup> Most of the party finances came directly from the central government and were indistinguishable from government revenues. One interesting event occurred in Cochabamba in the 1950's when the Departmental Comando decided that all party members would be assessed regular dues.<sup>52</sup> After a few weeks the campaign was called off since the party members simply refused to pay their assessments. After that the Comando, as well as others, continued to rely on certain local "taxes" and government financing. This failure to make party membership

---

<sup>49</sup>One source who asked to remain anonymous told the writer that no one paid any attention to the lectures of the distinguished doctors. They attended solely to receive government employment.

<sup>50</sup>Personal interview with Jorge Alurralde Palma, La Paz, January 14, 1965.

<sup>51</sup>Sources on party finance are difficult to encounter. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 16, states that government employees had 1% of their salary deducted automatically every month for party finances.

<sup>52</sup>E1 Pueblo, September 16, 1957.

meaningful in terms of personal involvement was repeated in other cases, and after 1960 the party leadership gave up useful attempts to incorporate party members into the active life of the MNR.

In the comparison between Mexico and Bolivia there seems to be a reverse situation in the case of party organization. The official Mexican party started as a "party of notables" which controlled and dominated party affairs with little active participation by the mass membership. In recent years the PRI has apparently made some efforts to broaden membership and make it more meaningful to the masses; it is too early yet to make an assessment of this effort, but at least the party is trying. On the other hand the MNR started as a mass-based, if loosely defined, organized party with many active members in the urban zones and a rather loose confederation of members indirectly affiliated through their local unions. Gradually an erosion of party membership took place as cynicism and corruption replaced the earlier enthusiasm of both leaders and members. Party leadership made few attempts to alleviate the disenchantment of members, and therefore the MNR structures gradually evaporated as effective organizations. It is interesting to note that both the MNR and the PRI appear to resemble the caucus type of party organization classified by Duverger as the "traditional" form of party structure, rather than the branch or cell which are regarded as the "modern"---although one would have to add the reservation that the PRI in recent years has probably moved on to the branch classification.<sup>53</sup> Both served primarily as electoral devices rather than constant centers of party activity designed to socially and politically inculcate party members into the ideology and life style of the party. The major difference

---

<sup>53</sup>Maurice Duverger, Political Parties(London: Methuen and Co., 1954), pp. 17-36.

between the two parties was the degree of control exercised by the national organization on the state and local structures. In Mexico there was a strong central authority hierarchially descending with almost absolute control over lower organizations and members; in Bolivia the state and local organizations of the MNR reflected the divisive tendencies within the polity and the central party structure often had little control over lower structures. Party members were therefore insulated from national control and direction, and this in turn reinforced allegiance to the local jefe. One cannot help but conclude from this general picture of the MNR membership that perhaps José Fellmann Velarde was right when he said that "without immediate incentive, without the possibility of personal gain, the Latin spirit does not lend itself to the disciplinary subjection of a party cell."<sup>54</sup>

3. Intra-Party Struggles, 1952-64. The history of the MNR after the Revolution is the story of the struggle between the left and right wings of the party for control of the government, and the subsequent fragmentation and disintegration of the MNR.<sup>55</sup> It was the failure of the party to develop

---

<sup>54</sup> José Fellmann Velarde, Trabajos Teóricos (La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1955), p.31. Fellmann Velarde made this statement in reference to a plan of reorganization for the MNR during the sexenio. In reference to the same period Paz Estenssoro said, "The people of Bolivia are not systematic; that is their cultural type and that is part of the reason why the party organization wasn't any better." Personal Interview with Christopher Mitchell, Lima, August 20, 1968. Used with the permission of Mr. Mitchell.

<sup>55</sup> This division into two wings differs somewhat from both Malloy and Mitchell who added a third group called the "pragmatic center," consisting of Paz Estenssoro and his new group of técnicos who entered the party after 1960. This group was small and did not play an important role until the election and convention of 1964. While Paz did remain above the conflict it seems difficult to call him, and a few members of Fortún's maquinita, a "wing" of the party. See Mitchell, op. cit., p. 7; also Malloy, op. cit., p. 212. Malloy's "pragmatic nationalist center" receives fuller treatment in his dissertation which, unfortunately, this writer has not seen. See Malloy, "Bolivia: A Study in Revolution" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1967).

institutional means to reconcile these differences which led to the walk-outs of Guevara Arze and Lechin. Although one must be careful to pay attention to the individual Presidential aspirations of both, they did represent important and distinct approaches and sectors within the party, and the failure to reconcile these differences resulted in the eventual defeat of the MNR. The comparison with Mexico is obvious; Mexico managed to alternate the Presidency to give voice to the two major sectors of the PRI and therefore avoid a direct confrontation between the wings. The MNR failed to develop any such device or any means of reconciling divergent points of view (or Presidential aspirations), and the failure of the party was a direct result.

From the first days of the Revolution there emerged two distinct wings of the MNR. The origins could be traced back to the sexenio when labor under Lechin was allowed to operate virtually independent of the central party organization. According to General Alfredo Ovando Candia the two wings were formally organized by Lechin and Siles between April 9 and April 16 when Paz finally arrived from Buenos Aires.<sup>56</sup> Siles tried to dominate the party and government while Lechin relied on the labor leaders and the COB. Paz was apparently aware of the division but made his own decision to remain aloof and maintain the office of the Presidency above the conflict.

The left wing of the party, first called the Vanguardia Obrera Movi-  
mientista (VOM---not to be confused with a later Vanguardia representing the right wing), and later simply the Sector Izquierda, was composed of former POR and PIR members, leftist intellectuals, students and teachers, and the largest part of the labor movement. The dominant role was played by labor leaders, and especially by the miners representatives. Although it is difficult to classify the exact role of the campesinos, generally the sindicatos

56

El Diario, January 11, 1956.

under José Rojas joined the Sector Izquierda for conventions and electoral campaigns. The leaders of the left included Nulfo Chávez Ortiz, the most prominent intellectual spokesman, José Morales Guillen, Alvaro Perez del Castillo, Mario Torres, Germán Burton, Alfredo Franco Guachalla, and Anibal Aguilar. The two leading women in the party, Rosa Lema Dulz and Lydia Gueiler Tejada (later de Moller), were also members of the Sector. The fortunes of the left sector, however, were always identified with Juan Lechin, and he dominated the activities of the left.<sup>57</sup>

The ideology of the left stressed the element of class conflict in the Bolivian Revolution. Lechin, in his speech to the VII National Convention of the MNR, distinguished between two types of National Revolutions: the first was the democratic bourgeoisie type found in Peron's Argentina: the second was that of the campesinos, workers, and impoverished middle classes found in Bolivia.<sup>58</sup> In the first type, due to the existence of a large middle class, the state did not have to play such an important role; but in the second, due to ignorance, the role of the state was all-important. The slogan "Campesino, obrero y gente de la clase media" was used by all Movimientistas, but the left wing was always careful to define the middle class as "poor," "impoverished" or "petitbourgeoisie," to separate it from the older middle classes associated with the rosca. The goal was apparently to embarrass those members of the MNR leadership, especially those of the right, who were regarded as part of the older middle class. Another element of leftist ideology was opposition to imperialism, particularly "Yankee imperialism." The leaders of the left continually raised objections to the amount of foreign aid and domination of the

---

<sup>57</sup>The early thoughts of Lechin can be found in Juan Lechin, Lechin y la revolucion nacional (La Paz: Ed. Casegural, n.d.)

<sup>58</sup>Published in El Diario, January 18, 1956. Also see Nulfo Chávez Ortiz, 5 ensayos y un anhelo (La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1963), especially pp. 13-43, 77-119.

country by the United States. Later they were vociferous supporters of the Cuban Revolution and constantly objected to United States policy towards Cuba.<sup>59</sup> They wanted closer ties with the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc, and continually urged acceptance of all aid from those countries. Another announced goal of the left wing was the nationalization of all industry, although it was less sure in practice of the value and tactics of such nationalization. It was the left of course which placed the greatest emphasis on the nationalization of the mines and railroads, and they stressed continual expansion of government control over all aspects of the economy. The left also opposed the enlargement of the Armed Forces and favored an increased role for the militias. The major ingredient of the ideology of the Sector Izquierda, in keeping with its preeminent COB composition, was the insistence on the principle of co-gobierno. They insisted that all government decisions be reached and endorsed through the COB and that labor be given the major voice in carrying out the reforms of the National Revolution. Along with the endorsement of co-gobierno went equal support for control obrero and the fuero sindical.

Despite the appearance of ideological unity in the Sector Izquierda, Lechin was often hard-pressed to gain adherents to his point of view and force through a well-supported plan or action. The Sector was deeply divided on ideological and personal bases---ideologically it included such divergent points of view as Trotskyism, Stalinism, Marxism, Castroism, Maoism, Titoism, utopian socialism, revisionism, anarchism, ad infinitum---which made it virtually impossible to agree on fundamental policies and tactics. In addition many of the union leaders did not want

---

<sup>59</sup> See Richard W. Patch, "The Pro- and Anti-Castristas in La Paz," AUFS Newsletter (February 1962).

to subject themselves to the direction of the Sector, e.g., Juan Sanjines Obando of the ferrovarios and also the independent petroleum workers; and these groups tended to detract from the strength and unity of the left. The fragmentation within the left increased over the years as Lechin offended certain leaders, others broke away to follow independent policies, and Siles and Paz were able to lure others away with various promises. As a result of these divisions, the left tended to lose to the right in any struggle over a specific program; on the other hand it usually won at conventions and elections because of its preponderant size.

The right wing of the MNR included the older leaders of the MNR, Army officers, professionals, office workers, and the other members of the middle groups who felt threatened by the ascendancy of the workers and campesinos. Although the right did receive some support from the older representatives of the oligarchy, these people, for the most part, did not take an active part in party affairs. The majority of the members of the right were those who had not foreseen the extent of the Revolution, and were disturbed over the excesses committed by the workers and campesinos, and resented the challenge to their respected and privileged position posed by the new groups. The right sector formally organized itself into the Acción de Defensa del MNR, but the right was not as effectively organized as the left. Much of the time it operated informally through the small Guardia Vieja---Old Guard---composed of party members dating back to the times of Villarreal. Among the most prominent leaders of the right were Augusto Céspedes, José Cuadros Quiroga, Luis Peñaloza, Federico Alvarez Plata, Jorge Rios Gamarra, Víctor Andrade, Walter Guevara



Arze, and Hernán Siles.<sup>60</sup> The latter tried to walk the delicate line between the factions early in his Presidential term, but the intransigent attitude of the Sector Izquierda to the Stabilization Plan forced him to lean to the right for support: by 1960 he was calling the leaders of the left "anarcho-syndicalists."<sup>61</sup>

There was even less ideological unity on the right than on the left; at least the latter had the more or less common background of some form of Marxism. The composition of the right sector led it to emphasize the role of the middle sectors in the Revolution. Primarily they saw the Revolution as one guided by the middle classes (meaning themselves) with a subordinate role assigned to the workers and the campesinos. As mentioned with regard to Guevara Arze, the chief spokesman of the right, this attitude often led to an elitist concept which meant in practice that they were to lead the nation as the most qualified persons available and other leaders were to be shunted aside. Most of the members of the right were uncertain of their exact economic ideology. They endorsed the nationalization of the mines at first but after a few years of mismanagement they began to question the wisdom of the move and were generally amenable to a return to private ownership. Speaking in general, the right was opposed to further nationalization and wanted a reduction of the role of the state in the economy. They also endorsed the agrarian reform although they continued to oppose outright confiscation and tended to support programs of resettlement in the

---

<sup>60</sup> For the political thought of Andrade, see MNR, Victor Andrade: su pensamiento político pasado y presente (Cochabamba: n.p., 1966); for Siles his Presidential messages, especially those of 1959 and 1960; for Guevara Arze, P.M.N.R.A.: exposición de motivos y declaración de principios (La Paz: n.p., 1960). The others have not systematically presented their political ideology but newspapers contain some statements, especially during the conventions of 1960 and 1964.

<sup>61</sup> Hernán Siles Zuazo, Mensaje al Honorable Congreso Nacional 6 de Agosto de 1960 (La Paz: Dirección de Informaciones, 1960), p. 37

oriente. Probably the reason for this latter view is that a good many of the rightists were former landowners and would have liked to either have received adequate compensation for their land or see its outright return to their families. The right did not oppose the other social and economic reforms of the Revolution, but they insisted on moderation and restraint in the implementation of these reforms. In terms of foreign policy the right was opposed to cooperation or even recognition of the Communist bloc and favored friendship and continued aid from the United States. In fact during periods of right wing dominance closer relations were maintained with the United States Embassy; the opposite was true in periods of leftist ascendancy. It should be noted that the right was not opposed to the basic tenets of the Revolution and had no desire to return to the traditional system. They wanted moderation in social and economic reforms, discipline in the labor movement, gradualness and responsibility in the agrarian reform, and most of all, the preservation of their status in the society. Unfortunately moderation and patience in a revolutionary setting are not easy tasks and the right often appeared as conservative or even reactionary.

The major tactical goal of the right was to put an end to co-gobierno; they also wanted an end to control obrero and the political interference of the unions in the affairs of government. To the right the numerous strikes and riots of the workers were evidence of the caudillismo of labor leaders.<sup>62</sup> The only alternative was to introduce measures of discipline into the labor movement by any means possible and thereby reduce the independence and power of the labor leaders. Since the major obstacle to the introduction of discipline was the existence of the workers militias, especially those of the

---

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

miners, it was necessary to build-up the Armed Forces as a counter-force. It was the right wing which insisted on the re-establishment of the Armed Forces in 1953 and from that time on they were the major supporters of an increased size and effectiveness for the military. In trying to destroy the influence of the Sector Izquierda the right also placed reliance on the government structures. In the period from 1957 to 1960, and again after 1962, the right tended to place most of its emphasis on the government, especially the Ministry of Government which was in control of the police apparatus. Union leaders were subsequently intimidated and subjected to persecution by the government.<sup>63</sup> It might be added that in spite of, or perhaps because of, the less ideological nature of the right, they generally were able to gain support for their point of view on specific problems.

Immediately after the Revolution the struggle between the two wings commenced. While the left concentrated its efforts and strength in the COB, the right tried to assume control over the government and party structures. The already discussed battle over the COB resulted in a victory for the right in that almost all important labor leaders were forced to join the MNR and accept nominal direction from the party. However, the subsequent elevation of leftist leaders to positions of power within the party and the government, and the independence of the militias, gave the Sector Izquierda control over the vital reforms of the Revolution. Their conduct over the nationalization of the mines and the agrarian reform angered many rightists. The first open revolt came from the right wing in January, 1953, when older party members and some military officers

---

<sup>63</sup>See, for instance, the Congressional investigation into the acts committed by the Minister of Government Arze Murillo in Interpelacion al Ministro de Gobierno, Justicia e Inmigracion Dr. Jose Antonio Arze Murillo Sobre Violaciones Constitucionales (La Paz: Ed. Universo, 1962).

attempted to overthrow the government and oust the labor leaders. (It is interesting to note that none of them had any intention of replacing Paz Estenssoro; they just wanted to get rid of the bad influences around him.)<sup>64</sup> It was not difficult to understand the attitudes of these rebels: Luis Peñaloza, one of the leaders of the revolt, had been displaced from the Social Security Department by labor leaders (after leading the party through the sexenio), and other MNR leaders were being replaced by labor people in their jobs. The failure of the revolt left the Sector Izquierda in the dominant position and, as had been mentioned earlier, this was critical for it was the time in which the major reforms of the Revolution were carried out.

At the VI convention held in February, 1953, the left was in the clear ascendancy. Lechín was elected President of the convention, and leftists controlled the major commissions appointed.<sup>65</sup> Special permission was given for workers to attend the convention and two major proposals indicated leftist control over the machinery of the convention. The first was a reorganization of the Armed Forces designed to make them even more subservient to the militias; the second was the proposal for reforming the university system. The latter, however, proved to be the undoing of Lechín. Paz Estenssoro, who had done little or nothing about the conflict between the two wings prior to that time, finally was disturbed and issued a reprimand to Lechín. It took some time for Paz to muster the necessary strength, but eventually Lechín was forced to resign

---

<sup>64</sup> Letter from General Alfredo Ovando Candia to Dr. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Presencia, January 7, 1964.

<sup>65</sup> See the newspapers in February, 1953, especially La Nación.

from the Cabinet and the power of the left was somewhat restricted. Prior to 1956, reflecting the general lack of control and the prevailing anarchy throughout the society, each sector cultivated its own special area and neither had the power to overcome the other.

The Presidential nomination of 1956 brought the next open clash between the left and right. Although both Lechín and Guevara Arze believed they were to receive the nomination, Paz let it be known that he favored Siles Zuazo. There was some mumbling from both sides, but the Sub-Jefe was generally respected and most believed he deserved the nomination for his work during the sexenio and the fighting of April. The problem, however, for the MNR leaders was that Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz and José Rojas were at that moment in control of the campesinos and the labor movement was more or less under the domination of Lechín and Mario Torres. These two segments had the largest number of voters not only for the coming election but also within the convention itself. As a result of this majority the left sector dominated the convention; the program of the party was written by Ñuflo Chávez and he was also selected as the MNR candidate for the Vice-Presidency.<sup>66</sup> Debate in the convention centered around the charges and counter-charges made by the leaders of both wings, as mentioned previously this was one of the few times when a genuine debate over party policies and programs took place. Right wing leaders such as Zenon Barrientos, Ovando Candia, and Guevara Arze charged the left with irresponsibility and caudillismo in the labor movement.<sup>67</sup> Chávez and Lechín countered by arguing that some leaders were trying to construct a national bourgeoisie and were not working for the benefit of all social classes.<sup>68</sup> The left eventually pushed through a resolution, signed by

---

<sup>66</sup> This program can be found in Chávez Ortiz, op. cit., pp. 77-119.

<sup>67</sup> For the various charges made, see El Diario, January 9-11, 1956.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., January 18, 1956.

both Paz and Siles, condemning Guevara for his irresponsible statements. Guevara was forced to resign from the Cabinet and from the CPN, and the left had won a clear victory. That victory was reflected in the composition of the new CPN with Lechín, Mendez Tejada, Butron, Aguilar, Angel Gomez, and Perez del Castillo, all leftists, as members.

Siles was then left to implement the Stabilization Plan, the first major effort of the MNR government to enforce some measure of discipline on the workers and on the country. He had intended to work with labor leaders but early opposition in two strikes by communication and transportation workers, with the backing of the COB, forced him to turn to the right for support.<sup>69</sup> His real problem came when he tried to reduce the support of the miner's pulperías and immediately encountered the strong opposition of the Sector Izquierda and the FSTMB. Lechín called a general strike of the COB (which failed); Siles countered with his own hunger strike and a dramatic personal confrontation with the miners. Siles was able to defeat the Sector Izquierda; Lechín resigned as President of the Senate, Nuflo Chávez had his resignation as Vice-President accepted by the Congress (he had not expected it to be but Siles pushed it through), and Siles replaced all the leftist leaders of the CPN with those from the right wing more loyal to his policies. Although billed as a victory for the moderates, the return of Rios Gamarra, Peñaloza, and Guevara Arze to power marked a resurgence of the right wing. At the same time Lechín made some critical errors in the Second National Congress of the COB which further subdivided and reduced his support.<sup>70</sup> Through

---

<sup>69</sup>

The position of the Sector Izquierda is presented in Juan Lechin, La C.O.B. y la estabilizacion monetaria (La Paz: Publicaciones de la C.O.B. 1957)

<sup>70</sup>

Jamie Ponce G., Tomas Shanley, and Antonio Cisneros, Breve historia del sindicalismo boliviano (La Paz: I.B.E.A.S., 1968), pp. 87-88

control of the convention machinery Lechin was able to elect an Executive Council eliminating many of the more potent unions, among them the railroad, factory, and construction workers. Siles took advantage of this discontent to establish a "new" COB and a "new" FSTMB with the support of opponents of Lechin.

Throughout the remainder of his Presidential term, Siles continued to rebuild the Armed Forces as a counterweight to the militias, and also excluded leftists from government and party positions. As the Congress remained in control of the left sector, Siles was forced to make public appeals for policies and to rule by executive decrees to avoid the legislative branch. Despite the fact Lechin was at the low point of his political career, he was able to paralyze the government through strikes and demonstrations by labor. Siles was never able to enforce all the provisions with respect to the miners commissaries and other major policy decisions for the remainder of his term were deadlocked. Finally, through the intervention of Paz Estenssoro, a truce was arranged between the two wings, and this was reinforced by the attempted golpe of the Falange in April, 1959. The truce did not last long because of the coming elections of 1960.

Siles was barred from another term by the Constitution and Paz---at least in the **view** of the leading contenders---had taken himself out of the race. This left the nomination open to the leaders of the two major wings, Guevara and Lechin. Siles backed Guevara for the nomination, but the right realized that it had serious difficulties because, once again, the left had greater control over the masses of Bolivian workers and campesinos. The first to break the truce was Guevara who attacked the lack of discipline on the labor movement, accusing the labor leaders of being caudillos, of using their militias as personal armies, and he also

stressed the role of the middle classes in the Revolution.<sup>71</sup> Lechín retaliated by calling Guevara an "opportunist" but Lechín was in some trouble himself due to splits and divisions within labor and the Sector Izquierda.<sup>72</sup> Apparently it was these divisions which made Lechin realize that he could not hope to win the Presidency, and he then decided to back Paz Estenssoro for the office in return for the Vice-Presidential nomination. Siles, dismayed at the return of Paz, attacked him saying, "Demagogy and irresponsibility during the government of Paz Estenssoro drove the Revolution to miss in great part Bolivia's hope for economic independence and recovery."<sup>73</sup> This attack represented the first open assault against El Jefe and marked the emergence of a split between Siles and Paz which was to irreparably widen.<sup>74</sup>

The open split came from another direction; Guevara had been denied the nomination in 1956 and now saw it being taken away from him again.<sup>75</sup> As Minister of Government he had been able to build some support within the party militias, in some of the party comandos, and also in the Army and the Police. He had also effectively split the campesino movement in the Cochabamba valley through his active support of Miguel

---

<sup>71</sup> New York Times, August 24, 1959, p. 7.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., October 16, 1959.

<sup>74</sup> According to Richard Patch the split between Siles and Paz dates back to 1939 when Siles supported Baldivieso against the Army. See Patch, "The Last of Bolivia's MNR?", op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>75</sup> In a recent article Guevara hints at his objection to Paz. It appears that Guevara feels that Paz was selected by a small group of the founders to be the leader and then they made him the leader. After he came to power he forgot this group and did everything possible to eliminate it as a reminder of his past debts. Guevara seems to feel, rightly or wrongly, that Paz had no claim to his own leadership and was heavily indebted to those who "made" him. See Los Tiempos Cochabamba, February 23, 1969.



Veizaga, the rival of José Rojas. Perhaps he therefore felt strong enough to oppose the MNR since he withdrew from the party and formed the "authentic" version to contest the election.<sup>76</sup> In the MNR convention held in February, 1960, Paz declared that there were no problems, those who were not true revolutionaries, had left the party.<sup>77</sup> Augusto Céspedes defended the right wing of the party by attacking Lechín for creating factions within the MNR.<sup>78</sup> Finally Guevara Arze, Zenon Barrientos, Rios Gamarra, Germán Vera Tapia and twenty three others were expelled from the party by the convention as enemies of the people and servants of the rosca.<sup>79</sup> During the convention Paz displayed his political adroitness by enlisting the support of Siles in the coming election, and by preventing a major break with the Célula Militar by giving them important positions within the party and the government.

The campaign which followed was marked by a "feudal alignment of chiefs and clans" which led to a great deal of maneuvering by all parties concerned.<sup>80</sup> Guevara made a vain effort to reconcile differences within the party by proposing a "lema" plan---the same one later offered by Siles---based on the model of Uruguay. The campaign was conspicuous for the amount of violence, especially in the Cochabamba valley where open warfare broke out between the rival campesino factions, and several assassination attempts were made on Guevara. The use of the government and party machinery determined the outcome and Paz and Lechín won handily. Soon after the election many of Guevara's followers returned to the MNR especially after 1962 when Paz was forced to turn to the right

---

<sup>76</sup> Guevara explains his reasons for leaving the MNR in a remarkably forthright manner in P.M.N.R.A., op. cit.

<sup>77</sup> La Nación, February 16, 1960.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., February 17, 1960.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., February 21, 1960.

<sup>80</sup> New York Times, April 17, 1960, p. 23.

for support. However, a good many of the middle sector people stayed with the new Partido Revolucionario Auténtico (PRA) and were joined by groups of campesinos and miners. Despite the fact that he lost his bid for the Presidency, Guevara's defection was important for it demonstrated that the urban middle sectors had deserted the MNR.

The first year of Paz Estenssoro's second Presidency has been characterized as one of "drift", but in reality there was little that could be done because of the power of the independent labor leaders and the strong position of the Sector Izquierda within the government.<sup>81</sup> Lechín was losing control of the situation and anarchy was the predominate characteristic in the nationalized mines. According to one source, Paz had begun immediately after the election of 1960 to put an end to the "small semi-autonomous states" which existed throughout the country, but he was forced to work slowly to avoid direct confrontations with these autonomous bases of power.<sup>82</sup> The military was also used in several disturbances in the countryside, and it showed increasingly ability to defeat the demoralized militias. A new Minister of Government, José Antonio Arze Murillo, was then appointed for the express purpose of undermining Lechín and the power of the Sector Izquierda.<sup>84</sup> While Paz was attempting to divide the left and reduce its base of power, he was simultaneously able to receive its support in the legislature for a constitutional amendment removing the second term barrier for the President

---

<sup>81</sup> Richard W. Patch, "A Note on Bolivia and Peru," AUFS Newsletter (April 1962), p. 26.

<sup>82</sup> Luis Antezana E., La retirada de Colquiri (La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1964), p. 13.

<sup>83</sup> For a rather hysterical account of this occupation, see J. Blanco (pseud.?) Santa Cruz: zona militar (Santa Cruz: n.p., 1961)

<sup>84</sup> See Interpelación al Ministro...op. cit.

Many believed the new amendment was not applicable to Paz (thereby barring him from running in 1964), and this is probably why Lechín was persuaded to lend his support to the amendment. Lechín assumed that not only would he be the party candidate in 1964 but that he would also be permitted to run again in 1968.

The implementation of the Triangular Plan brought another crisis for Lechín and the Sector Izquierda. Lechín could not openly endorse the Plan, but neither could he oppose Paz and hope to receive the Presidential nomination in 1964. His only alternative was to leave the country to avoid being associated with the Plan, and he departed with the probable assurance of Paz that he would be the party candidate in 1964. The absence of Lechín gave Paz the opportunity to discredit the Labor leaders and hasten the destruction of the Sector Izquierda. Accordingly, a campaign was initiated to discredit the controversial director of the FSTMB, COB, and Sector Izquierda; a contrived charge was leveled at Lechín stating that he was running the illicit cocaine traffic in Bolivia. As this charge was brought by the Minister of Government, Arze Murillo, it could have been done only with the knowledge of Paz Estenssoro. The charge was never proved and nothing ever came of it except perhaps to warn Lechín that Paz now considered him expendable. Paz in the meantime announced that he would be a candidate for the Presidency and that the new amendment was applicable to him. He also began to assiduously woo other labor leaders away from Lechín. Lechín returned to the country in the fall of 1963, and according to official MNR propaganda, entered into an agreement with Guevara Arze of PRA, Mario Gutiérrez of the Falange, and other "reactionary"

parties to overthrow the government.<sup>85</sup> Accusations and insinuations were hurled back and forth between the various leaders for the remaining months of 1963. A curious event in December, 1963, focused attention on Lechín and may have been instrumental in his final defeat. A group of miners at Catavi seized four Americans and held them hostage at the mine. World attention was centered on the act and many held Lechín responsible for it, although it is doubtful that he had anything to do with it because the miners involved were under the PCB, and Catavi was relatively independent of Lechín's group. While the Army and the campesino militias were preparing to march on the miners, Lechín was persuaded by outsiders, namely Teodoro Moscoso, to intervene and convince the miners to release the hostages. Lechín was successful in his efforts but he was forced to move cautiously because he had lost control over the members of the FSTMB; like the once monolithic MNR the miners union was now fragmented and disorganized. Perhaps this incident convinced Paz Estenssoro that Lechín was no longer to be feared and that it was now possible to isolate more labor leaders from the Sector Izquierda. Probably as a result of this line of thinking another COB was formed by Anibal Aguilar to further divide the left sector. Actually the "nueva" COB was a minute group, and the miners remained largely outside it.

In January, 1964, the IX national convention of the MNR was held in La Paz. The maquinista of Federico Fortún Sanjinés completely controlled the convention machinery, and the Sector Izquierda objected strongly to the methods used to seat delegations---their representatives

---

<sup>85</sup> Presencia, November 15, 1963. For the charges made against Lechín, see José Antonio Arze Murillo, Quién comienza a correr muy temprano corre el riesgo de cansarse: Juan Lechín (La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1963)

were almost invariably excluded by Fortún.<sup>86</sup> Using the manipulation of delegates as a pretext, the left refused to attend the convention and they were subsequently thrown out of the party of committing a breach of discipline.<sup>87</sup> Charges of a rigged convention were not limited to the Sector Izquierda for many prominent leaders among them Rene Barrientos, Ruben Julio Castro, and Siles deplored the lack of internal democracy.<sup>88</sup> During and just after the convention the fragmentation and grouping into personal cliques became increasingly evident within the MNR. At least five separate groups can be identified, all of them organized around prominent personalities of the party. The Sector Socialista led by Anibal Aguilar and Emil Sandoval Morón (the brother of the Santa Cruz strongman) was regarded as the strongest and most cohesive.<sup>89</sup> The main reason for this was the strategic position of Aguilar as Minister of Work. He was able to bring some union leaders into his Sector in exchange for favors granted by the Ministry, and he could count on several hundred Ministry employees for his "conventions" and street demonstrations. By and large the Sector Socialista remained a vehicle for the personal ambitions of Aguilar. Another group formed on the left was the Frente de Liberacion Nacional (FLIN) led by Nuflo Chávez, Alfredo Franco Guachalla, Edwin Mollier and Lydia Guieler, as well as other prominent ex-members of the Sector Izquierda. The Frente favored

---

<sup>86</sup> See "Impugnaciones del Sector Izquierda a la convocatoria," in Federico Fortún Sanjinés, Antecedentes para la IX convencion del MNR (La Paz: n.p., 1963), pp. 5-18.

<sup>87</sup> See Partido Revolucionario de la Izquierda Nacional, Programa del PRIN y plan de gobierno (La Paz: n.p., 1964), pp. 18-22.

<sup>88</sup> See El Diario and Presencia, January 15-25, 1964, for these charges.

<sup>89</sup> For its program, see Sector Socialista del MNR, Bases y principios de los socialistas del MNR (La Paz: n.p., 1962).

continued nationalization of the mines, of petroleum, and the exclusion of foreign interests.<sup>90</sup> The major goal was to oppose and destroy the machine of Fortún and return to the "good old days" of internal democracy within the party. Chávez was most direct in his charge here. He stated that Paz was a good, even great, President, but that he lacked the political skill to maintain control over the day-to-day operation of the party and that, as a result, Fortún had taken over the party as his personal machine.<sup>91</sup> Yet another group formed on the left was a new Sector Izquierda led by Ernesto Ayala Mercado and Alfredo Franco Guachalla (who seemed quite mobil at that time), but this was little more than a device to lure workers away from Lechín.<sup>92</sup> On the right the major group formed was the Bloque de Unidad de la Defensa de la Revolución Nacional which was largely the creation of Siles and Víctor Andrade. Again, the major charges of the right were directed against Fortún, and it is interesting to note that none of them at least at this stage directly challenged Paz, although Siles was to later. In his answer to Siles' charge of manipulation of convention delegates, Fortún accused Siles of dictatorial methods in the 1956 convention and concluded, "they have questioned the fundamental legitimacy of the IX convention and therefore my moral character."<sup>93</sup> Two other groups were also formed, but they were largely the tools of Paz to defend his center position in the conflict between the two wings. The Frente de Unidad

---

<sup>90</sup>

For the program and membership of the Frente, see FLIN, Documentos (La Paz: Ed. Liberacion, 1964): MNR: llamamiento para la constitucion del Frente de Liberacion Nacional (La Paz: n.p., 1964): FLIN, Manifiesto de l Frente de Liberacion Nacional (La Paz: n.p., 1964); and Nuflo Chávez Ortiz, Carta a los trabajadores de mi patria (La Paz: n.p., 1964).

<sup>91</sup>

Personal interview with Nuflo Chávez Ortiz, La Paz, January 12, 1965.

<sup>92</sup>

For the reasons and program of the new organization, see Alfredo Franco Guachalla, ¿Por qué nos reorganizamos? (La Paz: Ed. 16 de Julio, 1964).

<sup>93</sup>

La Nación, March 5, 1964.

Nacional (FUN) was composed of government employees loyal to Paz. The Frente Nacional Pazestenssorista was formed by Fortún and Ruben Julio Castro to oppose the candidacy of Barrientos for the Vice-Presidency and to protect the maquina.

In the convention itself this increasing fragmentation produced the resurgence of the Armed Forces. The power vacuum created by the personal and ideological divisions made it relatively easy for the military to present a united front and thereby increase their representation and power in the party organization. The only defeat for the military was when Barrientos was rejected for the Vice-Presidential slot, and Fortún managed to become the party candidate. Following the convention there was more than the normal shifting and shadow boxing which characterize a Bolivian electoral campaign. In early March a convention of opposition parties including PRA, FSB, PCB, PSD, PURS, PL, and the Lechinistas (soon to be PRIN) was held in La Paz; and although there was unanimous agreement on opposition to Paz Estenssoro for the Presidency, there was no agreement on the means or candidates to contest with him---as well might be expected given the wide disparity of viewpoints and personal ambitions represented. Still the convention represented an imposing array of general opposition to the Paz candidacy. The majority of Movimientistas while not openly against Paz were adamant in their opposition to Fortún; this was especially the case with the military, now the strongest and best-unified group in the party. It was at this time that Siles proposed his plan for lemas and sub-lemas similar to those employed by the two Uruguayan parties.<sup>94</sup> His primary concern was to increase the measure of internal democracy in the MNR by permitting the expression of divergent views while still managing to present a unified front for elections and against the active opposition. Paz's reply

<sup>94</sup>La Nación, March 2, 1964.

to the proposed system was stated in La Nación, and he said that such a plan would result in anarchy in Bolivia (One wonders what he thought the present situation added up to) because the MNR was more similar to the revolutionary PRI of Mexico than the traditional parties of Uruguay.<sup>95</sup> He added that the MNR was a party of the masses and not of individual groups. Throughout the coming struggle Paz was to continually emphasize the mass nature of the MNR, and one can only speculate that he did not favor unified groups within the party because of the threat they might pose for his leadership. The stress on the mass nature of the MNR flies in the face of reality; the party was divided into regional, local, and personalistic groups dominated by individual politicians. Mass participation was virtually non-existent. Perhaps Paz did not want to see the party as any other than one of the "masses" because it meant that he would be forced to deal and negotiate with party leaders. The same edition of La Nación, however, also carried the story of Fortún's resignation as the party's Vice-Presidential candidate. Fortún may have resigned over the insinuations cast on his "moral character"---his announced reason---by Siles, but a more realistic appraisal would suggest that Paz was forced to dump him in favor of Barrientos.<sup>96</sup> What is certain is that Barrientos and elements in the military had never accepted the results of the convention because no sooner was it over than Barrientos returned to Cochabamba and

---

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., March 6, 1964.

<sup>96</sup> Anonymous, Por qué cayó el MNR (n.p.: n.p., n.d.), p. 8 (although there are no page numbers.) This anonymous pamphlet, according to informed sources, was written by Luis Antezana, Augusto Céspedes, and Sergio Almaraz.



actively continued his campaign for the nomination.<sup>97</sup> In any case 404  
Paz had a new running mate and opposition within the party  
and the military was reduced for a time; although it has been estimated  
that as high as sixty percent of the party affiliates were opposed to the  
Paz candidacy.<sup>98</sup> Violence, however, continued to be part of the campaign  
tactics as Felipe Flores was killed, and attempts were made on the lives  
of Lechín and Barrientos.<sup>99</sup> Siles, Guevara, and Lechín signed an agreement  
pledging themselves not to support the candidacy or election of Paz  
because it was illegal and undemocratic. Thus the three major party  
leaders were now directly opposed to El Jefe, and it was only a short  
time before the facade of Paz's strength would crack. Siles made one  
more proposal to save the party by abolishing the Jefatura, but this  
was completely rejected by the Pazestenssoristas. He also proposed that  
Paz retire from the Presidency and a military junta rule Bolivia for a  
year. The military replied that it had no desire to intervene in the  
internal problems of the party and thereby provoke "political passions".<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>97</sup> William Brill states that Barrientos returned to Cochabamba and refused to take a political role. Other sources, such as Por que cayó el MNR, Carlos Serrate Reich, and Paz Estenssoro himself state that Barrientos never did accept the verdict of the convention and he was no sooner back to Cochabamba than he continued his plans to gain the nomination. See, for instance, Victor Paz Estenssoro, Contra la restauración por la revolución Nacional (Lima: n.p., 1965); also William Brill, Military Intervention in Bolivia: The overthrow of Paz Estenssoro and the MNR (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Institutions, 1967), p. 27.

<sup>98</sup> Malloy states this in his dissertation, quoted in Mitchell, op. cit., p.26.

<sup>99</sup> Brill, op. cit., p. 27, states that the attempted shooting of Barrientos, thwarted by a set of United States Air Force wings, was the key factor in the military uniting behind the Barrientos candidacy. Apparently Paz was blamed for the shooting by the younger officers. As Brill states, "...one cannot explain the events which followed with complete certainty..." but to place all the emphasis on the shooting as the reason for Barrientos acceptance seems incredibly naive.

<sup>100</sup> MNR, Bolivia: triunfo del voto universal, op. cit., p. 55.

Despite the abstention of the opposition parties, over 1,200,000 votes were cast in the election although a good many blank ballots in the cities left no doubt that Paz faced opposition there.<sup>101</sup> Six days after the election Siles was expelled from the MNR for adopting an anti-party attitude, collaborating with counter-revolutionaries, offering his proposals for lemas and the Jefatura to the public instead of through regular party channels, attending the convention (for two minutes) of PRIN, and for trying to entice the Armed Forces to take over the government.<sup>102</sup>

To the credit of Paz Estenssoro he made no immediate attempts to persecute his major opponents, although shortly they were required to go underground.<sup>103</sup> This left Siles, Lechín, and Guevara free to plot the overthrow of the government. The military also realized that they controlled the balance of power and apparently by late September had made the decision to depose Paz.<sup>104</sup> Barrientos remained in Cochabamba and Paz had little control over him. The students and teachers went on prolonged strikes and demonstrations in September and October (apparently with the support of certain military elements), and the government became increasingly harsh in its methods of reprisal thereby helping to further alienate the urban populace.<sup>105</sup> On November 3 Barrientos

---

<sup>101</sup> For the results, Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>102</sup> La Nación, June 5, 1964.

<sup>103</sup> The procedure for going "underground" in Bolivia is a delightful one. Generally politicians will seek refuge in a house in Obrajes or Calacoto, two of the suburbs, hold clandestine meetings and plot the overthrow of the government. What makes it interesting is that the government generally knows the whereabouts of these politicians from the start and can arrest them at their convenience.

<sup>104</sup> Por qué cayó el MNR, op. cit., p. 10-11.

<sup>105</sup> Interview with Carlos Serrate Reich, La Paz, May 13, 1969.

was recognized as President in Cochabamba and despite efforts by José Fellman Velarde to return him to the fold, he remained adamant in his opposition to Paz Estenssoro. At this juncture there was no where for Paz to turn except to Ovando Candia, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Ovando, the most enigmatic of Bolivian politicians, played both sides of the fence; but he was finally able to convince Paz that it would be best if he resigned and left the country.<sup>106</sup> On the morning of November 4, 1964, Ovando escorted Paz to El Alto and Paz departed for Peru; the MNR government was finished.

To recapitulate the most important points of comparison between the MNR and the PRI: the MNR did not have total control over the party organizations to the extent developed in Mexico; party organizations were often quite independent of higher authority, either because they had other access points to the government or because the party structures were subordinate to other structures; party membership was about equal in both countries (until recently in Mexico) with membership consisting of national and local politicians and a loosely-defined, amorphous, and remote mass membership; and the MNR failed to develop any means of reconciling the differences between the two wings of the party and to prevent individuals and groups from fleeing the party organizations. This latter point is perhaps most important. The PRI has managed to contrive a means of alternating the Presidency (and by implication the wings of the party) and thereby provide access to employment and the decision-making apparatus for the "out" wing of the party. Although the process is not necessarily institutionalized, it has followed a pattern and prevented outright breaks with the Family and has also helped rationalize the revolutionary process by providing alternating periods of conservative

---

<sup>106</sup> Ovando is reported to have told Paz he could either take him to El Alto or to the cemetery, whichever he preferred. John Gunther, Inside South America (New York: Pocket Books ec., 1968), p. 471.

and innovative rule. On the other hand the MNR did not manage to develop such a means for alternating the Presidency and appeasing the two wings of the party. Perhaps personal ambitions played a far more important role in Bolivia than in Mexico, but there are indications that these personal ambitions could have been resolved and prevented the disintegration of the MNR. For instance, Guevara Arze accepted the decision in 1956 disregarding him for the Presidency, but he refused to be put off twice. Lechín also swallowed his Presidential aspirations in 1960 but could not be persuaded to forego the nomination of 1964 as well. Standing in the way of both was Paz Estenssoro who tended to avoid the threat posed by the fragmentation of the party in favor of continuing his own personal power. Paz made little or no effort to reconcile the differences between the two factions of the party, and they were effectively cut-off from resolving the differences by themselves. Perhaps Paz tried to keep the two groups from meeting within the party to force them to work through himself in order to keep control of the situation and prevent a unified opposition arising to his own Jefatura. Given the state of anarchy which prevailed throughout much of Bolivia this might have been the only means available to Paz to insure some measure of stability and continuity of MNR rule, but it is also certain that his intransigent attitude with respect to the Presidential aspirations of Guevara Arze and Lechín led to his subsequent downfall.<sup>107</sup> The two wings of the party split-off and left the maquina of Fortún and the military as the only two pillars of Pazestenssorida support. Thus the failure of the MNR to develop a means of institutionalizing the Presidential succession and of reconciling the divergent viewpoints within the party led to its defeat.

---

<sup>107</sup> For an analysis of Paz's personality, see Mario Pando Monje, Los movimientistas en el poder (La Paz: Ed. El Siglo, 1969), pp. 81-93.

C. The Specific "Tasks" Performed by the MNR

As in the case of the PRI in Mexico, the next question to ask is: what specific tasks did the MNR perform in the Bolivian political system? Reference has already been made to the socialization and recruitment functions and the role of the MNR; here the major concern is with what the party managed to actually do.

In Mexico it was found that the PRI performed a specific task in the communication function; that is to say, the party mechanism served to inform party members of decisions taken higher up while at the same time the decision-makers had some insights into the needs and desires of the people and groups further down the hierarchical structure. How well did the MNR perform this task? In sum, not very well, certainly not to the extent of the PRI. In most cases the President and the other decision-makers made few efforts to utilize party mechanisms for the dissemination of knowledge or information. However, it should be pointed out that early in the Revolution a good many of the Zonal Comandos as well as the peasant sindicatos (though not necessarily the campesino party organizations) served as adequate mechanisms for the communication of various decisions and desires of the leaders. As these organizations died out or became the personal vehicle of local leaders, they tended to also fail as communicators of party information and many leaders preferred to isolate their followers from the central party structures. An exception to the general failure to use party structures as means of communication was during elections when these structures served as important centers of distribution of MNR propaganda and for stirring up some enthusiasm among the workers and campesinos---and also to insure that they voted the correct way. By and large, however, the MNR organizations did not serve as communicators to the masses of decisions

made higher up for the simple reason that they were cut-off from these higher structures by local and regional jefes.

This rupture in the line of communication may help to explain why both Siles and Paz made such frequent public exhortations to the masses for support; they had to because their own lines of communication did not extend through the party or government, and they had no recourse than these public appeals. Communication of demands and desires from the bottom up was equally difficult to find within the MNR structures. In most cases, as previously mentioned, it was not necessary due to access channels outside the party organizations. In other cases the MNR itself discouraged communication from below. This was especially the case with the blatant manipulation of Comandos at the lower level by the CPN and the Executive Secretary since it could only contribute to discouragement towards party structures as means of transmitting demands. The control of party channels by a few and the concurrent availability of other channels forced most interest groups to seek other means of access than those of the MNR. In comparison with the PRI the MNR was not a very effective mechanism for communicating demands from below or decisions from above.

The second task performed by the PRI in Mexico was that of mediator in disputes between contending groups. Party structures provided a meeting place for resolving basic differences between contesting groups and thereby helped to prevent a whole series of demands from erupting on the President and the Family. As should be obvious, the MNR did not perform this task. Party structures were seldom used to reconcile basic differences between interest groups and the elites seldom bothered to use party structures at all. At the same time party organizations gave little or no sense of participation to the members at the base. However, it should be pointed out that at least in two instances purely party organizations were utilized

to reconcile differences within the party. The first was the use of the CPN as the major decision-maker after the Revolution; but as most of the decisions taken represented already accomplished reforms, and other did not invade the territory staked out by one group or another, it may not have been very meaningful. During those years the CPN did not make crucial decisions requiring mediation between groups; rather each group used its representatives on the committee to achieve its demands and desires. That representative was seldom able to bargain because he felt the direct pressure of his own group. The second instance was at the party convention in 1956. This convention was open and democratic and resulted in a wide debate over the goals and tactics of the party and government. Although the Sector Izquierda won, the right wing accepted the defeat because of the recognition that the convention had been open and freely-contested. Unfortunately future conventions were not open nor democratic, debate often did not take place, and representatives of divergent views were shut-off from voicing them. The result was a closing-off of access and compromise within the party organizations, leaving dissidents little choice but to leave the MNR. The party convention of 1956 did indicate that party organizations could have served as structures of mediation and compromise if given the chance, but Movimientista leaders never gave party structures another opportunity. By 1964 the party organization was nothing more than a small group of men devoted to their own enrichment, and they cared little for the possibility of using the party as a mediator of disputes.<sup>108</sup> In sum the MNR did not approach in any fashion the task of resolving disputes that one encounters with respect to the PRI.

The MNR most closely approximated the role of the PRI in the electoral task. Both parties served as mechanisms for uniting dissidents during times

---

<sup>108</sup>See Bedregal, *op. cit.*

of elections---however the MNR was less successful since major segments of the party broke off in the elections of 1960 and 1964. (Although Mexico experienced a similar phenomenon in the personal breakaways of Presidential aspirants prior to 1952, this did not normally involve the desertion of major factions of the party.) The PRI also served to legitimize the official candidates as well as to recruit new leaders for the Family. The amount of legitimacy given to official candidates of the MNR is open to question. While one cannot doubt that these official candidates received the greatest degree of legitimacy due to being MNR members, the degree of electoral manipulation raises some questions as to the extent the elections themselves were regarded as legitimate. For the campesinos there can be little doubt that the MNR machinery served to legitimize the candidates and the election itself; the possible exception might be after 1960 when open warfare divided the campesinos of the Cochabamba Valley. Organized labor also recognized the legitimacy of the candidates and the elections, although certainly much less in 1964. In the cities, however, one can speculate that the elections served less as symbols of legitimacy for the MNR government than as specific reminders to the middle sectors that they were hopelessly outnumbered by the MNR majorities in the countryside. Certainly a good deal of cynicism developed in the cities towards elections in general. With the possible exception of 1956, the MNR did not serve as a useful mechanism for selecting party candidates and thereby reducing the amount of intra-party struggles for official nominations. In fact it was the lack of means to decide candidates within the party that caused the two major fissures in MNR ranks. However, at least for the worker and campesino majority, it would appear that the MNR did serve as an electoral device for uniting the masses behind the goals of the elite and the revolutionary ideology.



The reason the MNR was much less successful in carrying out these specific tasks is that it was not as effective an organization as the PRI. Without control from the top, without channels of communication open both up and down, and without the necessity of working through the party structures to present demands, the MNR became nothing more than an empty shell which was utilized to fight the "enemies" of the National Revolution; and which did not serve other than a few who sought power and affluence. As an electoral device it worked with some success in 1956, but each successive election found it less and less useful as an instrument for unifying dissident factions and providing a symbol of unity for the masses; if anything the elections tended to demonstrate the lack of party unity. In sum the MNR was not an effective aggregative structure for the political system, for the President, or for the elite. The failure of the party to become such an aggregative structure is one of the major factors in the explanation of the defeat of the revolutionary government and the MNR.

#### D. Conclusion

The most important comparative points to be made with respect to the aggregation function as performed in Bolivia and Mexico are the following:

1. The Bolivian President was not the final aggregator in the Bolivian political system. In fact the aggregation function, in the sense of transmitting demands into major policy alternatives, was not performed. The breakdown of the function of interest aggregation led to a paralysis of the decision-making process.
2. Since the President did not have the power to aggregate interest as in Mexico, the party also did not serve as a useful structure for the performance of the function. In fact the MNR did not perform any aggregative function.

3. The failure of the MNR to serve as an aggregative structure can be traced to its lack of central control, the failure of its organizational structures, lack of a committed membership, and intra-party disputes which paralyzed cooperation within the elite. Unlike Mexico the MNR could not develop means of alternating the two major wings of the party in power or of satisfying the Presidential aspirations of key politicians.

4. As a result of its lack of organizational strength, the party was not as effective as the PRI in the performance of certain tasks such as mediator, communicator, and as an electoral device.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE GOVERNMENTAL AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION FUNCTIONS

The focus of the present chapter is on the functions of rule-making, rule application and enforcement, rule adjudication, and political communication. The latter is included primarily because there is not sufficient evidence to produce a separate chapter devoted to the function. The emphasis on the governmental functions will be centered chiefly on the structures which performed (or did not perform) the functions. Where patterns of performance emerged they will be compared with similar developments in Mexico. However, the comparison as in the case of interest aggregation may be more meaningful between the structures than the function itself. In the case of the political communication function the structures performing the function will be discussed as well as the degree of autonomy enjoyed by these structures. The amount of information distortion in the Bolivian political system will also be reviewed.

#### A. The Rule-Making Function

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the function of rule-making is often one of the most difficult to separate from other functions and structures. The chief reason is that the function can be performed by many structures which also participate in other functions such as interest aggregation and rule application. Although too often the function is identified solely with the legislature or the executive, in reality rule-making may be performed by many structures and to determine the exact performance is difficult, if not at times impossible. Almond states the problem succinctly: "Thus, the problem of identifying

the rule-making structures in political systems is one of specifying the whole set of agencies and institutions involved in the process, the kind of things they do, the way they do them, and how they interact to produce general rules."<sup>1</sup> Almond then goes on to say that it is possible to relate the rule-making function to all the other functions of the political system. As such a task would seem to involve a monograph in or of itself, it would seem more appropriate simply to compare the function of rule-making as performed in Mexico with that which prevailed in Bolivia.

In Mexico it was found that the rule-making function centers around the Presidency. Since the President is the focus of the functions of interest articulation and aggregation, he is also the center of the decision-making process. The legislature does not serve as a structure for rule-making; rather it is used as a reward for faithful politicians and as a eulogistic device for the revolutionary ideology and the Family. Two other structures, autonomous agencies and state and local governments, which in other systems perform the function of rule-making, were found to be subordinate to the Mexican President. The semi-autonomous agencies are controlled through budgetary domination by the central government as well as by the appointment of directors loyal to the President and the Revolutionary Family. The state and local governments are also directly controlled by the budget and the appointment and the recruitment of leaders loyal to the President and the elite. Neither structure offers a threat to the superiority of the President in the performance of the rule-making function. Perhaps the most important discovery with respect to the making of rules by the Mexican President is that regular procedures have

---

<sup>1</sup>Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co, 1966), p.140.

developed within his own office for resolving differences and producing rules more or less accepted by the participants. The expansion of the staff of the Presidency and the institutionalization of the making of the rules has helped to reduce the load on the President for deciding minor issues while it has greatly helped him to conciliate and reach acceptable decisions on questions of major importance. This "government by consultation" had led to an increased rationalization and effectiveness of not only the performance of the rule-making function but also those of interest articulation, interest aggregation, and rule application. It may be said that the rule-making function appears to be performed adequately in the Mexican political system.

What structures performed the rule-making function in the political system of the MNR? In a phrase: everyone and no one. The lack of a central decision-making apparatus, the diffusion of power between government agencies, political interest groups, and regional interests, and the lack of coordination within the government bureaucracy produced a system in which decisions were either made by many structures or they were made by none. In a system with equal groups contending for power and none having a superiority of authority, in a system in which even the President lacked power over the administrative machinery, decisions were not made for the entire system; rather they were made for respective limited areas of authority and in a limited fashion.<sup>2</sup> In order to understand this diffusion of power and general lack of performance of the rule-making function, it is necessary to consider the structures encountered in Bolivia in comparison with those of Mexico.

---

<sup>2</sup> Nuflo Chávez Ortiz, then Vice-President, stated that the "authority of President Siles Zuazo ends at the rim of El Alto in La Paz." For this and other remarks concerning the general lack of governmental authority, see Demetrio Canelas, Aspectos de la revolución boliviana (LaPaz: n.p., 1958), pp. 39-40.

The Bolivian legislature did not normally act as a structure for rule-making<sup>3</sup>. Under the Constitution of 1947 as well as that of 1961, the legislature is formally granted the power of making the laws, but in practice it only debated (and during the period of the MNR, passed) those laws sent to it by the President.<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that the legislature was not even in session until 1956 after the major reforms of the Revolution had already been enacted. Several factors handicapped the legislature as an effective body after 1956. Most prominent among them was the attitude of the legislators themselves. Most of those elected to the Congress were important party leaders, union officials, or those who occupied independent positions of power such as regional chieftains. They primarily regarded the legislature as a source of income, of some prestige, and of possible protection against arrest and imprisonment because of parliamentary immunity. Since they did have other bases of power they did not place a great deal of significance in the role and authority of the Congress in making the rules. In most cases they could effectively make demands through their own interest groups or colonized bureaucracies, and they could oppose the President better from their independent positions.<sup>5</sup> This disregard of the Congress as a structure

---

<sup>3</sup>Virtually any Bolivian politician is confident in stating that the legislature did not play a significant role in the making of the rules. Víctor Paz Estenssoro confirmed this opinion in an interview stating that the legislature was seldom consulted in any law formulation. Interview, Lima, July 5, 1969.

<sup>4</sup>For the formal powers of the legislature, see Ciro Felix Trigo, Las constituciones de Bolivia (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1958), pp. 501-09; also Constitución política del estado, 1961 (La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda, 1961), pp. 44-60.

<sup>5</sup>Interview with Sr. Gustavo Stumph, diputado of the Falange, La Paz, December 9, 1968.

for making rules was especially true of the COB and labor officials who tended to dominate the legislature after the elections of 1956 and 1960. Due to the intransigence and opposition of the Sector Izquierda the President often had no other recourse than to ignore the legislature. He was aided in this process by additional factors limiting the power of the legislature to make laws. In the first place the Congress was only in session three to four months out of the year. Much of its time was devoted to organization and to political speeches of little value in the legislative process. The remainder of the year it was directed by a legislative commission which was not notably successful in making laws or in overseeing the President. A second factor was that the President could rule by decree when the country was under a state of seige. Under the MNR the state of seige was in effect a good part of the time and the President was not forced to seek the support of the Congress.<sup>6</sup> As a result of these factors the Congress was not an effective structure in the rule-making process. Occasionally the executive was deterred from an action by the threat of public exposure or criticism by legislative investigation. One such case reportedly occurred in the early 1960's when Paz Estenssoro forced the Prefect of Cochabamba to resign to avoid a possibly damaging investigation in the Congress.<sup>7</sup> Another incident about the same time illustrates the general use of the legislative branch under the MNR.

---

<sup>6</sup> For instance, a state of seige was declared in 1964 without the approval of the Congress and prolonged beyond the length of time provided by the Constitution.

<sup>7</sup> On information provided by Mr. Christopher Mitchell, graduate student at Harvard University, April, 1969. Subsequent discussions disclosed that the reason may have been due to internal divisions within campesino groups. The point was impossible to verify.

Anteñor Patiño, son of Simón, wanted a divorce from his Bourbon wife but did not want to involve himself with endless law suits. He appealed to Víctor Paz to grant him a divorce through the Congress in return for a \$5 million cancellation of the indemnification paid by the government for expropriation of the Patiño interests. Paz was in an awkward position for he could not openly support the divorce; however, he let it be known that he would not oppose legislative action for Patiño's request. When the Congress passed the bill granting the divorce, Paz was forced by public pressure to veto the bill, but it was subsequently passed over his veto which was the only time in the history of the MNR that this writer could find a bill passed over a Presidential veto. Paz simply manipulated the legislature to avoid his own political embarrassment. The conclusion with respect to the activities of the legislature would be that it did not serve as a useful structure for making the laws; instead it was little more than an appendage of the executive branch which served some propaganda task but not much else.

A major source of diffusion of power within the political system was the existence of several semi - or fully autonomous agencies. These were divided into several different types: fiscally decentralized agencies such as the nationalized railroads, the National Planning Board, the National Director of Education, etc; the "autarchial entities" such as COMIBOL, the Corporación Boliviana de Fomento (CBF), YPF; the "autonomous entities" including the universities and the municipalities; and finally the "mixed entities" which encompassed Lloyd Aereo Boliviano, the telephone companies, and the power and light companies.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup>Oscar Gandarillas V., La administración pública como instrumento del desarrollo: Bolivia (Washington: Pan American Union, 1966), pp. 24-26.



Although the degree of independence for each of these categories varied, all enjoyed some degree of fiscal independence from the central government.<sup>9</sup> All were theoretically under the control of the Comptroller General, but that office was handicapped by lack of personnel and poor budgetary practice and never acted as an effective check on the financial independence of the autonomous agencies.<sup>10</sup> COMIBOL as an example had a budget larger than that of the central government and its finances were not considered in the national budget; yet COMIBOL was not necessarily responsible to central government agencies for an accounting of its expenditures.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, YPFB with a budget one-third that of the national government was relatively free of control in its budgetary process. At times this financial independence reached absurdity as when COMIBOL was heavily in debt and the national government refused to aid it, whereupon COMIBOL sought loans abroad as a separate entity from the Bolivian government.<sup>12</sup> In fact it acted as if it was a sovereign nation. This fiscal independence of the autonomous agencies made it somewhat easier for money to be siphoned-off for purposes other than those for which it was originally intended. It also made it easier for foreign interest

---

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Cornelius H. Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 1952-65 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 75.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 70; also Sinforoso Cabrera R., La burocracia estrangulada a la COMIBOL (La Paz: n.p., 1960), p. 36.

<sup>12</sup> Hispanic American Report, Vol. XIV, p. 245.

groups to circumvent the national government and "colonize" an agency. The President, of course, appointed the directors of these agencies (although not in the case of the universities or some "mixed entities") and it may be supposed that he normally picked men who were loyal or at least indebted to him. Those whom he selected, however, also had to be acceptable to the interest group which dominated the agency. The miners had a veto over the selection of the directors of COMIBOL and the petroleum workers had the same right over the selection of the director of YPF. Due to the veto power of the interest groups, the President had difficulty appointing anyone who was not acceptable to the groups concerned; and the directors themselves could hardly act in an independent capacity since they could be forced to resign by union pressure. Thus the two major controls exercised by the Mexican President, that over financial resources and over the appointment of directors, were not as available nor as powerful for the Bolivian President.

Another explanatory factor in the independence of these agencies was the almost total control exercised over their direction by the workers of some agencies. Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano for example was subject to the increased demands of the workers who rapidly became so strong that the government could scarcely resist their demands or enforce its decisions with respect to the airlines.<sup>13</sup> As a result LAB became heavily in debt due to social costs and the government was forced to subsidize it. The two worst examples, however, were COMIBOL and YPF. The former for all practical purposes was the prisoner of the miners

---

<sup>13</sup> The power of these workers, if anything, has increased in the years since the MNR. Recently the workers forced the resignation of the President of LAB, Marcelo Galindo, over a proposed plan of re-organization of the airlines. This plan, in turn, was more or less forced by the United States on LAB in order to receive new equipment.

and management decisions required the consent and approval of the unions. While the miners may have been justified for their years of poor pay and miserable conditions, the fact is that their demands were an important factor in plunging COMIBOL further and further into debt. Requests by management (the government in this case) for postponement of demands in the national interest fell on deaf ears. YPFB is an excellent example of a development agency that turned into a political tool due to the power of the workers. Immediately after the Revolution the ranks of YPFB were swollen by the appointment, mainly on political grounds, of a good many superfluous workers. So powerful did the union of workers become that management was forced to use funds for social and economic benefits that should have been used for exploration and the other needs of the agency. While workers enjoyed more social and economic benefits than possibly any other group in Bolivia, Yacimientos itself began to lose money and could not maintain its previous standard of production.<sup>14</sup> (In a recent public statement for which he was heavily criticized President Barrientos pointed out how far this process has gone when he showed that slightly more than 5,000 workers of YPFB produce approximately 9% of Bolivia's petroleum while Gulf Oil with less than 500 workers produces the remaining 91%.)<sup>15</sup> While other unions (with the possible exception of the bankers union) were not as powerful as the miners and petroleum workers, in most of the autonomous agencies management was forced to capitulate to many exorbitant worker demands and sacrifice the rational management of their agencies. In most cases there was little thought given to central government desires or the over-all goals of the Bolivian economy.

---

<sup>14</sup> Zondag, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

<sup>15</sup> Los Tiempos, February 15, 1969.

If one takes into consideration the economic power of these agencies, and their relative independence, it becomes painfully obvious that the executive was critically handicapped by their existence in the running of the national government and the economy. The President had restricted control over the railroads, the mines, petroleum resources, the banks, the agrarian reform (although he had more power here than in the other examples), and certain development projects. While he could appoint the directors of these agencies, and it could be expected as in Mexico that these men would be loyal to him, he could not appoint anyone without the approval of the respective unions. Once the director assumed power he was continually subject to the demands of the workers and could not run his agency in a rational manner for the benefit of the agency or the economy. Thus the autonomous agencies constituted strong, independent centers of rule-making, and the power of the President over these structures did not approximate that enjoyed by the Mexican President over similar agencies.

Other structures capable of performing the rule-making function in the political system are the state and local governments. In Bolivia there are nine departments each divided into several provinces, and all under the national government with no provisions made for local rule. The states and provinces are regarded as creatures of the central government.<sup>16</sup> The President appoints the Prefects of the departments as well as the Subprefects of the provinces. Theoretically this gives him a check on the power of the Prefect, but in practice the provincial officials find it difficult to act independently

---

<sup>16</sup>Art. 107, Constitución política del estado, 1961. op. cit.

of the Prefecto and they are often more indebted to that official than to the President.<sup>17</sup> Another element of control was exercised through control of the finances of the department, province, and canton governments since virtually all money came down from the national level. The amount paid to the state governments was small, only 1.8% of the budget in 1961, but it was a measure of control over these structures.<sup>18</sup> The municipal governments in Bolivia are autonomous in the abstract.<sup>19</sup> They are governed by municipal councils who are supposed to select the Mayor. In reality this official is usually designated by the President. Municipal revenues are independent of the national budget and come mainly from taxes levied on consumer items.

This picture of state and local government would appear much more ordered than that of Mexico with the Bolivian national government in full control of its creations. At least Bolivia did not have to contend with the fiction of federalism as does Mexico. Through control of the budget and the appointment of local officials, one would expect that the central government would have been much more powerful and in full control over the activities of the lower structures. This was not entirely the case. For all practical purposes the more remote state and local structures acted as if the national government did not exist---except as a source of revenue. This was especially true of certain regions in the Beni. Although the President could and did appoint the Prefects and Subprefects, he often needed the approval or

---

<sup>17</sup> Much would depend on other factors such as the power of the Prefecto, his political astuteness, distance from the departmental capital, etc.

<sup>18</sup> United States Army, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Bolivia (Washington D.C. Special Operations Research Office, 1963), p. 612.

<sup>19</sup> Art. 130, Constitución política del estado, 1961., op. cit.

support of a regional or local boss in order to make the appointment. For instance, the support of the powerful campesino sindicato was normally necessary for the appointment of the Prefect in Cochabamba.<sup>20</sup> If such approval was not obtained the new official would find it very difficult to carry out his duties because he did not have the support of the local chieftain or powerful groups. The President could not intervene because he often lacked the necessary power---in this case physical power---to oppose the local strongmen. Thus the President was often forced to consider and consult with local leaders and give into their demands and advice. This restricted his appointment power as well as central government authority over local and state governments.

It may be added that the state governments did have a measure of financial independence through control of various taxes which could be used to pay salaries. Often as not, due to divisions within the national leadership, local leaders could exploit certain ministries and agencies to obtain revenues or projects without the approval of the President. They could also exploit channels to foreign agencies which aided their independence from the central government.<sup>21</sup> Despite the fact that these structures were not subject to the control and domination of the President to the extent found in Mexico, nevertheless as centers of independent rule-making they were limited by the nature of the unitary state. What seems most important is that they were not totally dominated by the President or the official party.

---

<sup>20</sup>The President, however, could often play-off contending groups in making appointments.

<sup>21</sup>For instance, local leaders in Cochabamba could circumvent La Paz agencies by dealing with United States representatives in Cochabamba. The same was true in Santa Cruz.

A final consideration with regard to the rule-making function is the extent to which the office of the Presidency was able to develop into an adequate administrative mechanism, not only for the performance of the rule-making function but also for that of rule application. In Mexico, as in the United States, the growth of the office of the Presidency has permitted the President to assume more and more authority with respect to the performance of both functions. In Bolivia the President ruled through a formal Cabinet consisting of twelve Ministries. The President appointed the Ministers and they were responsible primarily to him for the performance of their duties. Although the legislature did have the power of interpellation of the Ministers, it did not use this power to any great extent during the period of the MNR.<sup>22</sup> As indicated by the frequent Cabinet changes made during the years of the MNR, the President was able to remove and appoint department heads at will, and therefore had considerably more power over the Ministries than he did over the autonomous agencies.<sup>23</sup> Except in the case where a particular Ministry had been "colonized" by either an interest group or the bureaucrats, as in the case of the Ministry of Mines, the President had a decisive effect on policy through his appointment and removal powers. The office of the Presidency itself, aside from a limited staff and secretariat, consisted of the National Planning Board (Junta Nacional de Planeamiento), National Stabilization Council (Consejo Nacional de Establización Monetaria), the National

---

<sup>22</sup>The writer could find few instances of legislative interpellation. One such incident occurred in 1962. See Interpelación al Ministro de Gobierno, Justicia e Inmigración Dr. José Antonio Arze Murillo sobre violaciones constitucionales (La Paz: Ed. Universo, 1962).

<sup>23</sup>The writer has noted ten wholesale Cabinet changes during the years of the MNR. However, it should also be noted that often individual Ministers simply changed their positions within the Cabinet.

Council of Agrarian Reform (Consejo Nacional de la Reforma Agraria), and the Director of Press and Information (Dirección Nacional de Prensa, Informaciones, y Cultura y Seguridad).<sup>24</sup> (One should also probably add the Control Politico.) Evidence of the activity of these structures is scanty, and it would appear that the only effective agency was the Director of Press and Information which was charged with disseminating official announcements and controlling the press. The Planning Board did not perform any useful service until 1962-63 when, at the urging of the United States government and the Alliance for Progress, it issued a comprehensive ten-year plan for development; unfortunately most of its recommendations were ignored.<sup>25</sup> The Council of Agrarian Reform, although charged with responsibility for coordinating the reform, had little supervision over the agencies in the field and limited itself to official pronouncements of the value of the agrarian revolution.<sup>26</sup> Perhaps the shortage of staff and useful structures is in itself indicative of the lack of rule-making carried out by the President.

Was there any institutionalization of the rule-making function within the office of the Presidency? There is certainly little evidence to suggest such a process. Minor policy decisions were more often made by respective Ministries or agencies. In most cases it may be assumed that the President had knowledge of such decisions and may have taken part in them.<sup>27</sup> The difficulty is that major policy decisions were not

---

<sup>24</sup>Gandarillas, op. cit., p. 28.

<sup>25</sup>For this Plan, see Bolivia, Junta Nacional de Planeamiento, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social (La Paz: Centro Audiovisual, 1962).

<sup>26</sup>Arturo Urquidi, Bolivia y su reforma agraria (Cochabamba: Ed. Universitaria, 1969), pp. 125-26.

<sup>27</sup>Victor Paz Estenssoro stated that he knew of all the decisions and events taking place in Bolivia while he was President. He also said that the reason was that he had superior training as an administrator (one of the few members of the MNR to have such experience) and therefore had to continually check his subordinates. Interview with Victor Paz Estenssoro, Lima, July 5, 1969.



institutionalized if for no other reason than that few such decisions were ever made. When major decisions were made it can be assumed that some processes of consultation between important leaders were involved, but as far as can be determined this process did not become institutionalized. According to Víctor Paz Estenssoro, he consulted often with individual Ministers about their respective problems and when necessary a full Cabinet meeting was called over a particularly crucial problem.<sup>28</sup> However, the difficulty is that these meetings seldom resulted in an effective decision being reached---or if a decision was reached it was not often implemented. Doctor Paz went on to say that probably the most effective consultative process occurred when a foreign government was involved in a major decision, e.g. the United States in ~~the~~ Stabilization and Triangular decisions, which leads one to assume that these processes may have been the result of foreign insistence rather than Bolivian initiative.<sup>29</sup> Given the fragmentation of the interest aggregation function along with the existence of several structures in the political system which could perform the rule-making function, the President was denied the power to develop institutional means to perform the making of the rules within his own office.<sup>30</sup> No such process as "government by consultation" was able to develop because there were few instances of decisions taken by collective efforts through regular channels. Neither the CPN or

---

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> It should also be noted that the President, for whatever reason, may not have wanted to make a decision. See the remarks of Carlos Serrate Reich, infra., p. 347.

[ the Cabinet was effective as a structure for making rules especially <sup>429]</sup> because of the dispersal of authority owing to the prevalence of autonomous agencies and independent interest groups. The President could consult individual leaders, or heads of agencies or departments, but a regular procedure for resolving differences and making rules for the political system did not emerge.

The general performance of the rule-making function was sporadic and bifurcated. The existence of structures separate from the Presidency and the absence of an institutionalized process for making rules for the system prevented the emergence of a pattern of performance for the function. The irregularity of the performance had its effect on the performance of the other functions of the political system. It helped to reinforce certain political attitudes especially those of suspicion and alienation already present in the system. It also helped to maintain the pattern of interest articulation based on violence and lack of compromise since these groups were not sure of receiving answers to their demands nor were they certain of where to present the demands. Aggregation of demands was equally difficult since the structures performing the making of the rules allowed groups to present demands at different points in the political system without the necessity of aggregation. Perhaps the most important was that the irregularity of the performance of the rule-making function made it very difficult to apply and enforce the rules of the system.

#### B. The Rule Application and Enforcement Function

One of the apparent advantages in utilizing the functional approach is that once one of the functions appears to be inadequately performed as in the case of interest aggregation then it becomes readily evident that other functions will display certain similar characteristics. Since it has been seen that in the Bolivian political system the fragmentation of the

[ ]

aggregation function led to similiar fragmentation and diffusion of the rule-making function, it is also somewhat obvious that a like pattern would be expected with regard to rule application and enforcement. In fact the application and enforcement of the rules under the MNR system was sporadic, fragmented, and subject to the vissicitudes and whims of local and national politics. It should be mentioned that a general disregard for the implementation of the law, a characteristic of the pre-revolutionary political system, was carried over to the Movimiento system. Although there is a tendency in Bolivia to uphold the idea of the law, there is often a great breach in the actual observance of rules and regulation.<sup>31</sup> Given the opportunity the average citizen will either ignore or openly defy the existing laws. All too often this same attitude is encountered with those who are charged with the enforcement of the laws. Under the MNR several factors complicated this general disregard for rules. First it should be noted that the national government often lacked the necessary power to force compliance with its own laws. This was the case with the miners until 1962; the same was true for certain regions of the countryside. The government lacked the physical power to discipline the population . In fact the further away from La Paz, the weaker became the national government and the weaker the application of existing regulations. When the government did make an effort to enforce certain measures, it often over-reacted and enhanced its' own inability to perform the function adequately. For instance, the use

---

<sup>31</sup>See the remarks of Richard Patch concerning the value of the symbol in Bolivian life, Richard W. Patch, "Social Implications of the Bolivian Agrarian Reform," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Anthropology, Cornell University, 1956), p. 242.

of the Ucurena militias against Santa Cruz had the effect of almost permanently alienating the entire population from the MNR government and whatever measures it tried to enforce.

Another factor which is useful in explaining the lack of enforcement of the laws was the lack of resources of the government. Many laws were made, or ideals discussed, but when it came time for implementation it was impossible because the government did not have the finances. An excellent example is in the general field of social welfare. Bolivia has a rather advanced view of the role of government in caring for the social and economic needs of the people. The Constitution of the state embodies various ideals and promises among other things, adequate educational, health, employment, and other requirements to the citizen.<sup>32</sup> For example, the Constitution provides that every citizen is entitled to a free education.<sup>33</sup> In reality this was often impossible because the government did not have the necessary revenues to build schools, train teachers, or maintain the educational system. Another example in education is that the code of education emphasized the necessity for vocational training, but in practice most schools continued to place greater emphasis on liberal arts.<sup>34</sup> Thus, although the MNR did more for Bolivian education than any other previous regime, it was unable to meet the obligations of the law. A similar development took place in other social welfare

---

<sup>32</sup> Trigo, op. cit., pp. 518-19; also see United States Army, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Bolivia. op. cit., pp. 178-84, 211-226.

<sup>33</sup> Arts. 186-199, Constitución política del Estado 1961. op. cit.

<sup>34</sup> Art. 187. Constitución, op. cit.; also Servando Serrano Torrico (ed.), Código de la educación boliviana (Cochabamba: n.p., 1968).

fields. An excellent example is the Social Security Fund requiring contributions from both employers and employees.<sup>35</sup> Seldom, if ever did either contribute their assessments and as a result the Fund was continually in economic difficulty. Laws were also on the books guaranteeing work to all citizens, but unemployment was often high in the cities. One of the major features of the entire social welfare program was the constant lack of funds for programs outside La Paz. Funds either were not appropriated or somehow "disappeared" before they reached outlying regions.<sup>36</sup> Disregard for the existing law was not limited to the field of public welfare ; it could be found in virtually every phase of government operation. Perhaps most blatant was the disregard of constitutional rights regarding personal freedom and liberty. The MNR, with impunity, ignored provisions safeguarding the individual against arbitrary actions of the government. One can only speculate that this wide discrepancy between the ideal, between those laws on the books, and between the actual practice and disregard for existing rules may have reinforced attitudes of disrespect for general concurrence with the laws not only for the average citizen but also for those charged with the enforcement of the rules and regulations for the system.

---

<sup>35</sup>For the legal and financial difficulties encountered by the Caja de Seguridad Social, see United States Department of Labor, International Cooperation Administration, Summary of the Labor Situation in Bolivia (Washington: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1958), p. 25.

In numerous discussions with businessmen of Bolivia, the writer has encountered many examples of failure to adhere to the regulations of the Social Security Fund. Perhaps one of the more interesting cases involved a U.S. construction firm. This firm paid its Bolivian engineers less than half their salary in pesos in order to avoid payment of taxes to the Social Security Fund. They then received, at their own request, considerable additional payments in dollars which were not subject to such taxes. It is interesting to note that a continual bone of contention in Bolivia is the low "official" salary paid Bolivian technicians by American firms. If these unofficial payments were known there might be less discussion

<sup>36</sup>U.S. Army Area Handbook, op. cit., p. 180.

Finally, and most important, the political system lacked an effective and capable bureaucracy to carry out the application and the enforcement of the rules. This should not be too surprising since, as Almond points out, "for the bureaucracy to occupy a dominant position (in the application of the rules) the minimum requirement is that there be a ruling and directive group."<sup>37</sup> As has been seen previously, there was no such group or structure in Bolivia. Therefore a major handicap to effective bureaucratic practices in the country was the absence of control over varied branches of the government and the subsequent colonization of administrative structures by interest groups. The bureaucrats were not insulated against the demands of interest groups, they were not independent enough to implement rules free of group pressure, and they lacked an outside source of authority to appeal to in cases of such pressure;

One of the major problems encountered with respect to the bureaucratic structure was its size, organizational complexity, and overlapping of tasks and duties. The Bolivian governmental organization is noted for the profusion of structures, diffusion of responsibility, and an almost complete inability to assign a specific task to any one agency or department.<sup>38</sup> Boards, agencies, commissions, ministries, councils, etc., flourished in profusion; and no one was exactly sure of the particular job he was to perform. An example can be found in the general field of agricultural

---

<sup>37</sup>Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 156.

<sup>38</sup>For the general problems encountered in the bureaucracy, see Gandarillas, op. cit.; Lee S. Greene, "Administrative and Technical Assistance in Bolivia," in John M. Claunch(ed.), Political and Social Problems of Public Administration in Underdeveloped Countries (Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1959); Albert Lepawsky, "Revolution and Reform in Bolivia: A Case Study of the Root and Branch of Public Administration in a Developing Country," in W.J. Siffin(ed.), Towards the Study of Public Administration (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1957); and Allan Rene Richards, Administration: Bolivia and the U.S., Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1961).

development.<sup>39</sup> There were at least five national agencies and one foreign organization responsible for over-all agricultural development. General supervision in the field was given to the National Planning Board, and it was to coordinate and integrate the development plans, including agriculture, for the nation. Under the Ten-Year Development Plan an inter-ministerial board was to operate under the National Planning Board to achieve some measure of cooperation between the various agencies involved. As has been seen, however, the National Planning Board was virtually non-operative and certainly did not serve as a very useful instrument for coordinating general policies for agricultural development. The Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for the general development of agriculture, but according to one report it suffered from the following: 1) a shortage of technical staff; 2) low rates of pay and an inefficient system of staff selection (the reference here is to political appointment of Ministry personnel); 3) lack of development programs and the necessary funds to carry them out; and 4) the organizational defects of the Ministry itself which was not adapted to the country's needs.<sup>40</sup> It was apparent that the Ministry was not in a position to adequately handle the problem of agricultural development for the country. The Bolivian Development Corporacion (CBF) was also in the picture and supervised several projects relating to agricultural and husbandry development especially in the Alto Beni and Santa Cruz regions. (It may be added that despite a shortage of funds the

---

<sup>39</sup>Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development, Inventory of Information Basic to the Planning of Agricultural Development in Latin America: Bolivia (Washington: Pan American Union, 1963); also Julio Alberto d'avis S., Los errores administrativos de la reforma agraria de Bolivia (Cochabamba: Imp. Universitaria, 1959); and Urquidi, Bolivia y su reforma agraria, op. cit.

<sup>40</sup>IACAD, Inventory...Bolivia, op. cit., p. 32.

CBF was probably the most successful and best administered structure primarily due to the capabilities of its director, Alfonso Gumucio Reyes.)<sup>41</sup> Yet another agency involved was the National Agrarian Reform Service which in addition to supervising the implementation of the agrarian reform was also charged with developing planning and research for small farmers (the majority of farmers in Bolivia), and with establishing cooperatives and agricultural credit systems for the farmer. The Ministry of Rural Affairs was also involved since it directed the system of rural education which theoretically included research and training schools. Finally, the Inter-American Agricultural Service, a United States agency, carried out a good part of the research and experimentation devoted to agricultural development. Due to the overlapping of responsibility and division of funds, cooperation and coordination between these agencies was difficult to achieve. An added problem was that they shared an abysmally low amount of the budget, 2.2% in 1961, which forestalled any major development in agriculture.<sup>42</sup> Perhaps because of this shortage of funds there was constant infighting among the agencies for the limited funds available.

Another example of the confusion and complexity of the bureaucratic structure can be found in the administration of the nationalized mines. The mines had at least six recognized bosses: the Minister of Mines, the President and Board of Directors of COMIBOL, the General Manager, the FSTMB, the MNR, and the workers themselves operating through control obrero.<sup>43</sup> Orders for the mine managers were often conflicting and the result was a failure to take any decisions especially in light

---

<sup>41</sup>Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia's Experiment in Development without Aid," American University Fieldstaff Newsletter (June, 1964). Sr. Gumucio was President of the CBF from 1957-58, and Minister of the Economy 1960-64.

<sup>42</sup>U.S. Army Area Handbook, op. cit., 609.

<sup>43</sup>Zondag, op. cit., p. 90.



of the known propensity of the miners for organized violence. This confusion and diffusion of administrative responsibility was recreated in other major areas of policy-making and rule enforcement. Occasionally the difficulty was not so much in the division of responsibility leading to a lack of coordinated policies as it was in the lack of cooperation between agencies. Each tried to protect its own domain and did not want to surrender even the possibility of another structure usurping its limited power.<sup>44</sup> For instance, COMIBOL had to work with the nationalized railroads if it were to get its products to the Chilean sea-ports. However, at times there was almost open warfare between the two agencies. Political struggles between the miners and the railroad workers paralyzed any cooperation and often the mineral products faced innumerable delays before reaching the ports. Despite numerous attempts to reorganize and streamline the administrative structure (more often than not these efforts simply created more bodies than they eliminated), the Bolivian bureaucracy remained one of overlapping duties, lack of responsibility, and inability to carry out consistent policies.<sup>45</sup>

Other administrative practices detracted from the ability of the Bolivian bureaucracy to effectively perform the rule application

---

FUN

<sup>44</sup>See, for instance, Claudio F. Accurso, Tomaso Gasciello, Jack Bermeo, Arthur Candall, Marcos Magalhaes Rubinger, Informe del Grupo Asesor CEPAL/TAO/FAO (La Paz: mimeographed, 1966), p. 3-4. This report of international experts is perhaps the most biting criticism which can be found of Bolivian administrative practices. Interestingly, the team was given 24 hours to leave Bolivia after the publication of the report.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid. The general practice in Bolivia is to create new organizations to fill positions with political cronies. Most of these agencies are given sufficient budget to pay salaries and little more. They exist as "planning" agencies but in reality are nothing more than political sinecures.

function. Most notable were the selection procedures for government employees. Selection was invariably dictated by political or personal purposes.<sup>46</sup> Unlike Mexico, Bolivia did not develop a concept of the professional or technical administrator free from political affiliation, although there was some increase in the number of técnicos within the government after 1960. Generally the criterion for selection was purely political affiliation or family connection; little attention was paid to qualifications. Membership in the MNR was a necessity in most cases, but it was more important to be a member of the right political wing. The exception to political affiliation was family or personal connections. Nepotism, long a tradition in Bolivia continued, and if anything increased under the MNR. It was not uncommon for a Minister to appoint his relatives and friends to positions and some Ministries actually appeared as a family-operated business. Some of these appointees may have had the necessary qualifications to perform their tasks adequately, but in general such practices as recruiting administrators from among personal friends or political cronies lowered the prestige as well as the performance of the bureaucracy.

Two other factors hindered the effectiveness of the bureaucrats in the application of the rules. The first was a continual changeover

---

<sup>46</sup>Victor Paz Estenssoro says that there was no other alternative since the Revolution destroyed the only class with administrative experience, the *rosca*. Interview, Lima, July 5, 1969.

of personnel in higher positions.<sup>47</sup> Cabinet changes were frequent under the MNR (although probably not quite as frequent as in the pre-revolutionary system) due to changes in influence between the two wings of the party, and this no doubt hampered the development of consistent application of the rules or of general policy. The bureaucrats in lower positions may have been reluctant to take any initiative because changes in the hierarchy would subject them to review and possible castigation by their superiors. This reluctance to move would also hinder an effective superior since the habits of self-protection and the knowledge that superiors were seldom around very long would lead bureaucrats to a general immobilism. A second factor was that many regarded their appointments primarily as an avenue to sudden wealth. A Minister or head of an agency could never be sure how long he would remain in office or even the country, and therefore it was wisest to use the position to take care of any contingencies. Without any concept of a professional civil service, and without adequate regular salaries, corruption was rampant and the misuse of funds greatly handicapped development plans and regular operations.<sup>48</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup>There is insufficient evidence concerning hiring and dismissal procedures in the bureaucracy for the lower levels. There is some disagreement among Bolivians themselves whether wholesale replacement took place in government departments. Government bureaucrats complained at the 1964 convention that they had no job security at any level, but the writer tends to believe, given the general immobility of low prestige positions, that there was relatively little firing of bureaucrats in these positions during the years of the MNR. The matter demands further investigation.

<sup>48</sup>For possible misuses of United States aid, see William S. Stokes, "The Foreign Aid Program in Bolivia," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XV. No.3 (September 1962), p.29; also United States Senate, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee of Government Operations, Administration of U.S. Foreign Aid Programs in Bolivia (Washington: 86th Congress, 2nd session, 1960).

Two more factors hampering a consistent application of the rules within the administrative structure include regionalism and a general reliance on paperwork---on forms---rather than actual accomplishment within the bureaucracy. The strength of the central government varied from region to region and this meant that the laws were applied differently in the various zones of the country. In some cases national laws carried little weight (and even less money) and the rules were applied by local and regional jefes. In others especially La Paz the central government was relatively strong in applying the rules. Thus regionalism was a further factor in the fragmentation and weakness in the application of the laws. Perhaps because of frequent changeovers in personnel, low pay, lack of civil service protection, and so forth, the Bolivian bureaucrat generally failed to take the initiative in any way. Many of the bureaucrats "moonlighted" at other jobs and considered government employment as an adjunct to their income and prestige rather than as the major source of either revenue or work satisfaction. Perhaps because of their lack of protection and commitment bureaucrats tended to place more reliance on formal channels, on paperwork, on the fulfillment of the legal requirements of the position, and less emphasis on actually doing something constructive in their work. Compliance with the minimum of formal requirements was deemed more important than actual completion of specific tasks. One performed exactly what was required of him by law, no more no less, and there was little desire to look beyond one's own tasks to those of others or the agency itself. There were exceptions---many did perform their tasks in an admirable manner---but for the most part public employees were not concerned with their fellow bureaucrats, with the public welfare, with improve-

ment in the performance of their services, or with the over-all development of their country.

A final word is necessary in comparison with Mexico. In Mexico it was found that the public employees were united behind the government and the revolutionary ideology. They were also an effective interest group which has managed to obtain a good share of the benefits of the system. In Bolivia this was not <sup>49</sup>true. The bureaucracy may have been active supporters of the MNR system and the revolutionary ideology early in the history of the Revolution, but their enthusiasm waned and they were not active proselytizers for the government nor consistent bulwarks for the regime. As a group they were not united by the common bond of forging a "new" nation nor did they regard themselves as a coherent and technically-able elite. They tended to watch out for individual interests rather than those of the MNR or the nation. They were not united in the political sense because they were often under the control and domination of a particular interest group or individual leader. Internecine warfare within the administrative structures, often for the limited funds available, contributed to a good part of the mutual animosity of the bureaucrats. Finally, the bureaucrats were not notable recipients of the benefits of the system especially those in the lower ranks. Other interest groups were more effective in presenting demands and there was not much left over for the administrators. The result was a

---

<sup>49</sup>This view is not shared by Víctor Paz Estenssoro. Interview, Lima, July 5, 1969. Both he and Mr. Christopher Mitchell feel that the bureaucracy supported the MNR to the end. However, in view of the fact that few bureaucrats supported the MNR in November, 1964, and estimates put the number of the party members against Víctor Paz at 80% (and almost all party members were government employees), the writer feels that his assessment of lack of commitment on the part of the administrators is essentially correct.

bureaucrat who had little pride in the political system or his role in it, and one that was not over-zealous in the performance of his assigned task.

In comparison with Mexico then, the rule application function was not performed adequately in the Bolivian system. The President, or any other structure including the bureaucracy, was not in a position to enforce the rules uniformly throughout the political system. Without a strong center of enforcement, application of the rules was blocked by the diffusion of power within the system, the existence of semi-autonomous centers of rule-making, and most important, a bureaucratic structure which was almost completely ineffective in the performance of the rule application function.

### C. The Rule Adjudication Function

In Mexico the rule adjudication function is dominated by the President who controls the judiciary and the security organizations responsible for interpreting and adjudicating the rules. Although there has been an increasing professionalization of the judiciary in recent years, the President still dominates these structures through the recruitment process. Security organizations under his control give him extra-constitutional means of interpreting as well as applying the rules. Despite the dominance of the judiciary by the executive, one device has developed allowing the Mexican citizen some degree of neutrality and impartiality in the adjudication of the rules. This is the writ of amparo which gives the Mexican citizen a recourse for challenging administrative actions at the lower levels through the adjudicative structures.

In Bolivia the structures normally associated with the adjudication function, namely the courts, were not autonomous and did not perform

the function with impartiality.<sup>50</sup> The judiciary was under the control of the party and the executive. Membership in the MNR was almost a prerequisite for a judgeship and these judges seldom used their power against the government. Despite constitutional provisions for specified terms for judges, it was relatively easy for the executive to dismiss a judge and most judges were extremely reluctant to oppose the official viewpoint.<sup>51</sup> The formal powers of the court system---and in Bolivia the judiciary is unitary with no provisions for state or local judicial structures separate from the national system---appear to have given it some jurisdiction over decisions and actions of government officials.<sup>52</sup> For instance, in questions relating to matters of "pure law" where the constitutionality of a law, decree, or resolution was at issue, the Supreme Court could issue statements of clarification of the law. Although this right of review looks similar to "judicial review", there is no evidence that it was ever used to overrule a decision of the government.<sup>53</sup> The Supreme Court also had the right to settle matters of jurisdiction in disputes between administrative structures, but once again evidence of any such decision taken is scanty.<sup>54</sup> At the lower levels the district court judges were given the power to review various acts and decisions made by lesser officials among them subprefectos, mayors, agrarian and labor judges, and municipal coun-

---

<sup>50</sup> Material for this section was obtained from newspapers and informal discussions with students and teachers at the Universidad de San Simon, Cochabamba.

<sup>51</sup> After the Revolution of 1952 there was a wholesale replacement of all judges in the country with MNR supporters.

<sup>52</sup> Trigo, op. cit., pp. 519-22.

<sup>53</sup> The Court is divided into two sections, one for civil suits such as contractual matters, and the other for criminal cases. Most of the work of the Court involved divorce cases and civil suits.

<sup>54</sup> The writer could find no evidence of such a decision ever made by the Court.

Filmed as received

without page(s) 443.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS.



cillers. This power seems to come closest to the writ of amparo as it was used in Mexico, but it appears to have been used rarely and then primarily for reasons of political necessity.<sup>55</sup> Three specialized court systems did play an important political role, but not one noted for the adjudication of the rules in an impartial sense. The National Labor Court and the labor judges located throughout the country heard complaints involving labor disputes. Invariably the local judges were under pressure from the labor unions, and they seldom decided in favor of either management or the government. The National Labor Court was an appellate court but it, too, rarely decided against the labor unions, one reason being that the labor unions exercised some power in the appointment of the judges. Another series of courts was established for settling disputes arising from the agrarian reform. At first these Juzgados agrarios worked directly under the Juntas Rurales in their respective regions and they gave legal sanction to the seizure of land. The agrarian judges worked under considerable pressure often physical and could not act independently of the interests of the local jefe or milita.<sup>56</sup> One story relating to the type of pressure is told by Robert Alexander: in a Cabinet meeting a man was suggested to fill a vacant post as agrarian judge, but Víctor Paz vetoed the appointment on the grounds that the candidate was not fast enough with a gun.<sup>57</sup> Later on the judges were more independent, but they always felt the

---

<sup>55</sup>

Interestingly enough the Constitution of 1967 adopted the writ of amparo as it is used in Mexico. However, it has not been employed against administrators to this date. The writer is indebted to Senorita Marta Beatriz Lopez, a student in a seminar in research methods at UMSS, for information regarding the operation of the lower courts before and after 1964.

<sup>56</sup> Ernesto Ayala Mercado, Defensa de la revolución de abril (La Paz: Ed. Universo, 1961), pp. 134-35; also d'Avis, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

<sup>57</sup> Quoted in Robert J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. 65.

the pressure of their constituents.<sup>58</sup> It may be added that the inefficient system of agrarian judges contributed to a good part of the inability of the government to resolve the legal requirements of the agrarian reform. A final set of special courts were the electoral courts established in 1956 to supervise and determine the outcome of elections. These courts were directly controlled by the MNR and the government and simply made sure that the manipulation of the vote by the MNR was officially and legally endorsed.

No such practice as that of the writ of amparo ever developed under the MNR. In general the average citizen had no recourse if he felt an injustice from the government or one of its officials. There were no existing structures for resolving these problems and an individual had to use personal connections within the government if he was to redress a grievance. Without these connections he either accepted the decision in apathetic indifference or he could resort to some general action against the political system such as participation in a subversive plot.<sup>59</sup> Two factors probably aided the process of creating apathetic and/or activist opponents of the MNR. The first was that the MNR had a tendency to view any interference with a government act---whether individual or collective---as one by the agents of the rosca and they often used severe castigation of one type or another in such

---

<sup>58</sup>They also apparently became increasingly corrupt. See Manuel Carballo, "Agrarian Reform in Bolivia," (Unpublished Senior's Thesis, Faculty of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1963).

<sup>59</sup>For a general picture of these attitudes and the lack of recourse through the courts, see Hernán Landivar Flores, Infierno en Bolivia (La Paz: Emp. Talleres Gráfico Bolivianos, 1965), passim.

cases. A second factor was the security apparatus of the state which tended to discourage those who might have pursued their quest for some form of justice. Facing the threat of public denunciation or physical abuse, the citizen was more likely to resort to apathy or activity in subversion rather than delayed and ineffective efforts through the structures of rule adjudication.

The security apparatus of the Bolivian system was not as complete as that for the Mexican system. For one thing there were fewer organizations involved; most prominent were the Control Político, the national police, the Army, the militias, and perhaps the MNR structure itself. The Control Político was formally a part of the MNR party organization, but it also enjoyed official sanction as part of the Directorate General of Information and State Security. Until 1960 it was an independent agency under the direct control of the President, but then it was formally incorporated into the national police as Section II.<sup>60</sup> For all practical purposes the Control Político remained independent of the police organization and was more or less free to carry out its activities without interference and without accounting to any other structure than the President. As previously mentioned, these activities consisted of counter-subversive measures which led to imprisonment usually without trial, torture, murder, exile, etc. Formal trial procedures and existing legal devices for the protection of the accused were ignored by the Control Político and dependence was placed on night arrests, punishment without benefit of trial, and other irregular and illegal methods. Rule adjudication and application by this agency was totally arbitrary and without legal sanction.

---

<sup>60</sup> U.S. Army Area Handbook, op. cit., p. 640.

L

J

The national police (there were also traffic police, but they were less important) were one of the early supporters of the MNR and were given major control over public law and order although they were restricted in their duties by the presence of the militias. At least until the period from 1956 to 1960 when the police received extensive aid and training from a United States aid mission they were characterized as generally inefficient, politically dominated, and incapable of fulfilling their duty of maintaining law and order.<sup>61</sup> Despite the aid most Bolivians would agree that there was not a noticeable improvement in the performance of the police. Due to extremely low pay (a colonel received \$18 per month), recruitment of ill-prepared personnel, and lack of professional commitment, the police were severely limited in their ability to perform effectively their assigned tasks. Under the MNR their chief service was to put down internal disturbances such as riots and demonstrations; other tasks traditionally performed by the police were performed sporadically and unsystematically. Respect for the police was also limited and they were not helped in their duties by a general lack of regard by the population for their services. Most citizens either ignored the police or simply bribed them when confronted with a breach of the law.

The Army did not play a significant role in the security apparatus until after 1960 when it became the superior armed power in the country. From that time on it was used increasingly by the government to suppress internal rebellions and require adherence to the dictates of La Paz. It was particularly effective in enforcing the rules---and it is apparent

---

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., pp. 643-45.

that the use of force in applying the rules implies the adjudication of those rules---against the miners, campesinos, and some independent caudillos, but as the Army gained power the government also lost control over it.

Early in the Revolution the power to enforce the rules as well as to judge them resided with the local militias. In the mines and the campo the militias were used by their leaders to require adherence to the viewpoint of the local leader. Those who did not conform confronted a violent form of elementary justice in the form of beatings or physical removal from their place of residence. Whether these militias could be regarded as security agents of the state is debateable for they acted more often on their own authority rather than that of the government or the MNR. As the militias waned in power, their crude form of rule adjudication also died; but they probably had an important effect in the alienation of groups in the society from the concept of law employed under the aegis of the MNR.

Finally the MNR structures dispensed a form of rule adjudication. This was especially the case with party members who were found guilty of certain infractions of party discipline or revolutionary behavior. In general the party could expell the member accused of violating the rules and this meant that he would be denied government employment as well as other favors received by party members. Occasionally the penalty was more severe involving physical abuse, destruction of property, or imprisonment. The accused had little recourse within the party to defend his position and justice was usually administered arbitrarily.

Almond seems to feel that the most important factors relating to the rule adjudication function involve the 'norm of impartiality' in the performance of the function, and the degree of autonomy of the structures which perform the function.<sup>62</sup> In Mexico there was some autonomy of structures although the President and the Revolutionary Family tended to dominate the judiciary. Through the writ of amparo some impartiality with respect to administrative actions of individuals was achieved. Under the political system of the MNR, however, there was relatively little autonomy of the structures performing the adjudication function. When as in the case of the militias the structures were autonomous, the performance seldom had any degree of impartiality. Thus the rule adjudication structures did not serve as a means for channeling off dissent within the system nor for resolving individual or group grievances against the government. Due to the inability of the structures to perform the function adequately, a vicious cycle was perpetuated which reinforced the fragmented and sporadic pattern of interest articulation: that is to say that since the individual or group could not seek redress of grievances through the impartial structures responsible for rule adjudication, they were forced to resort to other methods such as violence and subversion to articulate demands. In effect the system of articulated demands that were poorly aggregated, poorly made and applied, and not adjudicated, led to a feedback system of further demands poorly articulated.

---

<sup>62</sup> Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 161.

#### D. The Political Communication Function

In Mexico it was found that the communication structures were used primarily to reinforce adherence to the revolutionary ideology and the dictates of the Revolutionary Family. Communication within the Family itself was mainly by face-to-face contact. In spite of the control exercised by the Family, the mass media structures enjoy a good deal of autonomy in the performance of the communication function with the reservation that those in control of the structures are themselves members of the elite and therefore unlikely to deviate greatly from the desires of the President or the party. Finally, it was noted that due to the control exercised by the President throughout the system there was little information distortion.

In Bolivia the situation was entirely different. In the first place there was no basic agreement on what was to be communicated; that is to say, there was no consensus on the revolutionary ideology or the values of the political system. Without such a consensus, it would be expected that groups and individuals would use the structures of communication to reinforce their own values, and at the same time try to communicate those values and attitudes to others. In other words the communication function was a reflection of the general fragmentation found in the political culture and the socialization process. Within the elite political communication was no doubt primarily by face-to-face contact, but one needs to be careful in this regard, The elite came from essentially the same social strata and would be expected to communicate through relatives, friends, social acquaintances, etc., in various meeting places of the elite. However, three factors mitigated against the degree of personal contact and reduced it to considerably less

than was found in Mexico. First, the Bolivian elite simply lacked the degree of unity of purpose or ideology found in Mexico and indeed, the lack of unity is in and of itself indicative of the failure to communicate. Second, there was much more animosity in the Bolivian political system; simply, there was more personal hatred and emotion involved than in the recent Mexican system. This emotional tone of politics hampered effective communication between the participants since they could not rationally present their case. Finally, a good many of the leaders of the COB and those in the campo were not of the same background and the same experience as the older leaders of the MNR. They did not have the same level of education, social standing, political understanding, and most important, a common identity of struggle over the years. Given the disparity between social background, ideology, and political experience, political communication within and between the elite was much more difficult than in Mexico.

The other structures performing the communication function also tended to reinforce the fundamental divisions existing in the country. Social structures such as the family and community continued to inculcate particularistic views found in those structures.<sup>63</sup> The school in general made an effort to communicate the goals and practices of the MNR, but it was less than successful in its efforts. The effort failed all together in the universities. The government itself was a major structure of communication; but with the possible exception of the campesinos, it probably only maintained existing attitudes, i.e., those supporting the government also supported the views expressed by its leaders, those opposed continued to view all government communications

---

<sup>63</sup>

There have been no studies of political communication made in Bolivia. Therefore these generalizations are based on the observations of the writer.



with suspicions. The sole exception to this reinforcement of previously held attitudes might have been in the case of the campesinos where government pronouncements especially those of the President were used to introduce the campesino to favorable attitudes towards the political system. The pattern of personal contact was also maintained in the campo through the local hierarchy, but the President was able to cut through and influence the campesinos as a representative of the national government. As might be expected, interest groups as structures of communication simply transmitted their own point of view. It follows that the mass media structures were not autonomous nor impartial.

A few general words are in order concerning the nature and impact of the mass media in Bolivia. In the first place, most of the structures had a small audience. The high illiteracy rate and the inability of the campesinos to buy radios until late in the Revolution restricted the audience of the mass media structures for much of the period under discussion. No one is exactly sure of the size of the radio audience in Bolivia, but it is significant that the total daily circulation of the La Paz newspapers---and they were and are the chief means of disseminating written information throughout the country--- was only 43,000.<sup>64</sup> Cochabamba and Oruro were the only other cities to have daily newspapers although several had weeklies. This meant that the Pacea newspapers were the chief means of communication for the literates of the cities, and these numbered a small percentage of the population. The campesinos probably had greater access to the radio as a means of information, but they were almost totally deprived of newspapers or other written materials. Another concern relating to the

---

<sup>64</sup>U. S. Army Area Handbook, op. cit., pp. 378-80.

structures of mass media is that, with the possible exception of El Diario and Presencia in La Paz, the technical performance of the mass media was spotty and generally very poor. Economic difficulties often led to shutdowns, frequent changes of name, and inadequate reporting of the news. The government also played a role in interrupting the flow of news through control of newsprint and occasional censorship imposed on the newspapers and radios. Bolivia also had few professional reporters or well-trained members of the staff, and these were, and are, paid extremely low salaries. As a result there were frequent changes in personnel and almost no concept of professionalism or neutralism in the reporting or analysis of events. With the exception of the two major dailies in La Paz, none of the newspapers had access to wire services and many simply "borrowed" their stories from the two Paceña newspapers. The radios presented a unique system of gathering the news.<sup>65</sup> At least until 1962, when one radio station received a teletype, the major source of information for the radios was pronouncements given to them by interest groups. An interest group would print an announcement or "positon paper" and the radio station would read it during the broadcast. Naturally this practice tended to reinforce the fragmentation of the communication pattern. Due to lack of wire services, it was much easier for certain interest groups, especially foreign ones such as the United States operating through the local USIS office, to dominate the dissemination of the news.<sup>66</sup> Continual economic difficulties also

---

<sup>65</sup>The writer is indebted to Father Leo Sommer, Maryknoll, for much of the information relating to radio stations under the MNR. Father Leo is currently Director of Radio San Raphael in Cochabamba.

<sup>66</sup>See, for instance, the remarks of Sergio Almaraz concerning USIS domination of the news in Requiem para una república (La Paz: Universidad de San Andres, 1969), p.24. It is worthy of note that the La Paz newspapers union condemned the managing of the news by USIS in June, 1969.

made made it easier for foreign interest groups including the United States and the Communist party to penetrate and control certain mass media structures. A final factor in the performance of these mass media structures was government interference in their operations. The MNR government consistently hampered the autonomy and independence of the newspapers and radios. Although the government did not go as far as its initial seizure of two opposition newspapers, La Razón of La Paz and Los Tiempos of Cochabamba, censorship and other means of interference were sufficient to result in a condemnation of the government for lack of press freedom by the Inter-American Press Association. The radios were not controlled to quite the same extent as the newspapers mainly because they lacked the audience to make them important (or perhaps because no one could assess the impact of radio on the country.) However, one case is interesting for pointing out government interference in the operation of a radio station. A particular radio station in Cochabamba had developed the practice in the period immediately prior to the November 1964 coup of reading public pronouncements of various political interest groups. The university students had been especially active and the station had edited several news releases to tone down the denunciations of the government by the students. One such announcement, however, was broadcast without editing and within twenty minutes the power for the station was cut-off. The director of the station discovered that the power had been cut by the power company on the direct orders of the local comando leader of the MNR, and after negotiations with local leaders and a promise to watch more carefully anti-government statements, the power was restored the following day.<sup>67</sup> Thus the general

---

<sup>67</sup> Interview with Father Leo Sommer, Cochabamba, March 13, 1969.

performance of the mass media structures was handicapped by a small audience, a low degree of professionalism in journalism, economic difficulties, colonization of the structures by various interest groups, and government interference.

A brief review of the prominent newspapers and radio stations should illustrate the degree to which they were dominated by individual and group interests and faithfully reflected those interests, thereby contributing to the fragmented pattern of political communication.

1. Newspapers. The largest and most widely-read newspaper in the country was El Diario with a circulation of approximately 20,000.<sup>68</sup> It was and is owned by the Carrasco family which was formerly identified with the rosca and the interests of the mineowners. Under the MNR it remained conservative and was highly critical of labor union leaders, general irresponsibility within the government, and the threat of communist penetration. It could be regarded as a reflection of the attitudes of the urban middle sectors and was generally in opposition to the MNR government although it was more objective in its reporting than many other newspapers.

Presencia was the organ of the Church in Bolivia and normally supported the Christian Democratic party. It was an outspoken opponent of the MNR and strongly opposed to communism, which it saw in many of the actions of labor leaders. Presencia's reading public was also limited to urban middle groups. It performed a useful task for discontented Movimientistas who could use its pages to voice criticisms of party and government actions.

---

<sup>68</sup>Most of the information for this section comes from the U.S. Army Area Handbook and personal observations of the writer. Another source of limited value is Luis E. Heredia, Prensa y nacionalismo (La Paz: Ed. del Estado, 1955.

Última Hora was the La Paz afternoon daily and was a supporter of conservative politics. Reportedly it was financed by former members of the oligarchy among them Demetrio Canelas, the owner of the confiscated Cochabamba newspaper, Los Tiempos. In its on-again, off-again career, Última Hora was an opponent of the MNR and highly critical of domestic and foreign policies.

La Nación was the official organ of the government and the MNR. As such it was not highly respected among the articulate elements of Pacena society, but it was an effective device for communicating the desires and plans of the government and the party. La Nación carried many stories of party activities and was useful in notifying party members of programs and activities. The reported circulation of 8,000 was probably exaggerated, but it was required reading for government and party officials.

In Cochabamba two dailies competed for much of the Movimientista period, but it is indicative of their economic difficulties that they frequently changed names, personnel, and ideology. (It should be added that two competing newspapers with such a potentially small market cannot run profitable enterprises.) El Mundo was not openly critical of the MNR, but it was pro-communist and may have been financed by the PCB. Prensa Libre, published between 1954 and 1960 as El Pueblo, was the official MNR paper for Cochabamba. In 1960 the workers took it over as cooperative venture, and it moved increasingly to be critical of the regime. It was consistently anti-United States and attacked the role of US aid in Bolivia.

Other newspapers serving special audiences included two representing

the POR and two the PCB. Lucha Obrera and Masas, the Porista newspapers were both highly critical of the government, but they spent more time fighting each other and thereby reduced their general effectiveness. The PCB published Unidad weekly scandal sheet which attacked government and U.S. officials in biting form. El Pueblo was a more respectable paper concentrating on constructive criticism of governmental actions.

2. Radios. The number of people who listened to radio stations is not known but the audience was probably very small until rather late in the Revolution. The number of stations was estimated at anywhere between 50 and 90, depending on the number of illegal, clandestine radio stations operating throughout the country at any given time.<sup>69</sup> Most of these illegal stations were operated by specific groups such as university students, unions, parties, and in one case Lloyd Aereo Boliviano. Of the regular, legal stations the most important bloc belonged to the Church which had five stations operating throughout the country. Of these the most controversial was Radio Pio XII located at Siglo XX mine. Pio XII was the subject of nine attacks by miners in twelve years and several times was forced to suspend operations. It was attempting to counter the "communist" propaganda then prevalent in the mines and was heavily inclined to broadcast in black and white terms. It was run by the Oblate fathers from Canada and was one of the few radio stations to concentrate on political matters.<sup>70</sup> The other Church-operated stations engaged in less

---

<sup>69</sup>U.S. Army Area Handbook, op. cit., pp. 387-91.

<sup>70</sup>Pio XII is still a controversial station. In 1968-69 it broadcast several criticisms of government suppression of the miners. It was, in turn, attacked by the government.

controversial activities and had normal programs of news, music, and education with a slight orientation towards the Church. However, it is interesting to note that programming was so poorly developed that in some cases it was difficult to tell if the radio was even supported by the Church.<sup>71</sup>

Radio Illimani was the official organ of the party and the government and spent a good amount of radio time on party affairs. Radio Altiplano was owned by the Carrasco family and reflected the conservative orientation of El Diario. Radio Méndez, although privately-owned, was more or less recognized as the voice of the PSD and was anti-MNR. Another legalized Pacena station, Radio Nacional, was owned by the factory workers union and was reportedly pro-and anti-MNR depending on the political tide, but was always strongly anti-U.S.

It was the clandestine radio stations which came and went rapidly where one could encounter specific groups using the radio to communicate particular interests and attitudes. These illegal stations were most often encountered in the mining areas and reflected political ideologies and differences of individual leaders. Among the more potent were Radio Nacional in Huanuni and Voz del Minero in Llallagua which competed with Pio XII for the attention of the miners. Both were under strong leftist influence. Other illegal stations reflected official or unofficial viewpoints of the POR, PIR, PCB, and other parties. For instance, Radio Falange Socialista Boliviana located in Potosi maintained a continual (if irregular) attack on the government and faithfully voiced the position of the FSB. It should be added that several international radio stations were heard in Bolivia and may have contributed to the

---

<sup>71</sup> In the case of the Church radios programming did not become fully organized until after 1964. The two stations operated by the Maryknoll priests were usually neutral in the presentation of the news. Only a station in Sucre operated by the Jesuits may have leaned towards support for the Palange.

fragmented pattern of political communication. Among these were the Voice of America, the BBC, Radio Moscow, Radio Peking, and Radio Havana. (The communist radios broadcast in Quechua and Aymara as well as Spanish and may have had some influence on the campesinos although studies of such influence have not been made.) All these radio stations are beamed into Bolivia on regular schedules and through presentation of their particular point of view may have had some effect on the pattern of political communication.

It can be seen that the mass media structures in the political system represented divisive cultural tendencies and aided in the fragmentation of the socialization process through the presentation of specific interests and attitudes. They were not autonomous in the sense of being neutral in the presentation of the news; rather they tended to reinforce already-held beliefs and attitudes about the government and the political system. The performance of the structures of political communication was an accurate reproduction of the fractionalized interest articulation and aggregation functions and the failure to achieve a consensus on the political values of the society.

The amount of information distortion in the Bolivian system was considerably higher than that encountered in Mexico. The President did not have the degree of power and control exercised by his Mexican counterpart; and therefore the channels of communication were not quite as open or reliable. It should be added that the personal search for power by individual politicians vis-a-vis the President probably helped to increase the information distortion from the bottom up. For instance, each politician was ready to tell the President his particular point of view



in order to enhance his own prestige rather than attempt to give an objective picture of the situation. To a certain extent there was, especially in the last term of Paz Estenssoro, a conscious effort to cut the President off from sources of information below and isolate and insulate him from sources of information other than those of his "kitchen cabinet."<sup>72</sup> Contributing factors to the distortion of information throughout the system would include the following; a tendency to voice all political communication in abstract, diffuse terms, making an understanding of specific events and demands difficult; domination of the structures of communication by definite interests who slanted the information one way or another; the organizational complexity of the party and the government which confronted the citizen with hopeless confusion as to where to present or receive information; and a tendency both within the bureaucracy and the political elite to protect one's own position through distortion of whatever information came up or down. An additional factor may have been the reluctance or inability of the President to explain to the citizens the reasons for governmental action. George Jackson Eder, the man responsible for the implementation of the Stabilization Plan, recalls that he tried to convince Siles to launch a propaganda campaign to win the support of the population for the Plan.<sup>73</sup> Eder recommended that

---

<sup>72</sup> Many Movimientistas blamed Federico Fortun Sanjinés for this isolation of the President. There was a feeling that if they could "get through" to Victor Paz there complaints would be heard. Interview with Nuflo Chavez Ortiz, La Paz, January 12, 1965.

<sup>73</sup> Translated from Presencia, March 17, 1969. Apparently this is from a recent book by Mr. Eder but the writer has been unable to encounter the book. Presencia did not give a source.

┌  
Siles employ the term "hero of Stabilization" to go with the President's<sup>461</sup>  
other titles of "hero of the Chaco War" and "hero of the Revolution."  
He failed because "we could never convince the President of the need  
for a consistent and continuous program of public information." If  
the President of the country was reluctant to explain governmental  
action to the people, it may be indicative of a general lack of in-  
formation (or desire to communicate information) throughout the  
political system. Therefore the level of distortion of information  
in the political system appears high and an accurate assessment of  
government policies by the citizenry, or of reactions and attitudes of  
the people by the leaders, virtually impossible.

#### E. Conclusions

With respect to the governmental and political communication  
functions, the following appear to be most appropriate in comparison  
between the Mexican and Bolivian political system:

1. In Mexico the President both makes and applies the rules. In  
Bolivia the President was severely handicapped in the performance of  
both functions and did not perform them to the extent of his Mexican  
counterpart. In both systems it should be noted that the legislature  
does not play an important role in the making of the rules. In Bolivia  
the existence of structures independent of the executive greatly reduced  
the capacity of the President to make laws and enforce decisions.  
Several structures, among them the autonomous agencies and the state  
and local governments, were not subordinated to the central government  
and they contributed to the fragmentation of the rule-making function.  
This was not true in Mexico. Finally, in Mexico the making of the rules  
was institutionalized through procedures developed within the office  
of the Presidency, but there is little evidence of such institutionalization  
└ in Bolivia.

2. While the President is the chief applier and enforcer of the rules in Mexico, the Bolivian President did not perform this function to the same extent. A general inability of the central government to impose its will on various structures accounts for the general failure to perform this function adequately. Perhaps more important in comparison with Mexico is that Bolivia lacked an efficient and devoted bureaucracy to assist the President in the application and enforcement of the rules.

3. Bolivia did not develop autonomous structures for the performance of the rule adjudication function. Although the judicial structures in Mexico were dominated by the executive, a growing concept of professionalism and the use of the writ of amparo aided in a more impartial administration of justice. Neither professionalism nor recourse were very evident in the Bolivian system. As a result individual and group grievances could not be resolved by autonomous structures and this increased the propensity for demands to erupt in the system in a sporadic and violent fashion. Both systems had an extensive apparatus for security, but the only comparison that appears valid is that Mexico seems more efficient in using its organization than Bolivia.

4. The structures of political communication reflected the fragmented political culture. Unlike Mexico there was no concept of neutral or impartial reporting of the news. Communication structures tended to reinforce divisive tendencies already existing. The mass media were dominated by special interests and not particularly socialized into the values of the National Revolution or those of the MNR. Information distortion was much higher throughout the system than in Mexico.

## CHAPTER VIII

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The original purpose of this research paper was to analyze the political system of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in Bolivia from 1952 to 1964. As a basis for understanding the task it was decided to utilize the functional framework provided by Gabriel Almond as a theoretical guide. It was also decided to use the Mexican political system as a model to establish various hypotheses to test in the Bolivian system. Two general restrictions were placed on the use of the theoretical guide and the Mexican model. In the first place the decision was taken to restrict the functional analysis to the system maintenance and conversion functions. Second, in the comparison of the two systems the major focus was to be on the operation of the two political parties, the MNR and the PRI, within their respective systems. Although each of the systems was to be analyzed and compared using the functional categories of Almond, it was hoped that restriction to the activities of the party would somewhat curtail the scope of the paper. The conclusion which follows is divided into two parts: the first is a summary of the empirical findings relating to the Mexican and Bolivian analysis in an empirical case.

#### A. Comparison of the Mexican and Bolivian Political Cultures

1. The Pre-Revolutionary Systems. Both Mexico and Bolivia experienced social and economic Revolutions which completely altered the structure of the countries. In both countries the political revolution has lagged behind, but definite changes are occurring which indicate the establishment of a

political system fundamentally different from that which existed in the pre-revolutionary regimes. In Mexico the Revolution was a drawn-out affair which some consider still to be in process. In Bolivia the Revolution occurred in a short time and with less violence and bloodshed, but it is also difficult to see any basic changes in the operation of the political system.<sup>1</sup> The pre-revolutionary political systems of both countries were dominated by a small elite which did not associate itself with the country. Both were backward economically, divided into social classes that were so rigid they could be classified as caste systems, repressive in ignoring the demands of the majority, and marked by political systems which were not integrated, not participative, and not even recognized by most of the citizens. In both Mexico and Bolivia the majority were parochials in the sense that they did not relate to either the input or output structures of the systems; nor did they participate in the system. Alienation from both the concept of the nation and the political system were characteristic of the peasant masses. The participants numbered a few who normally directed the system for their own benefit. Historically both societies had experienced approximately the same type of development; both sprang from ancient civilizations of rigid control through authoritarian structures, then succumbed to the Spanish colonial system with its strong emphasis on authoritarianism, and finally underwent the vacillation of the Republican period when they were ruled by a series of irresponsible caudillos and generally ineffective civilians--- but always by an anti-egalitarian elite. In both political systems the

---

<sup>1</sup>One observer maintains that the MNR built its legitimacy on the existing legitimacy of the pre-1952 political system. See James M. Malloy, "Bolivia: A Study in Revolution," (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1967).

cultural attitudes encountered were the results of this historical development. The Indian masses had resorted to a "stoic fatalism," a general resignation to life that effectively cut them off from the social, economic, and political life of the nation. In addition there was a lack of personal security throughout both systems which reinforced tendencies to identify with local patrones, caudillos or communities, thereby increasing divisive inclinations through reinforcement of regionalism. In both Mexico and Bolivia the lack of personal security resulted in attitudes of ambivalence toward authority and the political system.

2. The Post-Revolutionary Political Cultures. After their respective Revolutions the political cultures of both systems underwent similar changes. For instance, both changed from essentially parochial cultures to primarily subject cultures with the incorporation of the Indian masses in terms of relating to the output structures of the system. The number of participants in both systems also increased. There are, however, differences in the two political cultures. Bolivia has been much less successful in reducing sub-cultural attitudes based on local and regional affiliations. A major handicap of the MNR regime was its inability to reduce these local allegiances and transfer them to the national level. Another failure of the MNR regime was its inability to create system pride among certain elements of the population. Mexico evolved a system in which the average citizen takes pride and with which he can identify through the President. This was not as evident in Bolivia. Although the campesinos may have had some pride in the system and their expanded role in it, the important middle sectors did not identify with or have pride in the Movimientista system and, therefore, did not generally support it. In the Mexican system the elite controls the entrance of

demands into the system (using the PRI as one mechanism) thereby increasing the sense of participation, but in Bolivia the MNR was not successful in this regard and may have contributed to the alienation of important groups in the society. In both systems a large segment of the population shows some degree of personal insecurity, an identity crisis which leads to the reinforcement of authoritarian structures, while at the same time contributing to a general apathy on the part of the masses. While the majority of citizens of both Mexico and Bolivia may have been personally insecure, the important difference is in the elite. The Revolutionary Family of Mexico is not insecure, rather they are fixed in their positions and know exactly what they are doing. On the other hand their Bolivian counterparts were extremely insecure due to factors inherent in the revolutionary process and the lack of basic agreement among the political elite. The insecurity of the Bolivian elite reinforced the divisive tendencies in the country and helped to prevent the unification of the leaders at the national level.

## B. Functional Comparison of the Mexican and Bolivian Systems

1. Political Socialization. In the political socialization function the most important finding was the emergence of a fundamental consensus on the values and ideals of the Mexican political system and the lack of such a development in Bolivia. Both ideologies contained elements of nationalism (in the sense of constructing a viable, integrated nation), of social and economic development, and of political liberalism. However, the Mexican Revolutionary Creed was accepted by the elite and the people; the institutions associated with the ideology among them the PRI were also accepted as part of the ideology. In Bolivia, although there was some agreement on the necessity for the revolutionary reforms, there was not a basic agreement between the elite or the various political groups about the scope of

the new ideology. More important, there was basic disagreement concerning the institutions and structures created as part of the ideology of the Revolución Nacional. Whereas in Mexico the PRI was more or less accepted as a structure of the revolutionary ideology, the Bolivian MNR was not.

Neither was there agreement on such institutions as COMIBOL, the agrarian reform structures, the COB, and so forth. Finally, in the construction of the "Revolutionary Creed" the Mexicans were able to formalize their ideology in the Constitution of Querétaro thereby enhancing its legitimacy as an ideology and making it easier for the socializing structures to transmit the new values. In Bolivia there was no formalization of the ideology of the Revolution; thus, it was more difficult for the citizens to understand it as well as for the structures to communicate and transmit the goals and values to the population.

In the performance of the socialization function there were discontinuities found in both systems. In Mexico the major discontinuity was that between the ideals of the revolutionary ideology, with its emphasis on democracy and equalitarianism, in contrast with patterns of strong authoritarianism in the primary structures. In Bolivia this discontinuity between expressed ideals of democracy and actual authoritarianism was probably less important; the major difficulty was the failure to develop a specific socialization process for the revolutionary ideology. The chief reason for this failure was the maintenance of specialized socialization into attitudes contrary to the revolutionary ideology in the primary structures. In middle sector families there was a reluctance to accept the incorporation of the campesino and the increased power of organized labor; in some campesino suspicion and alienation towards the political system were maintained; and in



the mining areas hostility towards the outside world, including the political system, was reinforced. The schools, communities, families, work groups, and other primary and secondary structures, due to their lack of acceptance of the revolutionary ideology, tended to perpetuate subcultural differences and reduce the effectiveness of socialization into national values.

2. Political Recruitment. Perhaps the key difference between the Bolivian and Mexican systems relates to the elite. In Mexico the elite was a unified group---signified by the term "Family"---supporting the revolutionary ideology, the existing political system, and their own dominance of that system. In Bolivia the elite was not unified, was divided by ideological and personal differences, and could not reach basic agreement on the fundamentals of the political system or their role in it. The Mexican elite controlled the recruitment function but through periodical replacement of technical and administrative personnel (every six years) was able to offer those outside the government the opportunity to participate and receive the benefits of the system. In general the Bolivian system was closed, there was seldom recruitment of new elements into leadership ranks, and serious defections occurred in certain ranks especially among the young people. When new elements were recruited rather late in the Revolution, the politicians and entrenched leaders tended to reject the new técnicos. Multiplicity and interchangeability of roles within the elite was high in both countries. However, the extent of the practice was probably more important in Bolivia for two reasons: due to a lack of recruitment of new personnel, the existing leaders tended to co-opt what new positions were created; second, in Mexico a degree of institutionalization has taken place which mitigated against personal relations being the primary base of leadership communication. In

Bolivia, however, the number of leaders was restricted to the point that personal relations were far more important and institutional channels may not have had the opportunity to develop. Finally, and most important with respect to the recruitment function, the Mexican system evolved a procedure for the selection of the President which has more or less been institutionalized or at least does not offer a point at which the system is likely to break down. On the other hand Bolivia did not evolve such a procedure and the question of Presidential succession was a major cause in the decline of the official party as dissident groups followed their discontented leaders out of the MNR over selection of the Presidential candidate of the party.

3. Interest Articulation. In the articulation of interests it was found that the major interest groups in the Mexican system were controlled by the Revolutionary Family to the extent that they made their demands through the structures supported by the elite, i.e., the elite itself, the party structure, the administrative structures, and the office of the Presidency. The major interest groups in Bolivia were not controlled by the elite, were often quite independent of it, and were not forced to channel their demands through party or government structures dominated by "an" elite or the President. This independence enjoyed by interest groups was most prominent in the case of labor. Whereas in Mexico labor was almost totally dominated by the government, the Bolivian workers, especially the miners, were almost totally independent of the MNR and the government. This was due to the power of their own militias (and lack of military power of the central government), their anti-government attitude instilled by years of fighting the oligarchy, and the control over COMIBOL, the major government structure in their lives. Control obrero and co-gobierno were two ideological

banners which separated the workers from the control of the party and the government. The independence of the labor movement was a serious obstacle to the successful solution of social, economic, and political problems by the Movimiento. In both systems it was found that labor suffers from the "iron law of oligarchy" in leadership roles, and this stagnancy resulted in the maintenance of the status quo in Mexico and near anarchy in Bolivia. One major difference stemming from the control of the labor movement was that the Mexican worker has been sacrificed to the general demands of the economy. On the other hand the Bolivian worker was normally very successful in the presentation of demands, at least until the period of stalemate initiated in 1957.

Other groups in the society reflected the basic difference of government control and direction in Mexico with independence and fragmentation encountered in Bolivia. Whereas in Mexico the chief divisions in agriculture were based on types of production, specifically between small, communal, and commercial farms, the differences in Bolivia were based mainly on regional and racial divisions existing prior to the Revolution, although the pattern of agrarian reform and the role of the campesino sindicatos did have importance. The agricultural sector in Bolivia, not controlled from the top, was divided and subject to the political battles for control over the peasants by individual politicians. In both systems it was noted that caciquismo continued, but in Mexico the local chiefs were dominated by the elite while in Bolivia they enjoyed far more independence. Two major groups, the military and the students, appear to have become reconciled to the existing political system in Mexico, but in Bolivia they continued to be key centers of opposition to the MNR government and played influential roles

in the coup of November, 1964. Equally significant, the middle sectors in Mexico were supporters of the revolutionary regime and major benefactors of the resources of the system. In Bolivia the middle groups were alienated early from the government and did not accord it support or receive much in terms of satisfying their demands. The bureaucrats, business leaders, professionals, teachers, and other elements of the middle sectors were not strong supporters of the regime and often entered active opposition to insure the defeat of the MNR. Similarly, the Mexican opposition parties generally acknowledged the legitimacy of the political system, supported the revolutionary ideology, and worked within the system to gain power. The opposition parties in Bolivia did not accept the MNR system and worked actively to destroy it. Finally, Mexico was not confronted by an outside interest group making the most important decisions for the political system. In Bolivia the two most crucial economic decisions, the Stabilization and Triangular Plans, ones with devastating political results, were the direct result of United States pressure on the government. There is also some speculation that divisions within the official American community led to support for those who were to overthrow the MNR government.

The methods used to articulate demands also showed striking differences. Violence as a method has been greatly reduced in the Mexican system whereas in Bolivia physical demonstration and violence probably remained the major means of articulating demands. Strikes, demonstrations, walkouts, use of private armies, and other physical methods of presenting demands proliferated throughout the political system. Both elite representation and institutional channels were used much less in Bolivia than in Mexico. One reason for the failure to utilize elite representation was the divisions

existing at the top levels. Although Bolivia did have many channels open for making demands, there was not the degree of control over these channels found in Mexico and efforts to institutionalize the presentation of demands generally failed. In both systems it was found very difficult to classify the interest articulation function in terms of the styles employed.

4. Interest Aggregation. Perhaps the most important and significant comparative finding was that interest aggregation did take place in Mexico, but there was an absence of the performance of the function in Bolivia. (The problem may well result from the definition of interest aggregation given by Almond; this will be discussed in the subsequent section.) The President was the "final aggregator" in Mexico, but his Bolivian counterpart lacked the necessary power to perform the function adequately; in fact, no structure possessed enough power to effectively aggregate demands and there was a subsequent paralysis of the decision-making apparatus of the government. Whereas the Mexican elite, the administrative structures, and the political party all served as useful instruments in aiding the President to aggregate demands, each was found to be relatively useless in the Bolivian context. The major failure of the MNR to serve as an aggregative mechanism could be traced to the lack of control over subordinate organizations, and ineffective and inefficient lines of communication and transmission of orders and demands. Nor was the official Bolivian party as effective in the performance of such specific tasks as communication, mediation, or the selection of candidates for office. The MNR was more useful as an electoral instrument for controlling the vote. The breakdown of the aggregation function had important consequences for the other functions since it reinforced the fragmented methods of interest articulation, and also effected the performance of the rule making and rule enforcement functions.

5. Rule Making and Rule Enforcement. In Mexico the President was not only the chief aggregator of demands, he was also the major rule maker and rule enforcer. However, the ability of the Bolivian President to perform these two functions was restricted. In the making of the rules for the system the President was handicapped by the existence of structures independent of his office, as well as the ability of certain interest groups to circumscribe the central government. Among the more important structures were the semi-autonomous agencies and the state and local governments; neither of which was under the control of the President to the extent found in Mexico. The diffusion and dispersal of power within the Bolivian system, based on independent militias and lack of control by the national government, created autonomous bases of power outside the jurisdiction of the executive. It is significant that in both systems the legislature did not play a prominent role in the making of the rules. Perhaps the key difference between the two systems was the degree to which the rule making function was institutionalized in the office of the Mexican President, and the lack of such a development in Bolivia. Because of the methods of articulating demands and the lack of aggregation of those demands, so few decisions were taken that institutionalization was almost impossible in the decision-making process. The dependence on elite representation and personal connections also contributed to the failure of institutional procedures or regular channels for making the rules.

What rules were made were difficult to enforce. At first this was due to the almost total lack of power of the central government over such areas as the countryside and the mines. Later, several other factors were equally important: a general disregard for the rules prevalent in the society, a

lack of resources which curtailed the capacity of the government to carry out those rules which were made, regional centers of power, and lack of transportation and communication lines to integrate the nation. Most important, however, was the lack of a well-trained bureaucracy to assist the executive in the application of the laws. The Mexican bureaucrats were a mainstay of the revolutionary government and carried out their tasks with an esprit de corps simply not encountered in Bolivia. Organizational complexity and a failure to define responsibilities and duties were other reasons for the inadequate enforcement of the laws. Still others included poor recruitment practices, turnover at higher levels preventing the emergence of consistent policies, a general lack of initiative in the bureaucracy, and the colonization of bureaucratic structures by interest groups. Finally, the bureaucracy never developed much enthusiasm for the MNR regime; as a consequence it was not an ardent supporter of the system.

6. Rule Adjudication. The Mexican President maintained his dominance of the political system in the adjudication function through control over the appointment of judges and the security organs of the state. However, the individual citizen had some recourse against arbitrary administrative action by using the writ of amparo to review the actions of lower officials in the performance of their duties. In Bolivia there was approximately the same degree of control over the judicial structures by the executive; there was also less professionalism than encountered in Mexico. The pattern of autonomy of interest groups was maintained in the case of the miners and campesinos by a separate system of courts which they dominated dealing with their specific problems. No such practice as the writ of amparo ever developed in Bolivia; and because of the lack of impartiality in the adjudication of the rules, this may have reinforced the tendencies of interest groups to

resort to physical confrontation in the articulation of their demands. Both systems depended on a strong security apparatus to prevent subversion. Mexico's security agencies were probably more efficient(although they may have faced less active subversion because of the stability of the system) while those of Bolivia were more likely to interfere with individual rights and resort to physical punishment, thereby contributing to citizen alienation.

7. Political Communication. The structures in the Mexican system are effective agents for communicating the revolutionary ideology and for endorsing the present system. In Bolivia this was not the case. Because there was no consensus on the fundamental values of the system, the structures of communication tended to perpetuate the fragmented political culture and the equally fragmented socialization process. The primary structures such as the family, school, and community as well as the mass media communicated particularistic values and attitudes. The mass media did not enjoy the autonomy nor the impartiality and objectivity found in Mexico. There was also a higher degree of information distortion found in the Bolivia system than in Mexico.

In summary, although the two party systems appear somewhat similar in their formal organization, they differed radically in actual behavior patterns. The major failure of the political system created by the MNR seems to have been the inability to create the necessary structures to adequately perform the functions. In fact throughout this comparative analysis the key structures encountered in Bolivia were unable to match their Mexican counterparts in the performance of any given function. The major breakdown centers around the lack of a unified elite, of a strong and efficient President, and of a devoted bureaucracy. Without a center of power which can control the constituent elements of the political system, it appears impossible for other



structures in the system to perform the functions which might normally be expected. The most notable structure failing in this regard was the official party itself. The MNR served neither as a mechanism for unifying the elite, for aggregating the demands of interest groups or for aiding the President in the performance of other functions. The interesting aspect is that the MNR started as a rather strong organization consisting of important leaders and groups in Bolivia and then disintegrated. The PRI, on the other hand, began as a weak confederation of independent chieftains and then grew into a capable organization under the domination of a united elite and a strong executive. The MNR had its opportunity (under more auspicious conditions than in Mexico) and failed; its failure may prove to be an important handicap for the future political development of Bolivia.

### C. A Critique of Almond's Functional Theory

In discussing functional theory it may be useful to employ the types of criticisms found in the first chapter: ideological, logical, and methodological. However, since the logical criticism relates to the use of functional categories as requisites for the system, and it has already been stated that the functional categories in this study were not used as requisites, the logical criticism, with an important exception to be noted, will not be discussed. It is also possible to dispense with two ideological criticisms. The first which relates to the lack of neutrality of the observer and the bias of the writer has already been mentioned. The second is that of arguing that functional analysis implies that a system is "developing" towards something. Although the paper does implicitly accept the idea that it would have been far better for the Bolivian system to have evolved in a similar direction to that of Mexico, it is not being said that it was the

only way the system could have evolved. This is rather obvious in the comparisons made. In general a static picture of two political systems was compared without the necessity of implying they were going "up" or "down," "developing," or "modernizing."

However, two other ideological criticisms of functional analysis require further investigation, namely, the necessity of studying the entire unit of analysis and the inherent defense of the status quo. The organic whole of functional analysis, it has been argued, makes it extremely difficult for the researcher to separate out one particular structure or function. Interdependence of functions and structures creates an ever-increasing scope to any piece of empirical research. The original focus of this paper was on the operation of the political party in both systems, but it has been very difficult to maintain that focus. In both the Mexican and Bolivian political systems, although for different reasons, the party was found to be tangential to other structures which performed certain functions. In Mexico the PRI was a useful instrument for the President in the performance of the aggregation function as well as the rule making and rule application functions. Although the PRI played some role in the performance of these functions, it did not play the key role, and concentration on the party would have led to a misleading analysis of the Mexican political system.<sup>2</sup> In Bolivia the MNR was also tangential to the performance of certain functions, primarily because the functions themselves were not performed or performed inadequately by both the party and by other structures. Once again, a focus centering around the party would not have been very meaningful because it was not a

---

<sup>2</sup>As Brandenburg charges Robert Scott. See Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 144.

key structure in the performance of the functions. Therefore, the intended focus of the paper, on the political parties, has not been maintained and it has been found necessary to include the functions performed in all their aspects. That is, any and all structures which might have performed the function had to be taken into account. A related factor, not treated in this paper, is that a better understanding of the two political systems would require analysis of the capabilities functions. For instance, one cannot really understand the performance of the aggregation function in Bolivia unless there is an equal understanding of the limited resource allocation for the system. Many of the difficulties of the MNR regime were created simply because of the general lack of resources. This means that an adequate comprehension of the political system---or virtually any structure within that system---would have to include an analysis of all the functions. The necessity to include all the functions thereby greatly increases the scope of the study and may be a handicap to the use of functional theory in a limited empirical study; even if the researcher establishes artificial limits to his study, he will find it necessary to cross those boundaries because of the interdependence of the functions. Therefore, the criticism that functional analysis requires the study of the entire unit of analysis appears to be substantially justified, and the theory may be of limited value in empirical studies of restricted functions or structures.

It should be pointed out that the very interdependence of the functions and structures, although a handicap to limited research is useful in that it permits the student to see the relationship between certain functions, structures, and their performance. For instance, once it became apparent that the articulation and aggregation functions were performed as they were in Bolivia, it became obvious that the other functions would reflect these

performances. Or, as in the case of socialization, when it was realized that there was not a consensus on the fundamental values of the polity, that socialization structures maintained a fragmented political culture, one could expect to find certain residual effects in the articulation, aggregation, and communication functions. Inherent in this interdependence of functional analysis is the possibility that the student may see relationships which do not in fact exist. One hopes that this has not occurred in the present paper, but there is a very grave danger in functional analysis that once a function appears to be performed badly the researcher will simply look for similar results in other functions. This handicap is not necessarily peculiar to functional analysis, and may be encountered in other theories as well, but it should be guarded against carefully.

The second ideological criticism against functional theory, that of being oriented towards a defense of the status quo, is an important criticism of the present paper. The bias may not be with functional theory per se, nor with the defense of the status quo---which would be somewhat difficult in a revolutionary setting; rather it stems from an inherent inability of the researcher to see politics in any other way than that common to the United States. Reference is made here particularly to the mediation, compromise, rational solution of political difficulties. These are the methods of politics in the United States. They are also implicitly the methods endorsed by functional analysis, especially with regard to the articulation of demands, their aggregation into policies, and conversion into effective decisions. Throughout the political process emphasis is placed on mediation, on bargaining, on compromise between rational men. Obviously these are not the methods used in Bolivia, although Mexico does appear closer to the U.S.

model. In Bolivia political differences were not resolved by bargaining, by mutual negotiation over the conference table; instead it was "who got there firstest with the mostest." Many of the implicit and explicit criticisms leveled in this paper against the Bolivian political system have stemmed from the bias of the writer reinforced by the bias of functional analysis which does place such a great emphasis on rational and peaceful solutions to political problems. It may well be, as James Payne has discovered in Peru, that violence and physical confrontation are the accepted and legitimate methods of making demands in Bolivia.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps political violence is part and parcel of the Bolivian political experience; equally, impartial adjudication of the rules is a concept alien to the political culture. However, because of personal bias substantiated by the inherent bias of functional analysis, the student cannot see the performance of these functions in any other manner than as deviations from the norm of the United States.

The failure to account for these deviations can be traced back to a major fault of functional theory, especially that of Gabriel Almond: namely, the failure to include within the theory any concept of dysfunctional analysis. It is quite possible that the performance of certain functions may be dysfunctional to the system itself. In Bolivia the lack of aggregation led to a paralysis of the decision-making apparatus and to eventual defeat for the regime. The major difficulty encountered with dysfunctional analysis is that in order to adopt the concept, the researcher will be in the real danger of erecting functional requisites for the system. It has already been seen that a major logical criticism of functional analysis

---

<sup>3</sup>James L. Payne, Labor and Politics in Peru (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

is the use of tautological syllogisms to "prove" the necessity of certain functions for the system. The addition of dysfunctional analysis carries with it the suggestion that if certain functions are not performed, the system will collapse; and therefore, those functions are requisite needs for the system. There does not appear any way out of this vicious circle. Nonetheless, this writer would suggest that functional analysis attempt to establish some sort of standard for the performance of the functions. Perhaps a concept such as the under- or over-performance of functions would prove useful.<sup>4</sup> In fact the paper has used such a classification in the sense that it has been stated that a function was not performed "adequately" for the system. Whether one uses a concept such as "under- or over-performance" or "adequate" and "inadequate," the danger is still present that the functions will be requisites for the system. On the other hand, without such concepts functional analysis will not be as useful a guide as it could be. The problem is complex, but it would seem possible to say that the functions were not requisites for the system even though they may be under- or over-performed. Essentially that is what was done at the outset; it was specified that the functional categories adopted by Almond for use in the paper were not functional requisites; they were units of analysis. It would seem equally facile to state that there would be an effort to measure the performance of the functions by some yardstick. Certainly those who endorse or utilize

---

<sup>4</sup>The writer is indebted to Professor Roland H. Ebel, Tulane University, for the suggestion to incorporate the concept of under- and over-performance in functional theory.

functional analysis will have to devote themselves to the general problem of measuring the performance of the functions.

A minor methodological criticism of functional theory, that of being such a "grand theory" that empirical research is cumbersome and time-consuming, is more or less correct. The excessive length of this paper, together with the time necessary to write it (more than three years) are probably indicative of the difficulty this mode of analysis presents to the student. It should be remembered that the capabilities functions were not even discussed, and this aspect would have added to the length and time involved. The basic problem stems from the interdependence of the functions and the necessity to continually expand the scope of investigation to include all the nooks and crannies of the political system. Although the writer would tend to believe that the expenditure was merited by the results, he would warn future students to be prepared for an exhaustive effort if functional analysis is employed as the tool of investigation.

A more serious methodological criticism of functional theory, the failure to operationally define key concepts, has proved to be a major handicap to the present effort. Throughout the paper there has been a tendency to switch from an analysis of the function (as in the case of socialization and articulation) to the structure (as in aggregation and rule making), and the reason may be the inadequate definitions of the terms to begin with--- another reason may be that it is easier to switch the focus of analysis when a certain function is being under- or over-performed. Perhaps the major failure to operationally define a key function was in the case of interest aggregation. The conversion of demands into "major policy alternatives," as has been seen is not a very clear definition of interest aggregation and creates some problems for the field researcher. When does a policy become 'major'?

And one does not have the faintest idea what the 'more inclusive levels of the combinatory process' refers to in the Bolivian context. The problem appears to be that Almond has used the model of the United States where one does not have much difficulty in spotting major policy decisions. In Bolivia this was not the case; one simply cannot determine when a major policy decision was taken (with two exceptions), if they were taken. The function of interest aggregation, therefore, requires a more precise definition if it is to prove useful to the empirical researcher. Another function which may require a more rigorous definition is that of rule adjudication. Rule adjudication itself involves rule making and rule application---a factor that Almond no doubt realizes---but the difficulty of separating out the structures in the performance of one or another of these functions would indicate that a better definition of the rule adjudication function is needed. Although one can argue that a more precise definition of the key functions is needed, it may well be that further empirical research is also needed to improve the basic definitions.

The writer would make one positive recommendation: namely that Almond eliminate for the present his subdivisions based on styles in certain functional categories. It has been seen that an analysis of the style of interest articulation was not very meaningful in either Mexico or Bolivia. Neither were the styles included under the interest aggregation function, those he calls pragmatic-bargaining, absolute-value, and traditionalistic styles, particularly useful to the present analysis. Although the use of Parsonian variables may have some value in theoretical analysis, it is suggested that perhaps a refinement of the concept of style is needed before it will prove very useful to empirical research.



All is not lost for functional analysis; in spite of the criticisms leveled against it here and elsewhere, and in spite of the vagaries of comprehensive theories in the world of modern political science, there is some hope. The writer would suggest that functional analysis has proved to be a useful analytical tool in the comparison of the Mexican and Bolivian political systems, and that further research using it as a theoretical guide would lead to the necessary refinement and precision to make functional analysis an integral part of comparative politics.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### A. General and Mexico

#### Books

- Alexander, Robert J., Communism in Latin America. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Prophets of the Revolution. New York: Macmillan, 1962.
- Almond, Gabriel A., and Coleman, James S., (eds.). The Politics of Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
- \_\_\_\_\_, and Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_, and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Brandenburg, Frank, The Making of Modern Mexico. Englewood Cliff, N. J.; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.
- Cline, Howard F., Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940-1960. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_, The United States and Mexico. Rev. Ed., New York: Atheneum, 1968.
- Coleman, James S. (ed.), Education and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.
- Cumberland, Charles C., Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952.
- Dahl, Robert, Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.
- Deutsch, Karl, et. al., The Integration of Political Communities. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_, The Nerves of Government. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.
- DuVerger, Maurice, Political Parties. London: Methuen and Co., 1954.
- Easton, David, The Political System. New York: John Wiley and Son, 1953.

- Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley and Son, 1965.
- Edelmann, Alexander T., Latin American Government and Politics (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1965.)
- Glade, William P., and Anderson, Charles W. The Political Economy of Mexico. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961.
- Holt, Robert T., and Turner, John E., The Political Basis of Economic Development. New York: D. Van Nostran Co., 1966.
- James, Daniel, Mexico and the Americas. New York: Praeger, 1963.
- Johnson, John J., Continuity and Change in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_, The Military and Society in Latin America. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.)  
last part of book on Brazil, not part of Spanish-America.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.
- \_\_\_\_\_, (ed.) The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.
- Kling, Merle, A Mexican Interest Group in Action. Englewood: Prentice-Hall, 1961.
- Kornhauser, William, The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe: Free Press, 1959.
- Lewis, Oscar, The Children of Sánchez. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlán Revisited. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Five Families. New York; Mentor Books, 1959.
- Lieuwen, Edwin, Arms and Politics in Latin America. 2nd ed. rev. New York: Praeger, 1961.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics. New York: Doubleday, 1960.
- Maier, Joseph, and Weatherhead, Richard W., (eds.) Politics of Change in Latin America. New York: Praeger, 1964.
- Martz, John D., Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

- Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure. rev. ed., New York: The Free Press, 1957.  
"Manifest and Latent Functions", pp. 19-84.
- Michels, Robert, Political Parties. New York: Collier Books, 1962
- Needler, Martin C., (ed.) Political Systems of Latin America. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964.  
Robert J. Alexander, "Bolivia: the Government and Politics of The National Revolution," 319-50.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Latin American Politics in Perspective. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963.
- Neumann, Sigmund, Modern Political Parties. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956.
- Padgett, L. Vincent, The Mexican Political System. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966.
- Parsons, Talcott, The Social System. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951.  
"The Functional Prerequisites of Social Systems" pp. 24-36.
- \_\_\_\_\_, et. al., Theories of Society. New York: The Free Press, 1961.
- Payne, James L., Labor and Politics in Peru. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.
- Paz, Octavio, The Labryinth of Solitude: Life and Thought in Mexico. New York: Grove Press, 1961.
- Pye, Lucian W., Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_, and Verba, Sidney. (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.  
Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," 3-26.  
Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," 330-395.  
Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture", 512-560
- \_\_\_\_\_, Politics, Personality and National Building: Burma's Search for Identity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
- Radcliffe-Brown, A.R., Structure and Function in Primitive Society. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952.  
"On the Concept of Function in Social Science," pp. 178-87.
- Redfield, Robert, A Village that Chose Progress: Chan Kom Revisited. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950.
- Scott, Robert E., Mexican Government in Transition. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959.

Sigmund, Paul E., (ed.) The Ideologies of the Developing Nations., New York: Praeger, 1963.

Silvert, Kalman H., The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America. New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1962.

Simpson, Leslie Byrd, Many Mexicos. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964.

Tannenbaum, Frank, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1960.

Tucker, William P., The Mexican Government Today . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957.

Verba, Sidney and Pye, Lucian, Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.

Wilkie, James W., The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

#### Articles

Alexander, Robert J., "The Latin American Aprista Parties," Political Quarterly, Vol. XX (1949), 236-247.

Almond, Gabriel A., "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, Vol. XVIII, (August, 1956) pp. 391-409.

\_\_\_\_\_, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," American Political Science Review LII: (March, 1958), pp. 270-282.

\_\_\_\_\_, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics. Vol. XVII (January, 1965) 183-214.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Political Systems and Political Change," The American Behavioral Scientist. Vol. VI. (June, 1963), pp. 3-10.

Brandenburg, Frank R., "Organized Business In Mexico," Inter-American Economic Affairs. Vol. 12 (Winter, 1958), pp. 26-50.

Bredemeier, Harry C., "The Methodology of Functionalism," American Sociological Review. Vol. 20 (April, 1955) pp. 173-80.

Cardenas, Leonard, "Contemporary Problems of Local Government in Mexico," Western Political Quarterly. Vol. XVIII (December, 1965), pp. 858-65.

- Cochrane, James D., "Mexico's 'New Cientificos': The Diaz Ordaz Cabinet," Inter-American Economic Affairs. Vol. 21 (Summer, 1967), pp. 61-72.
- Davis, Kingsley, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology," American Sociological Review. Vol. 24., (December, 1959), 757-772.
- Dowse, Robert E., "A Functionalist's Logic," World Politics. Vol. XVIII (July, 1966), pp. 607-22.
- Fitzgibbon, Russell H., "The Party Potpourri in Latin America," Western Political Quarterly Vol. X (March, 1957), pp. 3-22.
- Gil, Frederico, "Responsible Parties in Latin America," Journal of Politics, Vol. XV (August, 1953), pp. 333-348.
- Hempel, Carl G., "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in Llewellyn Gross (ed.) Symposium on Sociological Theory. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1959, pp. 271-307.
- Horowitz, Irving Louis, "Sociology and Politics: The Myth of Functionalism Revisited," Journal of Politics Vol. 25. (May, 1963) pp. 248-264.
- Kalleberg, Arthur L., "The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems," World Politics Vol. XIX (October, 1966), pp. 69-82.
- Klapp, Orrin E., and Padgett, L. Vincent, "Power Structure and Decision-Making in a Mexican Border City," American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 65 (January, 1960), pp. 400-06.
- Leiserson, Avery, "The Place of Party in the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review. Vol. LI (December, 1957), pp. 943-954.
- Lieuwen, Edwin, "Neo-Militarism in Latin America: The Kennedy Administration's Inadequate Response," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XVI (Spring, 1963) pp. 11-19.
- Martindale, Don, (ed.), "Functionalism in the Social Sciences," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Monograph No. 5 (February, 1965.)
- Martz, John D., "Dilemmas in the Study of Latin American Political Parties," Journal of Politics, Vol 26 (August, 1964), pp. 509-531.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Place of Latin America in the Study of Comparative Politics," Journal of Politics Vol. 28 (February, 1966) pp. 57-80.
- Needleman, Carolyn and Needleman, Martin, "Who Rules Mexico?: A Critique of Some Current Views on the Mexican Political Process," Journal of Politics, Vol. 31 (November, 1969), pp. 1011-34.
- Padgett, L. Vincent, "Mexico's One-Party System: A Re-Evaluation," American Political Science Review, LI (December, 1957), pp. 995-1008.

- Scott, Robert E., "Budget Making in Mexico," Inter-American Economic Affairs. Vol. 9 (Autumn, 1955), pp. 3-20.
- Stevens, Evelyn P., "Mexican Machismo: Politics and Value Orientations," Vol. XVIII, (December, 1965) pp. 848-857.
- Stokes, William S., "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly V (September, 1952) pp. 445-468.
- Taylor, Phillip B., "Mexican Elections of 1958: Affirmations of Authoritarianism," Western Political Quarterly Vol. XIII (September, 1960) pp. 722-741.

### B. BOLIVIA

#### Books, Pamphlets, and Documents

- AcháAlvarez, Enrique and Ramos y Ramos, Mario H., Unzaga: mártir de América. Buenos Aires: Talleres Artes Gráficas Modernas, 1960.
- Aguiló, P. Federico, El contingente de Bolivianos en el exterior. La Paz: Ed. Don Bosco, 1968.
- Alcazar, Moises, Drama y comedia en el congreso. La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1957.
- Alexander, Robert J, The Bolivian National Revolution. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958.
- Almaraz, Sergio, Petróleo en Bolivia. La Paz: Editorial Juventud, 1958.
- Almaraz Paz, Sergio, El poder y la caída. La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Requiem para una república. La Paz: Universidad de San Andrés, 1969.
- Anaya, Ricardo, Nacionalización de las minas de Bolivia. Cochabamba: Imp. Universitaria., 1952.
- Anonymous (government?), El comunismo en los sindicatos obreros. n.p. n.p., n.d. (La Paz: Editorial del Estado, 1963.)
- Anonymous, ¿Por qué cayó el MNR? Cochabamba: n.p., 1967.  
This pamphlet was reportedly written by Luis Antezana, Sergio Almaraz, and Augusto Céspedes.
- Antezana, Luis, La lucha entre Cliza y Ucuireña. Cochabamba: n.p., 1960.
- \_\_\_\_\_, El Movimiento obrero boliviano. n.p.: n.p., 1966.

- Antezana, Luis E., Resultados de la reforma agraria en Bolivia. Cochabamba: Imprenta F.O. Guenca Sucs, 1955.
- \_\_\_\_\_, La retirada de Colquiri. La Paz: Editorial Burillo, 1964.
- Arce, Armando, Los fusilamientos del 20 de noviembre de 1944 y el Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario. La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1952.
- Arguedas, Alcides, Obras Completas, Mexico, D.F.: Aguilar, 1959.
- Arnade, Charles W, The Emergence of the Republic of Bolivia. Gainesville: The University of Florida Press, 1957.
- Arze y Arze, José Antonio, Sociología Marxista. Oruro: Ed. Universitaria, 1963.
- Arze Murillo, José Antonio, El principio de autoridad La Paz: n.p., 1962
- \_\_\_\_\_. Quién comienza a correr muy temprano, corre el riesgo de cansarse: Juan Lechin. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1963.
- Arze Vargas, Mario, Estadística de la division política administrativa de Bolivia. La Paz: Ed. Kollasuyo, 1954
- Ayala, Mercado, Ernesto, Defensa de la revolución de abril. La Paz: Editorial Universo, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Mercado, Ernesto, Crítica de la reforma universitaria. Autonomía y revolución. 3rd ed. La Paz, 1955.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Qué sucede con la reforma agraria. La Paz: Subsecretaría de Prensa, Información y Cultura, 1955.
- de Ayala Mercado, Gloria B., Compilación de leyes sociales de Bolivia, 1957-1965. La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1966.
- Balderrama Gonzales, Adalid, Nuestros agro y sus problemas. La Paz: Ed. Canata 1955.
- Baptista Gumucio, Mariano, Etapa actual de la revolución y tareas de la juventud del MNR. La Paz: Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones, y Cultura, 1955.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Revolución y universidad en Bolivia. La Paz, Ed. Juvenil, 1956.
- Barcelli S., Agustin, Medio siglo de luchas sindicales revolucionarias en Bolivia.
- Barriga Antelo, Hernán, Laureles de un tirano. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1965.
- Barton, Robert, A Short History of the Republic Of Bolivia. La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1968.



- Bedregal, Guillermo, COMIBOL: una verdad sin escándalo. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Económica nacional y defensa de Latinoamérica. La Paz; Editorial Burillo, 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_, La revolución Boliviana. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Revolución y contrarrevolución en Bolivia. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1963)
- \_\_\_\_\_, La revolución boliviana y las tareas del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario: Autocrítica y consignas. n.p.: n.p., 1965.
- Beltran, Fausto, ¿Dónde va la reforma agraria boliviana? La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1960.
- Belzu, Luis, Así Murió: Unzaga de la Vega. La Paz: Editorial Impacto, 1961.
- Blanco, J. (pseud.) Santa Cruz: zona militar. n.p.: n.p., 1961.
- Bolivia, Album de la Revolución. La Paz: Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones, y Cultura. n.d.  
(Jose Fellman Velarde)
- \_\_\_\_\_, Bolivia: 10 Años de revolución. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Celebración del 5° Aniversario de la revolución nacional. La Paz: Dirección de Informaciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1957.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Constitución política del estado, 1961. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Discurso pronunciado por Víctor Paz Estenssoro en la inauguración de la VI convención del MNR, 1953. La Paz: n.p. 1953.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Estatuto electoral Decreto Supremo no. 04315. La Paz: 1956.  
Ed. de la Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones, y Cultura, Filosofía de la Revolución Nacional. La Paz: Ed. del Estado, n.d.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Corte Nacional Electoral. Informe al Honorable Congreso Nacional: Elecciones generales de año 1960. La Paz: n.p., 1960.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Informe al pueblo: respuesta a una interpelación parlamentaria. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Congreso Nacional. Interpelación al Ministro de Gobierno, Justicia, e Inmigración, Dr. José Antonio Arze Murillo sobre violaciones constitucionales. La Paz: Ed. Universo, 1962.

- Bolivia. Ley de la reforma agraria. La Paz: Ed. del Estado, 1953.
- . El pueblo y la estabilización. La Paz: Dirección de Informaciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1957.
- . Junta Interministerial Directiva del Plan Nacional del Desarrollo Nacional. Plan Nacional del Desarrollo Rural. La Paz: Ediciones del Estado, 1963.
- . La Revolución Nacional a través de sus decretos mas importantes. La Paz: Ediciones del Estado, 1955.
- . Síntesis histórica de Bolivia en el décimo aniversario de la Revolución Nacional. La Paz: n.p., 1962.
- . Dirección de Informaciones de la Presidencia de la República. Vicente Alvarez Plata: Mártir de la reforma. La Paz: n.p., n.d.
- . Víctor Paz Estenssoro: Datos biográficos. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1964.
- . 1960: año de la clase media. n.p.: n.p., 1960.
- . 1960; 9 de Abril: ocho años de gobierno revolucionario. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1960.
- Bonifaz R., Miguel. Bolivia: frustración y destino. Sucre: Imp. Universitaria, 1965.
- Brill, William H. Military Intervention in Bolivia: The Overthrow of Paz Estenssoro and the MNR. Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1967.
- Cabrera R., Sinforoso. La burocracia estrangulada a la COMIBOL. La Paz: n.p., 1960.
- Canelas, Demetrio. Aspectos de la Revolución Boliviana. La Paz: n.p., 1958.
- Canelas O. Amado. China de hoy: America Latina de mañana. La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1962.
- . Historia de una frustración: nacionalización de las minas de Bolivia. La Paz: ed. Altiplano, 1963.
- . Mito y realidad de la corporación minera de Bolivia. La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1966.
- . Mito y realidad de la industrialización Boliviana. La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1966.
- . Mito y realidad de la reforma agraria. La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1966.

- Canelas O., Amado, Radiografía de la Alianza para el atraso. La Paz: Librería Altiplano, 1963.
- Carrasco, Manuel, Simon I. Patino: un prócer industrial. Cochabamba: Ed. Canelas, 1964.
- Carter, William E, Aymara Communities and the Bolivian Agrarian Reform. Gainesville: University of Florida Monograph, NO. 24, Fall, 1964.
- Central Obrera Boliviana, Primer Congreso Nacional de Trabajadores: Discursos. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1954.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Programa ideológico. Estatutos de la Central Obrera Boliviana. La Paz: n.p. 1954.
- Central Obrera Boliviana de Unidad Revolucionaria, Comunismo en el movimiento laboral boliviano. La Paz: COBUR, 1964.
- Céspedes, Augusto, et. al., Antentrguismo: una política del pueblo. Cochabamba: Ed. Universitaria., 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_, El dictador suicida. 40 años de historia de Bolivia. 2nd Ed. La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Sangre de Mestizos. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1962.
- Chávez Ortiz, Nulfo. Carta a los trabajadores de mi patria. La Paz: Frente de Liberación Nacional, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_, El signo de estaño. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_, 5 ensayos y un anhelo. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1963.
- Cleven, Nels A. H, The Political Organization of Bolivia. Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1940.
- Comando Nacional Feminino del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Acta final del Primer Congreso Nacional Feminino del MNR. La Paz; n.p., 1962.
- Cornejo S., Alberto, Programas políticos de Bolivia. Cochabamba: Imp. Universitaria, 1949.
- Dairqux, Max, Melgarejo: un tirano romántico. 2nd Ed. La Paz: Ed. Cisber y Cía., 1958.
- D'Avis, Julio Alberto S, Los errores administrativos de la reforma agraria en Bolivia. Cochabamba, Imp. Universitaria, 1959.
- Daza Barrenchea, Oscar, Sistematización armada de la revolución nacional. La Paz: n.p., 1959.

- Diez de Medina, Fernando, Bolivia y su destino. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1962.
- di Natale, Remo, América Latina hoy. La Paz: Ed. Cajías, 1964.
- Eder, George Jackson, Inflation and Development in Latin America: A Case History of Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1968.
- Fellmann Velarde, José. Una Bala en el viento: biografía de la revolución boliviana. La Paz: Ed. Fenix, 1952.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Trabajos Teóricos. La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1955.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Victor Paz Estenssoro: el hombre y la revolución. 2nd Ed. La Paz: n.p. 1955.
- Fortún Sanjinés, Federico, Antecedents para la IX convencion del MNR. La Paz: n.p., 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Dinámica del MNR: orientaciones y directivas para la militancia del partido. La Paz: Comité Político Nacional del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Tercera etapa de la revolución nacional. La Paz: n.p. 1964.
- Franco Guachalla, Alfredo. En torno a la cuestion social. La Paz: Ed. Universo, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_. ¿Por que nos reorganizamos? La Paz: Ed. "16 de Julio", 1964.
- Frankovich, Guillermo, La filosofía en Bolivia. La Paz: Ed. Juventude, 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_, El Pensamiento boliviano en el siglo XX. Mexico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1956.
- Frente de Liberación Nacional, Documentos. La Paz: Ed. Liberación, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_, M.N.R.: Llamamiento para la Constitucion del Frente de Liberacion Nacional. La Paz: n.p., 1964.
- Gandarillas V., Oscar, La administración pública como instrumento del desarrollo: Bolivia. Washington: Pan American Union, 1966.
- Garcia, Raul Alfonso, História del Movimiento Revolucionario. La Paz: Escuela de Capitacion Política del MNR, n.d., mimeographed.
- Goodrich, Carter, The Economic Transformation of Bolivia. Ithaca: New York School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell Univ. 1955.

Gueiler Tejada, Lydia, La mujer y la revolución; autobiografía política. La Paz: n.p., 1959.

Guevara Arze, Walter, Plan inmediato de la política económica del gobierno de la Revolución Nacional. La Paz: Editores. Letras, 1955.

\_\_\_\_\_, P.M.N.R.A. Exposición de motivos y declaración de principios. La Paz: n.p. 1960.

Gumucio Granier, Jorge, and Mariscal Guzmán, Jaime, Estudio regional del noreste boliviano. La Paz: IBEAS, 1966.

Gutiérrez Mario R., Predestinación histórica de Bolivia: libertad y dictadura. La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1966.

Guzmán Galarza, Mario, El MNR y la revolución americana en marcha. La Paz: n.p., 1961.

Heath, Dwight B., and Erasmus, Charles J., and Buechler, Hans C., Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia. New York: Praeger, 1969.

Heredia, Luis Edmundo, Prensa y nacionalismo. Potosí: Subsecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 1955.

Hewlett, John, Like Moonlight on Snow: The Life of Simon Iturri Patino. New York: McBride Co., 1947.

Instituto Boliviano de Estudio y Acción Social (IBEAS), Desarrollo Nacional. La Paz: IBEAS, 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_, Los estudiantes y la universidad: estudio de actitudes. La Paz: IBEAS, 1966.

Instituto Tecnológico Boliviano, Puntos de vista de la prensa local para una defensa institucional. La Paz: ITB, 1964.

Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development, Inventory of Basic Information to the Planning of Agricultural Development in Latin America: Bolivia. Washington: Pan American Union, 1963.

Juventud Comunista de Bolivia, Luchas universitarias. La Paz: n.p., 1962.

Juventud del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Sobre una declaración fascista y contra-revolucionaria. La Paz: mimeographed, 1963.

Klein, Herbert S., Orígenes de la revolución nacional boliviana: la crisis de la generación del Chaco. La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1968.

Kreidler, Alfonso, 13 años de resistencia. La Paz: Tall. Gráficos Bolivianos, 1968.

Landívar Flores, Hernán, Infierno en Bolivia. La Paz: Empresa Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1965.

Lechín Oquendo, Juan, La COB y la estabilización monetaria. La Paz: Central Obrera Boliviana, 1957.

Lechín, Oquendo, Juan, Discurso informe del Secretario Ejecutivo de la C.O.B. Tercer Congreso Nacional de Trabajadores de Bolivia. La Paz: n.p., 1962.

\_\_\_\_\_, Lechín y la revolución nacional. La Paz: Ed. Casegural, n.d.

Lenoir, Noel Pierre, Revolución: altitud 4,000 metros. Buenos Aires: Ed. Catedra Lisandro de la Torre, 1958.

Leonard, Olem F., Bolivia: Land, People, and Institutions. Washington: Scarecrow Press, 1952.

\_\_\_\_\_, El cambio económico y social en cuatro comunidades del altiplano de Bolivia. Mexico: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1966.

Liborio Justo(Quebracho) (pseud.), Bolivia: la revolución derrotada. Cochabamba: Ed. Serrano, 1967.

Llosa, José Antonio, Nuevo manual de sindicalismo. 3rd. Ed., La Paz; Ed. Nueva Bolivia, 1962.

\_\_\_\_\_, René Barrientos Ortuño: Paladin de la bolivianidad. La Paz: Emp. Novedades, 1966.

Llosa, José Antonio, Victor Paz Estenssoro: adalid de la revolución nacional. La Paz: Ed. Nueva Bolivia, 1960.

Loayza Beltran, Fernando, Campos de concentración en Bolivia. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1966.

López Murillo, René, Los restaurados. La Paz: Ed. Novedades, 1966.

Lora, Guillermo. La burocracia sindical y la masacre de Siglo XX. La Paz: Ed. Masas, 1963.

\_\_\_\_\_, Critica al estatuto electoral. 2nd Ed. La Paz: Ed. Masas, 1960.

\_\_\_\_\_, Denunciamos el Mamertazo! La Paz: Ed. Masas, 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_, Las Guerillas. La Paz: Ed. Masas, 1963.

\_\_\_\_\_, Historia del Movimiento Obrero boliviano, 1848-1900. Cochabamba: Los Amigos del Libro, 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_, José Aguirre Gainsborg: fundador del POR. La Paz: Ed. Masas, 1960.

\_\_\_\_\_, El pensamiento político de los mineros. La Paz: Ed. Masas, 1965.

\_\_\_\_\_, Perspectivas de la revolución boliviana. La Paz: Ed. Masas, 1964.

- Lora, Guillermo, La revolucion boliviana: analisis crítico. La Paz: Talleres Graficos Bolivianos, 1963.
- Lord, Peter P., The Peasantry as an Emerging Political Factor in Mexico, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, LTC NO. 35, 1967.
- Mariaca, Enrique, Mito y realidad del petróleo boliviano. La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1966.
- Marof, Tristán, Breve biografía de Víctor Paz Esenssoro: Vida y trans-fondo de la política boliviana. La Paz: ed. Burillo, 1965.
- Marsh, Margaret A. The Bankers in Bolivia. New York: Vanguard Press, 1928.
- Mendizbal, S. Jaime, Algunos aspectos de Bolivia. La Paz: n.p., 1965.
- Montenegro, Carlos, Nacionalismo y coloniaje. Buenos Aires: Ed. Placemar, 1967. Originally published in 1943.
- Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Así lucharon; los hombres del MNR compendio biográfico de los miembros mas deslacados del nacionalismo-por ECEGE. La Paz: n.p., 195?.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Avanzada Universitaria, Documentos, de la III Conferencia Nacional de Avanzada Universitaria del MNR. La Paz: Ed. Progreso, 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Comité Político Nacional, Bolivia: triunfo del voto universal 31 de mayo de 1964. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Instituto de Capacitacion Politi-ca del MNR. El catolicismo frente al falangismo fascista. La Paz: Ed. Artística, n.d.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Estatuto Orgánico del MNR La Paz: n.p., 1962. Adopted by VIII national convention.
- \_\_\_\_\_, El MNR: gobierno de obreros, cam-pesinos y gente de la clase media. La Paz: n.p., 1953.
- \_\_\_\_\_, M.N.R., sus bases y principios de accion inmediata. La Paz: n.p., 1942. (author is Jose Cuadros Quiroga) This is the famous el libro verde
- \_\_\_\_\_, Programa de Gobierno, 1960-64. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1960.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Programa de Gobierno, 1964-68. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Víctor Andrade: Su pensamiento político pasado y presente. Cochabamba: n.p., 1966.

- Osborne, Harold, Bolivia: A Land Divided. 3rd. ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Indians of the Andes. London, Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1952.
- Ostria Gutierrez, Alberto, The Treagedy of Bolivia: A People Crucified. New York: Devin-Adair, 1958.
- Padilla A., Mario, Oráculo marxista en los Andes. Bogotá: Imp. Ed. Retina, 1964.
- Pando Monje, Mario, Los movimientistas en el poder. La Paz: Ed. El Siglo, 1969.
- Pardo Valle, Nazario, Calendario histórico de la revolución nacional. La Paz: Ed. Universo, 1957.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Poligrafica de Bolivia. La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1966.
- Partido Comunista de Bolivia, Declaración programatica y plataforma política del PCB. La Paz: Comisión de Prensa y Propaganda del PCB, 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Documentos, II Congreso Nacional del PCB. La Paz: Publicaciones del PCB, 1964.
- Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, PIR: 1966, documentos. n.p.: n.p., 1966.
- Partido Obrero Revolucionario, Abstención electoral para desenmascarar los maniobras del oficialismo: hacia un frente revolucionario de la Izquierda. La Paz: Ed. Masas, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Desintegración del desgobierno movimientista y tareas del POR. La Paz: Ed. Masas, NO. 183, abril 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Documentos de Movimiento Obrero de la Tesis de Pulacayo al manifiesto de la COB de 1965. La Paz: Ed. Masas, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_, ?Por Que combatimos al MNR? La Paz: Ed. Masas, 1960.
- \_\_\_\_\_, ?Qué es y qué quiere el POR? La Paz: Ed. Masas. 1959.
- Partido Revolucionario de la Izquierda Nacional, Programa del PRIN y Plan de gobierno. La Paz: n.p., 1964.
- Partido Social Democratico, Principios y Finalidades. La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Gamarra y Cia., 1948.
- Paz Estenssoro, Víctor, Contra la restauración por la Revolución Nacional. Lima: n.p., 1965.



Paz Estenssoro, Víctor, Discurso inaugural dirigida al honorable congreso nacional 6 de Agosto de 1960. La Paz: Ed. del Estado, 1960.

\_\_\_\_\_, Discursos y mensajes. Buenos Aires, n.p., 1953.

\_\_\_\_\_, Discursos parlamentarios. La Paz: Editorial Canata, 1955.

\_\_\_\_\_, Función vital de las universidades. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1963.

\_\_\_\_\_, Hagamos de Bolivia una verdadera nación. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_, Imperativo nacional del momento. n.p.: n.p., 1965.

\_\_\_\_\_, Informe a la VII Convención Nacional del M.N.R. La Paz: SPIC, 1956.

\_\_\_\_\_, Mensaje al pueblo del Dr. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 6 de agosto de 1954. La Paz: Subsecretaría de Prensa, 1954.

\_\_\_\_\_, Mensaje a la VI Convención del MNR. La Paz: Ed. del Estado, 1953.

\_\_\_\_\_, Mensaje del 8 de abril de 1956. La Paz: Subsecretaría de Prensa, 1956.

\_\_\_\_\_, Mensaje del Presidente de la República al Honorable Congreso Nacional. La Paz: Subsecretaría de Prensa, 1956.

\_\_\_\_\_, Mensaje a la VIII Convención del MNR. La Paz: Ed. del Estado, 1960.

\_\_\_\_\_, Mensaje a la nación, 31 de diciembre de 1960. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_, XI aniversario de la revolución nacional. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_, Mensaje a la nación, diciembre de 1962. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1962.

\_\_\_\_\_, Mensaje del Presidente de la República. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1963.

\_\_\_\_\_, Mensaje a la nación, 31 de diciembre de 1963. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_, Mensaje del Presidente de la República, 1964. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_, El pensamiento revolucionario de Paz Estenssoro. La Paz: Secretaría Ejecutiva de Comité Político del MNR, 1954.

\_\_\_\_\_, Presencia de la Revolución Nacional. Antofagasta: Imp. La Reforma, 1966.

Paz Estenssoro, Víctor, Los profesionales en el proceso revolucionario. La Paz: n.p., 1959.

\_\_\_\_\_, Al pueblo de Uyuni. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_, Repudio a la contrarrevolución. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_, La revolución boliviana. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_, La revolución es un proceso que tiene raíces en el pasado. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_, La revolucion nacional es un hecho irreversible de nuestra historia. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_, La revolución seguirá adelante. La Paz: Ed. del Estado, 1960.

\_\_\_\_\_, La ultima carta de la oligarquia. n.p.: n.p., 1949.

\_\_\_\_\_, Y.P.F.B.: Instrumento de liberación nacional. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1963.

Penaranda Rivera, Mario, Entre los hombres lobos de Bolivia. La Paz: Instituto de Ediciones Americanos, 1965.

Peñaloza Cordero, Luis, Historia del Movimienta Nacionalista Revolucionario, 1941-52. La Paz: Ed. Juventud, 1963.

\_\_\_\_\_, Historia economica de Bolivia. 2nd. ed. 2 vols. La Paz: Ed. Fenix.

Pérez, Elizardo, Warisata: la escuela-ayllu. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1962.

Pérez Paton, Roberto. "Los partidos políticos y la democracia: Sociologia del partido unico," Universidad Mayor de San Andres: Publicaciones de la Facultad de Derecho y C.P. La Paz; Cuaderno No. 24 (Diciembre, 1961).

Perez Paton, Roberto. Los Sindicatos, causas y efectos Sociales. Desviaciones del Sindicalismo. Universidad Mayor de San Andres Publicaciones de la Facultad de Derecho y C.P. La Paz: Cauderno No. 22 (Diciembre, 1957).

Pimentel R., Irineo, Unidad sindical y lucha por mejores condiciones de vida y trabajo. Siglo XX: n.p., 1960.

Politica Antobrera? La Paz: Ed. Artistica, 1963.

Ponce G., Jaime, Shanley, Tomas, and Cisneros, Antonio, Breve historia del sindicalismo boliviano. La Paz: Instituto Boliviano de Estudio y Accion Social (IBEAS), 1968.

[Puntero (pseudo.), Cuadrante politico. La Paz: Ediciones La Nacion, 1957.]

Quién es quién en Bolivia. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1959.

Reyerros, Rafael A., Historia social del indio boliviano: 2nd. ed. La Paz: Ed. Fenix, 1963.

Richards, Allan Rene. Administration: Bolivia and the U.S., Alburquerque: Division of Research, Dept. of Govt., U. of New Mexico, n.a., 1961.

Rios Reinaga, David, Civiles y militares en la revolución boliviana. La Paz: ed. Difusion, 1967.

Roderigo, Saturnio, Diario de la revolución nacional. La Paz: Editorial Juventud, 1955.

Rolón Anaya, Mario, Política y partidos en Bolivia. La Paz: Emp. Novedades, 1966.

\_\_\_\_\_, Sociedad y desarrollo. La Paz: ed. Juventud, 1968.

Ruiz Gonzalez, Rene, La administración empírica de las minas nacionales. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1965.

Scott, P.H., Bolivia: Economic and Commercial Conditions in Bolivia. London: HMSO, 1956.

Serrate Reich, Carlos, Análisis crítico de la educación en Bolivia. La Paz: n.p., 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_, Qué es profundizar la revolución. La Paz: ed. Burillo, 1964.

Siles Salinas, Jorge. Lecciones de una revolución: Bolivia, 1952-59. Santiago: Editoriales Universidades, 1959.

Siles Zuazo, Cuatro años de gobierno. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones de la Presidencia, 1960.

Siles Zuazo, Harnan, Mensaje al Honorable Congreso Nacional. La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1959.

\_\_\_\_\_, Mensaje a la VII Convención del MNR. La Paz: n.p., 1960.

Tesis de Caranavi, Introduction by Guillermo Lora. La Paz: Ed. Masas, 1964.

Torres Calleja, Mario, La ayuda americana: Una esperanza frustrada. La Paz: Ed. de la Nación, 1962.

Torres Goytia, Hugo, Breve historia económica de Bolivia. La Paz: Escuela de Capacitación Política del MNR, n.d., mimeographed.

Trigo, Félix, Las constituciones de Bolivia. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1958.

- U.N., "Report of the United Nations Mission of Technical Assistance to Bolivia," (Keenleyside Report) New York: UN, 1951.
- United States Aid Mission to Bolivia, Economic and Program Statistic, No. 9. La Paz: USAID-Bolivia, 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_, USAID's Goals in Bolivia. La Paz: USAID, 1968.
- United States Army, U.S. Army Areas Handbook for Bolivia. Washington: Foreign Area Studies Division, Special Operations Research Office, 1963.
- U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Summary of the Labor Situation In Bolivia. Washington: GPO, 1958.
- U.S. Dept. of Labor, Div. of Foreign Labor Conditions Bureau of Labor Statistics, (BLS Report No. 218) Labor Law and Practice in Bolivia, 1962.
- U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Bureau of Foreign Commerce World Trade Information Service. Basic Data on the Economy of Bolivia. Washington:GPO, 1960.
- U.S. Dept. Health, Education, and Welfare; Educational Data: Bolivia; Office of Educ. Int. Educational Relations. Informations on Education Around the World. NO. 61, April, 1962. Washington: 1962 OE-14034-61.
- U.S. Department of State. Memorandum. Consultation Among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentina Situation. Washington:GPO, 1946.
- U.S. Senate. Senate Permanant Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, Administration of U.S. Foreign Aid Programs in Bolivia. Report n0. 1030, 86th Congress. 2nd Session,1960.
- Uriquidi, Arturo, Bolivia y su reforma agraria. Cochabamba: ed. Universitaria, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_, El fuedalismo en America y la reforma agrariaboliviana. Cochabamba: Imp. Universitaria, 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Labor universitaria, 1951-55. Cochabamba: Imp. Universitaria, 1955.
- Valencia Vega, Desarrollo del pensamiento politico en Bolivia. La Paz: h.p. 1953.
- Valencia Vega, Alipio, Geopolitica de Bolivia. La Paz: ed. Juventud, 1966.
- Villarroel Cloure, Ramiro, Mito y realidad del desarrollo en Bolivia. Cochabamba: Los Amigos del Libro, 1969.
- Zavaleta M., Rene, Bolivia: el desarrollo de la consciencia nacional. Montevideo: Ed. Dialogo. 1967.
- Zavaleta Mercado, Rene, La revolucion boliviana y la cuestion de poder. La Paz: Ed. Burillo, 1964.

Zondag, Cornelius H., The Bolivian Economy, 1952-65. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.

\_\_\_\_\_, Problemas en el desarrollo económico de Bolivia.  
np.: n.p., n.d.

Zook, David H., The Conduct of the Chaco War. New Haven: Bookman Associates 1960.

#### Articles

Alexander, Robert J., "Crisis in the Bolivian Revolution," The New Leader, Vol. XI(1957), pp. 21-22.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Differences of Opinion in the Bolivian Labor Movement," Inter-American Labor Bulletin, Vol. VIII(1957), pp. 2-3.

Arnade, Charles W., "Bolivia's Social Revolution, 1952-59: A Discussion of Sources," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 1(July, 1959), pp. 341-52.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Communism in Bolivia," South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. LIII(October, 1954), pp. 454-63.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Historiography of Colonial and Modern Bolivia," Hispanic-American Historical Review, Vol. XIII(August, 1962), pp. 333-84.

\_\_\_\_\_, "A Selected Bibliography of Bolivian Social Science," Inter-American Review of Bibliography, No. 256(1958).

\_\_\_\_\_, "The U.S. and the Ultimate Roots of the Bolivian Revolution," Historia(University of Puerto Rico, January, 1962). pp. 35-49

Beatty, Donald W., "Bolivia: An Uncertain Future," Current History, Vol. XXXII(April, 1957), pp. 216-22.

Bergsten, C. Fred, "Social Mobility and Economic Development: The Vital Parameters of the Bolivian Revolution," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. VI(July, 1964), pp. 367-75.

Clark, Ronald James, "Land Reform and Peasant Market Participation on the Northern Highlands of Bolivia," Land Economics, Vol. XLIV(May, 1968), pp. 153-72.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Problems and Conflicts over Land Ownership in Bolivia," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 22(Spring, 1969), pp. 3-18

Comitas, Lambros, "Educación y estratificación social en Bolivia," América Indígena. Vol. XXVIII(Julio, 1968), pp. 631-551

Edelmann, Alexander T., "Colonization in Bolivia: Progress and Prospects," Inter-American Economic Affairs. Vol. 20(Spring, 1967), pp. 39-54.

- Erasmus, Charles J., "Upper Limit- of Peasantry and Agrarian Reform: Bolivia, Venezuela, and Mexico Compared," Ethnology, Vol. VI (October, 1967), pp. 349-80.
- Flores, Edmundo, "Land Reform in Bolivia," Land Economics, Vol. XXX (May, 1954), pp. 112-24.
- Gonzalez, Heliodoro, "The Domestic Effects of Foreign Aid: The Failure in Bolivia," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XIV (Autumn, 1961), pp. 77-88.
- Goodrich, Carter, "Bolivia: Test of Technical Assistance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXII (1954), pp. 473-81.
- Greene, David G., "Revolution and Rationalization of Reform in Bolivia," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XIX (Winter, 1965), pp. 3-25.
- Greene, Lee S., "Administration and Technical Assistance in Bolivia," in Claunch, John M. (ed.), Political and Social Problems of Public Administration in Underdeveloped Areas. Dallas: Southern Methodist University, Monograph No. 4, 1959, pp. 28-46.
- Hanson, S. G., "Fraud in Foreign Aid: The Bolivian Problem," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XI (Autumn, 1957), pp. 65-89.
- Hawthorn, Harry B., and Hawthorn, Audrey E., "Stratification in a Latin American City," Social Forces, Vol. 27 (October, 1948), pp. 20-9.
- Heath, Dwight B., "The Aymara Indians and Bolivia's Revolution," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XIX (Spring, 1966), pp. 31-40.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Commercial Agriculture and Land Reform in the Bolivian Oriente," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XII (Fall, 1959), pp. 35-45.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Land Reform in Bolivia," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XII (Spring, 1959), pp. 3-27.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Land Tenure and Social Organization: An Ethiological Study from the Bolivian Oriente," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XIII (Spring, 1960), pp. 46-66.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Revolution and Stability in Bolivia," Current History, Vol. 48-49 (1965), pp. 328-335, 367.
- Karasz, Arthur, "Experiment in Development: Bolivia Since 1952," in Pike, Frederick B. (ed.), Freedom and Reform in Latin America. South Bend: Notre Dame Press, 1959,
- Keller, Frank J., "Finca Ingavi: A Medieval Survival on the Bolivian Altiplano," Economic Geography, Vol. XXVI (1950), pp. 37-50.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Institutional Barriers to Economic Development: Some Examples from Bolivia," Economic Geography, Vol. XXXI (October, 1955) pp. 351-63.

Klein, Herbert S., "American Oil Companies in Latin America: The Bolivian Experience," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XVIII (Autumn, 1964), pp. 47-72.

\_\_\_\_\_, "The Creation of the Patino Tin Empire," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XIX (Autumn, 1965), pp. 3-23.

\_\_\_\_\_, "The Crisis of Legitimacy and the Origins of Social Revolution: The Bolivian Experience," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. XI (January, 1968), pp. 85-101.

\_\_\_\_\_, "David Toro and the Establishment of 'Military Socialism' in Bolivia," Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. XLV (February, 1965), pp. 25-52.

Lepawsky, Albert, "The Bolivian Operation: New Trends in Technical Assistance," International Conciliation, No. 479 (1952), pp. 103-40.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Revolution and Reform in Bolivia: A Case Study of the Root and Brand of Public Administration in a Developing Country," in Siffin, W. J., Towards the Comparative Study of Public Administration. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957.

Lockwood, Agnes N., "Indians of the Andes: Technical Assistance on the Altiplano," International Conciliation, No. 508 (1956), pp. 355-430.

Malloy, James M., "Revolution and Development in Bolivia," in Blaisier, Cole (ed.), Constructive Change in Latin America. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1968, pp. 177-232.

Martin, Lois D., "Bolivia in 1956," Hispanic American Report. Stanford: Hispanic American Studies, 1956.

Metraux, Alfred, "The Social and Economic Structure of the Indian Communities of the Andean Region," International Labour Review, Vol. LXXIX (March, 1959), pp. 225-43.

Mitchell, Christopher, "Bolivia's MNR: Organizational Structure and Its Consequences," Unpublished Research paper, La Paz: January, 1969.

Patch, Richard W., "Bolivia: The Restrained Revolution," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 334 (March, 1961), pp. 123-32.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Bolivia: U. S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting," in Social Change in Latin America Today. New York: Vintage, 1960, pp. 108-76.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Peasantry and National Revolution; Bolivia," in Silvert, Kalman H., (ed.) Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development. New York: Random House, 1963, pp. 95-126.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Bolivian Background," American University Field Staff Newsletter (AUFS), June, 1958.

- Patch, Richard W., "Bibliography of the Andean Countries," AUFS Newsletter, September, 1958.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Bolivia: The Seventh Year," AUFS Newsletter, January, 1959.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Bolivia: Decision or Debacle," AUFS Newsletter, March, 1959.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Bolivian Falange," AUFS Newsletter, April, 1959.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Work Plan for Peru and Bolivia," AUFS Newsletter, January, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Bolivia Today: An Assessment Nine Years After the Revolution," AUFS Newsletter, April, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "An Anthropologist's Approach to Economic Aid," AUFS Newsletter, July, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Pro- and Anti-Castristas in La Paz," AUFS Newsletter, February, 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Bolivia's Developing Interior," AUFS Newsletter, March, 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "A Note on Bolivia and Peru," AUFS Newsletter, April, 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Personalities and Politics in Bolivia," AUFS Newsletter, May, 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Bolivia's Experiment in Development without Aid," AUFS Newsletter, June, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Last of Bolivia's MNR?" AUFS Newsletter, June, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "A Note on Bolivia and Peru," AUFS Newsletter, June, 1965.
- Rippy, J. F., "Bolivia: An Exhibit of the Problem of Economic Development in Retarded Countries," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. X (Winter, 1956), pp. 61-74.
- Sarolam, Sakar, "A Colonization Project in Bolivia," Rural Sociology, Vol. XXV (March, 1960), pp. 76-90.
- Spain, August O., "Bolivia: A Case Study of Welfare-State Politics," in Claunch, John M. (ed.), Case Studies in Latin American Politics. Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1961, pp. 17-40.



Stokes, William S., "The Foreign Aid Program in Bolivia," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XV (September, 1962), p. 29.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Revolucion Nacional and the MNR in Bolivia," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XXII (Spring, 1959), pp. 28-53.

Weston, Charles H., "An Ideology of Modernization: The Case of the Bolivian MNR," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. X (January, 1968), pp. 85-101.

#### Theses and Dissertations

Bath, Charles Richard, "The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario in Bolivia: Party Politics and Political Change in a Revolutionary Setting," Unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 1964.

Carballo, Manuel, "Agrarian Reform in Bolivia," Unpublished Senior's Thesis, Faculty of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1963.

Dandler Hanhart, Jorge, "Local, Group, Community and Nation: A Study of Changing Structure in Ucurena, Bolivia, 1935-1952," Unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin, 1967.

Lanning, Eldon W., "The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 and the Cuban Revolution of 1959: Case Studies in a Theory of Revolution," Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Department of Government, University of Virginia, 1964.

Malloy, James M., "Bolivia: A Study in Revolution," Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1967.

Patch, Richard W., "Social Implications of the Bolivian Agrarian Reform," Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Cornell University, 1956.

Newspapers

El Diario(La Paz)

La Nacion(La Paz)

New York Times

Prensa Libre(Cochabamba)

El Pueblo(Cochabamba)

El Pueblo(La Paz)

Presencia(La Paz)

Los Tiempos(Cochabamba)

VITA

C. Richard Bath was born January 25, 1937, in Salt Lake City, Utah. He attended public schools in Reno, Nevada. After two years at Stanford University and a tour with the United States Army in Germany, he graduated from the University of Nevada in 1961. He entered Tulane University in 1961 and completed the requirements for the Master's degree in 1964. During 1964-65 he spent eight months in Bolivia doing research for the dissertation. He returned there from 1967-69 as an Exchange Professor at the University of Cochabamba. Currently he is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas at El Paso.